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 2 
Abstract 
 
In the late 20th century, historical research on the 1632 Battle of Lützen, a major 
engagement of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), came to a dead end after 150 years of 
mostly unfruitful discussions. This thesis examines the battle’s military material culture, 
including historical accounts and physical evidence in the form of archaeological finds 
from the battlefield to provide new insight into the battle’s events, but also to develop a 
methodology which allows a comparison between two very different sources: the 
eyewitness account and the ‘lead bullet.’ To achieve this aim, the development of 17th 
century firearms is highlighted through an assessment of historical sources and existing 
weapons and by an evaluation of various collections of ‘lead bullets’ from Lützen and 
other archaeological sites, thus providing a working baseline for interpreting bullet 
distribution patterns on the battlefield. The validity of bullet distribution patterns is also 
dependant on the deposit process during the battle and metal detector survey 
methodologies, which also provides vital information for battlefield surveys in general. In 
an overarching methodology, statements from battle eyewitnesses are evaluated and 
compared to bullet distribution patterns, in conjunction with the historic landscape, 
equipment and tactics. Together, these ultimately lead to a better understanding of the 
battle and its historic narrative, by asking why reported events actually did not happen at 
Lützen. This last element is also important for understand the reliability of early modern 
battle accounts in general. Overall, a more general aim of this case study has been to 
provide a better insight into the wider potentials of early modern battle research in Europe. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
On 16 November 1632,1 the Swedish-Protestant2 army commanded by the Swedish King 
Gustav II Adolf met Wallenstein’s Imperial-Leaguist3 army at Lützen. It was the first battle 
on open ground Gustav Adolf did not win decisively since he landed his army in Germany 
in 1630. 
 
 
Figure 1: Left: Gustav II Adolf ‘Vasa’, King of Sweden, Commander of the Swedish-
Protestant Army. Right: Generalissimus Albrecht Eusebius Wenzel Graf von Waldstein, 
Herzog von Friedland, called Wallenstein, Commander of the Imperial-Leaguist Army. 
 
The Swedish intervention in the Thirty Years War in general, and the Battle of 
Lützen in particular, have long been seen as a turning point in weapons development and 
tactics, marking the peak of a ‘Military Revolution’4, which has been viewed as a prelude 
                                                 
1 For simplification, all dates in this thesis are given according to the Gregorian calendar; however, quoted 
dates according to the Julian calendar from Protestant sources are not changed. 
2 Gustav II Adolf’s (‘Gustav Adolf’ in this thesis) army at Lützen consisted of the Swedish army, a 
composite of Swedish, Finnish, Scottish and German regiments, plus some German regiments from his 
Protestant allies Saxony and Hessen-Kassel. The correct term for his forces would be Swedish-Protestant 
army, which is shortened to Swedish army for simplification. 
3 The Holy Roman Empire fielded two independent and rival armies; the Imperial army under the Emperor 
Ferdinand II, commanded by Wallenstein, and the Leaguist army from the Catholic League under the Elector 
Maximilian of Bavaria, commanded by Generalleutnant Johann Tserclaes Graf von Tilly. After Wallenstein 
was released from command, Tilly commanded both armies. Wallenstein was reinstated as Generalissimus 
after Tilly’s disaster at Breitenfeld 17 September 1631 and his death at Rain on the Lech 15 April 1632. 
Wallenstein reassembled an army consisting of veteran and newly raised Imperial regiments and a few 
Leaguist regiments. Although the correct term would be Imperial-Leaguist army, it is shortened to Imperial 
army as Wallenstein was an Imperial commander and most units were Imperial regiments. 
4 Roberts 1967a, Roberts 1967b. 
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to linear infantry tactics based on superior firepower, supported by light manoeuvrable 
regimental guns, that culminated in the Napoleonic era. Our present knowledge of Thirty 
Years War tactics is based chiefly on contemporary military handbooks, which often 
idealize situations, while battles of the same period are often poorly understood, due to the 
lack of reliable sources. However, both issues are connected and can not be understood 
independently. This thesis is a detailed study of the Battle of Lützen within the wider 
context of military equipment, weapons, and tactics. 
 
1.1 The material: Archaeological and historical sources 
 
Battlefield archaeology 
A vital part of this thesis is drawn from the results of an archaeological investigation on the 
Lützen battlefield launched as part of the 375th anniversary commemorating the death of 
the Swedish King. This event is still remembered by annual ceremonies at the Gustav-
Adolf-Memorial in Lützen and in Sweden on 6 November.5 
 
The archaeological methodology used here was first developed by Douglas Scott 
for his 1983 investigation of the 1876 Little Big Horn battlefield in the USA.6 Scott 
demonstrated that there is a substantial difference between what we believe occurred based 
on historical sources, and what was actually found on a battlefield. Since then, many more 
battlefields from different periods and countries have been archaeologically investigated, 
such as Culloden 1746 (UK), Camden 1780 (USA), Poltava 1709 (Ukraine), Lund 1676 
(Sweden), Towton 1461 (UK), and Kalkriese 9 (Germany).7 Together with many other 
projects collecting new archaeological evidence of a battle’s events, the methodological 
effort has become known as ‘Battlefield Archaeology’. Although some used different 
approaches and methodologies adapted to the special requirements of a particular 
battlefield, all shared some form of systematic metal detecting, collecting and recording 
small finds from the top soil. In terms of the number of collected small finds and effective 
working hours, Lützen became one of the biggest European battlefield surveys to date. 
 
                                                 
5 Limberg/Schuberth 2007, 159. The Protestants still commemorate the death of Gustav Adolf according to 
the Julian calendar on 6 November. 
6 Scott 2009, 253, Scott 2010, 45-48. 
7 Pollard 2009, Smith/Legg/Wilson 2009, Mandzy 2012, Knarrström 2009, Sutherland 2009, Rost/Wilbers-
Rost 2012. 
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In a five year project, carried out by the author, approximately one third of the 
battlefield was systematically surveyed with metal detectors. It was the first survey using 
full coverage metal detector sweeps on such a large scale (section 4.3.1). A huge amount of 
unstratified small finds were recovered from the top soil, recorded in a data base, and their 
position mapped through a G(eographic) I(nformation) S(ystem). The GIS-based small 
finds distribution maps, which provides denser distribution patterns than on any other 
battlefield due to the full coverage detector sweeps, are a substantial asset to researching 
this battle. A key to understanding the survey’s archaeological material is the firearms 
ammunition, which is usually the most numerous class of finds from early modern 
battlefields, and research has concentrated on their evaluation. However, since it became 
clear that a vital part of research on bullets - their allocation to firearm models - has been 
misunderstood in recent studies, clarifying the bullets and weapons became a more 
extended and very important part of this thesis than anticipated, because it provides a new 
insight into early modern calibre specifications, which is a key aspect of battlefield 
archaeology. Largely because the explanation of weapon calibres became much more 
extensive than expected, a planned evaluation of the non-ammunition small finds was not 
included in this thesis. There was also insufficient archaeological data on non-ammunition 
artefacts to ascribe dates and evaluations of them, because there was no consolidated, or 
regional, much less national, military production of buttons, buckles, and other uniform 
pieces and equipment during the Thirty Years War. The early modern non-ammunition 
material has to be indentified first, before distribution patterns can be interpreted, which 
forms a thesis in itself.  
 
In addition to the archaeological field survey, aerial photographs were taken, a 
geophysical survey was executed, and trial trenches were dug to locate the Imperial field 
fortifications and the mass graves. However, the results of these investigations were 
limited and play only a minor part in this thesis, except that one mass grave was actually 
found in the first trial trench, specifically situated for the purpose. 
 
Military history 
Within days of the battle’s end, documents about the battle were being generated. From the 
first accounts, the battle’s actual events were superimposed, embellished and co-opted by 
rumours, stories and legends regarding the death of Gustav Adolf. These were published as 
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pamphlets, or ‘relations’8, all over Europe and fairly soon the battle’s actual events were 
buried in the expanding literature. Most historical sources contradict each other and there 
are not many real facts written about the battle. 
 
During research it soon became clear that it was necessary to include an analysis of 
the historical material to evaluate accuracy and sort out buried facts. This effort required 
much more attention and space than anticipated because most publications about the Battle 
of Lützen were flawed and required interpretive explanation. The historical material 
reviewed included most published and some unpublished contemporary written sources 
and all known pictorial representations, as sketches, copperplates, and paintings. 
Evaluation of the accounts was challenging because they were written in seven different 
languages in a 17th century style, which not only required translation, but also a correct 
interpretation of specific terms which proved to be crucial to understanding the battle. Very 
few published translations exist; most of them are inaccurate and required partial re-
translation. 
 
1.2 Thesis structure and research questions 
 
How should the archaeological and historical sources be analysed to better understand the 
battle? It is the intention of this thesis to compare the archaeological materials with the 
historical sources, in a fashion similar to a crime scene investigation with physical 
evidence and witness testimony.9 However, both types of evidence have a different quality 
with certain advantages and disadvantages. The main disadvantage is that they are 
fragmented; we do not have a witness testimony from every battle participant nor do we 
have every object left on the battlefield. Therefore, both sources need to be analysed and 
evaluated; because they can only be understood together, some issues will be discussed 
over several chapters, which is necessary to enable a comparison between archaeological 
and historical sources to better understand the Battle of Lützen and with it the nature of 
Thirty Years War tactics – the aim of this thesis. It is also the intention of this thesis to 
discuss and clarify all the misunderstandings and myths, which are constantly repeated in 
modern research. 
 
                                                 
8 ‘Relation’ is an early modern term for printed pamphlet describing a single event or battle, and, on rare 
occasions, also for a book. 
9 Scott/Fox/Connor/Harmon 1989, 5. 
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 Is it possible to distinguish between facts and myths in historical sources? This 
question constitutes the beginning and the end of this thesis. Chapter Two gives a short 
overview of the problem by characterising the research of the last 150 years, followed by a 
first categorization of the historical sources and the development of the historic narrative. 
Their reliability, however, is discussed in more detail in connection with the archaeological 
sources in Chapters Six through Eight. The development of the historic narrative is very 
complex and involved, excerpting half sentences, sentences, and entire sections from each 
other; sometimes texts were not copied but utilized as a model, which is not always clear. 
However, as long as it is evident that one copied from the other, the term ‘copy’ is used in 
this thesis, although sometimes words have been changed between each text version. 
Because research on the historical narrative has not been done since Gustav Droysen in 
1865 (section 2.1), it was necessary to go to some lengths to recompile the historiography 
of the written data. 
 
In Chapter Three, the armies at Lützen will be characterized. First, the evaluation of 
the historical sources leads to preliminary first interpretations about the regiments 
participating in the Battle of Lützen. This table of organization is followed by an analysis 
of the types and models of firearms at the time, their production, effectiveness, and 
specifications, based on early modern military handbooks. The weapon calibre, in 
particular, is of importance, because it allows the ammunition found on the battlefield to be 
allocated to specific firearm types and models. In addition, a short overview of troop 
formations and tactics is given, which is important to assess the effective firing range and 
the linear frontage of units, which in turn is vital to understanding the bullet distribution 
patterns on the battlefield. 
 
The deposition process of artefacts during the battle and the clearing process after 
the battle determine how much we can find and the metal detector survey methodology 
determines the recovery rate of small finds; both are vital to understanding the relevance of 
small finds distribution patterns on battlefields. Metal detector test grids were made on the 
battlefield to shed some light on recovery rate and vertical small finds distribution in the 
topsoil, which will be discussed in Chapter Four. 
 
A detailed analysis of the ammunition from the battlefield is provided in Chapter 
Five. Although some work has been done on 17th century ammunition, the issue of how to 
measure ‘lead bullets’ and allocate them to specific weapon types and models was not 
entirely understood yet. The data collected from bullets of the Swedish warship Vasa 
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provided evidence for ammunition specifications, which are discussed together with the 
results on firearms from Chapter Three, making it possible to allocate the bullets from the 
Lützen battlefield to specific types and models of firearms. The results are compared to 
bullet samples from other battlefields and ship wrecks to verify them and to generate an 
overview on 17th century weapon development from an archaeological point of view. 
Although a forensic analysis on ‘lead bullets’ in terms of allocating them to one specific 
weapon is not possible, features and marks on bullets are discussed in some length. There 
is also a short introduction into bullet distribution patterns provided in this chapter. The 
results are compared to the statements from historical sources about the battle’s events in 
Chapters Seven and Eight in detail. Some fragments and pieces of artillery ammunition 
were also found on the battlefield. Although their number is too small to be discussed at 
length, they provide some information about the battle’s events, and provide an idea of 
artillery ammunition used at Lützen, and are therefore included in this chapter. 
 
 Landscape archaeology is a relatively new approach to battle research. In Chapter 
Six, on the basis of historic maps, statements by battle eyewitnesses and the author’s 
experience from years of work at Lützen, an attempt will be made to reconstruct the 
historic battlefield landscape, an important step towards understanding the battle. It is 
believed that Wallenstein’s field fortifications were an important deciding factor, 
something that will be discussed in detail due to new results from excavations and survey. 
 
 Deployment and command of both armies at the beginning of the battle according 
to all historical and archaeological evidence, in consideration of the terrain and unit 
formation types, sizes, and frontage, is discussed in Chapter Seven. 
 
This interdisciplinary approach is demonstrated in Chapter Eight where it serves as 
a final step for reconstructing the battle’s events with as much detail as possible. Known 
historical sources are re-evaluated, new sources are interpreted and compared with the 
archaeological sources and conclusions discussed. In particular, relating events to small 
finds distribution patterns is a challenge, a goal that was not always possible to achieve. 
 
 A short review of the results of the battle is given in Chapter Nine, including the 
casualties and the mass grave found in 2011. 
 
 The Tenth Chapter concludes the study of the Battle of Lützen. It discusses the 
potentials and limitations of battlefield archaeology and military history, the reliability and 
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validity of the different sources, and presents a summary of both what is known and what 
is still necessary to discover about the battle, as well as offering suggestions for the field of 
battlefield archaeology. 
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Figure 2: Start of Wallenstein’s Saxony campaign 21 August to 5 November (based on 
Sennewald 2013, 145-200). 
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Figure 3: Gustav Adolf’s approach to Naumburg 5 to 14 November. 
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1.3 The Battle of Lützen: A short introduction 
 
The most famous military leaders of the Thirty Years War, Wallenstein and Gustav 
Adolf,10 met only twice in battle. After losing a campaign of logistics, Gustav Adolf was 
finally forced to attack Wallenstein’s fortified camp at Nurnberg/Alte Veste on 3 
September 1632; the result was a Swedish disaster. 
 
Imperial/Leaguist/Saxon Swedish English 
Generalissimus (a)   
Generalleutnant Generalleutnant Lieutenant general 
Feldmarschall Fältmarskalk Field Marshal 
Feldmarschall Leutnant (b)   
General der Kavallerie 
General der Infanterie 
Generalfeldzeugmeister 
General för Kavalleriet 
General för Fotfolket 
General för Artilleriet 
General of Horse 
General of Foot 
General of Ordnance 
Generalwachtmeister Generalmajor Major-general 
Oberst Överste Colonel 
Oberstleutnant Överstelöjtnant Lieutenant colonel 
Obristwachtmeister Major Major 
Rittmeister 
Hauptmann 
Ryttmästere 
Kapten 
Captain (Horse) 
Captain (Foot) 
Kapitänleutnant Kaptenlöjtnant 1st Lieutenant 
Leutnant Löjtnant 2nd Lieutenant 
Cornet 
Fähnrich 
 
Fändrik 
Officer cadet/ensign (Horse) 
Officer cadet/ensign (Foot) 
Wachtmeister 
Feldwebel 
Sergeant för Kavalleriet 
Sergeant för Fotfolket 
Sergeant (Horse) 
Sergeant (Foot) 
Corporal Korpral Corporal 
a: unique rank for Wallenstein 
b: out-of-date 16th century rank for Holk (Fronsperger 1558, 83-84) 
Table 1: Ranks in the Imperial, Leaguist, Saxon and Swedish armies and their English 
equivalent (Brzezinski 2001, 19). Ranks are not always used consistently in historical 
sources. 
 
After the Battle of Nurnberg/Alte Veste, Wallenstein saw an opportunity and 
marched north to join Holk devastating Saxony (Fig. 2), Gustav Adolf’s most important 
but unreliable ally, to enforce a separate peace on the elector Johann Georg. The Swedish 
King had no alternative but to follow Wallenstein (Fig. 3). The two armies met at Lützen 
16 November 1632, engaging in what became the most famous battle of the Thirty Years 
War; not because it was decisive, the largest or bloodiest battle, but because it was one of 
the longest and most tragic. With the Swedish King’s death at Lützen, the dream of a 
Swedish victory died as well. The Imperial army also lost one of its greatest leaders, 
Feldmarschall Gottfried Heinrich Graf von Pappenheim and even the Generalissimus 
                                                 
10 In order to avoid confusion, all names, titles and military ranks are quoted in their original language, in 
particular, because some German military ranks are unique and difficult to translate, such as 
‘Obristwachtmeister’ or ‘Generalissimus’ (See Tables 1 and 2). Some high-ranking titles, such as ‘king’, 
‘emperor’ and ‘elector’, are given in English. 
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himself was wounded. Wallenstein was murdered by his own soldiers 15 month later. With 
the most capable military leaders gone, the war went on for another 14 years. 
 
German/Swedish/Italian English 
Prinz (German) Prince 
Herzog (German) Duke 
Graf (German), Greve (Swedish) Earl/Count 
Freiherr (German) Baron 
Marchese (Italian) Marquis 
Table 2: Titles of nobility. 
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Chapter Two 
Historical sources and historiography 
 
The Battle of Lützen has been a subject of interest from the time it was fought until the 
present day. This chapter will identify the various historical accounts, comment on their 
reliability, and give a short overview of the modern studies which have most influenced 
research. 
 
2.1 Historiography 
 
Thousands of publications contain at least a short version of the Battle of Lützen. 
However, there are only six independent academic monographs on which almost all 
publications are based. 
 
Gustav Droysen 
The first methodical study of the Battle of Lützen was published by Gustav Droysen in 
1865.11 He was the first to realise that the central drawback to research regarding the Battle 
of Lützen, as for all battle research, is the lack of records, documents and physical 
“remains”.12 Almost all historical sources concerning a battle are necessarily only 
subjective accounts of a past event as observed by eyewitnesses; opinions; or retelling of 
stories by others. Given the diversity of accounts and their internal conflicts, it would be a 
methodological and logical error to believe in reconstructing facts from historical sources. 
In Droysen’s opinion the truth diminished the longer the passage of time between battle 
and account, and eyewitnesses are more reliable than non-eyewitnesses.13 In the end he 
came to the conclusion that we cannot reconstruct the events of the Battle of Lützen from 
historical sources, because the eyewitnesses reported only single incidents, while those 
‘relations’ with a description of the whole battle were “artificial products” without any 
value.14 Droysen’s work is still the best methodical study of the historiography of the 
Battle of Lützen, except for his unfair antipathy against the catholic eyewitness Diodati. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Droysen 1865. The most quoted older publication is from Philippi 1832. See also Droysen 1865, 73. 
12 Droysen 1865, 72. His observation, the lack of physical evidence (i.e. finds from a battlefield) is 
remarkable for his time. 
13 Droysen 1865, 73. 
14 Droysen 1865, 231-232. 
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Herman Diemar 
In 1890, Herman Diemar criticized Droysen’s thesis and methodology,15 but in trying to 
prove the unreliability of the most important Imperial eyewitness by using an erroneous 
printed account, his own PhD thesis was a serious setback for research.16 
 
Karl Deuticke 
In 1917, Karl Deuticke published a promising work. He utilized Droysen’s methodology, 
using primarily eyewitness accounts, and acknowledged that even eyewitnesses were not 
free from making mistakes when they reported events they had not seen themselves. Most 
importantly he recognised that it was of great importance to locate the position of 
eyewitnesses on a battlefield.17 Unfortunately, he did not follow his own guidelines and in 
the end used any historical source that supported his thesis. 
 
Joseph Seidler 
Later, in 1954,18 Joseph Seidler claimed that “historical science in general is at stake, if it 
were not possible to reconstruct the events of the Battle of Lützen.”19 Seidler left 
verification of sources aside by using mostly accounts of non-eyewitnesses. His obsession 
to prove that Gustav Adolf died on the left instead of the right wing based on 
Khevenhiller’s unreliable account became his ruling theory and damaged his, and later, 
research.20 His most important observation was that an eyewitness’ account might have 
some value even if it was written years after the battle.21 
 
Swedish General Staff 
In 1939 the Swedish general staff published their study of the Swedish wars with a 
substantial chapter about the Battle of Lützen.22 It relied too much on experiences during 
World War One and tried to translate it into 17th century warfare. According to the 
Generalstaben, the Swedish army advanced slowly but steadily in one mighty front. The 
second line became, exclusively, reinforcement in a modern fashion as attack support 
                                                 
15 Diemar 1890, 2-4. 
16 Diemar 1890, 18-23 and 67-68. See also Seidler 1954, 9. 
17 Deuticke 1917, 13-14. 
18 Seidler had written this thesis in the 1930’s, but the war prevented him from publishing it (Seidler 1971, 
50-51). 
19 Seidler 1954, 9. 
20 Seidler 1954, Seidler 1971. See also Brzezinski 2001, 94. Unfortunately, Seidler influenced research for 
many decades, such as Roberts 1958, Mann 1971 and Junkelmann 1993. 
21 Seidler 1954, 14. 
22 Generalstaben 1939. 
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following the principle of operation in depth, which not only ignores almost all eyewitness 
accounts, but also contradicts principles of 17th century warfare. 
 
Wedgewood 
Although there was no genuine English research, there is one independent short study on 
the Battle of Lützen in Wedgewood’s The Thirty Years War, published in 1938, which had 
some influence. Surprisingly, it is based exclusively on eyewitness accounts, but left out 
most of the German and Italian sources. 
 
Richard Brzezinski 
For almost half a century, there was little progress in research, with the exception of 
Barbara Stadler’s biography of Pappenheim in 1991 which contained some new sources, 
until Richard Brzezinski published his results in 2001. Marking a return to Droysen’s more 
scientific method, he used mostly, but not always, eyewitness accounts with great success 
and discovered some new sources, in particular pictorial representations. His most 
important result was the reconstruction of the Imperial battle array. However, most papers 
containing a study of the Battle of Lützen are still based on the results of Seidler, 
Generalstaben and to a lesser degree of Deuticke, while Brzezinski’s important 
observations seem not to have a major impact on research.23 
 
2.2 Historical sources 
 
A key issue is that a large number of historical sources will inevitably lead to very different 
results in historical research, largely because of an uncritical use of sources. Therefore, the 
first requirement is to evaluate the historical sources of the Battle of Lützen. There are four 
main types: 
 
1. Primary sources are eyewitness accounts. They form the most important sources for 
reconstructing a battle’s events. This includes also the records of the court martial 
verdicts at Prague. 
2. Official records and documents such as written orders or correspondences about the 
terms of surrender. Although there are a large number of objective documents for 
contemporary campaigns and sieges, there are none for the Battle of Lützen itself. 
                                                 
23 Examples are Guthrie (2002, 200-232), who was greatly influenced by Seidler and Generalstaben, and 
Mortimer (2010, 171-176), who was influenced by Seidler and Guthrie. 
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However, there are a few important documents written before and after the battle, 
including lists of troop strength and casualties, as well as a few orders from 
Wallenstein, such as the famous order he sent Pappenheim (section 7.1.3). 
3. Secondary sources are accounts by contemporary writers, who were not present at 
the battle. There are two basic categories; those who were not in contact with 
participants, and those who were. The first are generally unreliable. Unless it can be 
shown that the author was in direct contact with participants and obtained specific 
information from eyewitnesses, information in these accounts must be considered 
suspect. 
4. Although copperplates, maps and paintings are, technically, just a different form of 
historical source (primary, secondary or documentary), they are discussed in an 
independent section. 
 
2.2.1 Primary sources: Eyewitness accounts 
 
2.2.1.1 Methodology 
 
The most important historical sources are the eighteen eyewitness accounts. These are 
subjective and the following considerations must be observed: 
 
1. Was the person actually an eyewitness? 
2. Every eyewitness saw only a small portion of the battle and their accounts of only 
those events are potentially reliable. Their descriptions of all other events are based 
on hearsay and are at the very least doubtful. It is, therefore, essential to determine 
their position in battle, if possible. 
3. A high-ranking officer on horseback, moving from place to place, had a better 
overall view of the battle than a low ranking officer on foot, who remained with his 
unit during battle. 24 
4. Statements about enemy forces, their strength, numbers and the names of officers 
and regiments are generally unreliable. Even if their intentions were to relate facts, 
enemy forces always seem larger than they actually were, and the knowledge of 
enemy ‘uniforms’25 and commanding officers is basically superficial. 
                                                 
24 Babits 1998, XV. 
25 Infantry regiments of the Swedish army were usually clad in a specific color, but those were not national 
uniforms as we understand today (Brzezinski/Hook 2006, 39). 
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5. One’s own defeats are rarely mentioned and victories are usually exaggerated. 
6. Most eyewitnesses felt an obligation to tell the story of the deaths of Gustav Adolf 
or Pappenheim in detail, although they did not actually witness it. Those events are 
a glorification of their heroes and largely unreliable. 
7. Although Wallenstein’s decision to divide his force and send Pappenheim back to 
the Rhineland was a strategic necessity, it nearly cost him the Battle of Lützen and 
could have be seen as a serious tactical mistake. Some Imperial sources tried to 
conceal this fact by claiming Pappenheim was present with his corps during the 
whole battle, which was partially true, because some regiments of Pappenheim’s 
corps actually were on the field well before the Feldmarschall arrived with his main 
forces (section 3.1.2). 
 
However, discussing incorrectly events they have not seen and enemy personnel and 
numbers, while being silent about their own defeats does not mean that an entire account is 
unreliable, as Droysen claimed.26 The events may have been incorporated deliberately to 
hide something, by mistake, to make the account more interesting, or to glorify their own 
deeds. These nuances must be considered when evaluating eyewitness commentary. 
 
The only way to get somewhere near the facts of the battle’s events is to find out what 
eyewitnesses actually saw, and from that suggest what is reliable for reasons discussed 
under no. 2-7. If an event was seen by more than one eyewitness, it most likely happened. 
In some cases, an account will say something happened. By asking what caused that 
episode to occur, and then what the opponent did in response, it is possible to identify 
verifying details that might otherwise be missed.27 Ultimately there is no method to prove 
if an eyewitness account is correct, beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
2.2.1.2 Early letters from eyewitnesses 
 
After the battle, there was a hectic correspondence in the Protestant Alliance, assuring 
everyone that the Swedish army was in good order despite the death of Gustav Adolf.28 
Other than the king’s death and the Swedish victory, those early letters provide little useful 
                                                 
26 Droysen 1865, 86-87. Seidler 1954, 22. 
27 Babits/Howard 2009, XIII. 
28 Letters from Generalleutnant Bernhard von Weimar (Mankell 1860, 643-644), Generalmajor Dodo von 
Inn- und zu Knyphausen (Studien 1844, 49-50), Oberst Caspar Graf von Eberstein (Diemar 1893, 347-349), 
Oberst Friedrich von Rostein (Diemar 1893, 351-352) and Rittmeister Bodo von Bodenhausen (Glafey 1749, 
10-11). 
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information. That observation also applies to Wallenstein’s 17 November letter to 
Generalfeldzeugmeister Johann Graf von Aldringen of the War Council of the Court, in 
which he played down his retreat by exaggerating Swedish losses and stated, incorrectly, 
that Pappenheim arrived before the battle.29 In this very short letter, Wallenstein did not 
provide details but only informed Aldringen of the battle, because he was about to send 
Oberst Francesco Grana, Marchese di Caretto with a detailed report to the emperor (section 
2.2.1.4). 
 
2.2.1.3 Swedish eyewitness accounts 
 
Royal Swedish Headquarters 
The first account, written the day of the battle, is a letter from an unknown author in the 
Royal Swedish Headquarters.30 He was probably some kind of secretary, who remained 
with the baggage train at Meuchen during the battle, but returned to the Swedish base of 
operations at Naumburg before the battle ended because the baggage train was in danger of 
being captured by Imperial cavalry.31 Although he probably had not seen much of the 
battle itself, he is a valuable source for the Imperial outflanking manoeuvre that threatened 
the Swedish rear. 
 
Vitzthum/Berlepsch 
Two Saxon officials wrote an account of the battle to Elector Herzog Johann Georg of 
Saxony.32 Erich Volkmar Berlepsch was Kriegskommissar33 in Erfurt, the Swedish 
headquarters; Johann Georg Vitzthum von Eckstedt, elder brother of Oberst Damian 
commander of the Saxon Regiment Dam Vitzthum (section 3.1.3), was canon of the 
cathedrals Halberstadt and Naumburg.34 As non-combatants Vitzthum and Berlepsch were 
either with the baggage train behind the battle or in Naumburg. It is, therefore, uncertain if 
they were eyewitnesses at all. However, they reported unique details from the early stage 
of the battle which could have been seen from behind the lines. That makes it likely that at 
least one of them was actually near the baggage train and saw what he reported. The date 
                                                 
29 Lorenz 1987, 255-256. 
30 Söltl 1842, 346-347, Droysen 1865, 75-76. 
31 Söltl 1842, 347. 
32 Glafey 1749, 12-14. 
33 ’War commissary’ was a supply officer. 
34 They are often incorrectly believed to have been Saxon officers (Diemar 1890, 30, Deuticke 1917, 16). 
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of this ‘post scriptum’ is unknown. Droysen believed that it was sent on 21 November 
1632 together with a letter from Bodo von Bodenhausen.35 
 
 
Figure 4: Approximate positions of Protestant eyewitnesses. 
 
Fleetwood 
Oberst George Fleetwood wrote a letter to his father from Stettin on 2 December 1632.36 
He must have left the army soon after the battle to reach Stettin, some 320km from Lützen. 
His account is less influenced by others, except his description of the king’s death, which 
he might have copied from Truchseß.37 Fleetwood had no command in battle38 and could 
have been anywhere during the fighting. He was most likely not with his fellow 
countrymen in Leslie’s Scots Regiment, as Deuticke and Seidler believed,39 because he 
would have outranked Oberstleutnant Ludovick Leslie and probably have been given the 
command. Since this is not mentioned by him, or by anyone else, his association with 
Leslie’s Regiment is unlikely. His detailed description of a skirmish on the Swedish right 
wing before the battle started suggests that he was on that wing initially. Later, he was seen 
                                                 
35 Droysen 1865, 77-78, Glafey 1749, 10-11. 
36 Fleetwood 1632. 
37 Fleetwood quoted “Truckes”, which is Truchseß (Fleetwood 1632, 8). The account of Truchseß is lost, but 
was used occasionally by contemporary writers when describing the death of Gustav Adolf, although 
Truchseß was no eyewitness (Seidler 1954, 133, rem. 139). 
38 Fleetwood (1632, 4) reported that his regiment was not with the army. 
39 Deuticke 1917, 23, Seidler 1954, 49 and 135, rem. 146. 
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by Jacobus Fabricius behind the centre,40 and was probably in the staff of the right wing or 
centre to perform special tasks. 
 
Fabricius 
King’s Chaplain Jacobus Fabricius wrote his report of Gustav Adolf’s death 18 years after 
the battle.41 Surprisingly, he did not repeat the circulating rumours, as everyone else did, 
but gave his own independent and very detailed account, which may give some weight to 
its accuracy. According to his account, he was behind the centre during the battle. 
 
Stockmann 
Coincidently, in 1632 Gustav Adolf’s former chaplain, Paul Stockmann, was vicar in 
Lützen. He did not witness the battle, but visited the battlefield the next day and described 
it in one of his sermons.42 
 
Dalbier 
The date of Oberst Johann Dalbier’s account of the battle is unknown,43 but it was written 
soon after the fighting and was the first account to reach England.44 Except for his 
description of the king’s death, in which he copied Extrakt Schreiben aus Berlin,45 he gave 
a detailed personal account of the second Swedish attack on the small Imperial battery in 
the afternoon. Because Oberst Johann Dalbier was a close associate of Generalmajor Dodo 
von Innhausen und zu Knyphausen, it is likely he was initially in the centre of the second 
line and then later sent with an infantry detachment to man the captured Imperial guns.46 
 
Leubelfing 
When Gustav Adolf was killed, his page Augustus von Leubelfing was in his entourage. 
Leubelfing was wounded in the incident and died a few days later in Naumburg, but not 
before telling the story of the king’s death to his father, who wrote it down.47 This text is 
full of historical mistakes, which could be excused by his youth, low rank, and his severe 
wounds. Curiously, the account mentions Gustav Adolf commanding the centre and, if 
Leubelfing was with the king, he should have known that he was on the right wing. This 
                                                 
40 Wittrock 1932, 306. 
41 Wittrock 1932, 305-307. 
42 Stockmann 1633. 
43 Dalbier 1632. The account is in 18th century handwriting and probably a copy or translation from the 
original. 
44 Brzezinski 2001, 80. 
45 Mankell 1860, 658-659. 
46 Brzezinski 2001, 75. 
47 Murr 1790, 121-124. 
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error suggests the account is completely unreliable and it almost certainly did not even 
derive from Leubelfing.48 
 
2.2.1.4 Imperial eyewitness accounts 
 
Münchhausen 
An anonymous letter written on 19 November 1632 is the earliest Imperial account.49 The 
author was long believed to be a cavalry officer.50 He recorded that his regiment undertook 
a joint operation with the Infantry Regiment51 Baden; the commander of the Regiment 
Baden, Oberstleutnant Stolper, took command, because his own Oberst was mortally 
wounded and his Oberstleutnant killed.52 Therefore, the letter was almost certainly written 
by an infantry officer. Two Imperial infantry officers, Oberst Berthold von Waldstein and 
Oberst Theodor Comargo, were mortally wounded during the battle, but the Oberstleutnant 
of Waldstein’s Regiment was only wounded, while Comargo’s Oberstleutnant was killed.53 
In a second letter, written by Münchhausen to the Elector Maximilian of Bavaria 6 
December 1632, some sentences are virtually identical to the first, anonymous, letter. It is, 
therefore, very probable that the author of the anonymous 19 November 1632 letter is 
Obristwachtmeister Hans von Münchhausen of the Regiment Comargo.54 
 
Diodati 
After the battle, Wallenstein sent Oberst Francesco Grana, Marchese di Caretto to the 
emperor, then at Vienna, to give him a report of the battle, but he fell ill on the way. As a 
replacement, Wallenstein sent Oberstleutnant Giulio Diodati of Grana’s Regiment, who 
reported to the emperor on 29 November 1632.55 There has been a long discussion among 
historians about the reliability of Diodati’s account because he omitted the left wing’s rout, 
claimed the Swedish army left the battlefield first, and gave a completely erroneous 
description of the Swedish initial deployment. Those errors may be partially explained 
                                                 
48 The unreliability of Leubelfing’s account is also proved in detail by Droysen (1865, 193-198) and Deuticke 
(1917, 26). Nevertheless, Seidler (1954, 67) claims “that there is some truth in the account” without giving 
any argument. Also Guthrie (2002, 232, rem. 42) and Sennewald (2013, 170) believed Leubelfing’s account.  
49 Wittrock 1932, 304-305. 
50 Wittrock 1932, 304, Seidler 1954, 130, ref. 112. 
51 During the Thirty Years War, German regiments in Imperial, Leaguist or Swedish service were not 
numbered, but were named after their owner, which was sometimes, but not always the commanding officer. 
This custom can lead to confusion, if one person owns more than one regiment, because historical sources 
usually do not state which regiment they are referring to. Regimental names are given in English in this 
thesis. 
52 Wittrock 1932, 305. 
53 For officer casualties see section 9.1.1 and table 27. 
54 Brzezinski 2001, 67 and 80. 
55 Fiedler 1884, 555-568. 
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because Diodati was in the uncomfortable position of not embarrassing Wallenstein by 
relating details about tactical mistakes made at Lützen while still reporting as accurately as 
possible to the emperor. The mistakes in Diodati’s account are not, sensu strictu, an 
argument against his general reliability, as Droysen claimed.56 Diodati’s description of the 
Imperial deployments matches that of Feldmarschall Leutnant Heinrich Holk (section 
7.1.2). Even more important is that most of his account is about the fighting of the Imperial 
centre. This suggests that he was actually with this regiment.57 The Regiment Grana was 
deployed as the central squadron58 in the centre of the first line, and Diodati reported 
largely those events he had personally seen. 
 
 
Figure 5: Approximate positions of Imperial eyewitnesses. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
56 As a Protestant, the otherwise objective Droysen (1865, 86-87) argued against the whole account of the 
catholic Diodati without giving any reasonable proof. See also Seidler 1954, 21-25 and Deuticke 1917, 29-
30. 
57 Brzezinski 2001, 67. Diodati did not own a regiment at Lützen, as Seidler (1954, 37) claimed. According 
to the War List No. 18 (Toegel 1977, 439) he was promoted to Oberst after Lützen and got his own regiment 
then. 
58 ‘Squadron’ is the contemporary term for a tactical unit (section 3.3.1). 
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Holk 
The Danish Feldmarschall Leutnant Heinrich Holk wrote a letter not long after the battle, 
the exact date of which is unknown, to King Christian IV of Denmark informing him of the 
battle.59 Holk commanded the Imperial left wing and, as second-in-command in the 
absence of Pappenheim, he was responsible for deploying the army.60 His position in the 
command structure is reflected in his account, which is one of the main sources for the 
Imperial army’s deployment. His account is short, but mostly honest and reliable, with the 
exception of the rout of Pappenheim’s cavalry, which he probably described more 
seriously than it was in order to look better. Holk remained in charge of the left wing 
during the battle and was not relieved by Pappenheim as Seidler believed (section 7.1.3). 
 
Ottavio Piccolomini 
Two quite different letters from Italian soldiers of the Harquebusier Regiment Piccolomini 
have survived. The commanding officer, Oberst Ottavio Piccolomini di Aragona, wrote the 
emperor a boastful letter on 4 December 1632, informing him of his own heroic deeds and 
his part in the events that led to Gustav Adolf’s death.61 It seems that all reports about his 
regiment are influenced by him and his actions in the battle are exaggerated. Nevertheless, 
his account’s raw details are the most detailed description of a single regiment’s action 
extant. 
 
Silvio Piccolomini 
The 2 December 1632 letter from Rittmeister Silvio Piccolomini to the bishop of Siena 
Askanio Piccolomini contains some serious mistakes, such as the date of the battle, given 
as 15 November, and the arrival of Pappenheim before the battle, about which he should 
have known better.62 Since he served in the regiment of his uncle Ottavio Piccolomini, 
there is no reason to believe that he was not present at the battle. In particular, the 
description of wounds his fellow officers received is an important detail, which shed some 
light on the fighting. 
 
Poyntz 
The ‘relation’ of Rittmeister63 Sydnam Poyntz was written in 1636/37.64 Poyntz’s account 
of his deeds in the Thirty Years War is full of mistakes and he confused the chronology of 
                                                 
59 Wittrock 1932, 307-309. 
60 Brzezinski 2001, 38. 
61 Argang 1894, 89-90. 
62 Archivio 1871, 239-242. 
63 Hauptmann according to Brzezinski (2001, 81). 
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events where he was not present.65 His account of the Battle of Lützen is more colourful 
than truthful. As an example, Poyntz claimed that when Pappenheim arrived on the 
battlefield, he and Gustav Adolf recognized each other immediately, then fought and killed 
each other in a duel.66 For the errors, his account is usually seen as unreliable by modern 
historians,67 but he was an eyewitness of the battle. Apart from his fictitious elaborations, 
there is no reason to doubt that he reported what he saw. It is not known in which regiment 
Poyntz served during the battle. According to his report, he lost all his horses, and he gave 
a detailed report of the Harquebusier Regiment Piccolomini, which fought on the Imperial 
left wing.68 His association with cavalry regiments indicates he was probably in a left wing 
or centre Imperial cavalry regiment. 
 
Name and rank Date of Account Position of Eyewitness 
Unknown person from Royal Swedish 
Headquarters 
16 November 1632 Swedish baggage train 
Generalissimus Albrecht von Wallenstein 17 November 1632 Imperial army, right wing 
Generalleutnant Bernhard von Weimar 18 November 1632 Swedish army, left wing, 1st line 
Generalmajor Dodo von Inn- und zu 
Knyphausen 
18 November 1632 Swedish army, centre, 2nd line 
Obristwachtmeister Hans von 
Münchhausen 
19 November 1632 Imperial army, centre, 1st line 
Rittmeister Bodo von Bodenhausen 21 November 1632 Swedish army, position unknown 
Kriegskommissar Erich Volkmar Berlepsch 
Canon Johann Georg Vitzthum 
Probably 21 
November 1632 
Probably Swedish baggage train 
Oberst Caspar Graf von Eberstein 28 November 1632 Swedish army, right wing, 1st line 
Oberstleutnant Giulio Diodati 29 November 1632 Imperial army, centre, 1st line 
Feldmarschall Leutnant Heinrich Holk Date unknown, very 
likely before 1633 
Imperial army, left wing 
Oberst George Fleetwood 02 December 1632 Swedish army, probably centre and right 
wing 
Rittmeister Silvio Piccolomini 02 December 1632 Imperial army, left wing and centre 
Oberst Ottavio Piccolomini di Aragona 04 December 1632 Imperial army, left wing and centre 
Oberst Friedrich von Rostein 06 December 1632 Swedish army, right wing, 2nd line 
Obristwachtmeister Hans von 
Münchhausen 
06 December 1632 Imperial army, centre, 1st line 
Oberst Johann Dalbier date unknown, 
possibly late 1632 
Swedish army, centre, 2nd line 
Rittmeister Sydnam Poyntz date unknown, 
possibly 1636 
Imperial army, probably left centre or 
left wing 
King’s chaplain Jacobus Fabricius 30 December 1650 Swedish army, centre, 2nd line 
Table 3: Accounts of eyewitnesses in chronological order with their approximate position in battle. 
 
Testimonies of the Prague Court Martial  
There are records of nine courts martial verdicts issued at Prague from 11 February 1633. 
These verdicts were based on sworn testimony against deserters from the Battle of Lützen 
                                                                                                                                                    
64 Poyntz 1908. 
65 Poyntz 1908, 24-25. 
66 Poyntz 1908, 73. 
67 Brzezinski 2001, 94. 
68 Poyntz 1908, 72 and 126. 
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and the siege of Chemnitz. Testimony involved questioning eyewitnesses.69 Although 
based on subjective eyewitness accounts, the aim was to reveal facts. Therefore, these 
records represent an important account of the Imperial cavalry’s rout at Lützen. 
 
Ehinger 
On 13 May 1633, a statement from the interrogation of Pappenheim’s trumpeter Ehinger 
was recorded about the death of the Feldmarschall.70 Ehinger’s statement about 
Pappenheim’s cavalry disobeying orders is supported by other testimony verdicts; his 
statement about Pappenheim’s last words seems more sentimental than reliable. 
 
2.2.1.5 Conclusion 
 
Most eyewitnesses were positioned on the Imperial left wing or centre, while some were 
with the Imperial and Swedish baggage trains; there are no eyewitness accounts from the 
Imperial right wing. Unfortunately, most potential archaeological evidence from the right 
Imperial wing is likely destroyed by housing development. These factors make it very 
difficult to reconstruct this portion of the battle. 
 
2.2.2 Secondary sources 
 
Shock and excitement about the death of Gustav Adolf resulted in an almost limitless 
series of letters, ‘relations’, historical papers and copperplate illustrations from 
contemporary non-eyewitnesses. These were followed by a 200 year long discussion about 
their reliability. Due to Droysen’s substantial research on the development of the battle’s 
historic narrative, there is a good idea of the process of copying, altering and inventing 
events. As many ‘relations’ and historical papers were known to him, his results are still 
valid, even though they were often not acknowledged by historians.71 Secondary sources 
can be arranged chronologically and by topic into four groups: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
69 Seidler 1954, 141-148. 
70 Hallwich 1912b, 133-136. 
71 Diemar 1890, 2-5, Deuticke 1917, 7, Seidler 1954, 9. 
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1. Letters 
2. Early printed ‘relations’ 
3. ‘Relations’ and copperplates from 1633 until 1637 
4. Early modern historical papers 
 
2.2.2.1 Letters 
 
The news about the death of Gustav Adolf spread rapidly through a huge amount of letters 
from Protestant secretaries, correspondents, officials, and liaison officers, none of whom 
had seen the battle. It is not possible to discuss them in detail in this thesis. Most letters 
only state that the King of Sweden has died and are of little relevance for researching the 
Battle of Lützen itself. The most quoted letters from 1632 are: (in chronological order) 
secretary Heinrich Schwallenberg to Fältmarskalk Gustav Horn (17 November, 22 
November);72 an unknown author to the Chancellor of the Reich Axel Oxenstierna 
(probably 19 November);73 the Copia verträulichen Schreibens from Pegau (20 
November);74 the correspondent Lars Grubbe who was quoted as Relation I from Grimma 
(23 November);75 Bernolf von Kreilsheim (approximately 23 November);76 the Extrakt 
Schreiben aus Berlin (24 November);77 Feldmarschall Matthias Gallas to Ferdinand King 
of Hungary (approximately 25 November);78 the correspondent Lars Grubbe quoted as the 
Relation II from Grimma (28 November);79 the correspondent Johann Hallenus to the 
Swedish Council of the Reich (30 November);80 three letters from unknown authors (26 
November, 3 December, 7 December);81  Adam Heinrich Pentz probably to Fältmarskalk 
Horn (2 December),82 and finally the letter from the Venetian Resident in Vienna Antonio 
Antelmi (4 December).83 
 
                                                 
72 Fiedler 1864, 569, Hallwich 1912a, 522-523. Schwallenberg was secretary in the Royal Swedish 
Headquarters at Naumburg (Droysen 1865, 77). 
73 Mankell 1860, 645-649, Droysen 1865, 78-79. 
74 Söltl 1842, 340-341, Droysen 1865, 79. 
75 Studien 1844, 50-52. Grubbe was Gustav Adolf’s correspondent in Torgau to report the movement of the 
allied Saxon army to him and prepare their joining with the Swedish army. He went to Grimma after the 
battle (Droysen 1865, 79-80). 
76 Droysen 1865, 80. 
77 Mankell 1860, 658-659. 
78 Förster 1844, 94-96, Diemar 1890, 55-57. 
79 Droysen 1865, 80-82. 
80 Mankell 1860, 661-664. Hallenus was correspondent in Stralsund to report the Council of the Reich. See 
also Droysen 1865, 82-83. 
81 Söltl 1842, 349-356, Droysen 1865, 83-84. 
82 Fiedler 1864, 569-572. 
83 Antelmi 1632, 359-362. It is often claimed that this letter is “excellent”, based only on a statement of the 
German historian Ranke (Deuticke 1917, 32), but, in fact, it is contradicted by most eyewitness accounts. 
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Some letters, in particular Pentz, contain many details about the battle and the 
circumstances of Gustav Adolf’s death, but in comparison to the eyewitness accounts, they 
give an almost entirely different kind of information. Most details can neither be proved 
nor disproved by reference to the eyewitnesses, so there is the question of where all this 
information originated. There is at the moment no evidence whatsoever that someone from 
Gustav Adolf’s entourage survived to tell the circumstances of his death; instead rumours 
filled the gap in knowledge. These rumours very likely derived initially from Swedish 
army soldiers, who needed to know how their beloved king died. It is likely that creating 
this myth did not stop with Gustav Adolf’s death, but soon co-opted all battle events, 
spreading by letters and verbal accounts. Although there is little evidence, this creation of 
the battle’s mythology seems the only reasonable explanation for the fundamental 
differences between eyewitness and non-eyewitness accounts. The early letters rapidly 
began to influence each other. This is most evident when comparing Kreilsheim’s letter 
and Relation I from Grimma, where either one copied the other or both had access to a now 
unknown written account.84 This one example demonstrates that some letters were copied 
and distributed by, and to, officials. Nevertheless, their impact on the development of the 
historic narrative was limited. 
 
An exception to those early letters is the Hallenus account. Two eyewitnesses, 
Löjtnant Bengt Graa from Kyle’s Regiment and Fändrik Ambrosius Jacobsson from 
Hastfehr’s Regiment, reached Stralsund on 29 November 1632 and reported the battle to 
Johann Hallenus, who had not yet received any detailed report.85 Both the Kyle and 
Hastfehr Regiments mustered as part of the Swedish Brigade and were thus deployed on 
the right centre.86 Most of their account deals with Gustav Adolf’s death, which then was 
certainly only a rumour spreading from the Swedish army. It is very peculiar that they 
mentioned Generalmajor Nils Brahe, Greve till Visingborg as left cavalry wing 
commander, because he actually commanded the first line of the centre (section 7.2.2). 
They should have known this, because Brahe was their wing-commander. What is curious 
is that when Brahe advanced with his “wing”, Hallenus correctly described combat 
involving an infantry brigade and the resulting counterattack of an Imperial cuirassier 
regiment. This is what happened to the Yellow Brigade, commanded personally by Brahe, 
when it fought just to the left of the Swedish Brigade.87 It is very likely, that the two 
officers correctly reported events that occurred to their left, but that Hallenus 
                                                 
84 Droysen 1865, 137-138. 
85 Mankell 1860, 661-664. 
86 Brzezinski 2001, 22. They were not in Winckel’s Old Blue Brigade, as Deuticke (1917, 22) suggested. 
87 Brzezinski 2001, 67. 
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misunderstood, and thought Brahe commanded the ‘left wing’. This is one example of how 
the narrative of events changed and was erroneously recorded, if not falsified shortly after 
the battle. There is a substantial difference between direct eyewitnesses accounts and 
accounts that were related by non-eyewitnesses, who were not aware of their mistakes. 
Once this error is rectified, the Hallenus’ account becomes an important source. 
 
2.2.2.2 Early printed ‘relations’ 
 
Printed accounts, like the second-hand letters, reported an entirely different kind of 
information than eyewitness accounts; they naturally had a bigger impact on the 
developing historical narrative due to their high print run. In order to understand the 
influence printed accounts had on the development of historic narrative, it is necessary to 
discuss the earliest ones.  
 
58th Weekly Newspaper 
The first printed account was published as early as 17 November 1632, the day after the 
battle, in the 58. Ordentliche Wochentliche Zeitung 1632,88 a local newspaper from 
Naumburg. The newspaper theoretically could have obtained some intelligence from 
Swedish soldiers, who had fled to Naumburg during the battle, but, instead, it gives only a 
very short account, full of mistakes; the stream Rippach is confused with the Floßgraben, 
Gustav Adolf is wounded, but still alive and so on. 
 
Relation from Torgau 
The second printed account, the Relation from Torgau or Bericht von der mächtigen 
Victoria dated 19 November 1632,89 claimed to have had intelligence from an Imperial 
prisoner of war. In fact, it tells a story completely different from any other account, and it 
is therefore incorrect and not based on an eyewitness testimony. 
 
Relation I from Erfurt 
The 21 November 1632 Extrakt Schreiben aus Erfurt90, quoted as Relation I from Erfurt, is 
largely a touching story of how Gustav Adolf, sensing he would die in battle, said goodbye 
to his wife. Then to embellish the account, a speech to his soldiers in the middle of the 
battle was added. This speech later became a topos (cliché), repeated in almost every 
                                                 
88 Söltl 1842, 337-339, Droysen 1865, 78. 
89 Droysen 1880, 13-15. 
90 Söltl 1842, 342-344. 
 46 
relation, but in very different ways. Although the Swedish headquarters was in Erfurt, and 
could have provided real information, it is obvious that this relation contains no factual 
material. These three ‘relations’ had no impact on each other and developed independently. 
 
Relation II from Erfurt 
The first printed ‘relation’ describing the whole battle in a chronological fashion was the 
‘Warhaffte unnd eygentliche Relation, von der Blutigen Schlacht, zwischen Königl. 
Mayest: zu Schweden, unnd der Kayserl: Armee den 5. und 6. Novemb deß Jahrs 1632. 
bey Lützen 2. Meilwege von Leipzig vorgangen und geschehen,’ quoted as Relation II 
from Erfurt. It was published 22 November 1632.91 Again, the author claimed he was an 
eyewitness to the battle, when he was not, which seems to have become a figure of speech 
in printed accounts to give it some weight.92 It is, however, the first ‘relation’ relying 
chiefly on previously printed accounts. The battle’s commencement, given as 9am in the 
Relation I from Erfurt,93 and 10am in the newspaper,94 is stated as 9am to 10am.95 The 
statement that Imperial forces would have been completely routed at Rippach if the 
Swedes had more time before nightfall96 and a reference to the Imperial army’s advantage 
of terrain97 is drawn from the newspaper, using similar sentences. The loss of all Imperial 
artillery, baggage, and ammunition is mentioned in all ‘relations’, while the Swedes taking 
advantage of a mist is probably from the Relation from Torgau and so on.98 It might be 
argued that some events were common knowledge, but it is certainly no coincidence that 
the Relation II from Erfurt mentioned precisely those events, and almost all of them, that 
had been published before, using similar words or sentences. The Relation II from Erfurt is 
still more than just a compilation of previous accounts. It provides more details, few of 
which can be verified by eyewitness accounts. These include the Imperial attack on the 
Swedish baggage train, and the obviously incorrect Imperial fortifications at the 
Floßgraben (section 6.2); for most of these events there is no other evidence. In essence, 
the Relation II from Erfurt combines previously published and incorrect events with some 
facts; they certainly heard the rumours current at the Swedish headquarters, and invented 
events, such as the speech Gustav Adolf gave before the battle. These were woven into a 
                                                 
91 Droysen 1880, 16-23. There are seven almost identical versions published under different titles. 
92 Diemar (1890, 18-23) believed this ‘relation’ to be the lost account from Schwallenberg based on the 
assumption that he was an eyewitness, which is both incorrect (Seidler 1954, 10). 
93 Söltl 1842, 343. 
94 Söltl 1842, 338. 
95 Droysen 1880, 19. 
96 Söltl 1842, 338, Droysen 1880, 18. 
97 Söltl 1842, 338, Droysen 1880, 18. 
98 Note that Droysen (1865, 151-166) has failed to realise the context between the Relation II from Erfurt, 
Ordentliche Wochentliche Zeitung and Relation I from Erfurt. 
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tale that sought to take advantage of the public’s thirst for news about the fighting. Even at 
this very early stage, less than one week after the fighting, it is virtually impossible to 
determine from secondary sources, which events were facts and which stories, without 
comparing them to more reliable sources. 
 
Relation and Declaration from 1633 
The next printed ‘relations’, the Relation from 163399 and the Declaration from 1633,100 
followed the same rubric of compiling earlier published ‘relations’, altering them and then 
combining them with invented stories.101 
 
2.2.2.3 Protestant ‘relations’ and copperplates from 1633 to 1637 
 
Inventarium Sueciae 
The 1633 publication of the Inventarium Sueciae marks a shift to the developing historic 
narrative. It is the first publication with a copperplate, made by Friedrich van Hulsen, 
showing the initial Swedish and Imperial armies’ deployment. Needless to say, the 
Inventarium Sueciae was itself a compilation102 that altered events found in previous 
‘relations’ and invented stories. 
 
Theatrum Europaeum 
The Theatrum Europaeum, first published in 1633,103 not only copied almost verbatim the 
Inventarium Sueciae text and added its own version of Gustav Adolf’s death, but also 
plagiarized van Hulsen’s copperplate with slight differences while including a new 
copperplate from Matthaeus Merian, showing various battle events. 
 
Glaubwürdiger Bericht/Wahrhaftige Beschreibung 
Later ‘relations’, including the Glaubwürdiger Bericht and Wahrhaftige Beschreibung, 
then copied nearly the entire text from the Inventarium Sueciae and both copperplates; 
except for some minor alterations there was no new information. 
 
 
 
                                                 
99 Droysen 1880, 24-35. 
100 Droysen 1880, 36-46. 
101 See Droysen 1865, 166-188 for details. 
102 In particular from the Relation II from Erfurt and the Relation from 1633 (Droysen 1865, 201-208). 
103 There are several versions. The Theatrum Europaeum from 1646 is used in this thesis. 
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Monro 
The description of the Battle of Lützen in Monro’s account is, in most respects, an exact 
translation of the Inventarium Sueciae with some minor alterations and translation 
errors.104 
 
2.2.2.4 Other ‘relations’ 
 
Swedish Intelligencer 
The development of historical narrative until the early historical papers suggests that the 
Battle of Lützen is exclusively a German-Protestant matter of interest. However, there are 
a few other ‘relations’ and historical papers, such as the account of the battle in William 
Watts’ 1633 Swedish Intelligencer, the longest and most detailed ‘relation’ of the Battle of 
Lützen. Watts used different sources, such as the Spanish Relation105 which, in turn, 
utilized Diodati’s eyewitness account. While Watts came to different conclusions, they are 
not necessarily more reliable. Watts claimed that he had reports from three English 
eyewitnesses, Francis Terret, John Pawlet, and Edward Fielding, who served in the 
Swedish army, were captured by Croats and saw the battle as prisoners from the Imperial 
army’s baggage train, before they were freed.106 There is no reason to doubt this story, but 
it is important to know which parts of Watts’ account derive from these three eyewitnesses. 
Watts mentioned them twice explicitly as his source; once when noting that after 
Wallenstein sounded the alarm on evening 15 November, his regiments came in all night 
long;107 the second event occurred when about 1,000-1,500 Imperial horse fled from the 
battle to the baggage train and frightened the female camp followers who, in turn, cut the 
wagon horses loose and rode off together with the cavalry.108 It is almost certain that the 
English prisoners actually saw the two events, especially the second one. However, Watts 
did report a completely erroneous initial deployment and fortification of the Imperial army 
(sections 6.2 and 7.2), which suggests that his eyewitnesses had not seen it and therefore 
probably had not seen anything else of importance about the battle itself.109 Watts’ 
reliability is clearly restricted to the events mentioned by his eyewitnesses. 
                                                 
104 Monro 1637, part II, 162-165. The description of the results of the battle from page 165 on is different 
from Inventarium Sueciae. 
105 The Spanish Relation seems to have been lost, but was translated and published by Watts (1633, 160-164). 
106 Watts 1633, 118. 
107 Watts 1633, 125. 
108 Watts 1633, 142. 
109 Watts 1633, 130. Compare to Imperial deployment in Brzezinski 2001, 44. It is a characteristic of the 
history of Lützen research that Deuticke (1917, 31) claimed that the English prisoners had seen the whole 
battle without giving any argument. 
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Relation from 1632 and others 
There is also the Catholic ‘relation’ Gründlicher und Außführlicher Bericht printed in 
Munich in 1632, quoted as Relation from 1632110, which is based partially on the 
Particular from 1632. While this ‘relation’ altered the events of the battle, the French 
Relation from 1633, translated into English and published in London, is a completely 
fictitious story. 
 
2.2.2.5 Early historical papers 
 
In the early 1640’s, discussion about the Battle of Lützen resumed and historians started to 
re-evaluate the historical sources; a process that is still in progress. The early historians 
obviously had access to some eyewitness accounts, of which some are known. It was often 
claimed by modern historians that the early authors had access to eyewitness accounts 
which are now lost, or that they were eyewitnesses themselves, something that would 
indeed make their accounts valuable sources. The following section discusses the 
possibilities raised by the early authors to clarify this matter. 
 
Chemnitz 
Chemnitz Bogislaus Philipp111 chiefly used the Inventarium Sueciae, but also included 
some earlier ‘relations’ known to us, that were rephrased, which do not provide any new 
evidence.112 
 
Priorato 
Galeazzo Gualdo Priorato113 was the first historian to publish a complete list of those 
Imperial regiments he believed fought in the battle. Since he listed every Imperial regiment 
whose name he knew, and many of them were not even close to Lützen, this listing is 
incorrect, as is his account of the battle.114 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
110 Droysen 1880, 6-12. 
111 Chemnitz 1648, 463-467. 
112 Droysen 1865, 230. 
113 Priorato 1672, 118-123. 
114 Droysen 1865, 230. Although Seidler (1954, 36) admitted the listing to be incorrect, he claimed that he 
will prove that Priorato’s account “is not as bad as usually suspected,” but he actually did not even try 
(Seidler 1954, 14). 
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Burgus 
Seidler claimed, without providing any evidence, that Petrus Baptista Burgus was present 
at the battle.115 Burgus’ account is largely copied from other sources. His description of 
Wallenstein motivating his soldiers and Pappenheim arriving before the battle comes from 
Siri;116 from Holk’s account he copied the statement that he did not have enough 
musketeers to deploy some in the wood to his left.117 His praise of Piccolomini’s heroic 
deeds is identical to Diodati’s account.118 Apart from inventing a long speech of Gustav 
Adolf, Burgus simply repeats the usual rumours and it is most unlikely that he was present 
in the battle. 
 
Richelieu/Siri 
It was often claimed by modern historians that Cardinal Richelieu’s account was “supplied 
by Bernhard’s [von Weimar] chancellery.”119 Generalleutnant Bernhard von Weimar 
commanded the Swedish left wing, and the claim is based on the fact that Bernhard von 
Weimar was in French service and probably knew Richelieu personally.120 Richelieu’s 
account, however, is a word-for-word translation of Vittorio Siri’s account.121 Siri actually 
claimed that he used an account from Bernhard von Weimar, who had given it to the King 
of France.122 Even if that is true, Siri did not relate very much about combat on the 
Swedish left wing, which he should have if he had actually drawn his information from 
Bernhard von Weimar. Deuticke and Seidler claimed that Richelieu copied a letter from 
Truchseß and that Truchseß made a personal report to Richelieu.123 However, Richelieu 
copied Siri and he could not have copied Truchseß as well. Truchseß was not an 
eyewitness124 and it is therefore unnecessary to speculate whether Siri used Truchseß. As 
long as there is no proof of the reliability of Siri’s sources, his or Richelieu’s accounts 
should be used with great care. 
 
 
 
                                                 
115 Seidler 1954, 13. 
116 Burgus 1641, 318-320, Förster 1829, 337. 
117 Burgus 1641, 318, Wittrock 1932, 308. 
118 Burgus 1641, 325, Fiedler 1864, 563. For the similarity of Diodati’s and Burgus’ accounts see also 
Droysen (1865, 210-214) and Seidler’s (1954, 14) counterargument that “he could not find much of a 
conspicuous similarity (of Burgus and Diodati).” 
119 Brzezinski 2001, 80. 
120 Richelieu 1823, 256-268, Brzezinski 2001, 80, rem. 8. 
121 Förster 1829, 336-341, Droysen 1865, 231. 
122 Droysen 1865, 231. 
123 Deuticke 1917, 24, Seidler 1954, 126, rem. 87. 
124 Seidler 1954, 133, rem. 139. 
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Khevenhiller 
Srbik claimed that Khevenhiller125 used the now lost account of Oberst Nicolas Desfours, 
who fought on the Imperial right wing.126 Srbik’s presumption is based on a note in the 29 
November 1632 expedition protocol of the War Council of the Court that 
 
“Nicolaws des Four baro avisiert J. K. Mt. aus Leitmeritz vom 19. November des 
Schweden und von Pappenheim Tod.”127 
 
Srbik believed that Khevenhiller quoted Desfours’s ‘relation’, which started with the head 
line: 
 
“Die Relation, so der Kayserl. Majestät dieses Todes halber in hoc passu überschickt 
worden, meldet,“ 128 
 
followed by a bold printed text. That indicates that there was, in fact, an account by 
Desfours and that Khevenhiller used an account which is now lost, but not that he used the 
account of Desfours. The bold printed text describes the circumstances of Gustav Adolf’s 
death. Even if this part were from Desfours’s ‘relation’, Desfours could not have seen it 
because the Swedish King died on the Imperial left wing while he was serving on the 
right.129 
 
2.2.2.6 Conclusion 
 
The main problem relating to the non-eyewitness accounts is that it is difficult to tell which 
parts are fictitious and which are based on eyewitness testimony. If contemporary writers 
did not cite their sources, as Hallenus and Watts did, it is almost impossible to prove 
whether or not they used now unknown eyewitness accounts. If it can be shown that they 
did use known accounts, then their information is superficial because the original 
eyewitness account can be used directly. But it is at least suspect, if not evidence for their 
unreliability, when the same incident is repeated again and again in printed accounts, 
because a battle consists of an unlimited number of events, which can all be told. In fact, 
                                                 
125 Khevenhiller 1726, 188-198. 
126 Srbik 1926, 246, Seidler 1938, 231. 
127 “Nicolaus Desfour reports His Imperial Majesty from Leitmeritz the 19 November the death of the Swede 
(i.e. Gustav Adolf) and Pappenheim.” 
128 Khevenhiller 1726, 192. “The ‘relation’ which was sent in hoc passu to the Imperial Majesty because of 
this death, reports…” 
129 Seidler (1938 and 1954) was eager to prove the reliability of Khevenhiller’s account, because he tried to 
prove that Gustav Adolf died on the left, rather than on the right wing, and his whole paper is based on that 
incorrect assumption (see also Brzezinski 2001, 9). 
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there are very few events, which were seen and written down by several eyewitnesses. 
Finally, it must be taken into consideration that it was not necessarily in the interest of 
contemporary writers to tell the truth but rather to tell a good story that would sell. 
 
2.2.3 Official records and documents 
 
Few official records concerning the Battle of Lützen have survived. 
 
Imperial war lists 
There are eight Imperial war lists from 1631 to 1634 with all regiments and their 
companies and commanding officers noted.130 These lists very often give a number of ten 
companies in a regiment, the official regimental organisation at that time.131 It seems 
unlikely that all regiments during the Thirty Years War had this organisation in actuality. 
At least one list (no. 14) contradicts itself by officially listing Hagen’s Regiment with ten 
companies, then saying in a footnote that the regiment was disbanded and its thirteen 
companies distributed among three regiments.132 Whilst these observations represent 
warning signs, there is a certain base line of data in the lists that can provide interpretive 
approaches if used carefully. 
 
Imperial casualty and reward lists 
The “list of damaged”133 is one of very few records with an exact and reliable number of 
Imperial soldiers, even though it only includes seven regiments.134 Imperial commanders 
kept records of numbers of companies rather than men.135 A “reward list” names five 
regiments rewarded very likely for their service in Lützen.136 Holk’s 6 December 1632 list 
names fourteen regiments, named also in the Trauttmansdorff list, suggesting that it is a list 
of regiments present in Lützen.137 
 
 
                                                 
130 Toegel 1977, 386-443. 
131 Wrede 1898, 29. 
132 Toegel 1977, 402 and 406. 
133 In trying to save the meaning of 17th century German or Italian, the author often favoured a literally above 
a correct translation. 
134 “Verzaichnuß der Beschädigten“ (Hallwich 1912a, 596-599). The record lists the wounded of the 
Regiments Desfour, Holk, Trcka, Götz, Bredau, Loyers and Goschütz. It does not include the killed, because 
the Oberstleutnant of Desfour’s Regiment, who was killed, is not included. 
135 Brzezinski 2001, 26. 
136 Hallwich 1912a, 538-539. 
137 Hallwich 1912a, 577-578. 
 53 
Swedish troop and casualty lists 
There are three reliable Swedish lists of regimental strength. Langman’s 14 November 
1632 list contains an actual number of infantry men and an approximate number of cavalry 
men.138 The second document is an undated casualty listing of wounded infantrymen, 
written not long after the battle.139 The last list is an unpublished and undated list of the 
strength of infantry regiments after the battle.140  
 
2.2.4 Pictorial representations 
 
Copperplates and paintings are a different form of secondary source with similar problems. 
The copperplates from van Hulsen in the Inventarium Sueciae (Fig. 62), from Merian in 
the Theatrum Europaeum (Fig. 63), and the copperplate published by Watts in The 
Swedish Intelligencer (Fig. 64), were meant to illustrate their account of the battle, which 
had already been substantially altered. For a long time, deployment of the Imperial army 
was subject to discussion until Brzezinski found evidence in two pictorial representations, 
the equestrian portrait of Gustav Adolf by Giovanni Paolo Bianchi of Milan (Fig. 123),141 
and the painting by Pieter Snayers (Fig. 65).142 In particular the latter shows many details 
that are confirmed by historical and archaeological sources, suggesting that it was based on 
at least one eyewitness account. 
 
Weißenfels battle plan 
There are also three maps of particular interest. The first, a sketch of the Imperial army 
published by Förster in 1829, had long been misidentified as Wallenstein’s battle plan for 
Lützen (Fig. 73).143 Brigitte Holl has since shown that it is a 12 November 1632 plan for a 
battle at Weißenfels which never occurred.144 It does provide clues leading to a better 
understanding of Wallenstein’s battle tactics. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
138 Langman 1632, 162. 
139 Mankell 1861, 126-128. 
140 Stockholm 1632, Brzezinski 2001, 87. 
141 Brzezinski 2001, 47. 
142 Pieter Snayers, Die Schlacht bei Lützen, Kunsthistorisches Museum Wien, Inv. Nr. GG1820. 
143 Förster 1829, 275-279. 
144 Holl 1976, 71-72. See also Brzezinski 2001, 48. The map is still misidentified as battle plan for Lützen 
(Guthrie 2002, 202, Mortimer 2010, 170). 
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Trauttmansdorff list 
In 1991 Barbara Stadler published the Trauttmansdorff list, which shows an undated list of 
Imperial units marked with letters or signs (Table 21).145 There is an included note that 
says that the list is to be given to the Imperial Vice President of the War Council of the 
Court Löbl, who was promoted to this position in 1633.146 Originally this list was a legend 
belonging to a lost battle map. Although its origin cannot be proved without a date and the 
map itself, the Imperial units listed are known to have been at Lützen (section 3.1.2). There 
is a special mark noting the units of Pappenheim’s corps, so it is probable that this legend 
belonged to a battle plan of Lützen.147 
 
Sketch from the Krigsarkivet 
It is often claimed that the sketch of the Battle of Lützen from the Stockholm Krigsarkivet 
is from a Swedish soldier who fought in the battle (Fig. 57).148 However, the deployment 
of the Imperial army is shown incorrectly whilst the Swedish centre and second line are 
missing. Particularly suspicious is that the illustration shows only four cavalry squadrons 
on each wing, which is stated incorrectly by the Declaration from 1633 and 
Khevenhiller.149 It seems possible that the sketch was drawn by someone who was 
studying accounts from the battle. While these omissions and faults do not necessarily 
prove that the sketch is not from an eyewitness, attributing it to a participant is at least 
doubtful. It may be that the omissions and incorrect deployment of the Imperial and 
Swedish army actually reflect what a low ranking soldier might have been able to see, or it 
is possible that the sketch is from someone in the Swedish baggage train. The latter is 
supported by some remarkable details on the sketch, such as the float-wood near the 
Floßgraben, where the baggage train was positioned. 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
 
Except for Droysen and Brzezinski, most historians have used all historical sources equally 
and then chosen those statements which fit their thesis. Important sources are quoted 
incorrectly, sometimes seemingly on purpose. Often mere hints are called evidence and if 
that fails to fully support his interpretation, the author simply stated that the source was 
reliable. Translation of foreign texts is often flawed. These misconceptions are deeply 
                                                 
145 Stadler 1991, 891-892. She accidently omitted the Regiment Piccolomini (see Brzezinski 2001, 48). 
146 Löbl was Oberst in late 1632 (Letter from the emperor to Wallenstein: Lorenz 1987, 256). 
147 Brzezinski 2001, 48. 
148 Brzezinski 2001, 52. 
149 Droysen 1880, 29, Khevenhiller 1726, 189. 
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embodied in the historical research of the Battle of Lützen; it would be a thesis of its own 
to complete a detailed analysis of all historical sources to determine who copied what from 
whom; this will not be attempted here. 
 
It is the intention of this thesis to demonstrate in Chapter Eight that most secondary 
sources are artificial products with little relevance for research on the Battle of Lützen. In 
this case most events described by secondary sources are contradicted by eyewitness 
accounts as well as by results from archaeological investigations on the battlefield. There 
are very few exceptions, chief among them the painting by Snayers. 
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Chapter Three 
The Armies 
 
This chapter provides a basic description of the Imperial and Swedish armies at Lützen, 
concentrating on the participating regiments, their strength, equipment, weapons, artillery 
and tactics. In particular, the structure of Wallenstein’s army was very organic. Some 
newly recruited regiments were still acquiring equipment whilst older regiments were 
upgraded with armour. Wallenstein adapted his tactics to match Swedish tactics. The 
Swedish army also changed substantially during Gustav Adolf’s campaign in Germany and 
acquired weapons and equipment different from their original issue. Although there are 
countless publications concerning the Thirty Years War, these changes in tactics, weapons 
and equipment during that time are still not fully understood. 
 
3.1 Order of battle 
 
Research on the participating regiments of the Imperial army and their strength at Lützen 
was conducted by German historians influenced mostly by Seidler on one side, and 
Swedish and English historians influenced by the Swedish General Staff on the other, with 
both groups coming to wrong conclusions.150 Still, even for the well documented Swedish 
army, it is not entirely certain which regiments actually were at Lützen. This can only be 
understood by looking at both armies and their movements during the week before the 
battle. 
 
3.1.1 Armies at Weissenfels and Naumburg 
 
On 8/10 November 1632 Gustav Adolf and Wallenstein entrenched their armies only 11km 
from each other at Naumburg and Weissenfels.151 On 12 November Gustav Adolf 
undertook a reconnaissance in force to Weissenfels, where Wallenstein, reinforced by a 
Leaguist corps under Pappenheim, waited for him with his army in full battle array. Since 
this important battle plan of the Imperial army survived, we know what regiments of 
Wallenstein’s army were present on that day (Fig. 73).152 
 
                                                 
150 Seidler 1954, 37-39, Generalstaben 1939, 413-414, Guthrie 2002, 223-224. 
151 Brzezinski 2001, 31. 
152 Holl 1976, 59 and Fig. 3. 
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Gustav Adolf must have been impressed by the Imperial forces as he made no 
attempt to attack their position.153 With winter drawing near, both army commanders knew 
they could not supply their armies in these positions indefinitely. Wallenstein’s army, 
consisting of approximately 13,000 foot and 7,500 horse and an estimated 5,000 camp 
followers and 2,500 horses in addition for the baggage train, artillery train and cavalry 
reserve horses, consumed approximately 125 tons of food and forage per day and the 
Swedish army probably not much less.154 After four days 1,000 tons of food and forage 
was consumed and the area was almost certainly picked clean by then. To avoid a disaster 
comparable to that suffered by the Swedish army at Nurnberg two month before,155 
Wallenstein made the first move. In the morning of 14 November he dispersed his army 
and sent it to winter quarters (Fig. 6).156 His order survived, but it lists seven regiments 
which are neither mentioned in the Weissenfels’ battle plan nor in the Trauttmansdorff 
list.157 The order is therefore very likely not a plan only for Wallenstein’s army at 
Weissenfels, but instead the order for winter quarters of his whole army in Saxony, 
including those regiments already in garrison.158 
 
Wallenstein was often criticised for dispersing his army at that time,159 but all he 
needed was to be ahead of the Swedish King by two days. Once his regiments were 
entrenched, he would have been in a strong position during the winter, cutting off Swedish 
supply lines from the Baltic Sea, dividing the Swedish and Saxon armies, and supplying 
his own army from enemy territory. Another motivation for dispersing his army was the 
news he received from the Rhineland, where in the absence of Pappenheim, Swedish 
                                                 
153 Relation from 1632 (Droysen 1880, 6). 
154 According to Engels (1980, 18) each person consumes three pounds of food (Schwendi 1594, 172) and 
each horse twenty pounds of forage per day. Both armies had access to water. 
155 At Nurnberg the Swedish army lost approximately 10,000 soldiers and 10,000 to 12,000 horses, most of 
them due to epidemics, desertion and in the case of the horses also starvation (Engerisser 2007, 116). 
156 Brzezinski 2001, 32. The connection between Wallenstein’s retreat and logistical problems has not been 
subjected to research yet, but the underdeveloped nature of the early modern economy caused logistical 
problems throughout the Thirty Years War in general (Parrott 2011, 133). Naumburg and Weissenfels are 
both located on the Saale, a small, navigable river. The importance of river transport during the Thirty Years 
War is mentioned by Monro (1637, part II, 50), in this case for the Swedish camp at Werben in 1631. 
However, Wallenstein’s river supply route was blocked by the Swedish army to the south and a Saxon 
garrison at Halle to the north. Concentrations of larger forces could not be supplied for more than a few days. 
As an example, food began to run low in two days after the 75,000-strong Confederate army had 
concentrated at Gettysburg in 1863, despite modern means of transportation (Engels 1980, 45). 
157 Hallwich 1912a, 480-484. Regiments: Hatzfeld, Trcka Foot, Thun, Contreras, Mohr vorm Wald, 
Scharffenberg and Czernin. For the Trauttmansdorff list see section 2.2.4 and below. 
158 Priorato’s (1672, 119) list of regiments (section 2.2.2.5) is incorrect. 
159 Parker 1984, 131, Englund 1998, 129, Guthrie 2002, 196. See Seidler (1954, 28) for criticism of the 
dispersal and Deuticke (1917, 49). 
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forces threatened Cologne.160 Wallenstein had to send Pappenheim with his corps back to 
prevent losing the whole Rhineland. 
 
On the same day, 14 November, the Swedish army was mustered and a record of 
this survives, providing exact numbers of infantry and approximate numbers of cavalry for 
each regiment that day.161 When Gustav Adolf heard about Wallenstein dispersing his 
army he followed him the next day, but left a garrison in Naumburg, hoping he could catch 
Wallenstein by surprise.162 Gustav Adolf’s advance was delayed by a small group of 
Croats and dragoons at Rippach, who held the high ground on the eastern side of the small 
stream just long enough to give Wallenstein time to gather his forces (Fig. 54).163 
 
 
Figure 6: Wallenstein’s 14 November dispersal plan. 
 
Wallenstein, then on his way to Leipzig, was at that time 6km northeast of Rippach 
in the town of Lützen with a corps of only ten regiments, approximately 6,000 men strong, 
when he was informed of Gustav Adolf’s approach around midday.164 With the Swedish 
army on his heels, he could not move without risking being chased out of Saxony and 
losing his slow moving artillery train. Wallenstein opted to stay at Lützen and prepare for 
                                                 
160 Brzezinski 2001, 32. 
161 Langman 1632, 162. 
162 Brzezinski 2001, 34. 
163 Brzezinski 2001, 34-38. 
164 The Regiments Waldstein, Chiesa, Altsachsen, Baden, Holk, Hagen, Lohe, Westfalen, Drost and Beygott 
(Hallwich 1912a, 482-483). It is not entirely certain if Wallenstein had only his corps at Lützen at midday on 
15 November or if there were also parts of the rear guards of other corps. 
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battle. His other corps’ were already one and a half days on their way from Weissenfels to 
their winter quarters but he hoped to gather enough troops to face the Swedish army the 
next day. 
 
3.1.2 Imperial army at Lützen 
 
There was a debate about which regiments managed to return in time for the battle on 16 
November until Barbara Stadler published the Trauttmansdorff list in 1991.165 According 
to this list, all regiments of the Weissenfels army returned to Lützen in time except the 
Mannsfeld166 and Suys Regiments and most of Pappenheim’s corps, of which only the 
Bredau and Tontinelli Regiments arrived before battle. The arrival of two of Pappenheim’s 
regiments before the battle might be the reason why some secondary sources, but only two 
eyewitnesses, reported incorrectly that Pappenheim arrived with all his cavalry regiments 
before battle (section 8.3.1). 
 
Some units that were probably at Lützen are not mentioned in the Trauttmansdorff 
list. It lists only one Croat167 unit, that of Isolani. But Croats are mentioned on the 
Weissenfels’ battle plan, not by their regiment name but only generally as “Croats”.168 
Since it can be shown that Wallenstein had the Croat Regiment of Beygott in his corps at 
Lützen and Isolani was the General of all Croats it is very likely that “Isolani” in the 
Trauttmansdorff list means any number of Croat regiments including his own. There was at 
least one Croat regiment on the right Imperial wing (section 6.3). Fleetwood mentioned a 
fierce combat between Stalhandske’s 500 Finns and the Croats on the Imperial left wing at 
the beginning of the battle, which would not have been worth mentioning, if it were only 
one Croat regiment.169 It is therefore very likely, that Wallenstein had more than two Croat 
regiments, possibly, in addition to Isolani and Beygott, the Regiments of Corpes170 and 
Révay, listed in Brzezinski’s order of battle.171 A company of Reinach’s Regiment of 
Pappenheim’s corps was in Weissenfels in garrison and able to reach Lützen, closely 
                                                 
165 Stadler 1991, 891-892. See also Brzezinski 2001, 48. The list is often overlooked in modern publications 
(Guthrie 2002, 223-224). 
166 Mannsfeld’s Regiment was on his way to Eilenburg to support the Regiments Trcka Foot, Thun and 
Hatzfeld against the 6,000 strong Saxon corps of Herzog Georg von Braunschweig-Lüneburg at Torgau (Holl 
1976, 67, Brzezinski 2001, 29). 
167 Irregular light cavalry recruited in Hungary (section 3.3.2.3). 
168 Holl 1976, 64a, Fig. 3. 
169 Fleetwood 1632, 7, Schürger 2011. 
170 Mentioned by Holk’s payment list (Hallwich 1912a, 577-578). 
171 Brzezinski 2001, 25. 
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pursued by the Swedish army.172 The Harquebusier Regiment Leutersheim is mentioned in 
the Trauttmansdorff list and Wallenstein’s dispersal plan, but not in the Weissenfels’ battle 
plan. It was probably on patrol or in a nearby garrison on 12 November, but arrived in time 
for the fighting at Lützen on 16 November. 
 
In theory, most Imperial regiments consisted of ten companies, as the Imperial war 
lists suggest, but those lists are not entirely reliable (section 2.2.3). Many companies were 
detached from their regiments; furthermore, the strength of companies varies substantially 
so the number of companies in a regiment does not reveal much about the regiment’s 
manpower. The only reliable source mentioning a total number of companies in Lützen is 
Holk’s letter to Christian IV. He stated that there were 36 cavalry companies on each 
Imperial wing, a figure that almost matches Brzezinski’s calculations.173 
 
Excursus: Wallenstein’s musketeer reserve 
One of the few uncertainties in Holk’s account is his statement 
 
“och sidst stode udcommenderet 5 Fahner à 500 Mand til foedz”174 
 
about the Imperial reserve.175 Holk himself admitted that he would have liked to deploy 
1,000 musketeers in the town of Lützen and the wood to his left if he had them. Under this 
circumstance it seems very unlikely that he deployed 2,500 musketeers in reserve. The 
term “Fahner” means infantry colour, which could be a company or regiment colour. In the 
context of a unit it usually means a company, as regiments are referred to as regiments. 
The theoretical full strength of an Imperial company was 343 men; the actual field strength 
was much less. In Gallas’ corps on 7 November 1632, each company had an average 
strength of 68 men.176 It is therefore much more likely that Holk meant “five companies 
with a total of 500 men”, which is confirmed by Diodati, who stated that the infantry 
reserve consisted of one squadron which, together with the 7,000 men in seven brigades 
and 700 detached musketeers, yields a total of 8,200 infantrymen.177  
                                                 
172 Brzezinski 2001, 25. 
173 Wittrock 1932, 308. Brzezinski (2001, 25) assumes 37 companies on the left and 36 on the right wing. All 
other calculations, such as those of Generalstaben 1939, 413-414 (29 and 50 companies) and Guthrie 2002, 
223 (38 and 41 companies), are inaccurate. 
174 “And last stood a detachment of five flags of 500 men on foot each.“ 
175 Wittrock 1932, 308. 
176 Hallwich 1912a, 448. Number of companies according to Toegel 1977, 397-399. Note: Average troop 
strengths give only a clue to the strength of other units and they are under no circumstance qualified to 
calculate the actual field strength of an entire army, because they can vary substantially. See also below. 
177 Fiedler 1864, 561. See also Seidler 1954, 125, ref. 79 and 82, Brzezinski 2001, 39 and Sennewald 2013, 
169. According to Brzezinski (2001, 25) there were 8,550 infantrymen, but he admitted that those numbers 
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Cuirassiers Commanders Coy Str. YoR Destination 
Desfours (b, c, f) Oberst Nicolas Desfours 6 300 1628 Chemnitz 
Götz (c, d, f) Oberstleutnant Moritz von Falkenberg 9 400 1626 Zwickau 
Holk (b, e, f, j) Oberstleutnant Frantz von Uhlefeld 8 250 1630 Leipzig 
Lohe (a, b, c, e) Oberst von der Lohe 5 150 1632 Leipzig 
Trcka (b, c, f, g) Oberst Adam Erdmann Graf von Trcka 4 250 1629 Altenburg 
Bredau (a, f)* Oberst Hans Rudolf von Bredau 6 300 1631 Aschersleben 
Harquebusiers      
Drost (e) Oberst Wilhelm von Westfalen, Landdrost und 
Dringenberg 
5 250 1632 Leipzig 
Goschütz (f, g) Oberst Benedikt Goschütz 5 250 1632 Merseburg 
Hagen (e, g) Oberst Johann Nicolaus Hagen von Sauwenbein 13 800 1631 Leipzig 
Leutersheim Oberst Johann Freiherr von Leutersheim 6 200 1632 Eilenburg 
Loyers (f) Oberst Gottfried Freiherr von Loyers 5 200 1632 Merseburg 
Piccolomini (b, c, d, 
j) 
Oberst Ottavio Piccolomini di Aragona 12 500 1629 Altenburg 
Tontinelli* Oberstleutnant Anton Tontinelli 6 250 1619 Merseburg 
Westfalen (e) Oberst Heinrich Leo von Westfalen 3 150 1632 Leipzig 
Westrumb (a) Oberst Johann von Westrumb 3 100 1632  
Dragoons      
Trcka  5 100 1632 Merseburg 
Croats      
Isolani (j) General Ludwig Johann Hector Graf von Isolani 5 250 1625 Merseburg 
Beygott (e) Oberst Daniel Beygott 5 100 1632 Leipzig 
Corpes (j) Oberst Marcus Corpes 10 300 1631 Eileburg 
Révay Oberst Paul Freiherr von Révay 5 250 1632  
Infantry      
Baden (a, e, j) Oberstleutnant Stopler 6 ** 1630 Leipzig 
Friedrich Breuner 
(h, j) 
Oberst Philipp Friedrich von Breuner 10 ** 1632 Zwickau 
GFZM Breuner (b, 
c, h, j) 
Generalfeldzeugmeister Hans Philipp von 
Breuner 
13 ** 1618 Chemnitz 
Jung-Breuner (c, j) Oberst Hans Gottfried von Breuner 5 ** 1630 Zwickau 
Colloredo (c, h) Generalwachtmeister Rudolf von Colloredo 7 ** 1625 Zwickau 
Comargo (b, h, j) Oberst Theodor Comargo 10 ** 1619 Altenburg 
Grana (c, h) Oberst Francesco Grana, Marchese di Caretto 8 ** 1627 Altenburg 
Chiesa178 (e, j) Oberstleutnant Matias Lasky or 
Oberst Andreas Matthias Kehraus 
12 ** 1618 Leipzig 
Reinach (detachm.)  1 ** 1620 Weissenfels 
Alt-Sachsen (c, e) Oberstleutnant Bernhard Hämmerle 8 ** 1618 Leipzig 
Waldstein (b, c, e) Oberst Berthold von Waldstein 11 ** 1628 Leipzig 
italic: Units not mentioned in the Trauttmansdorff list, but probably at Lützen. 
* Regiments of Pappenheim’s corps arriving before battle 
** A total of 8,200 infantry 
Red: Leaguist regiment  Black: Imperial regiment 
Coy: Number of Companies  YoR: Year of Recruitment 
Str.: Strength according to Brzezinski 2001, 25-26, highly speculative 
Destination: Destination of units according to Wallenstein’s dispersal plan 
(a, b…): see below 
Table 4: Imperial army at Lützen according to the Trauttmansdorff list. 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
were highly speculative. Generalstaben (1939, 413) and Guthrie (2002, 223) gave a number of 9,870, which 
is too high (see also Eriksson 2006, 235, Larsson/Villstrand/Wolke 2006, 128, Wolke 2007, 64). 
178 Chiesa himself was in Frauenstein on 16 November (Hallwich 1912a, 505). Oberstleutnant Kehraus 
commanded the Regiment Dohna in 1632 (Toegel 1977, 397 and 409), but was promoted to Oberst and put 
in charge of Chiesa’s Regiment in late 1632. However, it is uncertain whether before or after the battle (See 
also Brzezinski 2001, 25 and 48). 
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Regiments at Lützen mentioned by eyewitnesses (a-d) or documents (e-j): 
a: Münchhausen (Wittrock 1932, 305) 
b: Holk (Wittrock 1932, 309) 
c: Diodati (Fiedler 1864, 563-567) 
d: Piccolomini (Argang 1894, 88) 
e: Wallenstein’s corps according to the disposition of 14 November 1632 (Hallwich 1912a, 482-
483) 
f: Verzeichnis der Beschädigten (Hallwich 1912a, 596-598) 
g: Protocols of the court martial at Prague (Seidler 1954, 141-148) 
h: Wallenstein’s letter to Falchetti, 22 November 1632, Chemnitz (Hallwich 1912a, 538-539) 
j: Holk’s payment list, 6 December 1632 (Hallwich 1912a, 577-578) 
 
Artillery 
nine 24-pounders, two 16-pounders, six 12-pounders, one 10-pounder, six 6-pounders 
Table 5: Imperial artillery at Lützen according to the Schwerin 1633 document 
(Generalstaben 1939, 414). 
 
Cuirassiers Commanders Coy Str. YoR Destination 
Sparr (g) Oberstleutnant Albrecht von Hofkirchen 10 300 1629 Halle 
Harquebusiers      
Bönninghausen (g) Oberst Lothar von Bönninghausen 11 500 1630 Aschersleben 
Lamboy (c, j) Oberst Wilhelm von Lamboy 6 250 1632 Halle 
Dragoons/Guard      
Merode’s ‘Obwacht‘ 
Lifeguard 
 1 40  Halle 
Pappenheim’s 
‘Rennfahne‘179 
Lifeguard 
 1 40  Halle 
Merode (j) Oberstleutnant Robert Borneval d'Arlin 5 160 1625 Halle 
Pappenheim (j)  4 140 1632 Halle 
Croats      
Batthyanyi Oberst Franz Graf Batthyanyi 9 200 1632 Halle 
Forgacs (c) Oberst Nicolas Forgacs de Gymes 2 100 1630  
Orossy Oberst Paulus Orossy 9 450 1631 Halle 
Cossacks      
Poles (j)  3 250 1631 Querfurt 
Table 6: Pappenheim’s cavalry arrived midday at Lützen. 
 
Infantry Commanders Coy Str. YoR Destination 
Gil de Haes Oberst Gil de Haes 6 500 1632 Halle 
Goltz Oberst Martin Maximilian Freiherr von  
der Goltz 
10 700 1626 Halle 
Moriamez-Pallant Oberst Karl Dietrich Pallant, Baron de  
Moriamez 
8 500 1632 Aschersleben 
Pallant Oberst Rudolf Freiherr von Pallant 10 500 1632 Halle 
Reinach Oberstleutnant Gabriel Freiherr Comargo 9 650 1620 Halle 
Würzburg Hauptmann Willich  75 1631 Halle 
Table 7: Pappenheim’s Infantry arrived on the evening at Lützen. 
 
Infantry Commanders Coy Str. YoR Destination 
Mannsfeld Oberstleutnant Niderum 10  1625 Eilenburg 
Suys Oberst Freiherr Ernest Rolland von Suys 10  1631 Zwickau 
Table 8: Regiments on Weissenfels’ battle plan and Wallenstein’s dispersal plan not arrived 
at Lützen. 
 
                                                 
179 ‘Rennfahne’ was the general term for 16th century elite cavalry advance guard (Fronsperger 1558, 84, 
Schwendi 1594, 72). 
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Infantry Commanders Coy Str. YoR Garrison 
Trcka Foot Oberstleutnant Adrian Enckhevoert 7  1631 Eilenburg 
Thun Oberst Graf Rudolf Thun 7  1631 Eilenburg 
Contreras Oberst Andreas von Contreras 5  1628 Altenburg 
Mohr vorm Wald Oberst Franz Wilhelm Mohr vorm Wald 10  1628 Freiberg 
Scharffenberg Oberst Gotthard von Scharffenberg 10  1630 Freiberg 
Cuirassiers      
Hatzfeld Oberst Mechior von Hatzfeld 6  1625 Eilenburg 
Harquebusiers      
Czernin Oberst Graf Czernin 10  1632 Freiberg 
Table 9: Regiments on Wallenstein’s dispersal plan probably already in garrison on 14 
November. 
 
Troop strength 
There are three accounts by Imperial eyewitnesses mentioning the Imperial army’s 
strength. Diodati180 and Münchhausen181 give a total number of 12,000 men, 6,000 infantry 
and 6,000 cavalry, while Holk stated that the infantry was 8,200 strong. Holk’s statement 
seems reliable, because this number would give the ten Imperial infantry regiments an 
approximate strength of 820 men. This can be compared to the average strength of 725 
men of the seven Imperial regiments in Gallas’ corps on 7 November 1632, which is a 
reasonable field strength.182 The total army strength of 12,000 in Diodati’s and 
Münchhausen’s accounts seems too low. It is, however, unlikely Diodati substantially 
changed the army’s strength in his report to the emperor because some battle eyewitnesses 
would have noticed. He certainly rounded the numbers down slightly so that Wallenstein’s 
retreat from Lützen looked more reasonable. It is also possible that he did not include those 
cavalry regiments arriving on the battlefield at the last minute (section 8.1.2) or the Croats. 
We can thus assume a total strength of approximately 13,000-14,000, but certainly not 
more than 15,000.183 That would have left Wallenstein with approximately 4,800-5,800 
cavalrymen: 1,000 as reserve in the centre and 1,900-2,400 on each wing.184 Together with 
                                                 
180 Fiedler 1864, 562. There is no hint in Diodati’s account that the Imperial army had 8,000 infantry and 
4,000 cavalry, as Deuticke (1917, 55) claimed. 
181 Wittrock 1932, 304. 
182 Letter from Gallas to Wallenstein (Hallwich 1912a, 448). The theoretical full strength of a regiment was 
2,000, but this was only a commission, given by the emperor or the Generalissimus to a colonel, allowing 
him to raise a regiment of 2,000 men (Wrede 1898, 33). There was probably not one regiment in the Imperial 
army, that ever had this strength, but the historical sources do not give any valuable information. The actual 
full strength was more likely 1,500 men and the field strength after a few month of campaigning much less. 
183 Most modern historians came to the conclusion that the Imperial army’s strength was 16,000 men or 
more. Their arguments derived, either from presuming that regiments which were actually somewhere else in 
garrison fought at Lützen (Generalstaben 1939, 413-414, Guthrie 2002, 223), or they calculated the Imperial 
army’s strength at Lützen according to estimated average company strengths of the Imperial army in 1633 
(Seidler 1954, 42). As long as there is no reason to doubt the eyewitnesses Diodati (Fiedler 1864, 562) or 
Holk (Wittrock 1932, 308), the numbers they give must be considered seriously (See Wedgewood 1938, 325, 
Sennewald 2013, 168). 
184 Brzezinski (2001, 25-26) gave a number of 5,350 cavalry, which fits within the limit of 14,000 men total. 
Also Junkelmann (1993, 453) calculated 6,000 cavalry, including Croats, and 8,000 to 9,000 infantry. 
Generalstaben (1939, 414) gave a number of 6,700 cavalry; Guthrie 2002, 223 (followed by 
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150 musketeers, each wing would have had 2,050-2,550 men against approximately 2,400 
Swedes of the first line, which seems a reasonable number and matches eyewitness 
accounts, who reported a long and fierce combat on both wings. 
 
Artillery 
The number of Imperial artillery pieces and their calibre is not entirely certain, as there are 
almost no Imperial eyewitnesses mentioning any number of guns. The Swedes captured the 
entire Imperial heavy artillery at Lützen. According to Schwallenberg, nine 24-pounders 
and twelve other guns were taken, but it is uncertain whether or not those were all the 
cannon or only the intact ones.185 A document from 18 April 1633 stated that the captured 
Imperial artillery from Lützen arrived in Mecklenburg, consisting of nine 24-pounders, two 
16-pounders, two 14-pounders, four 12-pounders, one 10-pounder and six 7-pounders.186 
The nine 24-pounders are consistent with Schwallenberg’s and Knyphausen’s statement; 
the latter also mentioned six 12-pounders and four 6-pounders.187 
 
Only two Protestant eyewitnesses gave specific numbers of Imperial guns at 
Lützen. The most reliable source is Oberst Dalbier, who probably commanded the captured 
small Imperial battery, which consisted of four 24-pounders and two 12-pounders. Again, 
it is not certain if this number is the total number or only the small Imperial battery guns 
not destroyed.188 This is confirmed by Silvio Piccolomini, who mentioned incorrectly that 
the Imperial army lost six pieces, which seems in reality to have been small Imperial 
battery cannon only, near which he had fought.189 The other Protestant eyewitness, who 
gave the specific number of Imperial artillery cannon (21 in total) in common with most 
other sources, is Fleetwood.190 He stated that the windmill battery had nine guns, and 
twelve guns were in two or three other batteries, a statement that contradicts almost all 
other sources. Fleetwood probably never went close to the frontline and therefore could not 
see single guns, which might explain the low total of guns he gave for the windmill battery, 
                                                                                                                                                    
Larsson/Villstrand/Wolke 2006, 128, Wolke 2007, 64) claimed 6,900 and Pfaffenbichler (2007, 269) 7,500; 
all three are too high. 
185 Hallwich 1912a, 523. Watts (1633, 152) gives almost the same number: Nine 24-pounders and 11-12 field 
pieces. A total number of 21 guns is mentioned by the Relation from 1633 (Droysen 1880, 32) and Gottfried 
1633, 25-26, copied by Glaubwürdiger Bericht 1633, Monro 1637, part II, 164, Abelinum 1646, 750 and 
Chemnitz 1648, 464. 
186 Schwerin 1633, Generalstaben 1939, 414. The strange calibres are probably due to the use of different 
pounds in use in the various countries (see section 3.2). Specifications in the Schwerin 1633 document are 
probably calculated according the Swedish pound. A 14-pounder in Swedish pounds is a 12-pounder in 
Saxon pounds and a 7-pounder would be a 6-pounder. 
187 Studien 1844, 50. 
188 Dalbier 1632, 252. 
189 Archivio 1871, 240. 
190 Fleetwood 1632, 7. 
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but he certainly could see whole batteries firing. Since we know that the Imperial army had 
only two main batteries, the other 1-2 batteries mentioned by Fleetwood are possibly 
regimental guns. This suggestion is supported by a sketch in the Stockholm Krigsarkivet 
which shows a total of three batteries and the copperplate published in The Swedish 
Intelligencer which shows two smaller batteries between the main batteries.191 The 
painting by Snayer shows the Imperial artillery deployed in ten batteries flanking each of 
the five infantry squadrons of the first line centre; two large batteries are on the flanks and 
eight small batteries, probably regimental guns, are posted between the infantry 
squadrons.192 
 
No historical source makes explicit mention of any Imperial regimental guns at 
Lützen, which does not mean that there were none.193 When Wallenstein was reinstated as 
Generalissimus in December 1631194 and reassembled his army, he asked his colonels on 
14 May 1632 if they had their regimental guns or if they were obtainable.195 Additional 
evidence might be war lists no. 14 and 15 from 1632 giving a number of two light pieces 
for every regiment, but this seem more likely a theoretical figure than the actual number.196 
Nevertheless, these documents suggest that Wallenstein had regimental guns at Lützen, but 
certainly not as many as were mentioned in the sources otherwise, and that there were two 
to eight batteries with two or four guns per battery, but probably not more than 16 in 
total.197 
 
3.1.3 Swedish army at Lützen 
 
Gustav Adolf’s tactical plan was to force parts of Wallenstein’s dispersed army to engage 
on 15 November. Most of the Swedish baggage train was left with a garrison in Naumburg, 
which very likely consisted of one brigade, probably that of Vitzthum. The main sources 
for the Swedish army at Lützen are Langmann’s 14 November 1632 list of the army at 
Naumburg and the incomplete Swedish casualty list with the number of foot soldiers killed 
at Lützen.198 There are secondary sources, most based on the Inventarium Sueciae which 
lists Swedish cavalry regiments at Lützen and corresponds with Langmann’s list, and 
                                                 
191 Brzezinski 2001, 50 and 52. 
192 Pieter Snayers, Die Schlacht bei Lützen, Heeresgeschichtliches Museum Wien, Inv. Nr. GG1820. 
193 As Seidler (1954, 35) claimed. It is most unlikely that all regimental guns were in Gallas’ corps, as 
(Stadler 1991, 729) suggested. 
194 The exact date is unknown, but possibly mid-December (Kortus 2010, 117-118). 
195 Mittheilungen 1882, 346. 
196 Toegel 1977, 404 and 417. 
197 Brzezinski (2001, 25) suggests two regimental guns per front line battalion or ten in total. 
198 Langman 1632, 162, Mankell 1861, 126-128. See also section 2.2.3. 
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which are accepted by modern historians. Gustav Adolf’s plan to launch a surprise attack 
suggests that he took all regiments except the Naumburg garrison with him. However, it 
should be noted that there is no first-hand evidence for Swedish cavalry at Lützen.199 
 
Six infantry regiments that were in Naumburg on 14 November are completely 
missing from the casualty list. The six were Hard, Hastfer, Brandenstein, Erbach, Uslar and 
Vitzthum, but since the casualty list is incomplete, absence is therefore not proof that those 
regiments did not fight at Lützen. When historical sources mention any Protestant infantry, 
they usually refer to brigades instead of regiments, so it is not entirely certain whether a 
brigade had all their regiments present at Lützen. Nevertheless, it seems that the ten 
brigades of Gustav Adolf’s main army in Saxony remained intact as brigades without 
single regiments being detached to different places. One missing regiment is mentioned by 
Johann Hallenus, who wrote that two officers were sent to him to provide him with 
information of the battle. One of these men was Fändrik Ambrosius Jacobsson, an officer 
in Hastfer’s Regiment.200 Hard’s Regiment was part of the Swedish Brigade and therefore 
very likely in Lützen, as was Brandenstein’s Regiment, which was part of the ‘9th 
Brigade’.201 The Erbach’s and Uslar’s Regiments were very likely part of ‘Vitzthum’s 
Brigade’ and therefore probably guarding the camp at Naumburg.202 This 850 strong 
garrison had to protect the supply base and was the last defence if the battle at Lützen 
ended in a disaster. A djurskyttar company of 48 mounted riflemen accompanied Gustav 
Adolf to Germany in 1630 as part of his personal entourage (section 3.3.3.4).203 Although 
this unit is not mentioned in any Swedish troop lists of the Battle of Lützen, it is very likely 
that they took part, as they were usually not mentioned in muster rolls. In total the Swedish 
army at Lützen fielded 19,272 men, 13,032 infantry and approximately 6,240 cavalry. 
 
Artillery 
There are no eyewitness accounts or documents giving a total number of Swedish artillery 
pieces. The eyewitness Vitzthum/Berlepsch was alone in stating that the battle was opened 
by three Swedish 24-pounders (section 8.1.3).  Almost all research, contemporary and 
                                                 
199 Brzezinski 2001, 50. Watts 1633, 128 and Gottfried 1633, 27-28, copied by Wahrhaftige Beschreibung 
1633, Glaubwürdiger Bericht 1633, Abelinum 1646, 751-752 and Chemnitz 1648, 463-464. According to 
Khevenhiller (1726, 189), the Relation from 1633 (Droysen 1880, 29) and the sketch in Stockholm 
Krigsarkivet (Brzezinski 2001, 52) there were only four squadrons per line on each wing, which is incorrect. 
200 Mankell 1860, 661. 
201 A ‘9th Brigade’ is mentioned by Hülshorst (Wittrock 1932, 303). 
202 According to Watts (1633, 121), Oberst Damian Vitzthum was left as commander of the garrison of 
Naumburg (Brzezinski 2001, 22), but he remained unclear about the units under his command. However, all 
Swedish infantry was usually grouped into brigades and it is therefore likely that the Regiments Vitzthum, 
Uslar and Erbach formed a brigade. 
203 Brzezinski/Hook 2006, 67-68. 
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modern, is based on the Inventarium Sueciae, according to which the Swedish army had 20 
larger cannon and 40 regimental guns.204 Although the numbers from the Inventarium 
Sueciae seem reasonable when compared to the 42 regimental guns the Swedish army had 
at Breitenfeld on 17 September 1631, doubts remains until we have more reliable 
sources.205 Gustav Adolf experimented with leather guns as regimental guns during the 
Swedish-Polish War (1621-1629), but they tended to explode if fired continuously in rapid 
succession.206 In Germany the Swedish army usually used cast iron 3-pounder guns instead 
of leather guns,207 but they probably had also some small calibre German ‘Falkonett’-type 
artillery pieces, as they were common in Germany, but are usually not mentioned in 
historical sources.208 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
204 Gottfried 1633, 27, copied by Wahrhaftige Beschreibung 1633, Glaubwürdiger Bericht 1633, Abelinum 
1646, 751-752 and Chemnitz 1648, 464. Watts (1633, 128) gives a number of 24 larger cannons and 40 
regimental guns. 
205 Brzezinski/Hook 2006, 70. 
206 Brzezinski/Hook 2006, 70. 
207 Brzezinski/Hook 2006, 70. Nevertheless, leather guns were still used by the Scottish army at Newburn in 
1640 (Edwards 2002, 243). 
208 Engerisser 2007, 580. The German ‘Falkonett’-type artillery pieces have a slightly smaller calibre of 
3.8cm to 5.5cm than the English falconet’s 7cm. Pappenheim was reported to have been shot by a 
‘Falkonett’, but the reliability of this statement is not entirely certain (section 8.3.4). 
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Regiment Commander Coy Str YoR 
Smaland Överste Fredrik Stenbock 8 400 1627 
Östgöta Överstelöjtnant Lennart Nilsson Baat 4 100 1627 
Uppland Överstelöjtnant Isaak Axelsson 4 250 1627 
Södermanland Överste Otto Sack 4 200 1627 
Västgöta Överste Knut Soop 8 400 1627 
Finland Överste Torsten Stalhandske 8 500 1627 
Georg von Uslar Oberst Georg von Uslar 8 160 1630 
Hessian squadron: 
  Rostein 
 
Oberst Friedrich Rostein 
 
5 
 
180 
 
  Kurt von Dalwigk Oberstleutnant Kurt von Dalwigk  100  
  Franz von Dalwigk Oberst Franz von Dalwigk  50  
  Thilo Albrecht von Uslar Rittmeister Birckenfeld  50  
Beckermann Oberst Eberhard Beckermann 4 150  
Bulach Oberst Klaus Konrad Zorn von Bulach 8 120 1631 
Goldstein Oberstleutnant Marx Conrad von Rehlinger 8 150 1632 
Duke Wilhelm Oberst Herzog Wilhelm von Sachsen-Weimar 12 120 1631 
Bernhard‘s Life Regiment Oberstleutnant Bouillon 12 500 1631 
Carberg Oberst Carl Joachim Carberg 8 220 1630 
Kurland Oberst Hans Wrangel 4 230 1630 
Livland Oberstleutnant Karl von Tiesenhausen 8 300 1630 
Courville Oberst Nicholas de Courville 5 300 1628 
Hofkirchen Oberstleutnant Henning von Geisto 12 350  
Ernst von Anhalt Oberst Ernst von Anhalt-Bernburg 8 300  
Löwenstein Oberst Georg Ludwig Graf von Löwenstein 6 200  
Brandenstein Oberst Brandenstein 4 300  
Steinbach Oberst Jaroslav Wolf von Steinbach 4 200  
Stechnitz Oberstleutnant Georg Matthias von Stechnitz 4 80  
Öhm Oberst Johann Bernhard von Öhm 8 300 1626 
Krak‘s Djurskyttar (b) Kapten Nils Krak 1 30 1611 
a: Infantry regiments not listed in the Swedish casualty list. 
b: Not listed in any source, but probably took part in the battle as part of Gustav Adolf’s entourage. 
c: Regimental commander Oberst Caspar Graf von Eberstein commanded the right wing 
musketeer detachment. 
d: Regimental commander Oberst Hans Abraham Graf von Gersdorf commanded the left wing 
musketeer detachment. 
 
m: musketeers 
p: pikemen 
offs: officers 
 
colours: 
blue: Swedish army, national Swedish regiments 
black: Swedish army, foreign regiments 
green: Hessian allies 
red: Saxon allies 
 
Table 10: Swedish cavalry at Lützen according to Langmann’s list and Swedish casualty list. 
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Regiment Commander Coy Str YoR 
Swedish or New Blue 
Brigade: 
Överstelöjtnant Gabriel Kyle  1,575  
Eric Hand’s New Blue 
Regiment 
Överstelöjtnant Gabriel Kyle 8 465m, 267p, 96offs 1628 
Karl Hard (a)  8 447m, 96offs  
Klas Hastfer (a)  4 156m, 48offs  
Yellow Brigade: Generalmajor Nils Brahe, Greve till 
Visingborg 
 1,221  
Royal Lifeguard Kaptenlöjtnant Erik Stenbock 1 45m, 38p, 12offs  
Yellow Guard Regiment Generalmajor Nils Brahe, Greve till 
Visingborg 
16 610m, 324p, 192offs 1624 
Old Blue Brigade: Oberst Hans Georg aus dem Winckel  1,110  
Winckel's Old Blue 
Regiment 
Oberst Hans Georg aus dem Winckel 16 486m, 432p, 192offs 1624 
Green Brigade: Oberst Georg Wulf von Wildenstein  2,036  
Bernhard‘s Green Life 
Regiment 
Oberstleutnant Johann Winckler 12 396m, 210p, 142offs 1627 
Wildenstein‘s Black 
Regiment 
Oberst Georg Wulf von Wildenstein 12 468m, 102p, 142offs 1629 
Leslie's Scotts Oberstleutnant Ludovick Leslie 16 360m, 24p, 192offs  
Duke Wilhelm’s Brigade: Oberst Carl Bose  1,726  
Duke Wilhelm’s Life 
Regiment 
Oberstleutnant Georg Philip von Zehm 12 276m, 78p, 142offs  
Carl Bose Oberst Carl Bose 8 540m, 156p, 96offs  
Pforte Oberst Hans von der Pforte 4 306m, 84p, 48offs  
White Brigade: Generalmajor Dodo von Innhausen und 
zu Knyphausen 
 1,120  
Knyphausen‘s White 
Regiment 
Generalmajor Dodo von Innhausen und 
zu Knyphausen 
12 708m, 270p, 142offs 1630 
Thurn’s Brigade: Oberst Hans Jacob Graf von Thurn  1,252  
Thurn’s Black Regiment Oberst Hans Jacob Graf von Thurn 8 240m, 144p, 96offs 1629 
Isenburg Oberst Wolfgang Heinrich Graf von 
Isenburg-Büdingen 
8 120m, 54p, 96offs  
Hessen-Kassel‘s Green 
Life Regiment 
Oberstleutnant Hans Heinrich von 
Güntherode (c) 
12 216m, 144p, 142offs  
Mitzlaff’s Brigade: Oberst Joachim Mitzlaff  1,834  
Gersdorf Oberstleutnant (d) 8 330m, 96p, 96offs  
Mitzlaff Oberst Joachim Mitzlaff 12 342m, 198p, 142offs  
Rossow Oberst Friedrich von Rossow 8 366m, 168p, 96offs  
‘9th Brigade’:   1,158  
Brandenstein (a) Oberst Brandenstein 4 198m, 48offs  
Löwenstein Oberst Georg Ludwig Graf von 
Löwenstein 
7 600m, 84offs  
Henderson Oberst John Henderson 4 180m, 48offs  
Table 11: Swedish infantry at Lützen according to Langman’s list and Swedish casualty list. 
 
‘Vitzthum’s Brigade‘: Oberst Damien Vitzthum von Eckstädt  850  
Dam Vitzthum (a) Oberst Damien Vitzthum von Eckstädt 8 150m, 24p, 96offs  
Erbach (a) Oberst Georg Friedrich Graf von Erbach 8 144m, 18p, 96offs  
Thilo Albrecht von Uslar 
Guard (a) 
Oberstleutnant Alexander von Östringer 12 144m, 36p, 142offs  
Table 12: Probable garrison of Naumburg. 
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3.2 Firearms 
 
One of the main concerns within the field of 17th century battlefield archaeology is 
matching firearms ammunition to weapon types and models, and their assignment to 
different service branches and armies. This issue is the key to understanding the 
distribution of firearms, as represented by archaeological recovery of particular types of 
ammunition, and therefore being able to make interpretive assessments of gunfire combat 
and sequencing a battle’s events. Unfortunately, 17th century battlefield archaeology has 
barely scratched the surface of this important issue: the connection between gun barrel’s 
diameter and bullet calibre is not clearly understood. Moreover, not all 17th century 
firearms are known, nor is it known which army used which firearms during what period. 
 
The reason for this lack of knowledge is simple: A very wide range of different 
weapon models with substantially different calibres, often with different names, were in 
service. These can be analysed through recourse to three quite different sources – historical 
sources; ammunition from battlefields, sieges and ship wrecks; and modern firearms 
collections. This study, in turn, involves three fields of research – military history, 
battlefield archaeology, and weapons history. Of these three fields, military history has the 
longest academic tradition, but most historians, with very few exceptions, have failed to 
understand the relevance of precise firearm specifications and terminology, as well as their 
production and delivery dates to field units. Battlefield archaeology is still in its infancy 
and lacks the depth of experience and compilation of enough data to develop clear cut-
patterning. The study of weaponry is not an official academic field of research and 
therefore it is no surprise that there are very few 17th century firearms experts who have 
published their results.209 
 
Because of the complexity of this issue, firearms, ammunition, and their 
distributions are discussed across five chapters. It is the intention of this section to provide 
information on firearms production and export and the development of firearms models 
with their theoretical calibre specifications and windage dating back to a period three 
decades before the Battle of Lützen. The results will be compared and verified with 
ammunition archaeologically recovered from Lützen and other 17th century battlefields, 
sieges, and ship wrecks so as to be able to allocate bullets to the weapon types and models 
discussed in Chapter Five. Finally, the bullet distributions on the battlefield will be 
                                                 
209 Brzezinski/Hook 2006, Engerisser 2007. 
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discussed in Chapters Five through Eight and the results of the previous chapters verified 
according to their distribution patterns. 
 
In the Thirty Years War firearms were defined by the gun lock and the weapon 
type. There were three types of ignition systems, represented by different gun locks: 
Matchlock, wheel lock and snaphance. The matchlock required ignition using a burning 
fuse that had to be attached to the serpentine before each shot.210 The wheel lock had a 
spring-powered iron wheel with a roughened surface, which was wound up with a spanner. 
The wheel spun when the trigger was pulled running against a piece of marcasite or 
pyrites,211 causing sparks that ignited the priming powder. The snaphance was a precursor 
of the flintlock with a gunflint striking a steel plate and igniting the priming powder. The 
snaphance was not a common gun lock in the Thirty Years War except in Sweden, but 
Gustav Adolf made great efforts to replace his snaphance weapons with match lock 
weapons.212 
 
In general there were four types of firearms: Musket, arquebus, carbine and pistol. 
The musket was a heavy long gun. A light shoulder gun was called arquebus or caliver, but 
it was abandoned during the first half of the Thirty Years War with a few exceptions, Spain 
being an example.213 Both firearms were infantry matchlock weapons. A few wheel lock 
muskets (fire locks) were produced for dragoons and guards of artillery and ammunition; 
the burning fuse of the matchlock could detonate the gun powder supply, and they were 
easier to handle on horseback. Therefore, pistols and carbines, cavalry guns, were always 
equipped with a wheel lock. While 17th century pistols were short weapons with a length of 
30cm to 60cm, carbines could vary between 60cm and 120cm in length, and short carbines 
looked not much different from long pistols. Almost all barrels were smooth bore, but there 
were also a few rifled barrels used by marksmen. Most rifled weapons were wheel locks 
brought into the army by their owners who had used them in civilian competitions. They 
were fairly slow loading but also quite accurate in capable hands. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
210 Sivilich 2015, (30-31).  The ‘cock’ of a matchlock is called ‘serpentine’. 
211 It was mostly marcasite, not pyrites, used in wheel locks (Babits 1974, 7); however, both look very similar 
and were only listed as independent minerals since the mid-19th century. 
212 Engerisser 2007, 558, Brzezinski/Hook 2006, 20. 
213 Engerisser 2007, 548. 
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3.2.1 Production of firearms in the Thirty Years War 
 
The production of firearms, even the simple match lock muskets, was a complicated 
procedure and the knowledge was not widely spread. In addition, the exceptionally 
complicated wheel lock mechanism for pistols and carbines had to be produced by 
specialists, probably by clock makers.214 Production also required a ready supply of iron. 
Firearms production was therefore largely centralised in a few cities. During the Thirty 
Years War neither the Habsburgs nor Sweden were able to supply their armies with 
firearms from national production as this was outstripped by demand due to the large scale 
recruitment of new regiments. Vast amounts of firearms had to be imported. In addition, 
many firearms were acquired by looting armouries in conquered cities and by recovering 
weapons from battlefields after a victory. The result of these various procurement 
processes was that soldiers were equipped with a variety of older and newer firearms, from 
different sources and with different calibres. 
 
Habsburg had two facilities for the production of firearms, at Ferlach and Styria. 
However, these came nowhere close to producing the numbers required by the Imperial 
army.215 Naturally, most firearm imports came from the Holy Roman Empire, as it was 
part of the Empire. Suhl, in the Duchy Saxony-Coburg, was the largest German 
manufacturer of firearms and one of the most important in Europe, with an output of 
28,950 muskets in 1631 and 1632.216 The iron ore of Suhl contains manganese, making it 
almost steel-like, which in turn makes it more resistant to catastrophic failure under 
explosive pressure, so accidents were probably not as frequent as with firearms from other 
facilities.217 The Suhl production centre was completely destroyed by the Imperial General 
Isolani in 1634.218 Two smaller facilities were in the free cities of Augsburg and Nurnberg; 
the latter was famous for its production of wheel locks.219 
 
Nurnberg and Saxony were Protestant while Augsburg had a unique Catholic-
Protestant government, but all three states remained neutral and maintained good relations 
                                                 
214 Sivilich 2015, (31). 
215 Brooker 2007, 53-57. 
216 Engerisser 2007, 549. 
217 Piersig 1990, 4, Engerisser 2007, 551. 
218 Engerisser 2007, 550. Due to the destruction of Suhl, Habsburg set up a new arms manufacturer in Vienna 
in 1634 (Brooker 2007, 57). 
219 Sivilich 2015, (22). Wheel locks were probably invented in Nurnberg, one of Europe’s technically most 
advanced cities (Engerisser 2007, 548). Essen was also an important arms manufacturer, but was captured 
and recaptured by Spanish and Dutch forces; their weapons were very likely exported to the Spanish-
Netherland theatre of war. 
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with the emperor.220 That changed in 1631 with the destruction of Magdeburg, because 
Saxony and Brandenburg entered the war on the Swedish side. With the Swedish victory 
over Tilly at Breitenfeld on 17 September 1631, there followed a Swedish triumphal 
progress through Germany in which Nurnberg and Augsburg were captured. Cut off from 
German weapons, it is not certain where Habsburg received firearms after 1631, especially 
in early 1632, when Wallenstein raised and equipped a whole new army.221 
 
When the Thirty Years War began Sweden was unable to produce large quantities 
of firearms, and in particular was unable to produce wheel locks at all; instead, Sweden 
had to rely largely on imports from the Netherlands, in particular from Amsterdam.222 The 
13,000 Swedish soldiers landing in Usedom in 1630 were very likely equipped chiefly with 
Amsterdam firearms. Although there was a substantial increase in firearms production in 
Jönköping,223 the increased number of regiments was even greater and by late 1632 the 
Swedish-Protestant army in Germany was 146,000 strong.224 The situation got better in 
early 1632, when all important German arms manufactories were either allied or captured 
and many armouries of captured cities were looted. 
 
3.2.2 Calibre, windage and firing range of firearms 
 
Few military firearms from the Thirty Years War have survived in museums because they 
were mostly undecorated, in comparison with more ornate, and therefore more collectable, 
civilian hunting weapons. Barrels could only be produced with a precision of 
approximately one millimetre. This lack of precision meant that even firearms of the same 
model had slightly different calibres225 and it is not certain how many barrels of original 
weapons have widened due to firing and corrosion and on what scale. Therefore, the key to 
understanding calibre, windage and the development of 17th century firearms is the 
historical sources, in particular military handbooks. Most historical sources refer to only 
one model of each weapon type, something of a consolidation of all weaponry of that type, 
which brought historians to the mistaken conclusion that weapons used by Thirty Years 
                                                 
220 Nurnberg remained neutral despite being in the Protestant Union, which was dissolved in 1621 
(Schormann 2004, 33). 
221 Pfaffenbichler (2007, 268) suggests that Wallenstein received muskets from Danzig and Holland in 1632. 
222 Engerisser 2007, 547, Brzezinski/Hook 2006, 9 and 54. The production of wheel locks in Sweden started 
approximately in 1640. 
223 Engerisser 2007, 549. 
224 Engerisser 2007, 452. 
225 Toifl 1989, 127. 
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War armies were standardized.226 Some military handbooks, like that of Johann Jakob von 
Wallhausen, first director of Johann von Nassau’s schola militaris in Siegen,227 counter 
this impression and designate two models – one older, still in service, and one modern, 
which he recommends.228 This comment provides valuable evidence of ongoing weapons 
development, upgrading, and replacement. Since historical sources do not state which 
weapon models were actually being used in which European armies, battlefield 
archaeology is better suited to resolve this question by analysing ammunition recovered 
from battlefields (Chapter Five). 
 
In historical sources, calibres of firearms were specified in bullets per pound. The 
reason for using weight and not a linear measure was a technical problem: the calliper rule 
was not invented. The actual weight of a pound varied according to region: England 
(453g), Saxony/Suhl (467g), Amsterdam (494g), Nurnberg (510g) and Sweden (425g). The 
Nurnberg silver pound (477g) was used occasionally, but not always with pistols, and on 
rare occasions was also applied to muskets.229 In addition, the calibre of firearms in 
bullets/pound was sometime designated by the buyer instead of the arms manufacturer. 
This became more and more common during the course of the war, in particular in 
Amsterdam and Suhl when they started selling huge amounts of firearms to England 
during the English Civil War.230 Furthermore, some arms manufactures changed their 
calibre to a foreign weight due to the influence of poached foreign specialists. 
Unfortunately, historical sources do not mention the weight system used for calibre 
specification and it takes a great deal of experience to figure out which weight was used.231 
One example of the complicated situation is the Swedish production of 10 bore muskets in 
Jönköping. The manager of the Swedish weapon manufacture was the Fleming, Louis de 
Geer. The calibre specification of the 10 bore musket was designated using the English 
pound instead of the Swedish or Flemish pound, because this particular musket was first 
produced by Dutch arms manufactures, who decided to use the English pound, because this 
weapon was also exported to England.232 
 
                                                 
226 Ortenburg 1984, 56, Busch 2000, 147. 
227 Parker 1996, 21. 
228 Wallhausen 1615, 32. 
229 Engerisser 2007, 547. As leading weapon manufacturer, the Nurnberg pound became a standard 
measurement in the early 17th century (Schwarz 1977, 207). 
230 Engerisser 2007, 547. 
231 Engerisser 2007, 544-563. 
232 Brzezinski/Hook 2006, 20, Engerisser 2007, 546. 
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Historical sources refer to two different calibre specifications, which are often 
confused or misunderstood: 
 
1. The calibre of the barrel is called ‘bore’, which defines the inside diameter of the 
barrel, and which is also the technical term in English and Dutch (‘gheboort’) 
sources.233 If a source does not specify, or if it refers to a weapon, then it refers to 
the ‘bore’. The technical term of the barrel’s calibre in German sources, such as in 
Wallhausen’s Kriegskunst zu Fuß, is usually ‘Schießende Kugel’ (firing bullet). 
This can easily be misunderstood when Wallhausen states:  
 
“Dann ein rechte Musquet höret acht Kugeln eines Pfunds schwer zu 
schießen…,”234  
 
which refers to the bore and not the bullet, even if he is referring to firing the gun. 
 
2. English sources refer to bullet calibre by stating that the bullet is ‘rolling (in)’, like 
Cruso did, while German and Dutch sources often use the term ‘Laufkugel/ 
loopende Coghel (running bullet)’ or they speak directly of the number of bullets 
that can be produced from a pound of lead.235 ‘Rolling (in)’, ‘Laufkugel’ and 
‘loopende Coghel’ are thus terms specifying the bullet calibre. Although these 
terms meant that the bullet will run down the barrel without ramming, 17th century 
bullets were always small enough to run down the barrel, except when soldiers 
were supplied with wrong calibre ammunition, or if the barrel was heavily fouled. 
 
Most sources give either the bore or the bullet calibre, few sources give both. The 
difference between bore and bullet calibre is the ‘windage’. The fact that some sources 
distinguish between bore and bullet calibre of one weapon model, like Cruso and the Dutch 
regulation from 1599, can be seen as evidence for specifying windage.236 Therefore, it may 
be assumed that windage was very likely already a fixed value in the late 16th century237 
and not just an unknown value merely based on experience. As far as we can tell from the 
few sources, musket windage was calculated by adding two to the calibre of the barrel in 
bullets/pound. If for example, the barrel of a musket has a calibre of 10 bullets/pound 
(19.7mm), the bullet calibre is 12 bullets/pound (18.5mm) and the windage 1.2mm. Since 
                                                 
233 Cruso 1632, 30, Ordre op de wapeninghe 1599, 144. 
234 “Then a true musket should be eight bullets to a pound heavy to fire.” Wallhausen 1615, 32. 
235 Cruso 1632, 30-31, Erlach 1629, 112, Ordre op de wapeninghe 1599, 144, Lavater 1644, 50-51. 
236 Cruso 1632, 30, Ordre op de wapeninghe 1599, 144. 
237 Standardization of windage was not a result of the Thirty Years War, as Roberts (1967b, 205) suggested. 
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this method leads to a smaller windage the smaller the calibre, windage of smaller calibre 
weapons, such as carbines and pistols, was calculated by adding four to twenty to the 
calibre of the barrel. This fixed value of windage is the basis for all further interpretations 
of bullets in Chapter Five. Windage, bore and bullet calibre are of course influenced by the 
inability to produce barrels and bullets within 1/10th millimetre. Therefore, the term 
‘theoretical calibre’ is used in this thesis for calibres mentioned in historical sources. 
 
In recent decades many tests have been made to figure out the effectiveness of 
firearms. Most important for the interpretation of bullet distributions is calculating the 
range to which these weapons could shoot, a value which allows the researcher to calculate 
where a bullet would finally land if it missed its target. Historians seem to agree that the 
maximum range of a musket during the Thirty Years War was approximately 200-300m,238 
which is confirmed by tests carried out by battlefield archaeologists, in which the bullet hit 
the ground at 200m and bounced another 100m.239 There are also some historical sources 
concerning the weapons’ ranges. Johann Boxel wrote in 1675 that they were able to fire 
through a wooden plank at a distance of 390m.240 On the other hand, Graf Cratz von 
Scharfenstein complained in 1634 that the gunpowder he received was of such a low 
quality that his musketeers were barely able to fire 80m using double the usual amount of 
gunpowder.241 Although these might be two extreme examples, they show that the firing 
range depends on the quality of the gunpowder, which may vary substantially from battle 
to battle. Also a weapon’s efficiency is influenced by its windage. Although a larger 
windage means less velocity and accuracy, the main concern was an easy loading process 
during battle when the barrel was fouled with gunpowder residues and speed of firing was 
all important.242 Considering that Swedish musketeers usually fired at point-blank range 
10-15m (section 3.3.3.1) and the Imperial musketeers probably at 70m (section 7.1.1), the 
maximum range becomes meaningless for the common soldier. 
 
The rate of fire of musketeers was one shot in 2.5 minutes according to 
Montecuccoli,243 although tests have established a rate of fire of two to three shots per 
                                                 
238 Effective range 100m, medium range 200m (Junkelmann 2004, 70). Effective range 225m (Ortenburg 
1984, 56). Effective range vs. armoured targets 100m and vs. unarmoured targets 200m (Engerisser 2007, 
552). 
239 Foard 2009, 122. 
240 Engerisser 2007, 552. 
241 Engerisser 2007, 553. 
242 Confirmed by tests in the Graz Armoury with original Thirty Years War firearms (Kalaus 1989, 46): A 
windage of 0.5-0.8mm results in an optimal loading process and velocity. At a larger windage, accuracy and 
velocity decrease and at a smaller windage, velocity increases while accuracy and loading time decrease. 
243 Veltzé 1899a, 330. 
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minute under best conditions.244 The actual rate of fire during a battle was more likely 
determined by the Thirty Years War infantry tactics, whose combat-deciding factor was 
the shock attack, less the ability of a musketeer to rapidly load and fire his weapon. This is 
reflected by the fact that musketeers usually carried no more than twelve charges of 
gunpowder in a battle, expecting to fire not more than twelve times.245 Buck shot, charging 
the weapon with a multiple load, was unknown in the Thirty Years War and no buckshot 
has been found at Lützen. 
 
3.2.3 Development of firearms from late 16th to mid-17th century 
 
3.2.3.1 Arquebuses and Calivers 
 
The arquebus was developed in France in the late 15th century from the German 20 bore 
Halbe Hakenbüchse (half hackbut).246 This match lock, smoothbore long gun with a weight 
of less than 5kg and a calibre of approximately 12mm to 14mm,247 became the first 
standard infantry gun powder weapon.248 Its high military value was demonstrated in 
particular by the Spanish army during the first half of the 16th century249 and from then on 
soon replaced longbows, crossbows and older gunpowder weapons in most European 
armies.250 
 
While the arquebus kept its name in France and Spain (arcabuz), most European 
countries developed their own version under different names: Caliver in England, Rohr or 
Schützenrohr in Germany, roer in Holland and rör in Sweden.251 To complicate matters, 
the arquebus later became a term for a cavalry weapon in the second half of the 16th 
century and gave its name to the new light cavalryman, the ‘harquebusier’.252 In order to 
enable the cavalryman to have it ready to fire from horseback, the match lock was replaced 
with a wheel lock. The barrel was constantly shortened during the 17th century and became 
a new weapon type, the carbine,253 but even then it was often still referred to as ‘arquebus’. 
 
                                                 
244 Engerisser 2007, 555. 
245 Engerisser 2007, 546. 
246 López/López 2012, 34, Fronsperger 1558, 44. 
247 Arquebus bullets from the ship La Trinidad Valencera, sunk in 1588 as part of the Spanish Armada, had a 
calibre of 13mm (Martin 2001, 81). 
248 López/López 2012, 35. 
249 López/López 2012, 6-7. 
250 Roberts 2002, 4. 
251 Brzezinski/Hook 2006, 19, Engerisser 2007, 548, Foard 2008, 81. 
252 Engerisser 2007, 559. 
253 From French ‘carabine’ (Engerisser 2007, 559). 
 78 
 
Figure 7: Left: Caliver s1 from Nurnberg, calibre 15.9mm, length 136cm (replica). Right: 
Caliverman (de Gheyn 1608). 
 
In the early 16th century, the mosquetta (mosquito) or musket, a much longer, 
heavier and larger calibre weapon than the arquebus which had to be fired with a rest, was 
developed in Spain and replaced the 8/10 bore Hakenbüchse (hackbut) in Germany in the 
late 16th century.254 Both arquebus and musket coexisted for at least half a century in two 
different military branches: the musketeers and the calivermen or Rohrschützen or 
arcabuceros.255 At the present, the use of calivers/arquebuses in Europe is generalized 
evidence for the Spanish-style infantry formation (section 3.3.3.2) except for Eastern 
European and Turkish armies. England, Holland and Germany were the first countries to 
abandon the caliver; in the first half of the Thirty Years War it was replaced by the musket, 
which had a better firing range.256 The last caliver models in Germany and Holland were 
produced in the early 17th century in Nurnberg, Amsterdam and Suhl. They had a larger 
calibre (20 bullets/pound, or 15.8mm and 15.9mm) than the Spanish version and a weight 
                                                 
254 Engerisser 2007, 544, Fronsperger 1558, 44. German 16th century infantry was equipped with three 
different portable firearms; the 20 bore Halbe Hakenbüchse, the 8/10 bore Hakenbüchse, and the 4 bore 
Doppelhaken. By the late 16th/early 17th century, they developed into the caliver, the musket, and the 
Doppelhaken (section 5.2.1) with similar calibres, which can be seen as a continuation of tactics and 
weaponry. 
255 Engerisser 2007, 548. 
256 Engerisser 2007, 548, Foard 2008, 81. In 1608 de Gheyn gave a detailed description of handling a caliver, 
while Wallhausen (1615, 42) recommended not to use calivers. However, according to Hrncirík (2011, 17-
21) some Leaguist infantry still used calivers during the Battles of Rakovnik (1620) and Rozvadov (1621), 
which suggests that the caliver took longer than expected to vanish completely (section 5.1.1.4). 
Montecuccoli 1736, 11. 
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of approximately 3-3.5kg.257 Despite reorganization of the infantry during the Thirty Years 
War, local militia (Landesdefension) and possibly some dragoons used calivers throughout 
the war.258 
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Nurnberg/Amsterdam Nurnberg silver s1 20 15.9 24 15.0 1590-1615 
Suhl Suhl s2 20 15.8 24 14.9 1590-1615 
* A designation of weapon models is introduced for simplification - small letter: out of date in 1632, capital 
letter: in production in 1632, M/m: musket, S/s: Caliver, C/c: carbine, P/p: pistol. 
** All calibres in millimetre are theoretical calibres. 
*** The dates are the approximate time frame of the weapon’s main service, but some weapons could have 
been in service much longer. 
Table 13: Caliver specifications. 
 
Sweden missed the musket’s development in the 16th century.259 It was due to 
Gustav Adolf’s military reform that the Swedish rör and snaphance weapons were replaced 
with muskets before Sweden entered the Thirty Years War in 1630.260 Spain never 
completely abandoned the arquebus261 until the development of a light musket model in the 
1630’s made them obsolete (see below), and it seems that a different version of the 
arquebus saw service until the second half of the 17th century in Turkey and Eastern 
Europe.262 
 
 
 
                                                 
257 Engerisser 2007, 548. 
258 Engerisser 2007, 548. 
259 The first documented delivery of muskets arrived in Sweden in 1592 (Brzezinski/Hook 2006, 19). 
260 Doughty/Gruber 1996, 15. 
261 The average composition of the Spanish infantry was 37% pikemen, 40% arquebusiers and 23% 
musketeers in 1601 (López/López 2012, 36), 37% pikemen, 42% arquebusiers and 21% musketeers in 1632 
and 31% pikemen, 11% arquebusiers and 56% musketeers in 1636 (Engerisser/Hrncirík 2009, 190). There is 
almost no change in the composition between 1601 and 1632. While the number of musketeers increased 
substantially between 1632 and 1636, very likely a result from the introduction of the new light musket (see 
below), the number of pikemen was steady. 
262 Some small calibre bullets found on the battlefield of Zboriv/Ukraine (1649) derive probably from a 
Turkish version of the arquebus (Mandzy 2009, 200-201, Montecuccoli 1736, 149). 
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3.2.3.2 Matchlock muskets and forked rests 
 
In general, muskets became lighter during the Thirty Years War due to shortening the 
barrel and developments in production engineering which made it possible to produce 
thinner barrels, but this development did not reflect their calibre.263 In the late 16th and 
early 17th century there were two different developments. Holland, and probably Spain,264 
favoured larger calibres, as with the 8 bullets/pound (21.6mm) heavy musket, sometimes 
called ‘rechte (true)’ or ‘full’ musket, which was replaced by the 10 bullets/pound 
(19.7mm) musket by the early 17th century.265 Both musket models were also exported, 
chiefly, but not exclusively, to England and Scandinavia. These weapons were probably 
what were being referred to by a 1626 eyewitness report that the Swedish army in Poland 
had very large muskets.266 The term ‘bastard musket’, which is often used in modern 
publications,267 was probably created by Francis Markham in 1622;268 he described it as 
having a slightly smaller bore, while still being as efficient as the ‘full musket’. It seems 
very likely that he referred to the change from the 8 to the 10 bore musket in the early 17th 
century, a development which was described by Wallhausen seven years before.269 At the 
moment the terms ‘bastard’, ‘full’ and ‘true’ musket are misleading, as they are possibly 
referring only to different weapon models. 
 
Saxony produced much smaller calibre (16 bullets/pound or 17.5mm) muskets in 
Suhl which were exported chiefly to southern Germany, Switzerland and Austria.270 It is 
not certain if Augsburg was producing the 13 bullets/pound (18.8mm) musket in the early 
17th century but, if not, it was probably not much later. All these early muskets had a 
weight of approximately 7.2-7.7kg. The production of larger calibres was generally 
abandoned between 1620 and 1630. Muskets produced in Augsburg and Nurnberg had a 
calibre of 14 bullets/pound (18.3mm) and those of Amsterdam and Suhl had a calibre of 15 
                                                 
263 Engerisser 2007, 546, Brzezinski/Hook 2006, 22. 
264 The 19mm lead bullets found on the ship wreck La Trinidad Valencera derive very likely from an 8 
bullets/pound musket (Martin 2001, 82). It is either the Dutch model, or a similar model produced in Spanish 
facilities in the Basque Country (Quatrefages 1988, 16). See also Schwarz 1977, 207. 
265 Engerisser 2007, 545, Wallhausen 1615, 32, Ordre op de wapeninghe 1599, 144, Turner 1683, 175. 
Markham (1635, 3) is referring very likely to another weapon model when he mentioned a ‘true musket’. 
266 Brzezinski/Hook 2006, 20. 
267 Roberts 2002, 8-9. 
268 Markham 1622, 33-36. 
269 Wallhausen 1615, 32. 
270 Engerisser 2007, 545. 
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bullets/pound (17.7mm) and 16 bullets/pound (17.5mm) with a reduced weight of 
approximately 5.5kg.271 
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Holland Nurnberg silver m1 8 21.6 10 20.0 1590-1615 
Suhl/Amsterdam/Jönköping England M2 10 19.7 12 18.5 1630-1640 
Holland England m3 10 19.7 12 18.5 1600-1620 
Augsburg Nurnberg m4 13 18.8 15 17.9 1600-1620? 
Augsburg/Nurnberg Nurnberg M5 14 18.3 16 17.5 1620-1630 
Amsterdam Amsterdam M6 15 17.7 17 17.0 1620-1630 
Suhl Nurnberg m7 16 17.5 18 16.8 1600-1620 
Suhl Nurnberg M8 16 17.5 18 16.8 1620-1630 
Table 14: Musket specifications. 
 
In 1631 Gustav Adolf ordered Louis de Geer to equip 32 regiments with what 
would become the famous Swedish light musket.272 It was produced in Suhl, Amsterdam 
and Jönköping, had a calibre of 10 bullets/pound (19.7mm), a weight of 4.6kg and it is said 
that it was the first musket that could be fired without a rest.273 This development made the 
caliver obsolete. It is unclear why Gustav Adolf ordered such a large calibre weapon in 
contradiction to the ongoing development of smaller calibre muskets in the 1620’s. A 
possible explanation could be that the Swedish army was still using the older 10 
bullets/pound musket (m3) and that Gustav Adolf wanted to keep that calibre in a futile 
attempt to standardize Swedish firearms. In 1632 the first light muskets were delivered to 
the Swedish army. Sebastian Dehner reported on 6 May 1632 that a Swedish company 
arrived at Rothenburg ob der Tauber with musketeers carrying the new light musket 
without a rest.274 Strangely, the Swedes kept the larger calibre for their muskets until the 
Nordic War (1700-1721).275 
 
                                                 
271 Engerisser 2007, 545, Lavater 1644, 50-51, Erlach 1629, 112. Although the musket models produced in 
Suhl in 1600 and 1620 had the same calibre, they were completely different weapons with a weight 
difference of 2kg. 
272 Brzezinski/Hook 2006, 20. 
273 Engerisser 2007, 546-547, Brzezinski/Hook 2006, 20. 
274 Engerisser 2007, 546-547. 
275 Mandzy 2012, 72. 
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Figure 8: Left: Musket M2 from Suhl, Amsterdam and Jönköping, calibre 19.7mm (replica). 
Right: Musketeer (de Gheyn 1608). 
 
However, the rest did not vanish with one new weapon model. The 1620’s Dutch-
German muskets were not much heavier than the early Spanish arquebuses and were light 
enough to be fired without a rest.276 Therefore, it was not Gustav Adolf who suddenly 
came up with a new light musket, as often claimed;277 he only continued a general 
development. The Swedes had no intention of abolishing the rest because the new Swedish 
light musket was delivered with rests.278 The number of rests in the Stockholm Armoury 
even increased from 5,300 in 1626 to 12,126 in 1635 and decreased to 826 in 1645.279 
Probably out of habit, musketeers used their weapons with a rest until the last stage of the 
Thirty Years War although it was no longer necessary. 
 
3.2.3.3 Wheel lock carbines 
 
There is not much known about carbines.280 It seems that there was a development similar 
to muskets. In the early 17th century Holland used large calibre carbines of 14 
bullets/pound (18.1mm), while carbines produced in Ferlach had a calibre of 
                                                 
276 Johann von Nassau proposed already in 1596 that muskets should be light enough to be fired without rest 
in emergency situations (Engerisser 2007, 547, Frauenholz 1939, 58). 
277 Roberts 1967a, 68-69. 
278 Brzezinski/Hook 2006, 20. 
279 Brzezinski/Hook 2006, 20. 
280 Most information about calibres of carbines is according to Peter Engerisser and is unpublished to date. 
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approximately 32-38 bullets/pound (13.1-13.9mm). That changed in the 1620’s, when the 
calibre in Holland was reduced to 15 and 20 bullets/pound (17.2mm and 16.1mm),281 while 
Suhl produced the much-favoured 16 bullets/pound (16.8mm) carbine of the 1630’s.282 
Still, there were far too many exceptions to speak of a standard carbine. Unfortunately, 
carbines of late 16th/early 17th century were re-manufactured in the 1620’s with new wheel 
locks using their old stocks and barrels, which certainly reflects on the calibre of carbines 
in service between 1620 and 1640.283 Carbines used at Lützen, therefore, had all sizes of 
calibres ranging from 13.1mm to 18.1mm with a tendency toward 16.8mm. 
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Holland Amsterdam c1 14 18.1 16 17.3 1600-1620 
Holland England C2 15 17.2 17 16.5 1620-1630 
Nurnberg/Amsterdam England C3 16 16.8 18 16.2 1630-1640 
Suhl England C4 16 16.8 18 16.2 1620-1630 
Holland Amsterdam C5 20 16.1 22 15.5 1620-1630 
Ferlach Nurnberg c6 32 13.9 35 13.5 1600-1620 
Ferlach Nurnberg c7 38 13.1 42 12.7 1600-1620 
Table 15: Carbine specifications. 
 
3.2.3.4 Wheel lock pistols 
 
Pistols of the first half of the Thirty Years War tended to be decorated and many of them 
were produced in pairs rather than in large quantities.284 Based on those in the Armoury 
Graz, German-Austrian pistols had a relatively small calibre of 10.0mm to 12.7mm in the 
early 17th century.285 Slightly larger models with a calibre of 35 bullets/pound (13.1-
13.5mm) were produced in Nurnberg and Suhl by 1620.286 There were changes, probably 
due to war time increased production, between 1630 and 1640 as decorative 
embellishments vanished and the calibre became much larger, up to 16.0mm, although 
                                                 
281 Cruso 1632, 30-31. 
282 Engerisser 2007, 559. 
283 Brooker 2007, 315. 
284 Brooker 2007, 60-61. 
285 Brooker 2007, 269-497. 
286 Engerisser 2007, 561. 
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smaller calibres were still produced.287 However, it is unlikely that many larger calibre 
pistols reached Imperial or Swedish armies before the Battle of Lützen in large quantities. 
There is not much known about the development of pistols in Holland and northern 
Europe. John Cruso, who served in the Swedish army, stated in 1632 that the typical 
military pistol had a calibre of 20 bullets/pound (15.6mm).288 If we compare pistol 
development to muskets and carbines, it seems likely that Holland also produced pistols 
with a larger calibre in the early 17th century. 
 
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
 S
it
e 
P
o
u
n
d
 
D
es
ig
n
at
io
n
 
W
ea
p
o
n
 C
al
ib
re
 –
 B
u
ll
et
s/
P
o
u
n
d
 
W
ea
p
o
n
 C
al
ib
re
 -
 M
il
li
m
et
re
 
B
u
ll
et
 C
al
ib
re
 –
 B
u
ll
et
s/
P
o
u
n
d
 
B
u
ll
et
 C
al
ib
re
 -
 M
il
li
m
et
re
 
A
p
p
ro
x
im
at
e 
D
at
e 
Amsterdam England P1 20 15.6 24 14.7 1620-1630 
Suhl/Nurnberg/Ferlach  England P2 28 14.0 32 13.4 1625-1650 
Suhl/Nurnberg Nurnberg P3 35 13.5 42 12.7 1620-1635 
Suhl Suhl P4 35 13.1 42 12.3 1620-1630 
Nurnberg   Nurnberg P5 38 13.1 45 12.4 1625-1635 
Nurnberg Nurnberg P6 42 12.7 50 12.0 1620-1625 
Nurnberg/Ferlach Nurnberg silver P7 50 11.7 60 11.0 1625-1630 
Nurnberg/Augsburg Nurnberg silver P8 70 10.5 90 9.6 1625-1630 
Nurnberg Nurnberg silver P9 80 10.0 100 9.3 1620-1625 
Nurnberg/Augsburg Nurnberg silver P10 80 10.0 100 9.3 1600-1630 
Table 16: Pistol specifications. 
 
 
 
                                                 
287 Brooker 2007, 427. 
288 Cruso 1632, 30. 
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Figure 9: Calibre graph of pistols from the Armoury Graz. 
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3.2.3.5 Rifles 
 
The previous sections have shown that our knowledge of early modern, smoothbore 
military firearms is limited, but we know even less about early modern rifles, because they 
were not standard military weapons and are therefore not mentioned in contemporary 
military handbooks. 
 
The inaccuracy of early modern firearms was not as much a military problem - it 
was solved by firing volleys - as it was a problem for huntsmen and marksmen who used 
crossbows in addition to firearms until the late 16th century.289 To increase accuracy, rifled 
barrels were tested in the late 15th century.290 Although probably invented for hunting and 
target shooting, the value of rifled weapons was soon discovered by the military. The 
Austrian army used them, particularly in border defence against the Ottoman Empire, 
where skirmishes against small groups of marauding Turks were common and to fire at a 
target of opportunity was more important than volley fire.291 These weapons are 
documented physically by the firearms collection in the Armoury Graz, where the oldest of 
147 rifles from the 16th and 17th century is dated 1520-1540.292 
 
The rifles in the Armoury Graz have a calibre of 11.0mm to 16.5mm and were 
produced in Styria, Nurnberg and Augsburg, but no pattern of calibre development can be 
determined. Swedish snaphance rifles of the second half of the 17th century have much 
smaller calibres, as low as 8.8mm.293 Although from a later period and an advanced 
weapon type, it seems that northern European rifles took a different developmental track. 
One snaphance musket, which is not rifled, but that was probably used by marksmen, also 
has a very small calibre of 6.0mm.294 There seems to have been a genuine military 
development of rifles, but it is often difficult to establish whether a rifle was produced for 
the military or as civilian weapon.295 
 
 
 
                                                 
289 Dolínek/Durdík 1996, 247 and 267. 
290 Knarrström/Larsson 2008, 107. 
291 Brooker 2007, 315. 
292 Brooker 2007, 79. 
293 Knarrström/Larsson 2008, 109-124. 
294 Knarrström/Larsson 2008, 122. 
295 Brooker 2007, 671. 
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Figure 10: Rifles from Armoury Graz. 
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3.3 Organisation, arms, equipment, formations and battle 
tactics 
 
Many military handbooks were written during the Thirty Years War, most of them by 
experienced officers, giving quite a good, but generalized, picture of formations and battle 
tactics. That said, armies, equipment, organisation, battle formations and tactics were in 
constant development during that time. In every battle, commanders had to consider 
available forces, terrain and weather, and adapt his tactics accordingly. This makes it very 
difficult to find out what equipment and formations troops actually used in a specific 
battle. We also have to consider replacement of soldiers’ equipment after long service, 
because all soldiers tend to adapt their equipment according to their needs and 
circumstances during long campaigns. Sometimes regiments were hastily raised and went 
into battle without sufficient equipment and training while some veteran regiments were 
upgraded, receiving better armour or weapons, but there are few sources of the Thirty 
Years War confirming these observations (section 3.3.2.2). In battlefield archaeology 
knowledge of the actual formation size and frontage of every unit is important, as it gives a 
better understanding of the deployment and small find distributions.296 
 
3.3.1 Organisation: Tactical and administrative units 
 
In the Thirty Years War there was a difference between administrative and tactical units. 
The administrative unit was the regiment, divided into companies. Only in battle were 
regiments deployed as tactical units. The main tactical unit for infantry and cavalry in the 
Swedish and Imperial armies was the ‘squadron’.297 The term ‘battalion’ for tactical 
infantry units emerged during later stages of the Thirty Years War, and was transferred 
into an administrative unit after the war. To guarantee a specific strength of a squadron, 
multiple weak regiments formed a squadron or, conversely, strong regiments were divided 
to form more than one squadron. A few companies were detailed to form independent units 
in battle, mostly musketeers. In the Swedish army, three infantry squadrons formed a 
brigade, which was a tactical unit formed only for battle (section 3.3.3.1). However, the 
association of regiments with a brigade was usually fixed during a campaign. In 1633 the 
Imperial army experimented with brigade organisation, but not before the Battle of Lützen 
(section 3.3.3.2). 
                                                 
296 Mandzy 2012, Foard 2008, 183. 
297 Brzezinski/Hook 2006, 18. 
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3.3.2 Cavalry 
 
In theory, there were four main types of cavalry in the Thirty Years War: Cuirassiers 
(heavy cavalry), harquebusiers (medium cavalry), Croats (light cavalry) and dragoons 
(mounted infantry),298 but in practice many of them were mixed, in particular the Swedes. 
In battle, cavalry was deployed in squadrons according to the size of their regiments. At 
Lützen, most regiments were strong enough to be deployed as single squadrons, but some 
weak regiments, such as the Hessians, were combined to form one squadron while a few 
were strong enough to provide two squadrons, such as Bernhard’s Life Regiment. Cavalry 
squadrons were deployed three to ten ranks deep. Military handbooks give some idea of 
the ideal spacing adopted by cavalry. Each heavy cavalry trooper needed a minimum of 
1.0m to 1.2m in front and 3m in length, while the light cavalry usually assumed an open 
order with 2m frontage for each horseman. These spaces became meaningless in hand-to-
hand combat, retreat and pursuit.299 The space of 1.0m to 1.2m for heavy cavalry was the 
attack formation and seems too small for manoeuvring, when it was probably more likely 
1.5m.300 
 
Cavalry tactics: ‘Caracole’, ‘firing and retiring’ and ‘charge’ 
In early modern battles there were two main tactics for cavalry: charge and caracole. In a 
charge, the cavalry used momentum to break through the enemy’s formation with the blunt 
force of cutting and thrusting weapons. When caracoling, the cavalry moved close to the 
enemy, firing all firearms in single ranks and then turning 90° to 180° to retreat to a safe 
position.301 Complaints about the caracole are as old as the caracole itself, which dates to 
the late 16th century when the Dutch military reformer Johann von Nassau wrote that a 
charge is much more effective than caracoling.302 Most German cavalry was accused of 
caracoling during the Thirty Years War,303 while it was often claimed, incorrectly, that 
Gustav Adolf’s victories were chiefly based on his aggressively charging cavalry (section 
3.3.2.6).304 These myths derive partially from misunderstanding the caracole, which was a 
tactic designed for cavalry attacking infantry deployed in dense anti-cavalry formations, 
which might have been a 17th century pike front as well as a bayonet wall of a Napoleonic 
                                                 
298 Dragoons were officially mounted infantry, but are listed in Imperial war lists from 1632 as cavalry 
(Toegel 1977, 415). 
299 According to Montecuccoli (Veltzé 1899b, 579) 1.5 paces and to Ward (1639, 295) 3 feet in front. See 
also Schürger 2011, 107. 
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square, and therefore never really went out of fashion during the musket-era. At Lützen, 
Ottavio Piccolomini admitted that he made a caracole against Swedish infantry, who 
lowered their pikes against him, and no one held this manoeuvre against him.305 On the 
other hand, the caracole would have been an ill-advised manoeuvre against cavalry, but 
this is often confused with ‘firing and retiring,’ a skirmishing tactic used by light cavalry in 
a looser formation (section 3.3.2.2).306 However, neither the caracole nor ‘firing and 
retiring’ were standard tactics for Imperial cuirassiers at the time of Lützen,307 although 
such action was often claimed.308 
 
3.3.2.1 Imperial heavy cavalry: Cuirassiers 
 
A cuirassier was a cavalryman equipped with a sword and two pistols and protected by 
armour.309 The armour changed substantially during the Thirty Years War. Just before the 
war it was full armour, covering the whole body including face (visor), feet and hands.310 
This armour was expensive, tiring and inconvenient to wear in battle.311 The shin 
protection was abolished at the outbreak of the war and remaining armour was reduced 
further to breast and back plates with a Hungarian-style open helmet (Zischäge). After 
1635 no further armour was ordered.312 
 
 
Figure 11: Cuirassier (Wallhausen 1616). 
 
                                                 
305 Argang 1894, 89. 
306 Brnardic 2010b, 21. 
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310 Engerisser 2007, 456-457. 
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312 Engerisser 2007, 461. 
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The Imperial war lists of 1631-33 stated that cuirassiers wore full armour in 
German-style; Watts claimed that they were clad cap á pied in black armour at Lützen, 
which is not very helpful, because the war lists are not accurate and Watts was no 
eyewitness to the battle; ‘full armour’ does not necessarily mean from head to foot.313 
Although there is no way of knowing, it may be assumed that the Imperial cuirassiers did 
wear a variety of armour ranging from three-quarter armour with knee protection, also 
called ‘Pappenheimer’ after the Feldmarschall who died at Lützen, to simple breast and 
back plate with open helmet. Of the seven Imperial cuirassier regiments participating in the 
Battle of Lützen, few of Lohe’s men had armour,314 while Sparr was driven off the 
battlefield possibly, in part, because the men lacked armour. The other five regiments, 
Götz, Holk, Trcka, Desfour and Bredau, held their ground well or even charged through 
the Swedish cavalry, which suggests that they were well equipped.315 
 
The oldest Imperial cuirassier regiment was Götz, raised in 1626. The others were 
raised between 1628 and 1632, which might have had an impact on their equipment.316 
Götz’s Regiment very likely had the older and heavier three-quarter armour, and it was 
probably this unit that Watts described as clad from head to foot in black armour. Many 
Imperial cuirassiers were very likely equipped with the German-Austrian smaller calibre 
pistols of 10.0mm to 13.5mm. The cuirassiers were an Imperial elite force, deployed at the 
inner wings to support the infantry, which saved Wallenstein’s day at Lützen, and were 
therefore spared for battle, rather than used on campaign.317 
 
3.3.2.2 Imperial medium cavalry: Harquebusiers 
 
Harquebusiers, initially developed as a light cavalry, became medium cavalry during the 
Thirty Years War. They were equipped, in theory, with a carbine, one or two pistols, 
sword, breast plate and open helmet, but few had armour in actuality.318 Imperial 
harquebusiers probably had a mixture of both the smaller calibre carbines (13.1-13.9mm) 
from Ferlach and the medium calibre carbines (16.8mm) from Suhl, but it is unlikely that 
                                                 
313 Toegel 1977, 412, Watts 1633, 134-135. Full armour in contemporary sources meant mostly three-quarter 
armour (Engerisser 2007, 458). 
314 Brzezinski 2001, 26, rem. 23. 
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316 Brzezinski 2001, 25. 
317 According to Wallenstein’s order from 1633 (Mittheilungen 1882, 347). 
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they carried the larger calibre carbines from Holland in any quantity. In contrast to the 
cuirassiers, the poor performance of the harquebusiers at Lützen almost led to the Imperial 
army’s destruction. Wallenstein accused them of disobeying orders, desertion, and 
‘caracoling’; he had some executed at Prague following the battle.319 His reaction was an 
order to upgrade them to cuirassiers, take away their carbines and prohibit the caracole.320 
Wallenstein’s harsh criticism ignores the fact that harquebusiers were to conduct 
reconnaissance on campaign and support cuirassiers in battle, not fight head on against 
charging Swedish cavalry, and, because he was upset, he did not distinguish between 
‘caracoling’ and ‘firing and retiring’.321 Wallenstein’s 1633 order reduced the number of 
Imperial harquebusier regiments from 21 to sixteen, but they were still used at the end of 
the Thirty Years War, and still without metal armour.322 The Thirty Years War proved that 
medium cavalry’s assigned tasks could have been done much better by a light cavalry, 
such as Croats, or by dragoons, which were both cheaper than the harquebusiers.323 
 
 
Figure 12: Harquebusier (Wallhausen 1616). 
 
The exception was the Harquebusier Regiment Piccolomini, which was better 
armoured than some cuirassier regiments and fought well at Lützen. This regiment was 
officially upgraded to cuirassiers in 1633 and it is not clear how far this process had 
                                                 
319 Seidler 1970. 
320 Trial at Prague: Seidler 1970. Wallenstein’s order:  Hallwich 1912a, 683-684, Toegel 1977, 120. See also 
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progressed by Lützen. As they were still harquebusiers, they probably had still their 
carbines.324 
3.3.2.3 Imperial light cavalry: Croats and Cossacks 
 
Although originally recruited in Croatia, most light cavalry that came from Hungary, 
Transylvania and Croatia was called ‘Hungarian-style light cavalry’ or ‘Croats’ according 
to the Imperial war lists in 1632.325 They replaced harquebusiers as light cavalry during the 
Thirty Years War. In 1631 Croats were equipped with a sword and two pistols; a carbine 
was added to their weaponry during the 1630’s.326 It seems probable that the Croats had 
carbines at Lützen, as Wallenstein excluded them from his order taking away carbines 
from his cavalry, but it is not certain how many carbines they had already acquired, an 
issue that will be discussed in section 8.2.1.327 Their duties on campaign were 
reconnaissance, skirmishing, patrolling, setting ambushes and foraging. They were not 
suited for main force engagements and were often deployed on the outer wings harassing 
the enemies’ rear with hit and run tactics or covering a retreat as they did at Lützen.328 
There were also three companies of Polish Cossacks in Pappenheim’s corps.329 This light 
cavalry was even more inconsistently equipped than Croats and shared only their name 
with the famous Zaporozhian Cossacks.330 
 
3.3.2.4 Dragoons 
 
While dragoons were originally musketeers on horse and therefore mounted infantry,331 the 
Imperial war lists mentioned them as cavalry equipped with half armour and fire locks.332 
It is very likely that Pappenheim’s two Dragoon Regiments Merode and Pappenheim 
fought as cavalry.333 It is uncertain which type of muskets dragoons used, but it is unlikely 
that they had standard infantry muskets as they were too heavy, too long, and the burning 
match was impractical on horseback. Some might have had calivers, which were light 
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enough, but still needed the smouldering match. Others probably had fire locks (wheel 
locks or snaphances) as stated in the war lists or even carbines. In the end it probably did 
not matter much because their main duty on campaign was serving as advance guard, 
clearing roads and securing bridges.334 
 
 
Figure 13: Dragoon (Wallhausen 1616). 
 
3.3.2.5 Imperial cavalry formations 
 
There is not much known about Imperial cavalry formation depth at Lützen. In general 
they were deployed five to ten ranks deep.335 It is often assumed, according to the sketch 
from the Stockholm Krigsarkivet (section 2.2.4), that the Imperial cavalry had a depth of 
six ranks at Lützen. Although the sketch is not proven as a reliable source, Wallenstein did 
not have enough cavalry on his wings, suggesting that what cavalry was present was 
deployed at minimum depth of five to six ranks to ensure their front was wide enough to 
prevent being outflanked. 
 
3.3.2.6 Gustav Adolf’s cavalry 
 
Gustav Adolf had a variety of cavalry at his disposal at Lützen; they are mentioned only 
generally as ‘cavalry’ in Swedish troop and casualty lists; a reference that makes it difficult 
to determine their equipment. At the beginning of Gustav Adolf’s reign in 1611, Swedish 
                                                 
334 Brzezinski/Hook 2006, 67. 
335 Engerisser 2007, 462. 
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cavalry was in poor shape. The Swedish horses were too small, the Swedish weapon 
manufacturers were not able to produce wheel lock weapons, and there was no money for 
armour and expensive carbines.336 His solution was to equip the first three ranks of each 
squadron with breast and back plate armour, rather than three-quarter armour, and then 
take away the few carbines.337 De facto, this means that he disbanded his harquebusiers 
and reformed his cavalry into semi-armoured cuirassiers. It was the reduced firing range 
that prevented them from using the ‘firing and retiring’ tactic and forced them towards 
more aggressive behaviour. This might have been one reason for the myth that it was 
Gustav Adolf who had to teach the cavalry to ‘charge’, rather than to ‘caracole’, which is 
often seen as a revolution in mounted warfare.338 Gustav Adolf’s cavalry reform worked in 
most battles, but at Lützen Fleetwood wrote about the Swedish cavalry: 
 
“…for had not our foote stoode like a wall, there had not a man of us come off alyve…; 
and our horse did but poorely.”339 
 
This comment is not surprising; the Imperial cuirassiers were much better armoured340 and 
equally well-trained as the Swedish cavalry and they also knew how to ‘charge’; Gustav 
Adolf knew how dangerous the Imperial cuirassiers were.341 
 
The Finnish cavalry, called ‘Hakkapelits’ from their battle cry ‘hakkaa päälle’ (hit 
them hard), was eastern European-style light cavalry, used to protect the outer right wing at 
Lützen.342 After Breitenfeld, Gustav Adolf recruited many German cavalry regiments.343 
Although he had no genuine cuirassier and harquebusier regiments, it seems that his 
German regiments consisted of both; it is possible, although unproven, that his Swedish 
cavalry had also acquired some carbines in Germany, but had far fewer than the Imperial 
army with their pure harquebusier regiments.344 These carbines were probably the medium 
calibre versions (16.8mm) from Suhl and the larger calibre carbines (17.2-18.1mm) from 
Holland. 
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Montecuccoli and Watts wrote that the Swedish cavalry was deployed three or four 
ranks deep; the sketch of the Battle of Lützen (section 2.2.4) shows them deployed three 
ranks deep, which will be discussed further in section 7.2.2.345 
 
3.3.3 Infantry 
 
During the Thirty Years War infantry consisted of musketeers and pikemen. A pikeman 
was equipped, in theory, with a 5.5m long pike, sword and helmet; some pikemen wore 
armour (breast and back plate, thigh protection), others were unarmoured (‘Picche 
Freeche’).346 For the Swedish army, there is evidence that pikemen threw away their 
cumbersome armour and pikes, or at least shortened the pikes, on long campaigns, but it 
seems that this was not only a Swedish problem as Imperial pikemen did the same, thus 
increasing the number of unarmoured pikemen.347 This might be one reason why the 
pikemen numbers constantly decreased, even though they were still needed, because 
musketeers could not defend themselves against cavalry. At Lützen, the Swedish infantry 
consisted of 73.8% musketeers and only 26.2% pikemen. We have no exact figures for the 
Imperial army, but if we consider that Wallenstein was able to detach at least 1,200 
musketeers without reducing his regiment’s fire power too much, his infantry probably 
consisted of at least 60-65% musketeers.348 
 
Musketeers were equipped with musket and rest; many of them had no sword 
although it was officially part of their equipment.349 At Breitenfeld, many Swedish 
musketeers charged using their musket butts as clubs, which was probably easier than 
fighting with a sword in one hand and the musket and rest in the other. It is probably that 
this was also the case at Lützen.350 The space one foot soldier required is approximately 
1.0m to 1.2m in width and 2.1m in depth.351 
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Figure 14: Swedish brigade in theory (1.-3.) and practice (4.). Note that there is no evidence 
of a defensive position. 
 
Infantry formations and battle tactics adapted to the rapid improvement of weapons 
during the Thirty Years War. At the beginning of the war, the Spanish ‘square’ (cuadro) 
and the small Dutch formations dominated European battlefields. It was Gustav Adolf who 
introduced a reformed Dutch-style infantry battle formation, the Swedish brigade, to the 
European theatre of war. On the other side, Wallenstein, probably resuming Tilly’s 
military reforms, developed the Imperial-Leaguist infantry from the ‘Spanish school’ into 
what would become the German-style infantry battle formation, which dominated the 
second half of the Thirty Years War as well as the English Civil War.352 
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3.3.3.1 Swedish-style infantry battle formation: The Swedish brigade 
 
Theory 
During the Thirty Years War, the Swedish brigade underwent several changes. After some 
experiments with a four-squadron brigade (Fig. 16), the Swedish infantry battle formation 
was a three-squadron brigade in 1632.353 A squadron was deployed, similar to the linear 
Dutch tactics, only six ranks deep and divided into three bodies. One-third of the 
musketeers served as reserve while the remaining two-thirds were assigned as either 
flankers for a single body of pikemen on its exterior side or, in case of the central 
squadron, would seek cover behind the pikemen (Fig. 14-1.).354 Reserve musketeers filled 
up gaps in the ranks caused largely by enemy artillery fire, as Monro described for the 
Battle of Breitenfeld.355 It is not entirely certain if they still had a musketeer reserve at 
Lützen, an issue which will be discussed below and in section 7.2.2. 
 
 
Figure 15: Swedish volley. 
 
The single bodies of musketeers and pikemen of a squadron stood at a distance of 
just 5 paces from one another.356 These gaps were probably left for the sergeants, who 
flanked each body.357 The distance between brigades is discussed by contemporary military 
theorists, eyewitnesses and modern historians. Monro mentioned that a cavalry squadron 
could move between the brigades deployed at Breitenfeld,358 which seem to have been 
common practice in 17th century warfare.359 At Lützen, a cavalry squadron averaged 223 
men with a front of 37m (six ranks) to 74m (three ranks), which seems to agree with a 
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reasonable gap between brigades for deploying artillery, moving reserves forward, or 
letting withdrawing soldiers through (section 7.2.2). 
 
In the neutral position, or advancing order at the start of battle, the pikemen of the 
1st squadron took an advanced position with their musketeers behind them whilst the 2nd 
and 3rd squadrons formed a line with musketeers flanking pikemen on the outside of the 
brigade.360 The reason for the advanced position of the central pike formation was probably 
that the armoured pikemen should draw the musket fire, while the musketeers remained 
relatively unharmed until they reached point-blank range.361 
 
We do not know exactly how the Swedish brigade functioned in battle, but it was 
clearly an attack formation based on superior fire power. When attacking, the musketeers 
advanced to both sides of the 1st squadron’s pike formation (Fig. 14-2.) or passed in front 
of the pikes to a distance of 10m to 15m from the enemy.362 At that range, they fired two 
volleys, the first with first rank kneeling, second rank leaning forward, and the third rank 
standing erect. After firing, the first three ranks changed place with the next three ranks, 
which fired the same way (Fig. 15).363 According to Monro one single volley, doubling 
ranks and firing as described above, was designed for its shock effect by detached 
musketeer companies on the wings against cavalry at the Battle of Breitenfeld, but this 
complicated manoeuvre was not performed by whole brigades, as often claimed.364 Before 
the enemy could reform and close ranks, the musketeers charged with their musket butts 
and swords or the pikemen advanced to break into the already damaged formation.365 It is 
vital to understand that the key to Gustav Adolf’s infantry tactics was a combination of 
firepower and followed up charge.366 
 
                                                 
360 Brzezinski/Hook 2006, 18, Engerisser 2007, 499. 
361 Mentioned by Diodati (Fiedler 1864, 653). 
362 I. e. pistol shot range (Discipline 1632, part III, 24). 
363 Discipline 1632, part III, 24. 
364 Monro 1637, part II, 65, Engerisser 2007, 487. This tactic is also described by Watts (1632, 124) for the 
detached musketeer companies. Later, he assumed the same tactic for all Swedish infantry in Discipline 
(1632, part III, 26), although his source clearly stated that the Swedish detached musketeer companies 
doubled ranks against cavalry and not the Swedish infantry in general. Turner (1683, 237-238), although he 
served in the Swedish army in the 1630’s, seems to have known Monro’s and Watts’ works, using similar 
sentences, and concluded from their statements rather than from his experience that this became Swedish 
standard infantry tactics. However, there is no proof for this and it seems unlikely that whole brigades 
performed this complicated manoeuvre, but it is often suggested (Roberts 1967a, 66, Parker 1995, 157-158). 
365 At Breitenfeld the infantry did both: Pikemen advancing after the volley (Monro 1637, part II, 66) and 
musketeers charging into the enemy’s formation (Discipline 1632, part III, 24). 
366 It is sometimes assumed incorrectly that infantry hand-to-hand fighting did not play an important part 
during the Thirty Years War (Schwarz 1977, 214). 
 100 
There is no record of how the Swedish brigade formed a defensive position. It is 
probable that, in theory, the 2nd and 3rd squadron pikemen advanced and took position on 
both sides of the 1st squadron, while the musketeers retreated behind them (Fig. 14-3.). 
Obviously, here lies a weak point of this formation because it is vulnerable at the flanks 
and had to manoeuvre to form a defensive line. The complicated procedure was probably 
one reason for giving up the brigade formation (see below). 
 
The Swedish brigade at Lützen 
Brigades (and therefore also squadrons) were tactical units formed only in battle with from 
one to five regiments depending on their strength. At Lützen five of the eight brigades 
consisted of three regiments, suggesting that each squadron was composed of one 
regiment. This interpretation is supported by the 14 November troop strength list in which 
the number of pikemen in all but one regiment can be divided by six giving an even 
number of ranks and files. The number of musketeers of seven regiments can be divided by 
six and of eight regiments even by eighteen, the latter giving even numbers after detaching 
one-third as the reserve. This suggests that regiments had already exchanged soldiers on 14 
November to give every regiment the ability to function as a squadron or brigade with full 
ranks; it is also evidence that squadrons were still deploying reserve musketeers.367 
 
An ideal squadron had 216 (42.86%) pikemen and 288 (57.14%) musketeers 
without counting officers. By Lützen the number of pikemen had declined substantially: In 
the Green Brigade, the Green Regiment consisted of 34.65%, the Black Regiment of 
17.89% and Leslie’s Scots Regiment of only 6.25% (Fig. 14-4) pikemen. The New Blue 
Brigade had two regiments with no pikemen at all. The question remains as to how the 
Swedish brigade could have functioned at Lützen with so few pikemen. Brzezinski has 
suggested that the Swedish infantry was not always deployed in six ranks, but sometimes 
only three or four ranks deep.368 This seems very unlikely for the musketeers as the 
Swedish army had so many of them that it was unnecessary and also would have reduced 
fire power, a major keystone for Gustav Adolf’s success. In addition, there was not enough 
space on the Lützen battlefield to deploy all infantry in three or four ranks (section 7.2.2). 
However, considering how narrow a front pike formation would have been in six ranks, it 
seems very likely that some of the smaller pike formations were only three ranks deep, in 
particular in the Green and New Blue Brigades. It was not necessary for those two brigades 
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to have many pikemen as they were deployed adjacent to the cavalry wings and could have 
been supported by them in the emergency of an Imperial cavalry charge.369 
 
The position of infantry regiments inside the brigades is unknown. However, it is 
assumed that the regiment with the most pikemen formed the centre squadron, because 
they played the key role in holding the brigade together. If the pikemen of the centre 
squadron broke, the entire brigade would collapse. 
 
Development after Lützen 
It should not come as a surprise that the Swedish infantry took heavy casualties from 
Imperial cavalry attacks at Lützen, which caused a reform of the Swedish brigade.370 In the 
Battle of Nördlingen on 6 September 1634, the pikemen of all squadrons were flanked by 
musketeers, which enabled each squadron to operate more independently from the 
brigade.371 By Wittstock on 4 October 1636, the brigade was abandoned and the infantry 
was deployed in squadrons only and, learning the lesson from Lützen, supported by a 
cavalry reserve.372 
 
3.3.3.2 Spanish-style infantry battle formation: The cuadro 
 
The victory of Gustav Adolf’s brigades over Tilly’s Spanish ‘tercios’ at the 17 September 
Battle of Breitenfeld has long been seen as the victory of mobility and linear tactics over 
massive but inflexible infantry formations,373 a mistake which some historians believed 
Wallenstein repeated at Lützen.374 This shows more or less the myths and stereotypes 
modern research still has about the Spanish tactical infantry system used by Leaguist and 
Imperial armies, which were, in part, responsible for Roberts’ flawed ‘Military Revolution’ 
hypothesis.375 Although an analysis of the Spanish infantry tactical development deserves a 
thesis of its own, it can not be discussed here in detail, but is still too important to be left 
out entirely. 
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Figure 16: Left: Spanish-Leaguist-Imperial infantry formations. Their strength is roughly 
averaged according troop strength lists (Engerisser/Hrncirík 2009, 189). Composition of 
pikemen-calivermen-musketeers is the average composition of the period (37%-40%-23%: 
see section 3.2.2.2); a similar composition of 40% pikemen and 60% musketeers is assumed 
for Wallenstein’s infantry. Mangas are shown six ranks deep, which was the usual formation 
depth (Engerisser/Hrncirík 2009, 187). Formation depth of the cuadro de gente is calculated 
from the square root of the number of pikemen, the cuadro de terreno is calculated from the 
number of pikemen multiplied by 2,041, divided by 1,000, and from the result the square root 
(Quatrefages 1988, 17, López/López 2012, 38). The Tilly Squadron is suggested as 
transitional stage between the Spanish and Wallenstein’s squadrons. Right: Swedish 
brigade formations. Four- and Three-Squadron Brigade according to Brzezinski/Hook 2006, 
18. Note: Development and size was very organic, depending on the situation and available 
troops, and shown here only in theoretical numbers. 
 
Spain, involved in constant warfare in the Netherlands, Italy and other theatres of 
war over decades, had one of the most experienced armies in Europe, which reflects on the 
flexibility of Spanish infantry tactics. ‘Tercio’ translates as ‘one-third’ and very likely 
means third part of an army, the infantry, while the other two parts were cavalry and 
artillery.376 The tercio was the administrative unit of the infantry, similar to regiment,377 
while the tactical unit was called escuadron (i.e. Eng.: squadron, It.: squadroni, Ger.: 
                                                 
376 Quatrefages 1988, 18, López/López 2012, 11-12. 
377 Also, German 16th century sources often use the term ‘regiment’ to describe the three parts of an army, 
artillery, cavalry and infantry (Fronsperger 1558, 31). 
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Schwadron). This could have been formed in battle from several tercios or one tercio could 
form several escuadrones, as it was customary in all armies of the time.378 
 
The escuadron deployed with a block of pikemen in the centre, flanked by 
calivermen, called guarniciones (garrisons). Up to this point, an escuadron did not look 
much different from any early Swedish squadron, except for its formations depth. While 
Swedish infantry deployed in a theoretical fixed number of ranks (i.e. six) the escuadrons 
depth could vary according to the formation type. The pikemen of the cuadro de gente 
(square of men) had as many ranks as files, while the cuadro de terreno (field square), 
cuadro de prolongado (extended square), and cuadro de gran frente (wide-fronted square) 
were consecutively shallower with wider fronts.379 All cuadros were flanked by 
calivermen.380 
 
In addition to these formations, the Spanish army formed small musketeer units, 
called mangas (sleeves). Prior to engagement four mangas were usually deployed at the 
edges of the cuadro, giving the formation the typical Spanish look, which is often 
incorrectly called tercio; the entire formation could have a strength of 600 to 3,000 men, 
averaging 1,000. The mangas were highly mobile units, giving fire support where needed, 
and they were not permanently attached to the cuadro during the battle.381 This enabled the 
Spanish infantry to respond very flexibly to any situation.382 Clearly, Spanish infantry 
formations were not huge, inflexible and outdated in the Thirty Years War, as often 
believed.383 
 
3.3.3.3 German-style infantry battle formation: The Imperial squadron 
 
The commander who influenced warfare most during the early stage of the Thirty Years 
War was Johann Tserclaes Graf von Tilly. He started his military career in 1576 in the 
Spanish army, where he learned the Spanish art of war from some of the best military 
leaders, and he fought in many battles all over Europe. In 1610, he was promoted to 
                                                 
378 Parker 1995, 150, Engerisser/Hrncirík 2009, 186, López/López 2012, 12. 
379 Mendoza 1596, 54. Although cuadro means ‘square’, it is an often repeated misconception that the 
pikemen always formed an actual square (Schwarz 1977, 210). 
380 Parker 1979, 89, Engerisser/Hrncirík 2009, 186-187, López/López 2012, 37-38. Actual strength of a 
cuadro is usually estimated too high (Schwarz 1977, 210, Kaiser 1999, 106). 
381 Assumed by Schwarz 1977, 217. 
382 Parker 1979, 89, Quatrefages 1988, 18, Engerisser/Hrncirík 2009, 187, López/López 2012, 38. 
383 Kaiser 1999, 109, 458. 
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Generalleutnant and was in charge of organizing the Leaguist army. It is not entirely 
certain how the Leaguist infantry tactics developed under Tilly’s command. 
 
The results from archaeological surveys in the Czech Republic seem to provide 
evidence that Tilly introduced the ‘Spanish school’ into the Leaguist infantry at the 
beginning of his command and during the early Thirty Years War (section 5.1.1.4). In 
1629, the Spanish army deployed their infantry in shallow formations with only two 
mangas in the Battle of Den Bosch384 and it is probable that Tilly was not unaffected by 
this development.  According to the archaeological results from Lützen, Tilly’s Leaguist 
Regiment Comargo did not have any calivers, which is usually evidence for Spanish 
infantry tactics. Whether Wallenstein took the calivers from this regiment when he 
assembled his army in early 1632, or Tilly had disbanded his calivermen before then, is 
uncertain, but the latter seems likely, because calivers were not being produced after the 
first stage of the Thirty Years War (section 3.2.3.1). If this assumption is correct, then it 
would have been Tilly and not Wallenstein, who reformed the infantry into a simplified 
version of the Spanish school by attaching two bodies of musketeers directly to the 
pikemen centre. However, additional archaeological evidence from the Breitenfeld 
battlefield is needed to confirm this suggestion. 
 
 
Figure 17: Left: Imperial infantry squadron in the Pieter Snayer painting, showing an actual 
infantry formation in the Battle of Lützen. Right: Spanish cuadro de terreno with massive 
pike block in the centre, flanked by calivermen, a branch the Imperial army had abandoned 
during the early stage of the Thirty Years War, and four mangas on the edges in the van 
Hulsen copperplate. 
 
There is no evidence for Tilly deploying his infantry in Spanish cuadro de gente 
formations thirty ranks deep at the 17 September 1631 Battle of Breitenfeld, but it is very 
unlikely, because the Spanish deployed this formation only against an enemy with cavalry 
                                                 
384 Engerisser/Hrncirík 2009, 187. 
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superiority.385 Not even the usually unreliable copperplates illustrate such formations. 
Another myth is that the Battle of Breitenfeld, and the later 18 May 1643 Battle of Rocroi, 
showed the weakness of Spanish infantry tactics against the modern, linear and shallow 
Swedish and French infantry,386 because both battles were decided by cavalry on the 
wings, while the Imperial and Spanish infantry was slaughtered after the battle was 
decided.387 Junkelmann suggests that Tilly deployed his infantry ten to twelve ranks 
deep.388 
 
It is unclear why copperplates show Wallenstein’s infantry at Lützen in Spanish 
cuadro de terreno formations, but there is sufficient proof that they did not.389 Wallenstein 
deployed his infantry squadrons390 according to Montecuccoli391 seven ranks deep with the 
central pikemen flanked by musketeers, which is also illustrated on the painting by 
Snayer.392 The Protestant eyewitness Fleetwood noted that “the enemies army was ordered 
like ours,” which could be related to the Imperial infantry formation.393 With 1,000 men, 
they were much stronger than the Swedish squadrons, which is probably why Holk called 
them “Brigader”.394 
 
Some historians were astonished that at Lützen Wallenstein deployed a completely 
different infantry formation from Tilly’s at Breitenfeld.395 However, currently it seems 
more likely that Wallenstein only reduced the depth from ten or twelve to seven ranks, 
bringing Tilly’s reforms to a provisional end. With six ranks, it would become the German-
style infantry battle formation used by the Imperial army for the remainder of the Thirty 
Years War, adopted by the Parliamentarian, and later by the Royalist, armies during the 
English Civil War.396 
 
                                                 
385 Parker 1984, 126, Parker 1995, 156, Huf 2006, 186, Weigley 2003, 146. See also Sennewald (2013, 61), 
who based his argument on an anonymous source, which he believed was written by the eyewitness Gustav 
Horn, an unproved presumption. 
386 Roberts 1967a, 70, Schwarz 1977, 207, 214, Bernecker 2002, 74. 
387 Bennassar/Vincent 1999, 131. 
388 Junkelmann 2007, 31. 
389 Deuticke 1917, 67, Seidler 1954, 35-36. 
390 ‘Squadroni’ according to Diodati (Förster 1829, 561). 
391 Brzezinski 2001, 24. 
392 Diemar (1890, 67-68), Diwald (1969, 499), Weigley (2003, 142-143) suggested incorrectly that the 
Spanish square formation was adopted by the Imperial army at Lützen, based on the van Hulsen and Merian 
copperplates (Brzezinski 2001, 46 and 50-51, Engerisser 2007, 488). 
393 Fleetwood 1632, 6. 
394 Wittrock 1932, 308. To avoid confusion with the Imperial brigade with which Wallenstein experimented 
for a short period in 1633, the term ‘squadron’ is used for Imperial infantry formations in this thesis (Toegel 
1977, 440). 
395 Deuticke 1917, 67, Mann 1971, 849, Parker 1995, 158. 
396 Roberts/Tincey 2001, 25-26. 
 106 
Until the 1634 Battle of Nördlingen, Spanish and Imperial musketeers fired with 
single ranks retreating behind the formation to reload and giving way for the next rank, 
called ‘caracoling fire’, which was not necessarily inferior to volley fire.397 It should be 
noted that the Battle of Nördlingen was decided by the Spanish infantry and was a decisive 
victory of the Spanish-Imperial army, which could not have been achieved if the Spanish 
infantry tactics were outdated in comparison to the Swedish.398 In fact, the infantry 
formation was only one factor for success in a Thirty Years War battle, while numerical 
superiority, combat experience, training, physical condition, group cohesion, superior 
leadership and trust in their officers, were equally important.399 The main reason for 
simplifying infantry formations was probably that they were easier to handle in battle, in 
particular by inexperienced recruits. 
 
3.3.3.4 Jäger-infantry, djurskyttar and riflemen 
 
A few sources suggest that both sides acknowledged the advantages of sharpshooters and 
probably had them at their disposal in the Battle of Lützen. Gustav Adolf recruited the first 
recorded unit of mounted riflemen in 1611: a djurskyttar company consisting of 48 
huntsmen,400 which was probably present at Lützen. Following the Swedish example, the 
Swedish ally Hessen-Kassel recruited three companies of mounted Jäger,401 which were 
probably not at Lützen.402 
 
 The Imperial army used single marksmen as early as the 16th century, but they are 
rarely mentioned in historical sources in context of a battle.403 In 1642, the Elector 
Maximilian of Bavaria recruited a whole Jäger-regiment,404 suggesting that the Imperial-
                                                 
397 Engerisser 2007, 488. Brzezinski (2001, 67) claimed that the Imperial musketeers fired with three rank 
volleys at Lützen, which seems possible, but there is no confirming account. However, the Imperial officer 
Montecuccoli (1736, 20-22) described caracoling fire, and Markham (1635, 91) clearly favoured caracoling 
fire over volley fire, because the enemy can approach unchallenged after the volley. 
398 Parker 1979, 90, Bennassar/Vincent 1999, 131. 
399 This misconception has a long history and is deeply embedded in historical research. It is mostly based on 
Delbrück’s (2008, 271) work, first published in 1908, and adopted by Roberts (1967a, 67-68), whose 
authority seems to have prevented historians from verifying his thesis, and it is repeated by Polisenský 1971, 
209, Schwarz 1977, 207, 232, Kaiser 1999, 105-112, Weigley 2003, 143, 146, Brnardic 2009a, 22, Rebitsch 
2010, 92, Murray 2013, 13 and many others. 
400 Brzezinski/Hook 2006, 67-68. 
401 ’Huntsmen‘ – German light infantry. 
402 Brzezinski/Hook 2006, 68. 
403 Monro (1637, part II, 149) was wounded by an Imperial sharpshooter at Nurnberg/Alte Veste. Fronsperger 
(1558, 44) is an early reference to rifles in military context. 
404 Maximilian 1642, 253. 
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Leaguist side had experimented with smaller Jäger units, probably on company level, 
before.405 
 
Jäger had to be experienced marksmen, which is why Gustav Adolf recruited 
huntsmen. The recruitment of sharpshooters in Germany was easier due to the long 
tradition of the Schützenverein (rifle association) and the Schützenfest (shooting 
competition), which produced many experienced marksmen. They are likely to have been 
equipped with all kinds of rifled firearms and tended to use their own weapons, with which 
they were very familiar. 
 
3.3.4 Combined Arms Tactics 
 
3.3.4.1 Swedish combined arms tactics 
 
Gustav Adolf compensated for lacking long-range fire power of carbines in his cavalry by 
interlining musketeer companies between his front line cavalry squadrons on each wing.406 
Those musketeer companies at Lützen had an approximate strength of 72 men (section 
7.2.1). Distances between cavalry formations were not fixed and are usually not mentioned 
in contemporary military handbooks. According to Montecuccoli, who gave the best 
description of Swedish formations but is not always reliable, squadrons were deployed 20 
paces (approx. 15m) from each other with a musketeer company in each gap.407 That 
would have been sufficient space for six ranks and eight files in a company formation. 
 
The Swedish cavalry tactic of musket volley from the interlined musketeers, 
followed by a cavalry charge and withdrawal, then another musket volley worked well at 
Breitenfeld.408 In fact, Montecuccoli, an expert on Swedish tactics, wrote that this tactic 
was the main reason for most Swedish victories.409 At Lützen, however, the Swedish 
cavalry was never able to break through the heavily armoured Imperial cuirassiers, even 
though Gustav Adolf had added more fire power since Breitenfeld by deploying two 
regimental guns per interlined musketeer company. 
 
                                                 
405 Brnardic 2009a, 35. 
406 Engerisser 2007, 462 and 487, Brzezinski/Hook 2006, 54 and 61. 
407 Veltzé 1899b, 593. 
408 Monro 1637, part II, 65, Engerisser 2007, 487. 
409 Veltzé 1899b, 579. 
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The winning arm of the Swedish army was the infantry based on a point-blank 
volley fire – shock attack combination supported by heavy artillery and regimental guns.410 
At the outset of the Battle of Breitenfeld, all Swedish artillery, including regimental guns, 
opened fire at medium range.411 The infantry then advanced together with their regimental 
guns, stopped at short range and the guns fired two volleys. Finally, the infantry advanced 
again, receiving the defenders’ musket fire without firing back, until they reached point-
blank range. At 10m to 15m distance, they fired two volleys and charged.412 This tactic 
was effective at Breitenfeld because the Imperial-Leaguist cavalry was already beaten on 
both wings. 
 
3.3.4.2 Imperial combined arms tactics 
 
Wallenstein quickly adjusted his own tactics to suit his opponent’s. According to Holk, 
Wallenstein deployed 150 musketeers in front of each wing at Lützen to give his cavalry 
additional fire power and counter the Swedish musketeer companies.413 It is likely that 
Wallenstein’s musketeers were deployed in companies of 50 men between the four cavalry 
squadrons on each wing, although Holk said “in front of the cavalry.” 
 
Another simple but effective tactic saved Wallenstein’s day. He had deployed small 
cavalry squadrons as reserves behind his infantry centre. They waited until the Swedish 
brigades were engaged in hand-to-hand combat with Imperial infantry and then attacked 
the exposed Swedish flanks with devastating results because the Swedish brigades had too 
few pikemen to protect the musketeers, and Gustav Adolf had no cavalry reserve behind 
his first line infantry. After the disaster at Lützen, this mutual support by infantry and 
cavalry to cover infantry retreats and exploit success became common during the second 
half of the Thirty Years War414 and during the English Civil War.415 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
410 Brzezinski/Hook 2006, 84. 
411 Monro 1637, part II, 65. 
412 Monro 1637, part II, 66, Discipline 1632, part III, 24. 
413 Wittrock 1932, 308. 
414 Battle of Pfaffenhofen 10 August 1633 (Brzezinski/Hook 2006, 83). 
415 Roberts/Tincey 2001, 28. 
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Chapter Four 
Battlefield Archaeology: Methodology 
 
Battlefield archaeology is a specialised sub-discipline of conflict archaeology, which 
focuses on the material remains and traces left behind by a battle in contrast to sieges, 
naval and air warfare and other engagements not fought on open ground. The 
methodologies deployed in battlefield archaeology are not as much dependent on the scale 
and nature of the engagement as they are on the period in which it was fought. There are 
four main types of physical evidence on 17th century battlefields: fortifications, bullet 
impact scars, mass graves, and unstratified artefact scatters.416 
 
In 17th century warfare, the locations of engagements were usually too 
unpredictable to construct any significant fortifications in advance. However, during the 
Thirty Years War army commanders, in particular Wallenstein, made great efforts to 
choose and fortify their battlefields, as was done at the Battles of White Mountain (1620), 
Dessau Bridge (1626) and Nurnberg/Alte Veste (1632), and this has been suggested for 
Lützen (section 6.2).417 Bullet impact scars on structures are common on siege sites, but 
not on battlefields.418 Since all 17th century structures on the Lützen battlefield were 
removed except the castle and the Sckölpitz Bridge (section 6.1), impact scars play no role 
in the interpretation of this particular battle. 
 
The knowledge of mass graves locations could be used to assist in locating a 
battlefield, while the trauma on bones could be an important source of information for 
interpreting the nature of combat in the vicinity of a mass grave.419 Two mass graves were 
found at Lützen: one, by chance in 1891 due to house development, which was not 
excavated,420 and the other in 2011 during the Lützen project under the direction of the 
author. However, the investigation of this mass grave does not represent a component of 
this research, though a summary of the process of discovery is relevant to a comprehension 
of how the battle has been investigated (section 9.1). 
 
                                                 
416 Foard 2008, 64. 
417 Matousek/Grabolle/Meduna/Smrz 2009, 180, Diwald 1969, 350 and 492-493. 
418 Foard 2008, 66. 
419 Foard 2008, 66-67. 
420 Mentioned in the newspaper Volksbote 1901, 2. The building has already been replaced by a supermarket, 
but its location was pinpointed by Rainer Münzberg. 
 110 
Most physical evidence of a battle is left in the top soil. In a 17th century major 
battle thousands of bullets were shot from firearms, in addition to artillery discharging 
hundreds of round-, grape- or case shot. In hand-to-hand combat, hundreds of buttons, 
buckles and pieces of equipment (harness, gun parts, etc.) would be lost. Therefore, the 
unstratified artefact scatter is the most important archaeological signature of a battle, and 
one that cannot be effectively recovered through conventional archaeological methods.421 
Although not all battle related artefacts are metal, the use of metal detectors is the only 
practicable means to recover these artefacts at the present time. This chapter is concerned 
with the methodology of metal detecting survey. 
 
Battlefield archaeology is a young discipline and though its methodology is not 
very different from fieldwalking, developed in the 1970’s to locate settlements and 
graveyards, there is still debate over how to produce a statistically relevant small find 
distribution eligible for interpretation. The interpretation of any distribution patterns is 
highly dependant on the deposition process during the battle, the clearing and looting 
process after the battle, and the recovery rate of finds during the survey. In addition the 
impact agriculture has on small finds is not always fully understood. 
 
4.1 Deposit process and ‘background noise’ 
 
Very little is known of the depositional process during a battle beyond knowing that we 
can expect many more artefacts from large scale, long and bloody battles than from short 
skirmishes. The density of small find distributions also depends on the mobility of the 
opposing forces during the battle; a highly mobile battle produces more scattered 
distributions than a static battle like Lützen or a ‘defile’ battle like Kalkriese, where several 
battle events overlap in a single area.422 Another influence on the types of small finds lost 
on a battlefield might be the outcome of the battle; the annihilation of an army, as at 
Kalkriese,423 very likely produces a distribution pattern very different from a rout, such as 
at Edgehill, or a stalemate, as occurred at Lützen. For example, 27 charging flask caps 
were found at Edgehill which were probably lost in the rout, but only one has been found 
at Lützen.424 
 
                                                 
421 Foard 2008, 68, Rost 2009, 106, Schürger 2012, 247. 
422 Schürger 2011, 113, Rost 2009a, 55, Rost/Wilbers-Rost 2012, 13-14. 
423 Rost/Wilbers-Rost 2012, 8. 
424 Foard 2008, 89. 
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In a 17th century battle, bullets were fired in their thousands by musketeers and 
cavalry. This certainly applies to Lützen, with its six hours duration making it one of the 
longest battles in the Thirty Years War. Although the total number of bullets fired by a 
musketeer in a 17th century battle is difficult to calculate, an account from the long lasting 
1636 battle at Kitzingen reported that Swedish musketeers fired at least seven times over 
the three engagements.425 At Lützen, Imperial Rittmeister Sydnam Poyntz claimed that he 
could not find any loaded pistols nor any pistol shot towards the end of the battle, although 
he found many straying horses with empty pistols in their saddle holsters, thus providing 
an idea of the nature of the Battle of Lützen, where many soldiers probably ran out of 
ammunition.426 
 
The total number of bullets fired at Lützen might range from 100,000 to 200,000, if 
it is calculated that every musketeer fired six to eight times and every cavalryman two to 
five times. The great number makes shot the most important archaeological source as their 
distribution defines the battlefield’s extent, the location of wings, or even single units. 
Although the absence of bullets does not necessarily show the absence of troops, it 
demonstrates the absence of combat, as all independent units had firearms in the Thirty 
Years War. 
 
In contrast to firearms ammunition, the rate of fire of heavy artillery pieces was too 
slow to deposit much roundshot on a battlefield, and even in a prolonged artillery 
bombardment, there were probably not more than 300 roundshot fired.427 A higher number 
of ammunition elements can be expected from grape- or case shot, where a large number of 
projectiles were fired with a single discharge,428 and from shells producing multiple 
fragments of spherical cast iron shells. In particular, case shot represents valuable evidence 
as it can be used to pinpoint the position of artillery pieces according to the spray 
pattern.429 
 
Most buttons, buckles, pieces of harness and armour deposited on the battlefield 
were very likely ripped off in hand-to-hand combat or during the post-battle clearing and 
looting process.430 However, the entire process of losing those items is not fully 
understood, as there are too few comparable battlefield projects. What is to be expected is 
                                                 
425 Engerisser 2007, 546. 
426 Poyntz 1908, 126-127. 
427 Foard 2008, 68. 
428 Foard 2008, 68. 
429 Case shot spray patterns were found in Edgehill (Foard 2009, 124). 
430 Foard 2008, 69, Rost 2009, 109, Rost/Wilbers-Rost 2012, 9. 
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that there will be far fewer metal pieces from uniforms and harness than firearms 
ammunition to be found on an early modern battlefield. One reason for the lack of 
understanding is that those items were not standardized for military use alone until the 18th 
century and therefore they are indistinguishable from civilian items. 
 
Non-battle related artefacts are quite common on European battlefields, and are 
often referred to as ‘background noise’.431 No research has yet been conducted to establish 
the ratio of battle related artefacts to background noise.432 However, Foard has suggested 
that the number of bullets not relating to a battle is negligibly small in comparison to the 
vast amount of bullets fired during a major battle, while with the non-ammunition finds it 
is the opposite.433 The main point to be drawn from this is that we can not relate any single 
unstratified item to the battle just because it was found on the battlefield. 
 
4.2 Clearing and looting process 
 
Any assemblage recovered from a battlefield can only represent a fragment of the total 
body of material deposited during a battle. An important factor in understanding the 
recovery rate is the clearing of battle and the looting of bodies which takes place after any 
battle. 
 
“And now also did Stolhanske charge so fiercely towards that very place [where Gustav 
Adolf was killed], that he beate off the Imperialists, recovered the Kings Body: which he 
brought off naked…” 
 
reported Watts from the Battle of Lützen.434 This might be an extreme example of looting a 
dead soldier by stripping him naked in an ongoing battle and there might have been other 
reasons, such as gaining a trophy from a king, but this incident best illustrates the Thirty 
Years War, when violence was omnipresent, looting paid the soldiers and greed was a 
common trait. In battlefield archaeology it is essential to understand the clearing and 
looting process after the battle, as it can considerably reduce and manipulate the physical 
evidence of the battle.435 
 
                                                 
431 Foard 2008, 69. 
432 Foard 2008, 69. 
433 Foard 2008, 69. 
434 Watts 1633, 141-142. 
435 Rost 2009, 107, Rost 2009a, 51. 
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With vast amounts of weapons, ammunition and equipment lost, with possibly 
some artillery pieces and the baggage train captured, a battlefield contained considerable 
riches, which were usually protected and collected by the victor. One document states that 
a few days after the Battle of Lützen, 200 civilians from Weissenfels were commanded to 
clear the battlefield, very likely under supervision of Saxon officials.436 They carried all the 
dead bodies to “the road,” obviously to systematically remove their cloth and equipment as 
the weapons and armour were handed over to the Saxon Oberst Tauber before burying 
them along that roadside. 
 
The clearing process is illustrated best in a Saxon inventory from the Battle of 
Breitenfeld (1631). This is an exact list of every item collected from the battlefield, mostly 
weapons, armour and artillery pieces, but also artillery ammunition and 357kg of musket 
shot, or 13,730 bullets assuming an average weight of 26g for one musket bullet.437 It is 
not entirely certain if the ammunition was only collected from the captured Imperial 
baggage train, or if the total also reflects ammunition taken from dead soldiers, or if it even 
includes fired or dropped bullets collected from the ground. Although it is believed that 
bullets were not collected from 17th century battlefields during the clearing process,438 
there is a possibility that some battlefields were cleared very thoroughly. Whether the 
Lützen battlefield is one of them is unknown, but at least it was officially cleared by 200 
men for a couple of days. After the official clean-up operation, the battlefield was cleared 
or looted a second time by the local population. This process would take place over a 
longer period, particularly in densely populated areas, until the number of artefacts was 
reduced to a limit where the effort was greater than the gain.439 
 
Unfortunately, much damage to battlefields was inflicted during the late 19th and 
20th century, in particular by house and road construction (Fig. 18).440 Though only a 
quarter of the Lützen battlefield was affected by development, important parts of the main 
battleline’s centre and large areas of the Imperial right wing were destroyed. If a battlefield 
was in agricultural use, the few larger items, which might have been buried during the 
battle, were almost all collected in the first half of the 20th century due to mechanisation of 
agriculture and deep ploughing. In Lützen, locals reported that GDR officials paid for the 
                                                 
436 Wernigerode 1632, Stahl 2012, 258-259. 
437 Dresden 1631: “7 rl.64 pf. Mußquetir Kugeln (7 hundredweight 64 pounds of musket bullets).” 
438 Foard 2008, 70. 
439 Schürger 2012, 248. During the American Civil War, lead bullets were picked up on sight by the local 
population (Gay 1897, 256). 
440 Foard 2008, 72. 
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delivery of roundshot to use them as raw material and, in fact, not one was found during 
the survey, nor were any larger pieces of weapons or armour. 
 
 
Figure 18: Accessible areas of the Lützen battlefield (white): Grey areas were not accessible 
for survey due to house and road development, or state border to Saxony. 
 
Probably the most serious current threat to battlefields began in the 1980’s, when 
metal detectors became available and modern looters did and still do great damage by 
collecting vast amounts of what until then were ‘invisible’ small finds.441 Fortunately, 
damage caused by metal detecting on the Lützen battlefield is not as severe as on other 
battlefields for various reasons. In Eastern Germany metal detectors became available only 
after the 1989 reunification and even then it took a while until metal detecting became 
popular. Further, a combination of law enforcement, one committed policeman and a local 
population interested in their history, the visibility of the battlefield from a major road and 
the lack of interest of most metal detectorists in 17th century artefacts has prevented the 
battlefield from becoming severely looted. 
 
                                                 
441 Foard 2008, 72. 
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Figure 19: Surveyed areas of the Lützen battlefield (roman numbers) with distribution of 
ferrous and non-ferrous material. 
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It is difficult to estimate the impact that the clearing and looting process has had on 
battlefield artefact scatters, and this will certainly vary from battlefield to battlefield, 
depending on the environment, nature of battle and victory, density of population and 
many other factors. 
 
At Lützen, almost all larger artefacts were already removed from the battlefield by 
the mid-20th century due to the extensive clearing and looting process and agricultural use. 
Also, some of the small finds were removed by illegal metal detecting. This process of 
constant removal of small finds is not equal in all areas of the battlefield and manipulates 
the artefact scatter on different scales.442 Considering the time consuming process of 
collecting small finds from a battlefield even with a metal detector, it is assumed that many 
more small finds were removed from high than from low density artefact scatters.443 The 
author has witnessed the behaviour of skilled but archaeologically untrained metal 
detectorists who gave up their search after a few minutes without finding anything. 
Therefore, we have to take into consideration that a lot, in Lützen possibly up to one-third, 
of small finds from main combat areas of a major battle may have been removed, if the 
area was seriously looted by metal detectorists, while almost all small finds and some 
larger items from short skirmishes might have survived in the topsoil.444 
 
4.3 Recovery: the survey 
 
One of the few constants in battlefield archaeology is that it is very difficult and time 
consuming to strip an area completely of metal with metal detectors.445 There are many 
factors influencing the recovery rate of small finds, including temperature and soil 
humidity (see below), which have a serious impact on methodology, and because the 
artefact scatter has already been modified by the clearing and looting process, the main 
goal of a survey should be to gain a representative and statistically relevant sample of 
small finds from a battlefield.446 
 
 
                                                 
442 This is also suggested for the 9 AD Kalkriese/Varus battlefield (Rost 2009, 113). 
443 Rost 2009a, 54. 
444 A Roman sword scabbard, one of the few weapons found in Kalkriese, was found at the edge of the 
battlefield (Rost 2009a, 55-56). Some battlefields have been seriously looted by metal detector rallies 
(Ferguson 2013, 266-267). 
445 Pollard 2009, 142, Schürger 2012, 250. 
446 Foard 2008, 73. 
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4.3.1 Methodology of survey 
 
Most readily available metal detectors with a display meet the requirements of an 
archaeological survey. Adjustment of the discriminate mode is a more important 
consideration than which type of detector should be used. Adjusting the discrimination 
mode controls which type and size of metal objects can be found. Three different types of 
detectors, Tesoro Cortez, Minelab Explorer SE and Whites, were used in Lützen, and 
considerable testing was necessary before the different detectors were synchronized and 
produced a similar number of small finds. 
 
When the Lützen project began in 2006, the Tesoro Cortez was used in ‘all-metal-
mode’ and produced a vast amount of small iron fragments slowing down the survey 
substantially without producing much evidence of the battle, a problem Foard faced at 
Edgehill, and therefore it was abandoned after a few weeks (Fig. 19).447 From then on the 
‘minimum-discriminate-mode’ was used, with the satisfying result that only larger iron 
objects, together with other non-ferrous objects of any size were detected, speeding up the 
survey by approximately 500%.448 In 2010, the Minelab Explorer SE was introduced into 
the survey and synchronized with the Tesoro Cortez with a ‘discriminate-mode’ of 26 on a 
scale of 1 to 31. In addition, in 2006, non-metal objects collected on sight also proved to be 
too time consuming (Fig. 19). 
 
Unfortunately, over the life of the five year project, the composition of the 
detecting team members changed and it was difficult to keep the standard of detecting at 
the same level throughout. From 2008 to 2011, the main team consisted of five untrained 
individuals without any prior archaeological knowledge or experience. Therefore, team 
members were trained to dig up every metal object they found according to the setting of 
their detectors and bag it in order to prevent selective find recovery.449 They were also 
trained to move with the same slow speed to assure an even, full coverage of the surveyed 
area.450 This was taken very seriously, even in areas with few or no battle related artefacts 
at the edge of the battlefield; though this discipline paid off as peripheral areas produced 
important evidence of skirmishing in front of the Imperial left wing.451 The importance of a 
uniform adjustment of all metal detectors and moving with the same speed should not be 
                                                 
447 Foard 2008, 210. 
448 On the Lützen battlefield the ratio of ferrous to non-ferrous material was between 6:1 and 10:1 (Schürger 
2012, 249). 
449 Foard 2008, 75. 
450 Schürger 2012, 250. 
451 Schürger 2011, 119. 
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underestimated, because it has an important impact on recovery rate and can falsify the 
results substantially.452 It took team members four months of metal detecting before they 
developed the skill to distinguish between ferrous and non-ferrous material, leading them 
to produce a more dense distribution pattern of iron objects in 2008 (Fig. 19). Due to this 
variation iron objects do not represent equal recovery distribution patterns across the entire 
battlefield. However, they do provide valuable evidence in some areas where iron has been 
collected more systematically. 
 
A total of 11,066 small finds were recovered from the battlefield. All find positions 
were recorded with a GPS ‘Garmin 60’. The introduction of the Wide Area Augmentation 
System (WAAS) in 2004 enables an approximate accuracy of 5m, depending on the 
position and availability of satellites and on nearby obstacles, such as buildings or trees.453 
Since the battlefield of Lützen is a flat plain almost without obstacles an accuracy of 2m 
was possible for the most part. On relatively flat terrain, there is usually little small find 
displacement and we can assume that also for those parts of the battlefield, where the soil 
has not been moved due to development.454 
 
 
Plate 1: Marking transects during the survey. 
(image has been removed due to copyright restrictions) 
From the start of the project in 2006 to its end in 2011, 1,329,940 square yards 
(111.2ha or 1.1km²) of the battlefield were surveyed with 100% coverage, i.e. every square 
                                                 
452 Haselgrove 1985, 9, Haupt 2012, 38. 
453 Foard 2008, 76. 
454 Haselgrove 1985, 7. 
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meter was searched once, instead of using transects of 2.5m to 10m as it is often done on 
early modern battlefields.455 To ensure a systematically 100% coverage, each detectorist 
marked his transect every 10m at the limit of his reach with the detector with a simple pile 
of top soil. This way, every detectorist determined the width of his transect, which in turn 
makes the coverage independent of his arm’s length (Plate 1). 
 
The decision to detect for ferrous material or not depends largely on the period in 
which the battle was fought and the desired results. Generally, 16th to 19th century battles 
produce enough bullets and other non-ferrous artefacts to justify a metal detector survey 
with discriminate mode, while more artefacts lost in a medieval or ancient battle will be 
ferrous, usually from armour, horse equipment or arrow heads.456 
 
Coverage has an impact on distribution pattern densities and determines the quality 
of the interpretation that can be made; therefore, there is no ground rule of which coverage 
should be used on which battlefield, except that the coverage should not be changed during 
the survey, because distribution patterns can not be compared between areas surveyed with 
a different coverage.457 
 
In any case, the limits of a survey should always be shown on distribution maps, 
together with a notation about transect width, because areas with few or no battle related 
finds are just as important as areas with a dense artefact scatter. 
 
4.3.2 Control grids 
 
In order to check the results, a resurvey of three test grids of 625m² was conducted during 
late September 2009 in areas previously surveyed using the ‘Tesoro Cortez’ metal detector 
to establish just how many artefacts may have been overlooked during the initial survey 
(Fig. 19).458 The ground had moderate soil humidity with temperature of 15°C during the 
resurvey. Grid 1 was ploughed once and grids 2 and 3 were not ploughed between the 
surveys. However, fields II, III, VII and IX were not really ploughed for several years and 
only the topsoil to a depth of approximately 10cm was tilled. Therefore, no finds were 
expected to have been ploughed to the surface. 
                                                 
455 Edgehill with 2.5m to 10m grids (Foard 2008, 208-209). 
456 Battle of Towton 1461 (Sutherland 2009, 110-111) and Kalkriese/Varus Battle 9 (Rost 2009, 108). 
Schürger 2012, 249. 
457 Schürger 2012, 250. 
458 Schürger 2014, 154. 
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Grid 1 was surveyed for the first time in December 2008 by the author. The ground 
had high soil humidity with temperature near the freezing point. Three bullets, one coin, 
two buttons and eleven other small finds were found. The resurvey conducted by Bo 
Knarrström with a ‘Minelab Explorer SE’ recovered two bullets and eight other small 
finds. 
 
Grid 2 was surveyed for the first time in mid August 2009 by a team member. The 
ground had very low soil humidity with temperature of 35°C. Three bullets and one other 
small find were found. The resurvey conducted by Bo Knarrström with a ‘Minelab 
Explorer SE’ recovered two bullets, five coins, three buttons and nine other small finds. 
 
Grid 3 was surveyed the first time in August 2009 by a team member directly after 
the first rainy day in weeks. Therefore, the ground had high soil humidity with temperature 
of 20°C. One coin, two buttons, one buckle and nine other small finds were found. The 
resurvey conducted by the author with a ‘Tesoro Cortez’ recovered two bullets, two coins 
and two other small finds. 
 
Although the control grids are too small to be representative of all surveyed areas, 
they demonstrate the severe impact weather can have on the recovery rate. Approximately 
50% more small finds were recovered in a second survey in grids 1 and 3, where the soil 
humidity was high in the first survey. In contrast an additional 500% of small finds were 
found in grid 2, where soil humidity was very low at the time of the first survey. Actually, 
the area surveyed following the first day of rain after a hot and dry August can be seen 
according to linear concentration of small finds (Fig. 19). After the connection between 
soil humidity and recovery rate had been established, surveying was postponed in hot and 
dry weather. However, grid 1 and 2 both produced three bullets in the first survey and two 
bullets in the second, even though they had completely different humidity conditions. This 
suggests that the recovery of bullets is not affected by soil humidity, probably because 
their mass is large enough to produce a signal under any soil conditions, while thin pieces 
of metal, in particular coins, do not. The reason why there were no bullets found in grid 3 
in the first survey and two in the second is probably coincidental, because there were 
apparently few bullets in this grid. 
 
It is difficult to calculate the percentage of finds overlooked in a survey under good 
conditions according to one resurvey. If the results of the resurvey of grids 1 and 3 are 
representative, it seems that the number of finds may be reduced by 50% in each 
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consecutive survey and therefore a total of approximately 50% of the artefacts, which were 
actually in the top soil, were found in the first survey. This would of course include only 
those artefacts lying within the metal detector’s zone of the depth penetration. Most 
artefacts were found at a depth of up to 10cm with the exception of very large and massive 
metal objects, while most small and thin metal objects were found near the surface, usually 
not deeper than 5cm. 
 
The circa 10cm459depth penetration of metal detectors might cause a problem when 
soil is brought onto the battlefield, as was the case at Kalkriese. On the one hand this might 
preserve the battlefield, but on the other makes it difficult or impossible to find battle 
related artefacts with metal detectors unless this soil overburden is removed.460 Additional 
soil layers were observed on the Lützen battlefield in two small areas where the ground 
rises slightly (Fig. 19). In these areas no artefacts older than early 20th century were found, 
although they are located in the zone of the battle’s main action. 
 
4.3.3 Vertical small find distribution 
 
In order to more fully understand vertical distribution of finds the opportunity was taken to 
metal detect regular spits down through the topsoil. In 2011, a 4m wide and 340m long 
trial trench was dug with an excavator on the battlefield in an area already surveyed in 
order to find a mass grave (Fig. 19, section 9.1). The 30cm top soil layer and 40cm black 
subsoil underneath was removed in seven levels or spits of 10cm, and each was surveyed 
twice, once with a ‘Minelab Explorer SE’ and once with a ‘Whites’. A total number of 211 
artefacts were found in the trial trench, including artefacts from the first survey in 2009. 
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38 82 65 16 4 2 2 2 
Table 17: Number of finds in the trial trench. 
 
Levels 4 to 7 were through black earth. Ploughing, the main reason for vertical 
small finds distribution, usually did not reach this depth and therefore no finds should have 
                                                 
459 See also Haupt 2012, 39. 
460 Wilbers-Rost 2009, 128. 
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been made there. However, half the artefacts from level 4 to 7 were found in two refilled 
modern pits, the other half were very likely brought down to this depth by rodents. 
 
The higher number of artefacts in level 1 and 2, in comparison to level 0, can be 
explained by the fact that level 0 was surveyed only once and the removal of the top soil 
with an excavator produced a flat and even surface with high soil humidity and no air 
pockets, thus providing ideal conditions for metal detecting and producing very likely at 
least a 50% higher recovery rate in level 1 through 7 than in level 0. 
 
Although those numbers are difficult to compare, they give us at least an idea of the 
vertical small find distribution on the battlefield of Lützen, with approximately 70% of 
finds located deeper than 10cm and therefore mostly outside the depth penetration of metal 
detector. Calculating further that approximately 50% of the finds are overlooked in a 
survey (section 4.3.2) and up to 30% were already removed from the battlefield due to the 
clearing and looting process (section 4.2), the full coverage survey has recovered an 
average of roughly 10% of the small finds deposited during the Battle of Lützen. However, 
the recovery rate might vary according to object size, soil condition, density of object 
deposition etc. and is certainly much higher on battlefields which were not in agricultural 
use during the last century, such as the 1876 Little Big Horn battlefield. This important 
observation has a serious impact on the interpretation of small find distributions which can 
be illustrated by the following example. 
 
When the Blue Brigade attacked the first Imperial line at the beginning of the Battle 
of Lützen, they fired one volley of 486 bullets (number of musketeers) and charged. If we 
try to identify this volley on the battlefield, we will find approximately 49 bullets in a full 
coverage survey in a zone 120m (front of brigade) wide and 300m (overshots) deep, or 
3.6ha, which is barely enough to see a distribution pattern. If we survey the area in 10m 
transects the number of bullets found is statistically reduced to ten, which is insufficient for 
any interpretation, and is insufficient to find the location of any cavalry skirmish at all, 
where the number of fired bullets was much smaller. 
 
It would appear that 100% coverage survey using a low setting discriminate mode 
on an early modern battlefield, currently in agricultural use, seems to be the best 
compromise between progress of survey and quality of results, a conclusion that seems to 
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be confirmed by results from the surveys of Landskrona and Lützen, and also by the 2.5m 
transect survey at Edgehill.461 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
461 Knarrström 2009, 189, Foard 2009, Fig. 6. 
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Chapter Five 
Battlefield Archaeology: Ammunition 
 
5.1 Firearms ammunition 
 
The idea to locate battlefields by looking for firearms ammunition goes back to the 19th 
century, but historians failed to see the significance of this new information source.462 With 
metal detectors readily available in the 1980’s, many 17th century British battlefields were 
subsequently collected and produced huge collections of bullets, as from Naseby and 
Marston Moor. Many more large samples were found on ship wrecks, including La 
Trinidad Valencera, Solen, Vasa and Batavia. However, the data of those collections were 
often inaccurately published or not published at all. It was not until 2008 that the first 
attempt to systematically and accurately evaluate 17th century bullets was made by Glenn 
Foard. The reason why it took over 150 years to achieve the first results is threefold. First, 
the sheer number of different weapon models in service in the 17th century made accurate 
statistical accounting difficult. Then, the different weight systems used for calibre 
specifications complicated comparison. Finally, the inaccuracy of weapon barrel and 
ammunition production made it difficult to fully understand the relevance of calibre and 
weight of recovered bullets as well as complicating bullet allocation to weapon models and 
types. 
 
It is the intention of this chapter to provide an evaluation of bullets, and in 
particular their calibre and weight. Once the archaeologically recovered bullets are 
statistically arranged, they can be applied to specific weapon types and models. This result 
in turn forms the basis for all further discussion of bullet distribution patterns. Once 
patterns are identified, there will be an evaluation of the significance of casting sprues, 
modified firearms ammunition and firing evidence, especially bullet deformation due to 
impact. Firearms ammunition from Lützen will be discussed in the context of six other 
archaeological sites, from which exact data and a representative sample of bullets were 
available, in order to understand the development of firearms in the first half of the 17th 
century.463 
 
 
                                                 
462 Foard 2008, 37. 
463 The ammunition from the Vasa and Stralsund has been measured by the author; the ammunition from 
Edgehill has been measured by Glenn Foard, who has kindly placed his data to the author’s disposal. 
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1. The 28 October 1620 Battle of Rakovnik (Rackonitz) was the prelude to the 
decisive Battle of White Mountain between the Bohemian-Protestant and the 
Imperial-Leaguist armies. 
2. The 16 July1621 Battle of Rozvadov (Roßhaupt) was a minor battle between Ernst 
Graf von Mansfeld and the Catholic League. The ammunition of both Czech 
Republic battles provides an insight in firearms used during the early stage of the 
Thirty Years War. 
3. The Swedish flag ship Vasa sank on 10 August 1628 in Stockholm Harbour. 
4. The Dutch East Indian Company ship Batavia sank on 4 June 1629 near Australia. 
The bullets from both wrecks give us a unique insight in unused and undeformed 
ammunition of those weapon models used by in Sweden and the Netherland three 
and four years before the Battle of Lützen. 
5. An excavation of Wallenstein’s fortifications erected during the siege of Stralsund 
(May-July 1628), was carried out in 2009 and 2010, revealing a trench and a mass 
grave.464 The trench was filled up during the siege, probably due to an explosion, 
preserving a vignette of the siege frozen in time including soldier’s skeletons, 
weapons, ammunition, and personal equipment. The archaeological finds from the 
Vasa, the Batavia and Stralsund are important evidence for interpreting Thirty 
Years War firearms ammunition, because they are stratified finds and therefore not 
mixed with finds from other periods. The forces engaged in the siege of Stralsund 
were Wallenstein’s besieging army on one side and the garrison of the Hanseatic 
city of Stralsund on the other. Initially the garrison of Stralsund consisted only of 
the city’s militia, but was reinforced by 1,000 Scots and Danes commanded by 
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Monro and Oberst Heinrich Holk on 7 June465 and 10 
July and by 1,200 Swedes on 16 July. Realising that capturing Stralsund was no 
longer possible after the arrival of reinforcements, Wallenstein retreated after some 
mock attacks at the end of July.466 As the Danish-Swedish reinforcements arrived 
on the last days of the siege, most bullets were very likely fired either by the 
Stralsund militia, the Scots or the Imperial army, which provide clues to the 
weapon models used by the Imperial army four years before the Battle of Lützen. 
6. On 23 October 1642, almost exactly ten years after the Battle of Lützen, the 
English Civil War Battle of Edgehill was fought. In a three year project, 5km² of 
                                                 
464 The excavation was carried out by Landesamt für Kultur und Denkmalpflege Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. 
Hansestadt Stralsund at Frankenhof (Fundplatz 333), reference no. trench: Bef. 20, reference no. mass grave: 
Bef. 18. Konze/Samariter 2012, 266-281. 
465 Monro 1637, part I, 64. 
466 Konze/Samariter 2012, 279, Olesen 2010, 52-54. Holk changed allegiance after the siege of Stralsund and 
fought in Wallenstein’s army at Lützen. 
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the battlefield was surveyed by Foard and his team, collecting 3,250 artefacts.467 
Edgehill was the first major battle of the English Civil War and occurred only three 
months after war broke out. This early date suggests that new firearms from 
English production, or imports from the continent, probably had not yet reached the 
armies in large quantities, and that many recently raised soldiers were very likely 
equipped with older weapon models from armouries. While some veterans 
returning home from the Thirty Years War may have brought their German, 
Austrian and Dutch weapons, these were probably a minority, albeit a distinct 
minority possible to identify from bullet distributions. In comparison with Lützen, 
similarities and differences of firearms ammunition and the development of 
firearms from 1632 to 1642 will be examined as well as the differences of firearms 
used in Germany and England. 
 
5.1.1 Calibre: Allocation of ammunition to firearms types and 
models 
 
In order to enable an interpretation of battlefield bullet distribution, the first task is 
assigning the bullets to known types and models of firearms according to their calibre, as 
discussed in section 3.2. The great number of different weapon models and the inability to 
produce 1/10th millimetre exact calibres for either bore or bullet already suggest that this is 
not a simple task which can be done in the field, as it has been in the past.468 There are two 
approaches to determine the bullet’s calibre: measuring the diameter or the weight. As the 
calibre was specified in weight (i.e. bullets/pound) in the 17th century, the best approach 
for allocating bullets to weapons seems to be measuring their weight. In contrast to 
diameter, weight allows determining the calibre of deformed bullets. 
 
Foard first developed a method to measure diameter and weight of bullets while 
analyzing those from Edgehill, then visualising the data in graphs by calibre, so as to 
allocate bullets to weapon types.469 Since an unusually high percentage (56.6%) of the 
Edgehill bullets were deformed due to firing and impact, they were therefore not eligible 
for measuring diameter.470 Consequently, Foard used primarily weight as a means to 
deduce calibre. This section is concerned with the methodology of Foard’s approach and 
                                                 
467 Foard 2009, 121. 
468 Foard 2008, 116. 
469 Foard 2008, 90-128. 
470 According to Foard’s data. 
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the validity of bullet weight and diameter, followed by interpreting the bullets from Lützen 
within a context of bullets from other archaeological sites. 
 
 
Figure 20: Lützen: Spherical and elliptic bullets according to their divergence in width and 
depth. 
 
 
Figure 21: Vasa: Spherical and elliptic bullets according to their divergence in width and 
depth. 
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5.1.1.1 Validity of weight and diameter of bullets 
 
The validity of bullets’ weight and diameter is influenced by their shape. In theory, all 
unfired bullets should be spherical, but at Lützen only 1.2% actually are, while 8.7% are 
almost spherical with a divergence of width to depth of less than 0.15mm (Fig. 20). 90.1% 
of the bullets are more or less elliptical, as in the form of a cherry stone. In comparison to 
the Vasa (Fig. 21) and Stralsund (Fig. 22) bullets, the elliptical shape of the Lützen bullets 
does not seem unusual. Although the bullets from the Vasa are larger calibres, which 
generally tend to have a greater divergence of width to depth, and the bullets from 
Stralsund are too few to be statistically representative, all three sites have a similar ratio of 
12.9% to 16.7% of bullets with a divergence of 1.05mm to 2.05mm. The consequence of 
those divergences in width and depth is either a substantially different bullet weight with 
the same diameter or a clearly different bullet diameter with the same weight. This 
problem will be discussed further in section 5.1.1.2. 
 
 
Figure 22: Stralsund: Spherical and elliptic bullets according to their divergence in width 
and depth. 
 
If weight is the indicator for calibre, then it is necessary to calculate the length of 
remaining casting sprues. Usually sprues were removed, but 162 (5%) bullets from Lützen 
have sprues at least 2mm in length (Fig. 24). According to three single sprues found on the 
battlefield, the average weight of a sprue is approximately 1.5g to 2.5g. As another 
problem, 51 (2%) bullets have their casting sprues removed by cutting off parts of the 
bullet as well, which reduced their weight. Weight is further influenced by the bullet 
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material. Although the bullets from Lützen have not been fully analysed, some general 
observations can be made according to the colour of corrosion and their specific weight. 
182 (7%) are dark grey tin bullets.471 As tin has a specific weight of 7.28g/cm³, while lead 
is 11.34g/cm³, tin bullets are substantially lighter than lead bullets. We must also consider 
the possibility that tin and lead was mixed on different scales. Small amounts of tin in a 
lead bullet might not create a different patina.472 This consideration can be demonstrated 
with five lead bullets from Lützen. The lead bullets are spherical, as exactly as can be 
measured with a digital calliper rule, are only slightly corroded, and have no sprues. They 
are 2.5% to 10.0% lighter than a pure lead bullet should be. While a 2.5% weight 
difference can be explained by an inaccurate measurement, a 10% weight difference 
almost certainly derives from other reasons, such as a small portion of tin mixed into the 
lead (section 7.2.5). Another influence on weight, other than impure lead and pewter, could 
be corrosion, although no tests on the 17th century lead bullets have been conducted yet to 
understand the significance corrosion has on weight. At any rate, at Lützen, the observation 
has been made that 109 (4%) moderately and 35 (1%) severely corroded bullets have lost a 
significant amount of weight. Tests carried out by Foard have demonstrated that bullets 
loose 0.57g to 2.01g weight due to melting when fired.473 In summary, shape, different 
material, corrosion, and firing reduced the weight of bullets on different scales, which 
implies too many inaccuracies to simply calculate their weight to derive the bore. 
 
 
Figure 23: Measuring width and depth of bullets. 
 
The different shape of bullets not only has an impact on weight, but also on calibre, 
because it complicates measuring the diameter. From the view of a 17th century soldier, it 
                                                 
471 See Sivilich’s 2014, (112, 203) comment on tin and pewter bullets. 
472 Sivilich 2015, (112, 203). 
473 Foard 2008, 118. 
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was most important that a bullet could roll easily into the barrel. Considering the non-
spherical shape of most bullets, the calibre is defined by the mould line, or seam, which is 
almost always the biggest diameter. All recovered bullets were measured at least three 
times at the mould line using the biggest diameter as intended calibre or width and one 
time at the smallest diameter or depth 90° from the mould line. On rare occasions, bullets 
have a single rise usually at the sprue, but sometimes at the mould line, which creates a 
bigger diameter than intended. Those single rises do not prevent the bullet from rolling into 
the barrel and therefore do not indicate the intended calibre. Bullet calibre was measured 
with a digital calliper rule with an accuracy of 1/10th millimetre. 2,019 bullets out of 2,756 
from Lützen were not or only slightly deformed due to firing or impact and therefore 
eligible for measuring their calibre. 
 
Lützen 1632: Bullets - Material, Corrosion, Casting Sprues
2%
7%
4%
1%
5%
81%
Tin Bullets
Moderate Corrosion
Severe Corrosion
Casting Sprue >2 mm
Casting Sprue <-2 mm
Other Bullets
 
Figure 24: 19% of the bullets are not eligible for measuring by weight due to different 
material, corrosion or casting sprues. 
 
5.1.1.2 The Vasa: Correlations between bullet calibre, bullet weight and 
weapon bore 
 
The calibre graphs from Lützen (Fig. 31), Stralsund (Fig. 35) and Edgehill (Fig. 37) show a 
variety of calibres deriving from different models of pistols, carbines and muskets. The 
reason why there are no clear concentrations of single weapon models visible on the graphs 
can be explained by the inability of manufacturers to produce bullets with an accuracy of 
1/10th millimetre. In order to understand the divergence in diameter, a large collection of 
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unfired bullets from a single weapon model is required. This is provided by the Vasa 
bullets. The ship contained several barrels of lead bullets - tin bullets were not among them 
- stored probably to be used as case shot. A sample of 60 lead bullets from each of the 
seven barrels was measured. The bullets were chosen by chance to ensure a random 
sample. Some bullets did show corrosion, which created bubbles on the surface, probably 
from the sea water exposure; since this complicated measurement of diameter, corroded 
bullets were therefore not evaluated. The diameter ranges from 17.5mm to 18.7mm. 
 
If the calibres of musket bullets are sorted according to storage barrels, the 
divergence is most distinct between barrel 17193, with calibres ranging from 17.5mm to 
18.5mm, and barrel 17908, with calibres ranging from 18.0mm to 18.6mm (Fig. 25). 
Although not all bullets were measured, the sample of 60 bullets from each barrel seems 
sufficient to suggest that this is not coincidental. It is not entirely certain if the reason for 
this divergence is because the barrels were delivered by different arms manufactures, or if 
the bullets in one barrel were produced with one large gang mould, which would suggest 
that the calibres of one mould differ less than the calibres between different moulds. 
 
 
Figure 25: Calibre graph of musket bullets from the Vasa sorted according to barrels. (Vasa 
museum: Inv. No. 17193, 17174, 17345, 17908, 17154, 17133, 17324). 
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While most Vasa bullets (87%) have a calibre of 18.0mm to 18.3mm, the 
distributional curve of the calibre graph drops steeply at 18.4mm and 17.9mm and is 
phased out at both ends (Fig. 27). Although the calibre of the bullets has a divergence of 
1.3mm, the form of this curve suggests that one specific calibre was meant and the bullets 
were produced for one specific musket model before they were set aside to be used as case 
shot. The most reasonable explanation that the intended bullet calibre is the most common 
calibre of 18.1mm or 18.2mm is problematic, because no weapon firing this bullet calibre 
is known in 1628. Before that time, three musket models with bore diameters those bullets 
could fit are known to have been produced: 
 
1. The 21.6mm musket from Holland (m1) fired 20.0mm (10 bore) bullets. That 
would mean a windage of 2.9mm to 4.1mm, which is far too large to provide the 
bullet with an effective velocity, even by 17th century standards. 
2. The 17.9mm (15 bore) ammunition of the 18.8mm musket from Augsburg (m4) is 
in the range of calibres from the Vasa. The largest bullet of 18.7mm would barely 
fit the barrel of this musket, but it must be considered that barrels also vary in 
calibre, approximately some +/-0.5mm (section 3.2). That would give the Augsburg 
musket an actual calibre of 18.3mm to 19.3mm. 7.4% of the bullets would not fit 
the smallest barrels (Fig. 26). Many other bullets would have to be rammed home, 
which would have cost valuable time in battle and increase the risk of malfunction 
or even of exploding the musket. Although ramming of bullets or treating bullets by 
soldiers to reduce their size is reported in at least one 17th century military 
handbook, this account is related to the use of different calibre muskets in one army 
and the problems caused by delivery of ammunition only for larger calibre muskets, 
in which case musketeers using smaller calibre weapons had to improvise.474 
3. Therefore, the bullets from the Vasa almost certainly belonged originally to the 
heavy 19.7mm (10 bore) musket produced in Holland from 1600 to 1620 (m3), 
firing, in theory, bullets with a calibre of 18.5mm (12 bore), which were found on 
the Lützen battlefield (Fig. 26). This presumption is consistent with a 1626 
eyewitness account, which stated that the Swedish army used heavy muskets 
(section 3.2.2.2) and with the fact that Sweden imported most firearms from 
Holland until the late 1620’s (section 3.2.1). 
 
                                                 
474 Orrery 1677, 29. 
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Bullet and Weapon Calibre in Comparison
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Figure 26: Comparison of calibres of Vasa bullets with a suggested +/-0.5mm calibre 
divergence of Dutch (m3) and Augsburg (m4) muskets. 
 
Vasa 1628: Bullet Calibres
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Figure 27: Calibre graph of musket bullets from the Vasa with primary (red), secondary 
(yellow) and ideal (white) calibre. 
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It is no contradiction that few bullets actually have the theoretical 12 bore calibre of 
18.5mm, while 98% are up to 1.0mm smaller and only 0.5% are up to 0.2mm bigger. It 
suggests that it was far more important that a bullet could roll easily into the barrel, in 
particular after the barrel was narrowed due to fouling caused by repeated firing, than to 
have a greater bullet velocity. Also an effective windage of 0.5mm to 2.7mm, calculating 
the divergences of bullet and bore, seems acceptable, which guaranteed that larger bullets 
fit smaller barrels of the same model. 
 
Vasa 1628: Pistol Bullets from Privat Chest 
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Figure 28: Calibre of eleven pistol bullets from a private chest, found on the Vasa, which 
also contained also two powder horns, and a gun flint. (Vasa museum: Inv. No. 14041). 
 
The divergence of 1.3mm from smallest to largest bullet seems to be the accepted 
range of production error for Thirty Years War firearms ammunition. An alternative 
interpretation might be that the range was, in fact, unacceptable, and defective bullets were 
set aside for case shot. This does not seem likely, given the bell shaped curve of bullet 
diameters shown in the various graphs. Of major importance for interpreting 17th century 
calibre graphs is the fact, that 87% of the musket bullets from the Vasa have a calibre of 
0.2mm to 0.5mm below the theoretical bullet calibre, while 13% have a calibre of -0.6mm 
to -1.0mm and -0.1mm to +0.2mm of the theoretical bullet calibre. To express this ratio the 
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term ‘primary calibre’ is used for the 87% majority and the term ‘secondary calibre’ for the 
13% minority. 
 
There is similar data for the French Charleville musket used by American soldiers 
during the American Revolutionary War. This musket had a calibre of 17.5mm, while the 
bullets had a diameter of 15.2mm to 16.8mm with most bullets at 16.0mm.475 That means a 
windage of 0.7mm to 2.3mm and a bullet calibre divergence of 1.7mm. At the present 
time, it seems that the calibre values did not change substantially over time in the musket-
era. 
 
One chest on the Vasa contained eleven pistol size bullets, but not the pistol or 
pistols themselves (Fig. 28). The calibre ranges from 10.5mm to 11.7mm. It is likely that 
these bullets belonged to one pistol, or a pair of pistols, with the same calibre. A pair of 
different calibre pistols would have produced two visible groups of calibres in the calibre 
graph. The calibres of the pistol bullets have the same divergence of 1.3mm as the musket 
bullets. Although the small number of pistol bullets is not sufficient to be representative, it 
seems to support the notion that 1.3mm is an acceptable divergence in the 17th century. 
 
The difficulty of using weight for allocating bullets to specific weapon models is 
reflected by a comparison of bullet weight and calibre (Fig. 29). The weight-calibre graph 
appears to create a curve similar to the diameter-calibre graph. If the presumption that the 
bullets from the Vasa belonged to the 19.7mm (m3) musket is not accepted, those bullets 
have a calibre of 12 bore according to diameter, but not one bullet approaches the intended 
weight of 37.75g. The actual weight of bullets is 4g to 11g or 10.6% to 29.9% lower than 
intended, suggesting that they are 14 or 15 bore. In a cross-check, 37.75g bullets from 
Edgehill have a diameter of 18.7mm to 19.5mm. The weight suggests that they are 12 bore, 
but the diameter is similar to 11 bore. 
 
                                                 
475 Sivilich 2015, (60). 
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Figure 29: Vasa: Comparison of weight and calibre of bullets from the 19.7mm musket from 
Amsterdam. 
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It is evident that both weight and diameter could not have been responsible for 
determining calibre simultaneously. The deciding factor for 17th century ammunition 
supply was much more likely whether bullets could fit the barrels of firearms, and 
therefore had the correct diameter, rather than having bullets with the correct weight, 
which did not, or barely fit the barrel of a firearm. This suggestion is supported by 
evidence from the Vasa, where the bullets apparently can be allocated to one known 
weapon model according to their calibre. Therefore, the diameter of bullets will be used to 
determine their calibre so as to allocate bullets to specific firearm types and models in this 
thesis. However, weight is too important a value to disregard it entirely, and section 5.1.2.1 
will discuss how to use it. In any case, the approach discussed here applies to early modern 
ammunition. With advancing weapon standardization, weight could still produce sufficient 
data to determine the weapon type when the divergence between calibres of the main 
weapons is big enough, as it is between the British 19.1mm Brown Bess and the French 
17.5mm Charleville 18th century muskets. 
 
5.1.1.3 Lützen: Interpretation of calibres 
 
The analysis of firearms ammunition from the Vasa provided valuable evidence about 
bullet calibre diversity, the relation between calibre and weight, and the problematic issue 
of using primarily weight and bore as means for a calibre interpretation. The Lützen calibre 
bullet data will be analysed according to primary and secondary calibres of each known 
weapon model, instead of the current method of representing the data in bullet weight and 
bore. This methodology will allow a far more accurate assigning of bullets to weapon 
models; in turn attribution of bullets to weapons will provide the basis for interpreting 
bullet distribution on the battlefield. 
 
The distribution of calibres on graphs is generally influenced by the surveyed areas 
of a battlefield, in particular the ratio of pistol and carbine shot to musket shot, which 
serves as an indicator for cavalry and infantry action (Fig. 30). At Edgehill, the ratio is 
50% to 50%; it is one of the few 17th century battlefields where all areas, wings and centre, 
were at least partially surveyed. Edgehill will thus provide a ‘typical’ ratio of pistol/carbine 
shot to musket shot. This suggestion is supported by the substantial survey of Marston 
Moor by Roberts (Fig. 30). The lower number of pistol and carbine shot at Lützen can be 
explained because most of the centre (infantry), but only approximately 50% of the left and 
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10% of the right Imperial wings (cavalry), has been surveyed. Thus it must be considered 
that pistol and carbine shot are underrepresented. 
 
Ratio of Pistol/Carbine to Musket Shot on 17th Century Battlefields and Sieges
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Figure 30: Ratio of pistol and carbine bullets to musket bullets. This is a subjective and 
approximate allocation of bullets to weapon types. Bullets from Lützen, Edgehill and 
Stralsund were allocated by the author; the ratios from other battlefields are from Foard 
2009a, 151. 
 
Generally the large number of weapon models makes it impossible to allocate a 
single bullet to one model with certainty because calibres of different models overlap with 
one exception (see below). Bullet diameters for three broad weapon classes are 17.6mm to 
19.9mm/musket shot, 15.3mm to 15.8mm/carbine shot and 8.4mm to 11.7mm/pistol shot, 
although it is possible the latter might be mixed with rifle shot (Fig. 31). Therefore, a 
statistical probability has to be calculated according the following presumptions: 
 
1. There are more bullets of primary than of secondary calibre. 
2. There are fewer old and very new models, than those which had been in general 
production for some years (see below). 
3. At Lützen, there are more musket than carbine or pistol bullets, with an 
approximate ratio of 4:1:1. 
 
 139 
The calibre graph is discussed in nine groups (weapon types/models) subjectively 
identified by peaks or concentrations on the distributional graph of bullet diameters or by 
known weapon types and models. The groups are 18.9-19.9mm, 17.9-18.8mm, 17.3-
17.8mm, 15.9-17.2mm, 15.0-15.8mm, 14.0-14.9mm, 11.8-13.9mm, 8.4-11.7mm and less 
than 8.4mm diameter. 
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Figure 31: Lützen calibre graph with models of firearms: musket bullets – blue, carbine 
bullets – green, pistol bullets – red, rifle bullets – orange. Weapon models: In front of 
backslash – primary calibre, behind backslash – secondary calibre. 
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Group 1 (18.9-19.9mm) 
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At Lützen only the largest bullets (18.9-19.9mm) can be allocated to a single weapon 
model with a certain degree of probability; the heavy 21.6mm musket with a bullet calibre 
of 20.0mm produced in Holland (m1). Only thirteen bullets (0.6%)476 of that type were 
found. This does not come as a surprise as this weapon had already been out of date for 
two decades. Weighing 7.5kg, it was relatively heavy, in particular on long campaigns; it 
was probably transported with the baggage or artillery train and employed with the artillery 
due to its lack of mobility. 
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476 The percentage value given after a number of bullets refer to the 2,019 slightly or not deformed bullets 
eligible for measuring. 
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There is a conspicuous series of peaks at 17.9mm to 18.8mm similar to the peak on the 
Vasa musket bullet calibre graph. It has a peak in the middle at 18.0mm, 18.2mm and 
18.4mm and drops at both 17.9mm and 18.8mm. The high point is not as distinct as on the 
Vasa graph because there were fewer bullets of this calibre found at Lützen. These bullets 
can belong to two weapon models: The old, heavy 19.7mm musket as on the Vasa (m3), or 
the new, light musket of the same calibre produced from 1630 to 1640 (M2). The dual 
possibility of an obsolete model and a very recent model is reflected by the low number of 
those bullets (100 or 5.0%) found on the battlefield. The m3 was out of production for 
twelve years and the production of the M2 started just two years before the battle. How 
many bullets derive from which of these two weapons will be discussed when interpreting 
the bullet distribution (section 8.3.3). Both models were used chiefly by the Swedish army 
at Lützen (section 3.2.2.2). The low number of bullets used by two out of date models (m1 
and m3) and the one recently developed model (M2) is one key for understanding the 
calibre graph. According to the Lützen bullet distributions, older weapons were still in use 
in the Thirty Years War, but in significantly lower numbers. As the army upgraded its 
weaponry, it took some years until it was equipped with a newer model. 
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A slight concentration on the calibre graph occurs between 17.3mm and 17.8mm, but 
without the typical bell-shaped curve seen on the Vasa’s calibre distribution graph. The 
113 bullets (5.6%) in this peak can be allocated to five different weapon models making 
any interpretation difficult. The c1 carbine from Holland had been obsolete for 12 years. 
Neither the Swedish nor the Imperial armies had many type c1 carbines in service by 1632 
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(sections 3.3.2.2 and 3.3.2.6), therefore, an insignificant number of c1 carbine ammunition 
is to be expected on the battlefield in general and in particular in this concentration on the 
calibre distribution graph, as the c1 bullets are a secondary calibre here. The M2 and m3 
musket bullets are also secondary calibres in this part of the calibre distribution graph and, 
as there were only few of those muskets in service in Lützen, they can be largely 
disregarded. That leaves the older m4 musket (primary calibre range of 17.4-17.7mm) and 
the M5 musket (primary calibre at 17.3mm). The process of elimination suggests that most 
bullets in the 17.3mm to 17.8mm range derive from the m4 and M5 muskets. As both 
models were produced in southern Germany’s Augsburg and Nurnberg, they were very 
likely used chiefly by the Imperial army, although some were probably captured by the 
Swedish army during their earlier German campaign. 
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The most conspicuous concentration (1,200 bullets/59.4%) on the calibre graph occurs in 
the range between 15.9mm and 17.2mm with a peak (202 bullets) at 16.4mm. It has the 
typical bell shaped curve expected from a single weapon model, but the bullets actually 
represent nine different models: five muskets and four carbines. Although it is impossible 
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to allocate these bullets to any specific weapon model, it is the typical curve of one weapon 
model that must be considered. The curve suggests most of this bullet group derives from a 
single model or models with a similar calibre. Four models (muskets M6, m7 and M8 and 
the carbine c1) have their primary calibre at the peak (734 bullets/36.4%) between 16.4mm 
and 16.8mm. As the carbine can be ruled out (see above) as a weapon represented in this 
calibre peak, and musket m7 was obsolete by the time of the battle, most bullets almost 
certainly derive from the 17.7mm musket (M6) produced in Amsterdam and the 17.5mm 
musket (M8) produced in Suhl. The calibre distribution indicates that, since only 11.2% of 
the total bullets recovered derive from larger calibre muskets m1, M2, m3 and m4, a total 
that is far too small a number for a 17th century battlefield, the explanation with the best fit 
is that most musketeers, approximately 75%, in both armies, were equipped with musket 
models M6 and M8, as shown by the bullet calibre graph’s distribution. It is not certain 
whether the Swedish army was chiefly equipped with Amsterdam model M6 and the 
Imperial army with the Suhl model M8. It seems likely that the Swedish army acquired 
many Suhl-manufactured 17.5mm muskets during 1631 and 1632, when Saxony became 
an ally and many new regiments were recruited. In any case, the calibre divergence 
between these two models is too small to distinguish them from each other, which means 
that most musket bullets can not be allocated to a particular side. 
 
Bullets at 16.7mm and below can be allocated to three carbine models (C2, C3 and 
C4). The 17.2mm carbine from Holland (C2) and the 16.8mm carbine from Suhl (C4), 
together with the C5 carbine (see below), saw service mainly from 1620 to 1630 
suggesting that they were the standard carbines in Lützen. The 16.8mm Nurnberg (C3) 
carbine was too new to be in service in any great number at the time of Lützen. 
The various carbine bullets at 16.4mm to 16.7mm overlap with the standard muskets M6 
and M8, but only as their secondary calibre. If it is considered that, normally, there are 
many fewer carbine than musket bullets on a normal battlefield, the bullets at 16.4mm to 
16.7mm are more likely to be almost exclusively from muskets. That changes at 15.9mm 
to 16.2mm where only carbines have their primary calibre. In particular, the small peak at 
16.0mm represents three carbines’ primary calibre (C2, C3, C4) and might indicate carbine 
bullets predominate at 15.9mm and 16.0mm. 
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Group 5 (15.0-15.8mm) 
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Bullets with a calibre of 15.0mm to 15.8mm are exclusively carbine shot. They can be 
divided into two concentrations, 15.0mm to 15.2mm and 15.4mm to 15.8mm. The 
variation suggests different carbine models. The larger calibre concentration probably 
derives from the C3 Nurnberg carbine and the C4 Suhl carbine with the addition of some 
of C2 and C5 carbine bullets. The smaller calibre concentration derives mostly from the 
16.1mm carbine from Holland (C5) with, possibly, a few bullets from calivers (see below). 
Although Gustav Adolf had disbanded his harquebusier regiments, the Swedish army 
certainly had some carbines in service, in particular with his German cavalry. Since we do 
not know the number of carbines used in the Swedish army at Lützen, it is not possible to 
suggest a ratio of Imperial to Swedish carbines without more evidence. 
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Group 6 (14.0-14.9mm) 
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Ammunition from the 15.9mm calivers from Nurnberg and Amsterdam (s1) and the 
15.8mm caliver from Suhl (s2) has a calibre ranging from 14.0mm to 15.2mm. This 
distribution overlaps entirely with the C5 carbine and the P1 pistol. The gap at 14.6mm, 
where the s1 and s2 calivers have their primary calibre, and between the two small 
concentrations at 14.2mm and 14.5mm suggests that there were no s1 or s2 calivers 
present; however, the total of 140 bullets is not enough to be certain that the gap is not 
coincidental. If there were any calivers at Lützen, they may have been used by the Leaguist 
Regiment Comargo, which, as formerly part of Tilly’s army, had once used them (section 
3.3.3.3). The actual bullet distribution patterns of this calibre show a wide scatter on the 
battlefield (Fig. 32). Although there is a low density bullet concentration where Comargo’s 
Regiment is expected, a denser second concentration is located northeast of the windmills. 
If Comargo’s Regiment was still equipped according to the Spanish school with calivers, 
there should have been one clearly visible concentration of caliver bullets. The calivers 
might have been used by Imperial dragoons, but there was only the small Dragoon 
Regiment Trcka at beginning of the battle on the right wing, while two other dragoon 
regiments, Pappenheim and Merode, arrived with Pappenheim around midday on the far 
left wing. They probably did not make much use of their calivers, which were not even 
their official standard weapon, because they were put into action as cavalry. They could 
not have created any visible distribution patterns, while any potential patterns would have 
been outside the surveyed area. Therefore, it is far more likely that most bullets in this 
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group derive from the P1 pistol and, possibly, a few from the C5 carbine, with its 
secondary calibre at 14.6mm to 14.9mm. 
 
 
Figure 32: Distribution of possible caliver bullets s1 and s2: primary calibre – 14.4-14.8mm, 
secondary calibre – 14.0-14.3mm, 14.9-15.2mm and 15.00-16.50g. 
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Group 7 (11.8-13.9mm) 
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Caution is essential when interpreting the smaller calibres because there were very likely 
many more small calibre pistol and carbine models in service than suggested by the calibre 
distribution graph. Bullets with calibres between 11.8mm to 13.9mm can be allocated to 
various pistol models (P1 to P7) and the small calibre carbines c6 and c7 produced in 
Ferlach. Although these carbines were obsolete at the time of Lützen, many were 
remanufactured and still in service in the Imperial army (section 3.2.2.4). The carbine 
bullets have their secondary calibre at 11.8mm to 12.1mm and it is likely that there are 
actually more pistol than carbine bullets at this calibre, while between 12.2mm to 13.6mm 
both pistol and carbine bullets mix at an unknown ratio. 
 
Group 8 (8.4-11.7mm) 
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There are only 75 bullets (3.7%) with a calibre between 8.4mm to 11.7mm. They can be 
allocated almost exclusively to pistols with the exception of a few possible rifle bullets. 
Small calibre pistols from Germany and Austria are thought to have been used more 
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regularly by Imperial cavalry in the early 1630’s. However, 11mm bullets from the 
Swedish ships Vasa and Solen (section 5.1.1.4) suggest that the Swedish army also used 
them, not just the larger calibre Dutch pistols, as one might have expected because of the 
good trade relations between Sweden and Holland. 
 
Group 9 (6.6-8.3mm) 
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There are no standard military weapons known which could have fired bullets with a 
calibre of 8.3mm or below. This is reflected by the fact that only four bullets (0.2%) with a 
calibre of 6.6mm to 7.9mm were found at Lützen. They might not even relate to the battle, 
because small shot usually derive from hunting weapons.477 If they are battle related, these 
bullets derive most likely from Swedish hunting rifles used by Gustav Adolf’s djurskyttar. 
The low number of small calibre bullets makes it unlikely that buck shot, which ranges in 
size from 6.1mm to 9.1mm, was used at Lützen.478 
 
5.1.1.4 European firearms in the first half of the 17th century: A 
summary 
 
Although we know something about most standard weapons of the time from military 
handbooks, they simplify the actual conditions of military equipment production by 
suggesting there was standardization of weapons, while archaeological evidence reveals 
something different. At Lützen, the range of bullet diameters indicates many different 
models of firearms; this suggests a lack of standardisation of equipment in Thirty Years 
War armies. While the development of pistols and carbines during this period is still too 
complex, and vague to fully grasp, there is some evidence for understanding the basic 
musket evolution and development. There was a tendency toward standardized muskets, 
whether it was on purpose or simply the result of mass recruitment increasing the necessity 
to acquire thousands of new weapons in a short time, purchasing huge amounts of weapons 
                                                 
477 Sivilich 2015, (230). 
478 Sivilich 2015, (265). 
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of a model recently in production is uncertain. To fully understand equipment evolution 
during the late 16th and early 17th century European armies much more closely dated 
archaeological evidence from battlefields, sieges and ship wrecks from different periods 
and locations, and in clearly defined contexts is necessary, to demonstrate the chronology 
of orders, production and delivery. Some archaeological evidence is already available as 
evidenced by the following examples. 
 
La Trinidad Valencera 1588 
The bullets from the ship La Trinidad Valencera, sunk as part of the Spanish Armada, have 
calibres of 13mm and 19mm.479 The 13mm bullets were for the arquebus, while the 19mm 
bullets very likely belonged to the 21.6mm Dutch musket (m1). The latter was probably 
the main musket model of the Spanish infantry as early as 1588. 
 
Rakovnik 1620 
The bullet calibre distribution graph from the Battle of Rakovnik, although measured in 
half millimetre and therefore difficult to compare, seems similar to the Lützen distribution 
(Fig. 33). The concentration between 15.5mm and 17.0mm suggests that the primary 
musket model was the m7 from Suhl. There were fewer m3 from Holland and m4 from 
Augsburg at 17.0mm to 18.5mm, and very few m1 from Holland at 19.0mm to 19.5mm. 
That said, however, there is one significant difference. While there is a concentration at 
14.5mm to 15.5mm in Rakovnik, the Lützen calibre distribution graph has a gap between 
14.5mm to 14.8mm. This gap represents only the primary calibre of caliver models s1 and 
s2 from Amsterdam, Nurnberg and Suhl. The huge amount of those diameter bullets at 
Rakovnik suggests that at least one side, the Leaguist, used a great many calivers and 
therefore deployed their infantry very likely according to Spanish tactics (section 3.3.3.2). 
 
                                                 
479 Martin 2001, 82. The calibres were rounded to full millimetre and therefore are difficult to evaluate. 
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Figure 33: Rakovnik calibre graph. Caliver bullets – yellow. 
 
Rozvadov 1621 
A similar distribution occurs with the Rozvadov bullet calibre distribution graph, tending 
to confirm the use of calivers by Leaguist infantry during the early Thirty Years War (Fig. 
34). 
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Figure 34: Rozvadov calibre graph. 
 
Solen 1627 
The Swedish warship Solen sank during the Battle of Oliwa near Gdansk (Danzig) on 28 
November 1627.480 466 bullets were recovered from the ship, of which the dominant 
calibres were 21mm, 17mm (the most common), 14mm and 11mm. Without more precise 
data, these calibres are difficult to interpret. The 11mm examples match the bullets from 
Vasa’s chest no. 14041 and probably represent ammunition for the P6 or P7 pistol models 
from Nurnberg. The 21mm bullets could have derived only from the old Dutch/Spanish 
(m1) musket, which matches the German account from Poland that states the Swedish 
army used heavy muskets in 1626 (section 3.2.3.2). The 17mm probably belong to several 
different musket models, including the older m7 from Suhl and the new M6 from 
Amsterdam. Most interesting are the 14mm bullets, which might have derived from the 
                                                 
480 Mandzy 2012, 72. 
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new P1 pistol from Amsterdam, from an older carbine model, or even from the Swedish 
rör; this could indicate either the introduction of a new pistol model, or it could be seen as 
evidence that Gustav Adolf’s military reforms of abolishing carbines and calivers had not 
yet progressed. 
 
Vasa 1628 
The German 1626 account from Poland about heavy muskets used by the Swedes is 
supported by the Vasa bullets, which clearly suggest that one of the main Swedish army’s 
firearms in the 1620’s was the 19.7mm musket (m3). This weapon was already out of date 
by 1628, possibly reflecting on the poor condition of the Swedish army and the incomplete 
military reform of Gustav Adolf’s. In either case, sufficient data from the Swedish-Polish 
War (1621-1629) is required to fully understand firearm development in the Swedish army 
before it entered the Thirty Years War. 
 
Stralsund 1628 
At Stralsund 49 bullets were found in a trench and a mass grave from the siege. Of these, 
thirteen bullets (26.5%) were too deformed due to impact damage to measure their calibre. 
The remaining number, 36 bullets, were found in a very small area and are certainly not 
numerous enough to provide sufficient data for a relevant statistical evaluation of firearms 
used in the siege. They can, however, at least suggest an idea of the firearms in service 
during 1628. In context of the events, and their location, it is likely that most of the 
Stralsund bullets derive from the Imperial army, from the Stralsund militia, or from 
Monro’s Scots, because the main action took place before the arrival of Danish and 
Swedish reinforcements. Twenty-two Stralsund bullets (61.1%) have diameters ranging 
from 16.3mm to 17.0mm with the peak at 16.7mm. The distribution of musket shot (Fig. 
35) on the graph is similar to the Lützen calibre graph; although the Lützen peak is at 
16.4mm. This difference suggests that musket bullets found at Stralsund derive from the 
same musket models used at Lützen, except that in Stralsund there seem to be fewer 
17.5mm Suhl muskets (m7, M8), while there were probably more 17.7mm Amsterdam 
muskets (M6) and 18.3mm (M5) and 18.8mm (m4) muskets from Augsburg and Nurnberg. 
Four bullets (11.1%) with a calibre of 18.0mm to 18.3mm very likely derive from older 
19.7mm Dutch muskets (m3). As a Protestant Hanseatic city, Stralsund had good relations 
with Holland. Therefore, those bullets and the bullets from the 17.7mm musket (M6) very 
likely belonged to the militia or, possibly, to the Scottish reinforcements. 
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Stralsund 1628: Calibre of Bullets
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Figure 35: Stralsund calibre graph. 
 
Batavia 1629 
In contrast to the Vasa, bullets from the Batavia have a much greater variety, ranging from 
10.9mm to 19.8mm in calibre, possibly because the Batavia was not a warship, but a 
merchant ship from the East India Company sailing to a colony (Fig. 36). Between 
17.9mm and 18.7mm, the Batavia calibre graph is similar to Lützen with a drop at 
17.9mm; these bullets derive from the older 19.7mm Dutch musket (m3). The very low 
number of bullets above 18.8mm for the obsolete 21.6mm Holland musket (m1) is similar 
to the Lützen calibre graph. The largest number of bullets, between 16.4mm and 17.8mm, 
derive mostly from German weapons, in particular the 18.8mm (m4) and 18.3mm (M5) 
muskets from Augsburg and Nurnberg with, possibly, a few 17.7mm muskets from 
Amsterdam (M6). This is surprising to find on a Dutch ship, because Holland, as one of the 
largest arms manufacturers in Europe, should have had the capability to equip all their 
ships with their own muskets. It may be that they preferred to equip their forces with their 
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own weaponry whiles sending foreign weapons to their colonies. The peak at 14.0mm, 
where no known weapon has the primary calibre, clearly shows that there were other 
weapons unknown to us, making an interpretation of smaller calibre bullets difficult. 
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Figure 36: Batavia calibre graph. 
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10.8mm: P7
10.9mm: -/ P7
11.0mm: -/ P7
11.1mm: -/ P6, P7
11.2mm: -/ P6, P7
11.3mm: -/ P6
11.4mm: -/ P4, P6
11.5mm: P6/ P4, P5
11.6mm: P6/ P4, P5
11.7mm: P6/ P4, P5
11.8mm: P4, P6/ c7, P3, P5
11.9mm: P4, P5/ c7, P3, P6
12.0mm: P4, P5/ c7, P3, P6
12.1mm: P4, P5/ c7, P3, P6
12.2mm: c7, P3, P5/ P4, P6
12.3mm: c7, P3/ P4, P5
12.4mm: c7, P3/ P4, P5
12.5mm: c7, P3/ P2, P4, P5
12.6mm: -/ c6, c7, P2, P3, P5
12.7mm: -/ c6, c7, P2, P3
12.8mm: -/ c6, c7, P2, P3
12.9mm: P2/ c6, c7, P3
13.0mm: c6, P2
13.1mm: c6, P2
13.2mm: c6, P2
13.3mm: c6/ P2
13.4mm: -/ c6, P2
13.5mm: -/ c6, P2
13.6mm: -/ c6, P2
13.7mm: -/ c6
13.8mm: -/ P1
13.9mm: -/ P1
14.0mm: -/ s2, P1
14.1mm: -/ s1, s2, P1
14.2mm: P1/ s1, s2
14.3mm: P1/ s1, s2
14.4mm: s2, P1/ s1
14.5mm: s1, s2, P1
14.6mm: s1, s2/ C5, P1
14.7mm: s1, s2/ C5, P1
14.8mm: s1/ s2, C5, P1
14.9mm: -/ s1, s2, C5, P1
15.0mm: C5/ s1, s2
15.1mm: C5/ s1, s2
15.2mm: C5/ s1
15.3mm: C5/ C3, C4
15.4mm: -/ C3, C4, C5
15.5mm: -/ C3, C4, C5
15.6mm: -/ C2, C3, C4, C5
15.7mm: C3, C4/ C2, C5
15.8mm: C3, C4/ C2
15.9mm: C3, C4/ m7, M8, C2
16.0mm: C2, C3, C4/ m7, M8
16.1mm: C2/ M6, m7, M8, C3, C4
16.2mm: C2/ M6, m7, M8, C3, C4
16.3mm: m7, M8, C2/ M6, C3, C4
16.4mm: m7, M8/ M6, c1, C2, C3, C4
16.5mm: M6, m7, M8/ c1, C2
16.6mm: M6, m7, M8/ M5, c1, C2
16.7mm: M6/ M5, m7, M8, c1, C2
16.8mm: M6, c1/ M5, m7, M8
16.9mm: c1/ M5, M6, m7, M8
17.0mm: M5, c1/ m4, M6, m7, M8
17.1mm: M5, c1/ m4, M6
17.2mm: M5/ m4, M6, c1
17.3mm: M5/ m4, c1
17.4mm: m4/ M5, c1
17.5mm: m4/ M5, c1
17.6mm: m4/ M2, m3, M5
17.7mm: m4/ M2, m3, M5
17.8mm: -/ M2, m3, m4
17.9mm: -/ M2, m3, m4
18.0mm: M2, m3/ m4
18.1mm: M2, m3/ m4
18.2mm: M2, m3
18.3mm: M2, m3
18.4mm: -/ M2, m3
18.5mm: -/ M2, m3
18.6mm: -/ M2, m3
18.7mm: -/ M2, m3
18.8mm: -/ M2, m3
18.9mm: -/ m1
19.0mm: -/ m1
19.1mm: -/ m1
19.2mm: -/ m1
19.3mm: -/ m1
19.4mm: -/ m1
19.5mm: m1
19.6mm: m1
19.7mm: m1
19.8mm: m1
19.9mm: -/ m1
20.0mm: -/ m1
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Lützen 1632 
The standard muskets of both armies at Lützen were the 17.7mm Amsterdam (M6) musket 
and the Suhl (m7, M8) 17.5mm muskets with which approximately 75% of the musketeers 
were equipped. The Imperial army had a low number of 18.8mm (m4) and 18.3mm (M5) 
muskets from Augsburg and Nurnberg. In comparison to Stralsund four years before 
Lützen, the muskets in service during 1632 had not changed much in the Imperial army. 
The Swedish army seems to have retained a small number of old 19.7mm muskets (m3) 
while in the process of equipping their soldiers with new 19.7mm muskets (M2). A very 
few old 21.6mm muskets (m1) were still in service as well. Since only 25% of the Swedish 
musketeers were equipped with these three models, most of them probably carried the new 
19.7mm musket (M2). It seems that the Swedish army’s weaponry changed substantially 
between 1628 and 1632 and became similar to that of the Imperial army. It is also evidence 
that the assumption by Delbrück and others, that the Swedish army was superior because 
their infantry was equipped completely with light muskets that could be fired without a 
rest, is wrong.481 
 
Edgehill 1642 
At Edgehill, 1096 bullets were collected from the battlefield, of which 621 bullets were 
either case shot or too deformed to measure their calibre.482 The remaining 475 bullets 
create similar concentrations on the calibre graph as musket calibres at Lützen. At least 
155 bullets (32.6%) have a calibre of 18.6mm to 19.6mm, with a peak at 19.0mm (Fig. 37). 
They create the typical indicator of one weapon model. This suggestion is supported by the 
fact that this group of bullets has a calibre divergence of 1.1mm, which is within the 
accepted divergence. The mathematically calculated ideal bullet calibre of this group is 
approximately 19.4mm, 0.2mm below the largest bullets of 19.6mm, with a primary 
calibre from 18.9mm to 19.2mm (95 bullets). Therefore, the bullets are very likely 11 bore. 
This calibre musket was not used at Lützen or Stralsund. Some of these bullets might 
derive from the 20.8mm snaphance carbine used by the New Model Army’s cavalry, which 
can be seen in the Littlecote collection,483 but it is unlikely that this carbine had reached the 
army by 1642 and the large quantity of these calibre bullets suggests that most derive from 
a musket model used by both sides. The model in question is very likely the 9 bore 
(20.4mm) musket (M9), which is mentioned only by William Eldred as being used in the 
                                                 
481 Lloyd 1908, 112, Deuticke 1917, 67 and Delbrück 2008, 224, followed by Schwarz 1977, 217. See also 
Roberts 1967a, 69. 
482 Foard 2009, 122. 
483 Foard 2008, fig. 34. 
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1620’s.484 At the present time there is no evidence that this weapon was used on the 
continent and it is probably a genuine English musket. An 18.9mm bullet found during an 
excavation in Derry in Ireland, which derives probably from the 1649 siege, also suggests 
that an English 9 bore (20.4mm) musket was one of the main weapons in the English Civil 
War.485 
 
The smaller concentration (45 bullets/9.5%) on the calibre graph at 17.7mm to 
18.6mm almost certainly derives from the 19.7mm Amsterdam muskets; the gap at 
17.7mm clearly separates this cluster from lower calibre weapons. Although it is possible 
that a few old muskets (m3) were still in use in 1642, this model had been out of date for 
over two decades. It is more likely that most of these bullets derive from the newer model 
M2, which first saw service at Lützen, but was only recently out of date by Edgehill. 
Nevertheless, there seem to be very few outdated weapons in service at Edgehill. The two 
bullets (0.4%) with a calibre of 20.2mm and 20.5mm were probably fired by the old 
21.6mm Dutch musket (m1), a new weapon during the 1588 Spanish Armada, and it seems 
possible that those muskets were still stored as war booty in an armoury only to find 
service 54 years later at Edgehill.486 However, two bullets are not enough to be certain that 
they are related to the battle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
484 Eldred (1646, 96) relates to the bullet calibre of 11 bore, which should have been fired by a 9 bore musket. 
485 Although Logue/O’Neill (2006, 60) suggest that this bullet derives from the siege in 1689, it is almost 
certain that the bullet is 11 bore and belonged to the 9 bore weapon mentioned by Eldred, because the calibre 
lies exactly between 10 and 12 bore. 
486 In particular the royalist army was supplied with old weapons from armouries (Foard 2008, 220). 
However, even new supply from the continent was far from being of a standard type, as Sir Ralph Hopton 
complained in 1643 (Parker 1995, 152, Ferguson 2013, 165). 
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Figure 37: Edgehill calibre graph. 
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6.6mm
6.7mm
6.8mm
6.9mm
7.0mm
7.1mm
7.2mm
7.3mm
7.4mm
7.5mm
7.6mm
7.7mm
7.8mm
7.9mm
8.0mm
8.1mm
8.2mm
8.3mm
8.4mm: -/ P9, P10
8.5mm: -/ P9, P10
8.6mm: -/ P9, P10
8.7mm: -/ P8, P9, P10
8.8mm: P9, P10/ P8
8.9mm: P9, P10/ P8
9.0mm: P9, P10/ P8
9.1mm: P8, P9, P10
9.2mm: P8/ P9, P10
9.3mm: P8/ P9, P10
9.4mm: P8/ P9, P10
9.5mm: -/ P8, P9, P10
9.6mm: -/ P8
9.7mm: -/ P8
9.8mm: -/ P8
9.9mm
10.0mm: -/ P7
10.1mm: -/ P7
10.2mm: -/ P7
10.3mm: -/ P7
10.4mm: -/ P7
10.5mm: P7
10.6mm: P7
10.7mm: P7
10.8mm: P7
10.9mm: -/ P7
11.0mm: -/ P7
11.1mm: -/ P6, P7
11.2mm: -/ P6, P7
11.3mm: -/ P6
11.4mm: -/ P4, P6
11.5mm: P6/ P4, P5
11.6mm: P6/ P4, P5
11.7mm: P6/ P4, P5
11.8mm: P4, P6/ c7, P3, P5
11.9mm: P4, P5/ c7, P3, P6
12.0mm: P4, P5/ c7, P3, P6
12.1mm: P4, P5/ c7, P3, P6
12.2mm: c7, P3, P5/ P4, P6
12.3mm: c7, P3/ P4, P5
12.4mm: c7, P3/ P4, P5
12.5mm: c7, P3/ P2, P4, P5
12.6mm: -/ c6, c7, P2, P3, P5
12.7mm: -/ c6, c7, P2, P3
12.8mm: -/ c6, c7, P2, P3
12.9mm: P2/ c6, c7, P3
13.0mm: c6, P2
13.1mm: c6, P2
13.2mm: c6, P2
13.3mm: c6/ P2
13.4mm: -/ c6, P2
13.5mm: -/ c6, P2
13.6mm: -/ c6, P2
13.7mm: -/ c6
13.8mm: -/ P1
13.9mm: -/ P1
14.0mm: -/ s2, P1
14.1mm: -/ s1, s2, P1
14.2mm: P1/ s1, s2
14.3mm: P1/ s1, s2
14.4mm: s2, P1/ s1
14.5mm: s1, s2, P1
14.6mm: s1, s2/ C5, P1
14.7mm: s1, s2/ C5, P1
14.8mm: s1/ s2, C5, P1
14.9mm: -/ s1, s2, C5, P1
15.0mm: C5/ s1, s2
15.1mm: C5/ s1, s2
15.2mm: C5/ s1
15.3mm: C5/ C3, C4
15.4mm: -/ C3, C4, C5
15.5mm: -/ C3, C4, C5
15.6mm: -/ C2, C3, C4, C5
15.7mm: C3, C4/ C2, C5
15.8mm: C3, C4/ C2
15.9mm: C3, C4/ m7, M8, C2
16.0mm: C2, C3, C4/ m7, M8
16.1mm: C2/ M6, m7, M8, C3, C4
16.2mm: C2/ M6, m7, M8, C3, C4
16.3mm: m7, M8, C2/ M6, C3, C4
16.4mm: m7, M8/ M6, c1, C2, C3, C4
16.5mm: M6, m7, M8/ c1, C2
16.6mm: M6, m7, M8/ M5, c1, C2
16.7mm: M6/ M5, m7, M8, c1, C2
16.8mm: M6, c1/ M5, m7, M8
16.9mm: c1/ M5, M6, m7, M8
17.0mm: M5, c1/ m4, M6, m7, M8
17.1mm: M5, c1/ m4, M6
17.2mm: M5/ m4, M6, c1
17.3mm: M5/ m4, c1
17.4mm: m4/ M5, c1
17.5mm: m4/ M5, c1
17.6mm: m4/ M2, m3, M5
17.7mm: m4/ M2, m3, M5
17.8mm: -/ M2, m3, m4
17.9mm: -/ M2, m3, m4
18.0mm: M2, m3/ m4
18.1mm: M2, m3/ m4
18.2mm: M2, m3
18.3mm: M2, m3
18.4mm: -/ M2, m3, M9
18.5mm: -/ M2, m3, M9
18.6mm: -/ M2, m3, M9
18.7mm: -/ M2, m3, M9
18.8mm: -/ M2, m3, M9
18.9mm: M9/ m1
19.0mm: M9/ m1
19.1mm: M9/ m1
19.2mm: M9/ m1
19.3mm: -/ m1, M9
19.4mm: -/ m1, M9
19.5mm: m1/ M9
19.6mm: m1/ M9
19.7mm: m1
19.8mm: m1
19.9mm: -/ m1
20.0mm: -/ m1
20.1mm: -/ m1
20.2mm: -/ m1
20.3mm
20.4mm
20.5mm
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There are three distinct concentrations on the Edgehill calibre graph below the 
19.7mm musket. These closely match the primary calibre of five different musket models. 
Nine bullets (1.9%) at 17.4mm to 17.7mm belong to the 18.8mm Augsburg musket (m4); 
fifteen bullets (3.2%) at 17.0mm to 17.3mm belong to the 18.3mm Augsburg/Nurnberg 
musket (M5); 24 bullets (5.1%) at 16.3mm to 16.8mm belong to the 17.7mm Amsterdam 
(M6) and the 17.5mm Suhl muskets (m7, M8). These five musket models were the main 
firearms of the Imperial and Swedish armies at Lützen. It is not coincidental that only 
10.2% of the Edgehill bullets derive from these weapons as these musket models were 
obsolete by at least ten years. In addition, four of the five models were produced in 
Germany, which had a great demand for weapons during the Thirty Years War that was 
being met by southern German arms manufactures for the German theatre, although some 
weapons probably came to England with returning English and Scottish veterans of the 
Imperial and Swedish armies. However, many 24g bullets were found in the 31 August 
1644 Battle of Tywardreath/Cornwall, indicating that Dutch M6 and German M8 muskets 
were widely distributed in some English Civil War regiments.487 
 
The most distinct differences between the Lützen and Edgehill bullet distributions 
are the three conspicuous concentrations of pistol calibres at Edgehill. The reason is that 
standardisation and development of military pistols had started in the 1630’s (section 
3.2.2.5). While at Lützen, all kinds of pistols were in service, the English cavalry was 
equipped largely with three models: The 20 bore (P1) and the 35 bore (P3, P4) pistols, 
which can be seen at the 13.5mm to 14.7mm and at 12.3mm to 12.8mm peaks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
487 Ferguson 2013, 167. See section 5.1.2.1 for an interpretation of bullet weight. 
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5.1.2 Firearms ammunition features and distribution patterns 
 
While the calibre of firearms ammunition provides for an understanding of weapon types 
and models used in a battle, firearms ammunition features can add valuable interpretive 
information to the battlefield distribution patterns. Lead and tin are soft metals leaving 
many imprints on their surface, but some imprints, such as bite marks and others not 
entirely understood, are too infrequent to provide any clear distribution pattern.488 The 
most important features supporting interpretation of bullet distributions on the calibre 
graph or the battlefield are firing evidence, intact casting sprues and modified ammunition. 
Since many fired, and most impacted, bullets are too deformed to measure their diameter, 
weight has to be introduced as means to enable an interpretation of firing evidence in the 
context of calibre. 
 
 
Plate 2: Undeformed bullets from the Lützen. 
 
5.1.2.1 Introducing weight for calibre analysis 
 
Although weight is not the first choice for identifying calibres (section 5.1.1.2), there is 
obviously a connection between a bullet’s diameter and weight. The different weights 
bullets with identical calibre can have can be calculated according to sample bullets from 
                                                 
488 Bite marks might come from bullets chewed by animals, especially pigs after the battle, or by soldiers 
holding the bullet in the mouth ready for loading. Lavater wrote in 1644 (85-86) that very experienced 
musketeers filled their mouths full of bullets before battle; they took the gunpowder with their hands out of a 
pocket, poured it into the barrel, spit the bullet from their mouth directly into the barrel, stamped the musket 
butt twice on the ground, attached the match, and fired the musket without a rest (Engerisser 2007, 555). It is 
also suggested that some soldiers chewed bullets to promote salivation (Foard 2008, 152, Sivilich 2009, 92-
93). 
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the battlefield if their number is large enough and therefore representative. This sample 
population must not be deformed, have no sprues, and only be made of lead. The result is a 
minimum and maximum weight for every calibre. There are two possible uses of this 
method: 
 
1. Exclusion: To allocate bullets to a specific weapon model or type by calibre 
according bullet weight with a certain degree of probability, the maximum weight 
of the smallest bullet and the minimum weight of the largest bullet determine the 
lower and upper weight limit of this group of bullets. This method is effective, 
particularly when including deformed musket bullets, because the sample of 
undeformed bullets is large enough to provide representative data, and the upper 
weight limit is irrelevant as no bullets are heavier than musket bullets. Table 18 
presents this information in easily compared form. 
2. Inclusion: If the goal is to rule something out, for example, if the ammunition of a 
specific weapon type has no sprues (section 5.1.2.4), the minimum weight of the 
smallest bullet and the maximum weight of the largest bullet determine the lower 
and upper weight limit of this group of bullets. 
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#C #B #wmin #wmax #C #B #wmin #wmax 
6.6 1 1.50 1.50 14.6 2 15.00 17.25 
6.7 1 1.75 1.75 14.7 8 15.75 18.50 
7.4 1 1.75 1.75 14.8 10 15.25 18.00 
7.9 1 2.50 2.50 14.9 4 17.25 19.00 
8.4 1 3.00 3.00 15.0 6 17.00 20.75 
8.9 1 3.75 3.75 15.1 12 16.50 19.75 
9.0 1 4.25 4.25 15.2 12 17.75 20.50 
9.1 2 4.00 4.25 15.3 6 16.75 20.00 
9.6 1 4.50 4.50 15.4 13 17.25 21.25 
10.0 1 5.00 5.00 15.5 18 18.00 21.25 
10.1 1 5.25 5.25 15.6 27 17.75 21.75 
10.2 1 4.00 4.00 15.7 28 18.25 22.00 
10.4 2 6.00 6.25 15.8 22 18.75 22.50 
10.6 2 6.00 6.25 15.9 22 18.50 23.00 
10.8 1 7.00 7.00 16.0 55 18.50 24.00 
10.9 3 6.50 9.25 16.1 36 19.75 24.00 
11.0 2 7.25 7.50 16.2 78 20.00 25.00 
11.1 1 7.75 7.75 16.3 72 20.50 25.50 
11.2 3 7.25 8.50 16.4 190 19.50 26.00 
11.3 1 8.00 8.00 16.5 96 22.25 25.25 
11.4 1 8.50 8.50 16.6 156 21.00 27.50 
11.6 2 7.50 8.00 16.7 128 22.00 26.75 
11.7 2 8.25 8.50 16.8 120 22.75 28.50 
11.8 4 8.00 9.50 16.9 51 21.50 27.75 
11.9 3 8.25 9.50 17.0 65 22.75 27.75 
12.0 6 8.25 11.00 17.1 24 22.50 27.50 
12.1 3 9.00 9.50 17.2 26 23.50 28.50 
12.2 6 8.00 10.00 17.3 15 25.25 29.50 
12.3 2 8.75 9.75 17.4 21 23.00 30.00 
12.4 5 10.25 12.00 17.5 17 25.50 32.75 
12.5 2 9.75 10.50 17.6 19 25.25 20.25 
12.6 3 9.00 11.00 17.7 13 24.75 31.50 
12.7 2 9.25 11.25 17.8 16 26.50 31.50 
12.8 3 10.50 11.50 17.9 2 24.00 30.25 
12.9 1 11.75 11.75 18.0 10 29.25 32.50 
13.0 8 10.00 12.50 18.1 8 29.75 32.75 
13.1 2 11.25 12.50 18.2 12 29.75 33.25 
13.2 3 10.50 12.50 18.3 5 32.25 34.25 
13.3 3 12.25 13.00 18.4 10 30.50 34.50 
13.4 4 11.00 13.50 18.5 7 30.00 35.25 
13.5 5 11.75 13.50 18.6 8 31.50 36.25 
13.6 4 13.00 13.75 18.7 6 29.25 36.50 
13.7 1 13.75 13.75 18.8 7 32.50 37.00 
13.8 6 13.00 14.50 18.9 1 35.50 35.50 
13.9 4 13.00 14.25 19.0 4 33.25 36.50 
14.0 6 14.00 15.50 19.2 2 37.00 39.00 
14.1 2 13.00 13.75 19.3 1 39.75 39.75 
14.2 9 13.25 15.75 19.4 1 40.25 40.25 
14.3 3 14.25 16.25 19.5 1 40.50 40.50 
14.4 2 17.00 17.25 19.8 1 41.75 41.75 
14.5 5 16.25 17.00     
Table 18: Bullet calibre and weight. C: calibre, B: number of bullets, wmin: lightest bullet, 
wmax: heaviest bullet. 
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Figure 38: Distribution of musket and rifle bullets with calibres as follows: 99% musket – 
16.8-19.9mm or 28.75-41.75g, 75% musket – 16.3-16.7mm or 24.25-28.50g, 25% musket – 
15.9-16.2mm or 18.50-24.00g, rifle – 6.6-7.9mm or 1.50-2.75g. 
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Figure 39: Distribution of musket bullets from the German/Imperial 13 bore (m4) and 14 bore 
(M5) muskets with calibres of 17.3-17.8mm, and the Dutch/Swedish 8 bore (m1) muskets 
with calibres of 18.9-19.9mm or 37.25-41.75g, and 10 bore (M2, m3) muskets with calibres of 
17.9-18.8mm. 
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5.1.2.2 Distribution of firearms ammunition on the Lützen battlefield: 
An introduction 
 
When evaluating small finds distribution patterns in general, the recovery rate, in 
comparison to initially deposited artefacts, must be considered. At Lützen the 
archaeological recovery rate was approximately 10% and a little higher for large calibre 
bullets. Another important fact is that Lützen was a static battle with overlapping small 
finds concentrations from different events. This makes small groups of finds almost 
undetectable because a concentration of less than twenty initially deposited artefacts is 
reduced to two actually found by the archaeologist or because a low density artefact scatter 
is mixed with artefacts from other events, making it difficult or impossible to detect. This 
section provides a general guideline for the interpretation of small finds distribution 
patterns, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter Eight. 
 
The goal of interpreting bullet distribution patterns is to identify combat areas of 
single units. However, with so many different weapon models in use, and the overlapping 
calibres, it is extremely difficult to create clear ammunition patterning ascribed to a single 
weapon model or even a single weapon type. Distribution patterns relating musket and rifle 
bullets used by infantry and pistol and carbine bullets used by cavalry will be discussed in 
two separate maps over the course of this thesis. The latter two weapon types are combined 
because there are too many calibre intersections between them. 
 
Infantry 
Considering the small finds recovery rate, the long duration of the battle, and that Lützen 
was a static battle, it is not surprising that musket bullets distribution does not create a 
clearly visible pattern (Fig. 38). However, some general observations can be made. The 
highest bullet density representing the Imperial main battle line is in the southern part of 
field VII and the western part of field I. The area west and north of this line consists of 
high and low density areas, which are in the Imperial army’s rear. The low density areas in 
fields II and III, and in the eastern part of field I, are skirmishing areas in front of the 
Imperial army. The musket bullets in the southwest half of field VII form linear patterns 
parallel to the Via Regia representing infantry battle lines, although they are somewhat 
obscured by intersecting events. The lines are slightly more apparent if the bullets from the 
Swedish M2 and m3 and the Imperial m4 and M5 muskets are considered. Bullets from 
these four musket types are concentrated on field VII, in particular the western part, and 
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thin out eastwards (Fig. 39). Interestingly enough, the two linear bullet concentrations of 
these four weapon models also contain most of the heavy Dutch (m1) out-of-date model 
bullets. 
 
Cavalry 
Surprisingly, the densest pistol/carbine bullet concentration is in the southern part of field 
VII, the same area as the densest musket bullet concentration at the windmills, suggesting 
that the most intense action took place there (Fig. 40). Another surprise is the moderate 
pistol/carbine bullet concentration on field IX, south of the Via Regia, where no cavalry 
action was thought to have happened. The few pistol/carbine bullets on fields II and III 
support the interpretation of a skirmishing area here due to the low density musket bullet 
concentration. Altogether, pistol/carbine bullet concentrations appear to be less linear than 
musket bullets; if they are linear, then they follow a direction at a 90° angle to the Via 
Regia. Since this orientation is also at a right angle to the Imperial battle line, the bullets 
very likely represents a cavalry charge. This can be seen best by the distribution of the 
German/Imperial small calibre pistols P7 to P10, which form a linear concentration in the 
eastern part of field I (Fig. 41). 
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Figure 40: Distribution of pistol and carbine bullets with calibres as follows: pistol – 8.4-
11.7mm or 3.00-7.75g and 13.8-14.5mm or 14.00-14.75g, pistol or carbine – 11.8-13.6mm or 
8.00-13.75g and 14.6-14.9mm or 15.00-18.75g, carbine – 15.0-15.8mm and 13.7mm, 75% 
carbine – 15.9-16.2mm. 
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Figure 41: Distribution of pistol bullets from the German/Imperial small calibre pistols (P7-
P10) with calibres of 8.4-11.7mm or 3.00-7.75g, and the Dutch/Swedish 20 bore (P1) pistol 
with calibres of 13.8-14.5mm or 14.00-14.75g. 
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5.1.2.3 Firing evidence 
 
There are two groups of firing evidence: markings caused by the firing process and impact 
damage. There are no markings from ramrods on the Lützen bullets because the ramrods 
were typically wooden during the Thirty Years War.489 
 
Experiments conducted in the USA and the UK whilst attempting to understand 
markings caused by the firing process revealed banding is the most significant feature 
(Plate 3). A flattened band forms around the circumference of the bullet by compression 
due to the gunpowder explosion.490 The various degrees of banding range from very 
distinct around the whole bullet, to only barely visible on one side. At Lützen 545 bullets 
(20%) show a flattened band. There seems to be a slight increase of banded bullets toward 
the larger calibres, but groups of fewer than 30 bullets seem not to be representative (Fig. 
42). 
 
286 bullets (10%) have markings from the gunpowder combustion (Plate 4). These 
are not as distinctive as banding and it is possible that some have already corroded away.491 
A higher percentage of larger calibre bullets have markings from burning gunpowder 
explosion; this can be explained by the larger amount of gunpowder used in larger calibre 
firearms (Fig. 42).492 
 
 
Plate 3: Firing evidence: Flattened band (Inv.-No. 2007:1478, Inv.-No. 2007:2622, 2007:2781). 
(image has been removed due to copyright restrictions) 
 
                                                 
489 Engerisser 2007, 551, Foard 2008, 88 and 155. This is confirmed by missing ramming rod markings on 
the bullets from Edgehill (Foard 2008, 158). 
490 Foard 2008, 157. 
491 Foard 2008, 160-161. 
492 If the quality of the gunpowder was high enough, an amount of half the bullets weight was used; on lower 
quality gunpowder the amount was up to 2/3 the bullets weight (Engerisser 2007, 553). 
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Lead and tin bullets deform when impacting hard materials such as stone, metal, 
bone or wood. The degree and nature of impact damage depends on many different factors, 
including bullet velocity, angle of impact, the shape and hardness of the material and its 
ability to bend, as iron, or break, as bone or wood. Unlike firing evidence, there is little 
precisely known about the degree and nature of impact damage and for interpreting what 
object a bullet could have hit.  A great deal more analytical experimentation and data from 
different battlefields would be required to enable accurate interpreting of impact 
damage.493 Even if comparable data from numerous battlefields were available, it is very 
likely that every battlefield have its own signature of impact damage according to the 
nature of battle, ground condition, vegetation etc.494 It is, therefore, the intention here to 
provide a general analysis of the degree of impact damage to aid the interpretation of bullet 
distributions on the battlefield. This is particularly important where a volley might have hit 
a battle line. 
 
 
Plate 4: Firing evidence: Gunpowder explosion marks on the lower left side (Inv.-No. 
1946:16:1425). 
(image has been removed due to copyright restrictions) 
The ratio of the number of impacted to non-impacted bullets depends partially on 
ground condition, vegetation and the existence of houses and walls. For the Lützen 
battlefield, there are no contemporary reports mentioning walls, trees, or other vegetation 
such as hedges within the surveyed area. In November 1632 the field crop was already 
harvested leaving almost no vegetation on the battlefield. The only structures near the 
surveyed area which could have been responsible for causing bullet impact damage were 
three windmills and the fortifications erected by Wallenstein’s two batteries. 
 
                                                 
493 Foard 2008, 164-169. 
494 For impact damage see also Sivilich 2009, 88-91, Sivilich 2015. The Sivilich sample bullets are from a 
very different kind of battle with more trees and the absence of body armour. 
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Figure 42: Distribution of firing evidence in percent: flattened band and gunpowder 
markings. The hatched bars have a too few bullets to be representative. 
 
 
Plate 5: Bullet with severe impact damage caused by a hard, flat surface (Inv.-No. 
1946:16:4476). 
(image has been removed due to copyright restrictions) 
At the present time, soil on the battlefield is not particularly stony and there was no 
significant difference between surveyed areas. The field conditions could have changed 
over time as all surveyed areas were in agricultural use from the Thirty Years War until the 
present. Stone removal from fields is a common practice, in particular with the 20th century 
mechanisation. Six m² of soil were sieved to a depth of 0.6m in the park of Lützen, which 
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was created in the late 19th century and therefore was never ploughed by heavy machines. 
All stones were smaller than 1cm; these could not have caused massive impact damage on 
bullets.  
 
In 2011 a 340m long and 4m wide trial trench was dug on the battlefield to a depth 
of 0.5m to 1.0m. It revealed three large stones of approximately 0.5m diameter and a few 
stones of approximately 0.1m to 0.2m diameter, slightly more than could be seen on the 
surface and which probably depicts the situation in 1632. Stones together cover less than 
2% of the ground, which theoretically, should also be the percentage of bullets having hit 
stones, therefore, it may assumed that the battlefield was not much stonier in 1632 than it is 
at the present time and that most impact damage on bullets is battle related i.e. bullets hit 
soldiers, their weapons, armour or equipment, guns etc. 
 
Presently, there is no practical objective method to classify impact damage in a way 
which would show any significant distribution pattern on a battlefield. Impact damage was 
subjectively classified according to the degree of deformation in ten percent steps from 
10% (impact damage barely visible) to 90% (flat bullet showing no sign of its former 
shape); at 50% the shape of half the bullet is still intact (Table 19). It was hoped that this 
classification would show any distribution patterns, such as a battle line. This notion 
presumed that most heavily impacted bullets hit soldiers at point-blank range, in particular 
the armour of pikemen and cuirassiers. 
 
light impact damage moderate impact damage severe impact damage 
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
93 141 150 146 98 73 68 71 81 
Table 19: Number of bullets with impact damage according to their degree of deformation. 
 
At Lützen 921 bullets (33.5%) show various degrees of impact damage. Because of 
the subjective classification, and because most groups contain too few bullets to show any 
significant distribution patterns, distribution will be discussed according to three main 
groupings: light, moderate and severe impact damage. Many bullets have either a type of 
firing evidence or impact damage, but some have a combination of both features, 
demonstrating that the firing process does not necessarily create firing evidence (Fig. 43). 
Likewise a bullet landing on soft ground can show no sign of impact damage. Therefore, 
impact damage or firing evidence only demonstrates that a bullet was fired, but their 
absence does not prove that it was not.495 
                                                 
495 Foard 2008, 156. 
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The distribution patterns of bullets with impact damage can help to understand their 
significance. Musket bullets with severe or moderate impact damage seem concentrated on 
the Imperial centre’s infantry battle line; they appear to have hit the armour of pikemen at 
point-blank range (Fig. 44). Bullets with light impact damage are distributed more widely 
on the battlefield. The reason for so few bullets with heavy or moderate impact damage on 
the Imperial left wing, where they were expected to have hit cuirassier armour, might be 
that musketeers tended to fire on charging cavalry at longer distances to prevent being 
overrun before they could deliver at least one volley or; that they were trying to aim at the 
horses so as to dismount the horsemen. Pistol/carbine bullets with severe impact damage 
are distributed over the whole battlefield with some even found in the skirmish area on 
field III. The distribution patterns of bullets with and without impact damage are visualised 
and interpreted in two separate maps. 
 
Lützen: Firing Evidence
27%
5%
1%
1%
11%
3%5%
47%
impact damage
impact damage and flattened band
gunpowder marking and impact damage
impact damage, flattened band and
gunpowder marking
flattened band
flattened band and gunpowder marking
gunpowder marking
no firing evidence
 
Figure 43: Firing evidence: Impact damage, gunpowder markings, and flattened band. 
 
In general, there is a much higher percentage of pistol/carbine bullets than musket 
bullets with heavy impact damage when compared to bullets with moderate or light impact 
damage. It is possible that smaller bullets tended to deform more severely than larger 
bullets, but another reasonable explanation could be that, in particular, pistols were used 
much more often at point-blank range or in hand-to-hand combat. 
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Figure 44: Distribution of musket bullets with impact damage (24.25-41.75g) and firing 
evidence (16.1-19.9mm).  
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Figure 45: Distribution of pistol and carbine bullets with impact damage (3.00-18.25g) and 
firing evidence (8.3-15.8mm). 
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Figure 46: Interpretation of distribution patterns of musket bullets with and without impact 
damage. 
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Figure 47: Interpretation of distribution patterns of pistol and carbine bullets with and 
without impact damage. 
 
In addition, pistol/carbine bullets with heavy impact damage tend to be distributed 
more widely over the battlefield, creating fewer concentrations (Fig. 45). The exception is 
the southern part of field VII near the windmills, where the densest bullet distribution of all 
weapon types has been identified. This confirms that the most serious action took place 
near the windmills. 
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5.1.2.4 Casting sprues, paper cartridges and bandoliers 
 
Casting sprues were the by-product of bullet manufacture and normally clipped or cut off 
after production. Nevertheless, bullets with remaining sprues can be found on 17th century 
battlefields. At Lützen 162 (5%) bullets with intact casting sprues were found. It is 
sometimes argued that bullets with sprues found on battlefields are unfinished or unfired 
bullets; however, 28 bullets with sprues show impact damage and 50 show firing evidence, 
suggesting that there must be another reason for leaving sprues on bullets.496 
 
 
Plate 6: 12.0mm pistol bullet with casting sprue (Inv.-No. 1946:16:4029). 
(image has been removed due to copyright restrictions) 
Battlefield archaeologists and historians alike agree that sprues were sometimes left 
on bullets to attach a paper cartridge containing gunpowder from at least the early 17th 
century to the late 18th century. There is no historical evidence before 1707, when Pierre 
Surirey de Saint Remy claimed that this was done “previously”.497 There are two 
approaches known to have been used to connect the bullet to a paper cartridge, either by 
wrapping the whole bullet into the paper or by tying the paper to the sprue. The advantage 
of tying bullets to the sprue over wrapping the bullet into the paper is unknown. 
 
The origins of paper cartridges are almost as mythical as Gustav Adolf’s leather 
canons and it is still believed that he was also responsible for their development,498 in 
particular for musketeers, based on a misunderstanding by Reverend Walter Harte in 
1759.499 Although it is possible that paper cartridges were invented in the late 16th 
                                                 
496 Foard (2008, 145) suggests also that intact sprues are no indicator for unfinished or unfired bullets. 
497 Pirkl 1985, 27, Foard 2008, 145, Sivilich 2009, 95, Mandzy 2009, 201. 
498 Weigley 2003, 143. 
499 Brzezinski/Hook 2006, 87, Mandzy 2009, 202. 
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century,500 neither Lodovico Melzo in 1611,501 nor Giorgio Basta in 1612,502 mentioned 
paper cartridges in their military handbooks.503 The earliest European reference to paper 
cartridges in a military context is from Wallhausen in 1616, who claimed that 
harquebusiers should either use powder flasks and bullets from a bag or, alternatively, 
paper cartridges.504 Cruso in 1632505 and Vernon in 1644506 already knew only paper 
cartridges were used as ammunition for cavalry, cuirassiers and harquebusiers alike.507 
Those sources seem to confirm that paper cartridges were adopted by the military in a very 
short period between the mid-1610’s to the late 1620’s, but exclusively for cavalry, 
evidently because the loading process on horseback was more difficult than for musketeers 
on foot. Therefore, it can be assumed that some cavalry troopers probably used cartridges 
at Lützen. 
 
 
Figure 48: Paper cartridges. Top: Paper attached to casting sprue. Bottom: Bullet wrapped 
into paper. 
 
During the Thirty Years War, musketeers (Fig. 8), but not calivermen (Fig. 7), 
usually used the bandolier, eleven to thirteen flasks each holding a single charge of 
gunpowder hanging from a leather belt, and a bag for bullets. In 1683 James Turner, who 
served in the Swedish army during the Thirty Years War and wrote his ‘Pallas Armata’ in 
that time, claimed that “it is thirty years ago since I saw these (bandoliers) laid aside in 
some German Armies”, because they were exchanged for paper cartridges.508 Although 
there is no reason to disbelieve his account, there are no other historical sources stating that 
                                                 
500 Pirkl 1985, 27, Dolínek/Durdík 1996, 295, Mandzy 2009, 202. 
501 Melzo 1625. 
502 Basta 1614. 
503 Engerisser 2007, 560. 
504 Engerisser 2007, 560, Wallhausen 1616, 35. 
505 Cruso 1632, 37-42. 
506 Vernon 1644, 8. See also Turner 1683, 173. 
507 Engerisser 2007, 560 and 563. 
508 Turner 1683, 176, Brzezinski/Hook 2006, 22. 
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musketeers used cartridges in the Thirty Years War and it is not even certain if he was 
referring to that or a later time. The Armoury Stockholm provided bandoliers until 1670.509 
So it seems more likely that Turner relates to just one incident he saw and that probably a 
few musketeers were using cartridges toward the end of the Thirty Years War. However, it 
was not until 1670 that bandoliers were generally replaced by paper cartridges in the 
Swedish army, and not much earlier in other European armies.510 Another explanation for 
leaving sprues on bullets is suggested by Mandzy and concerns the extra damage inflicted 
by the sprue when using low muzzle velocity weapons.511 Some ballistic testing has been 
conducted in which the sprue was sometimes parted from the bullet when fired, which did 
extra damage, but it is not certain if sprues were left on bullets for that purpose.512 
 
In evaluating the archaeological evidence from Lützen, the percentage of bullets 
with sprues according to weight shows a very distinct concentration at 5.25g to 17.50g on 
the graph (Fig. 49). These are almost exclusively pistol and carbine bullets, while there are 
very few musket bullets with sprues. The calibres from 15.0mm to 15.9mm, which are 
almost exclusively carbine bullets, have a weight of 16.5g to 23.0g. Very few of these 
bullets have sprues, which suggest that at Lützen carbine bullets tend to have no sprues. In 
comparison to other sites, the bullets from Stralsund have no significant sprues, because 
only four pistol or carbine bullets were found there. The musket bullets from the Vasa have 
also no sprues as expected, but of the eleven pistol bullets found in chest 14041, eight have 
sprues, although it could be argued that those pistol bullets were unfinished, because no 
one on the Vasa expected to go to battle soon. 
 
                                                 
509 Brzezinski/Hook 2006, 22. 
510 Engerisser 2007, 546, Brzezinski/Hook 2006, 22. 
511 Mandzy 2009, 203. 
512 According to a paper held by Sivilich on the Fields of Conflict Conference in Osnabrück. 
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Figure 49: Distribution of bullets with intact casting sprues by percentage. 
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It is unclear why many, but not the majority, of pistol bullets had sprues, while 
carbine bullets tend to have no sprues. If intact sprues are an indicator for paper cartridges, 
a higher ratio of carbine bullets from Lützen should be expected to have sprues, because 
cavalry is reported to have used paper cartridges in the 1630’s. It is also possible that for an 
unknown reason cartridges were attached to pistol bullet sprues, while carbine bullets were 
wrapped into the cartridge paper. Intact casting sprues on bullets must be seen probably in 
a context of the intended purpose of pistols, either their use at distances shorter than 5m, or 
because they were used more often by cavalry against cavalry than against infantry. At the 
present time there is not enough historical or archaeological evidence for a reasonable 
interpretation of sprues left on bullets. To demonstrate the connection between sprue and 
cartridge, comparative data from a 16th century battlefield, where no cartridges are 
expected to have been used, is required (see section 7.2.5). Musket bullets with casting 
sprues are known from battlefields dating after the Thirty Years War. They have been 
found at 1649 Zboriv, Ukraine, 1677 Landskrona, Sweden, and at several 1655-1675 
Seneca village sites in upstate New York.513 However, all bullets found at 1634-1695 St. 
Mary’s City, Maryland, had no sprues.514 
 
5.1.2.5 Tin bullets 
 
Without material analysis it is difficult to distinguish lead from tin or tin alloy so the 
provisional determination of Lützen bullets material might be not entirely correct (section 
5.1.1.1). The possibility that bullets were made of different materials seems too important 
to omit completely. Since there were no tin bullets on the Vasa it is likely that tin was not 
used for mass production of bullets, but it may have been used by individual soldiers. Tin 
bullets can be found in most calibres in the Lützen collection. However, carbine and, in 
particular, pistol shot have a much higher percentage of tin bullets than musket shot. There 
is a slightly higher percentage of larger calibre musket tin bullets than for the smaller 
calibre standard muskets. 
 
                                                 
513 Sivilich 2015, (82-84). 
514 Sivilich 2015, (90). 
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Figure 50: Distribution of tin bullets in percent. 
 
The distribution of tin bullets on the calibre graph has some similarities to the 
casting sprue graph, which suggests that there might be a connection (Fig. 50). A possible 
explanation might be that there was sufficient supply of ammunition for standard weapons 
and therefore no need for individual bullet production, but not for uncommon weapons. 
Pistols, in particular, were far from being standardized at the time of the Battle of Lützen. 
This circumstance might have caused problems with ammunition supply and probably 
forced some cavalry troopers to produce their own bullets. The slightly higher percentage 
of larger calibre tin bullets and bullets with sprues might indicate that there was not 
sufficient supply for the largest calibre muskets, as well. 
 
Tin and pewter was probably used instead of lead because there might have been a 
general supply shortage of lead in the Thirty Years War. The American army suffered a 
similar shortage during the War of Independence and used tin or pewter instead.515 
However, the connection between tin bullets, casting sprues, and individual bullet 
production does not rule out a possible connection between casting sprues and paper 
cartridges. It seems that horsemen were producing their own paper cartridges at Lützen. 
This might be seen as a normal development in a long war, where very experienced 
soldiers adjusted their equipment according to their needs before some innovations might 
have been officially produced sufficient quantity. 
 
                                                 
515 Sivilich 2015, (198). 
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 Note: Tin bullets or bullets with banding, gun powder combustion markings or 
intact casting sprues do not create any meaningful distribution patterns on the battlefield. 
 
5.1.2.6 Modified ammunition 
 
The most common type of 17th century firearms ammunition is round balls, but there are 
occasionally some bullets modified by individual soldiers prior to battle. These include 
parted bullets, slugs and nailed bullets. 
 
 
Plate 7: Parted bullet, quarter (Inv.-No. 1946:16:1738). 
(image has been removed due to copyright restrictions) 
Parted bullets 
Parted bullets are ordinary round balls cut into two, four or eight parts leaving a crosspiece 
at one end so that they split when fired, creating a spray pattern (Plate 7).516 They are 
known from 17th and 18th century battlefields, but it is possible that they have a longer 
tradition and have not been discovered yet on earlier or later battlefields. In the 17th 
century, parted bullets are known to have been used as fragments in ceramic hand 
grenades, probably in sieges, but their use in a field battle should not be dismissed 
completely.517 
 
                                                 
516 Foard 2008, 127, Sivilich 2009, 95-96. 
517 Foard 2008, 127. 
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Figure 51: Distribution of parted musket bullets. 
 
Pieces of 25 (0.9%) parted bullets were found in Lützen – five halves, twelve 
quarters and eight eighths. It is difficult to measure their exact calibre, because they are not 
symmetrically divided, but most of them seem to be originally musket or possibly large 
carbine bullets. A similar percentage of parted bullets (0.7%) with a similar distribution of 
halves (two), quarters (three) and eighths (two) were found at Edgehill, suggesting that this 
is a typical ratio of parted bullets on a 17th century battlefield. 
 187 
Other than that they were certainly fired at point-blank range, there is not much 
known about them. A letter from the British General Lord Howe written in 1777 to 
General Washington complaining about the use of parted bullets suggests that they were 
used unofficially by soldiers, but not in what situations as they were found in campsites.518 
At Lützen, the majority (eighteen) of them are associated to the pistol bullet concentrations 
on the Imperial left wing, while only six were found in the centre; none were recovered 
from the cavalry skirmish area in front of the Imperial left wing or behind the Imperial 
centre (Fig. 51). This suggests that they were used by musketeers against cavalry where 
infantry-cavalry interaction was to be expected and thus probably by the interlined 
Swedish or Imperial musketeer companies on the wings. 
 
Slugs 
Slugs were originally round bullets altered by hammering them into cube-shaped, 
elongated cube-shaped (Plate 8), or cylindrical (Plate 9) bullets to be used as pistol and 
carbine shot by cavalry in 17th and 18th century battles.519 Because most slugs are altered to 
a large extent, their calibre often can not be identified with certainty. 
 
 
Plate 8: Elongated slug (Inv.-No. 1946:16:3577). 
(image has been removed due to copyright restrictions) 
36 (1.3%) possible slugs of different shapes with a calibre of 11.3mm to 16.2mm 
and 8.5g to 33.5g were found in Lützen. Most of them are elongated, cube-shaped or 
cylindrical, but some are short cube-shaped or cylindrical. The length depends on the 
former size of the bullet and the final size of the slug and there seem to be no obvious 
purpose for the different lengths.520 It is more difficult to alter a bullet into a cylindrical 
form than into a cube-shaped slug, but cylindrical slugs seal the barrel more tightly and 
therefore have a higher velocity and, possibly, greater accuracy. Five bullets with casting 
                                                 
518 Sivilich 2009, 96. 
519 Foard 2008, 121-122, Sivilich 2009, 95. 
520 Foard 2008, 123. 
 188 
sprues look as if they were severely banded and are similar to those from the battles of 
Zboriv in 1649 or Monmouth in 1778, but they appear to be altered into a cylindrical shape 
to be used as slugs.521 
 
 
Plate 9: Cylindrical slug (Inv.-No. 1946:16:4793). 
(image has been removed due to copyright restrictions) 
The asymmetrical shape caused the slug to tumble in the air, but it is unclear for 
what reason. Sivilich suggests that they were used because they caused more severe 
wounds than round bullets, but they are probably less likely to penetrate armour.522 They 
might also have made a noise that might instil some uneasiness among the soldiers who 
were being shot at. At Lützen they were found almost everywhere on the battlefield except 
in the skirmish area to the front of the Imperial left wing suggesting that they were not 
fired by cavalry against cavalry (Fig. 52). Their distribution pattern concentrates more on 
the outer centre, where cavalry-infantry combat took place, suggesting that slugs were used 
in particular by cavalry against dense infantry formations, something that is also suggested 
by Foard for the Battle of Edgehill, where 34 (3.5%) slugs, a significantly higher 
percentage than at Lützen, were found.523 The densest concentration of slugs is near the 
windmills in the southern part of field VII. 
 
                                                 
521 Mandzy 2009, 201, Sivilich 2009, 95. 
522 Sivilich 2009, 95. 
523 Foard 2009, 124. 
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Figure 52: Distribution of pistol and carbine slugs and bullets with iron pins. 
 
The origins of slugs are unknown. 17th century Turkish musketeers seem to have 
used slugs which they cut from lead bars in large quantities.524 A mould for elongated 
cube-shaped firearms ammunition and a hunting musket with a square-shaped inner barrel 
                                                 
524 Balázs 2012, 104-107. 
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from the 18th century Schwerin weapon collection suggest that slugs could have been used 
originally in hunting.525 
 
 
Plate 10: Bullet with iron pin (Inv.-No. 2007:1716). 
(image has been removed due to copyright restrictions) 
Nailed bullets 
Two carbine calibre bullets, and possibly a third (0.1%), have an iron pin or nail driven 
through their axis (Plate 10). This is also reported from the American War of 
Independence, and one example was recently discovered on the 1644 battlefield of 
Tywardreath.526 If this low ratio of 0.1% is representative for 17th century battles, they 
would be almost invisible in archaeological collections. They probably served the same 
purpose as slugs to inflict extra damage against unarmoured soldiers. However, two of 
these bullets might be spring shot, two bullets wired together.527 
 
The low number of modified bullets suggests that they were unofficially produced 
and fired by individual soldiers, rather than in official ammunition issues, and that the 
effect they achieved was not important enough to produce this ammunition in large 
quantity. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
525 Waffensammlung 2008, 68 and 147. 
526 Sivilich 2009, 96, Ferguson 2013, 171. 
527 Sivilich 2015, (150). 
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5.2 Artillery ammunition 
 
A total number of approximately 80 to 100 cannon were deployed in the Battle of Lützen. 
These should have left substantial evidence after six hours of fighting, but only a few small 
finds could be classified as artillery ammunition. One reason for the lack of artillery 
evidence might be that the surveyed area is limited largely to the initial Imperial 
deployment. This means that the Imperial artillery fired into areas that have not yet been 
surveyed. Another reason is certainly the type of ammunition used in the Battle of Lützen. 
A variety of different types of artillery ammunition were used in the 17th century, 
depending on the nature of engagement, but they can be subsumed into four categories: 
roundshot, grapeshot, case or canister shot and shells. 
 
 
Figure 53: 4 bore (27mm) Doppelhaken from Suhl. 
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5.2.1 Roundshot 
 
Iron roundshot was used at long distance, but was usually not very effective in terms of 
hitting soldiers.528 As the rate of fire of 17th century heavy artillery pieces was low, only a 
few would be deposited during a battle. Because of their considerable size most were 
picked up during the clearing and looting process and, in fact, none were found during 
surveys on the battlefields of Lützen or Edgehill. 
 
One lead roundshot (116.8g) was discovered on the Lützen battlefield. The bullet 
was almost certainly fired from a 4 bore Doppelhaken, possibly from Suhl as the bullet’s 
weight is a perfect match to 1/4th Saxon pound (Fig. 53).529 The 17kg to 19kg heavy and 
2.3m long Doppelhaken were very heavy wheel lock muskets, sometimes combined with a 
match lock, and usually used during sieges against artillery crew. They were able to fire 
through earthwork and wooden planks, but it is not unlikely that they were also deployed 
in a linear battle, possibly on a mount and utilized together with regimental artillery, 
although there is no historic evidence. Some Doppelhaken are known to have rifled barrels, 
which makes them excellent, far reaching sniper rifles with a high striking force.530 
Generalleutnant Tserclaes Graf von Tilly was killed by a Doppelhaken in the Battle of 
Rain am Lech,531 which suggests that they were sometimes deployed in battle to fire at 
officers. 
 
5.2.2 Grapeshot 
 
Grapeshot was a projectile with several iron balls of approximately 2-5cm size, which was 
very effective at medium range (Plate 11). Initially developed for naval warfare, possibly 
as early as 15th century, it is not entirely certain when it found its way into European land 
warfare, but it seems likely that the Swedish army used grapeshot during the Thirty Years 
War,532 as some were found on the battlefield of 1677 Landskrona.533 Chemnitz reported 
                                                 
528 Foard 2008, 129. 
529 Engerisser 2014. The Doppelhaken (‘double hook’) is similar to the ‘rampart gun’. However, because of 
the unique design the German term is used in this thesis. 
530 Brooker 2007, 92. 
531 Junkelmann 2007, 38. 
532 Brzezinski 2001, 23. Grape shot was present on the Vasa (Foard 2008, 131). 
533 Knarrström 2009, 189. 
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that Gustav Adolf’s 3-pounders fired mostly “Kartätschen” and “Schrot” instead of 
roundshot, which seems to have the meaning of ‘grapeshot’ and ‘case shot’.534 
 
 
Plate 11: Grapeshot (Inv.-No. 1946:16:2181). 
(image has been removed due to copyright restrictions) 
Five iron bullets with a diameter of 24mm to 30mm, which could have been 
grapeshot, were found on the Lützen battlefield. Grapeshot should produce a similar 
pattern as case shot, but the bullets of grapeshot projectiles are bigger and easier to find 
during the post-battle clearing and looting processes. Another factor is that iron objects 
were not specifically searched for at Lützen and thus most grapeshot might have been 
overlooked during the archaeological survey due to the use of discrimination on the metal 
detectors (section 4.3.1). Finally, without any distribution pattern or material analysis, the 
iron balls can not be classified as grapeshot or even be allocated to the battle with 
certainty. Another possibility is that the iron balls are roundshot from ‘Falkonett’-type 
artillery pieces, which have a calibre of approximately 3.2cm to 5.5cm (section 3.1.3). 
 
5.2.3 Case shot 
 
A type similar to grapeshot, case shot or ‘canister’ was multiple ball artillery ammunition, 
but with smaller bullets and fired at close quarters with devastating effects against dense 
formations (Plate 12).535 In the 17th century, one case usually consisted of approximately 
                                                 
534 Engerisser 2007, 584 and 590. The German word ‘Kartätsche’ is a general description of any multiple 
load ammunition, while at the present time ‘Schrot’ have the meaning of small shot used by huntsmen. As 
there are no adequate German terms for ‘grapeshot’ or ‘case shot’, Chemnitz possibly tried to circumscribe 
this type of ammunition. 
535 Foard 2008, 129. 
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70 or more musket bullets which, when fired, form a long triangular distribution pattern on 
a battlefield, as can be seen at Edgehill.536 Bullets from case shot have very distinctive 
hexagonal facets, which distinguish them from firearms ammunition.537 Since case shot 
projectiles were not standardized in the 17th century, it could contain a variety of 
projectiles, including non-metal material such as pebbles or cast off iron fragments.538 
 
At Lützen, only one bullet with hexagonal facets was found. Since the battlefield 
was surveyed with 100% coverage, it is extremely unlikely that any other case shot bullets 
were overlooked, if they were part of an all-lead-bullet case shot. Although the Imperial 
artillery probably fired mostly into an area that has not yet been surveyed, the 40 Swedish 
regimental guns, which almost certainly fired case, were distributed along the whole 
Swedish front line and must have deposited case projectiles in the surveyed area. The only 
two reasonable explanations are that either small iron or non-metal projectiles were used as 
case in Lützen (langrage). It is uncertain how only a single bullet from case shot could 
have been deposited on the battlefield. 
 
 
Plate 12: Case shot (Inv.-No. 2007:894). 
(image has been removed due to copyright restrictions) 
5.2.4 Artillery shells or hand grenades 
 
Nineteen fragments of spherical cast iron shells, two of them with part of a fuse hole, were 
found at Lützen (Plate 13). Their form is not entirely spherical, which complicated 
measuring their calibre. Only two fragments were large enough to determine a fairly 
accurate calibre, while nine smaller fragments provided at least an approximate calibre, 
ranging from 50mm to 200mm (Table 20). Spherical cast iron shells are rarely found on 
                                                 
536 Foard 2008, 132, Foard 2009, 124. 
537 Foard 2008, fig. 65 and 66. 
538 Foard 2008, 130. 
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17th century battlefields, as at Landskrona,539 so these derive either from artillery shells or 
hand grenades. 
 
   
 
Plate 13: Spherical cast iron shell with fuse hole (Inv.-No. 2007:745). 
(image has been removed due to copyright restrictions) 
Shells were usually fired by mortars during sieges. Their short firing range made 
them unsuitable for battles and there is no historical reference that they were used in that 
way in the 17th century, although it is not impossible. Shells were also fired by normal 
artillery pieces of any calibre. Although there is no account of their use in battle, it is more 
probable that they were used against the enemy’s heavy artillery batteries. As the Imperial 
artillery positions in Lützen were fortified, which would have made a bombardment with 
roundshot ineffective, the Swedish heavy artillery possibly fired shells against them. 
Initially hand grenades were used in siege warfare in the 16th century when they were 
recommended for battle as early as 1590, but their use in battle became more common 
during the 17th century.540 It is unknown if hand grenades were used at Lützen. 
 
 
                                                 
539 Knarrström 2009, 189. 
540 Foard 2008, 139. 
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Calibre (mm) Gauge (mm) Artillery piece 
164-180 f 17-20 24-pounder 
164-170 16-20 24-pounder 
140-180* 15-17 24-pounder 
120-200* 15-16 24-pounder or 12-pounder 
120-160* 16-20 24-pounder or 12-pounder 
104-120* 14-15 12-pounder or 6-pounder 
90-100* 9-19 12-pounder or 6-pounder 
80-100* 11-14 12-pounder, 6-pounder or 3-pounder 
70-100 f* 14-17 12-pounder, 6-pounder or 3-pounder 
60-70* 12-16 3-pounder 
50-70* 11-14 3-pounder 
f = fuse hole 
* = small fragment, approximate calibre 
Table 20: Calibre of spherical cast iron shells. 
 
At the present time, it is not possible to distinguish cast iron shells as hand grenades 
from those shells fired by artillery and both seem possible for Lützen. The very different 
calibres suggest that they were fired by artillery; however, two large calibre cast iron shells 
were found on the Imperial left wing. They were apparently too heavy to be thrown as 
hand grenade. Those two shell fragments very likely derive from a Swedish 24-pounder 
firing at the Imperial artillery (section 8.1.3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 197 
Chapter Six 
The Battlefield 
 
6.1 Geography: Reconstruction of the historical 
battlefield 
 
In 1632 Lützen, located between Weißenfels, 13km southwest, and Leipzig, 19km 
northeast, belonged to the Electorate of Saxony. The town itself was unimportant but it was 
sited on the Via Regia, one of Germany’s most important medieval-early modern roads, 
running from Paris through Mainz, Erfurt, Leipzig, Görlitz, and on to Kiev. This road saw 
millions of soldiers; eight major battles were fought near it in the region of Leipzig alone: 
Auerstädt (1806), Roßbach (1756), Großgörschen (1813), Lützen (1632), Leipzig (1813), 
Breitenfeld (1631 and 1642) and Torgau (1760). 
 
6.1.1 Landscape in general 
 
The battlefield is located on a flat plain, 115.1m to 126.3m above sea level, with a 
maximum gradient below 1% and almost no visible heights. Holk mentioned that Gustav 
Adolf had the advantage of a wood and small hill on his right wing, one “musket shot from 
the battaglia.”541 There is only one barely visible elevation, Hill 126, which is 1,200m 
south of the Imperial first line (Fig. 55, Plate 14). As no Protestant eyewitness mentioned 
any hill, we can assume that Hill 126 played no major role in the battle; however, it blocks 
the line of sight from the Imperial battle line to the Floßgraben. This obstruction might 
have had an impact on early Imperial artillery fire against the deploying Swedish army 
(section 8.1.3). It is not entirely certain, which “wood” Holk meant in his account (section 
6.1.3). 
 
 
                                                 
541 Wittrock 1932, 308. 
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Figure 54: Approximate military situation 15 November 1632. 
 
The main source for understanding the battlefield landscape is a 1710 field 
boundary map.542 Although this map was drawn almost 80 years after the battle, the 
landscape generally did not change much during this period and it is very likely that it 
shows the battlefield as it was during the battle. There are no hills or woods on the map, 
but a few green areas, which are not farmland, are present. 
 
                                                 
542 Museum in the Castle of Lützen. 
 199 
 
Figure 55: The battlefield according to a 1710 field boundary map. 
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6.1.2 The canals: Mühlgraben, Floßgraben and their bridges 
 
The Floßgraben (‘Floß’ = raft, ‘Graben’ = ditch, Plate 15) is an artificial canal dug in 1578 
for transporting wood to the Saxony salt mines.543 Although very narrow, it has a steep 
embankment, making it a serious obstacle to movement and, considering the fact that the 
water was cold in November, it was very difficult to cross, except on the few bridges.544 
The Floßgraben has been not recognized as an obstacle by historians very often,545 
probably because the water level has dropped due to extensive brown coal mining 
operations in the last decades.546 However, the canal presented a serious obstacle in the 
1813 Napoleonic Battle of Großgörschen, 2km south of Lützen, too.547 
 
 
Plate 14: View from the top of ‘Hill 126’ north toward the Imperial battle line. The last row of 
trees barely visible on the horizon at right is the Floßgraben. 
 
The bridges and fords are known mostly from an 1809 map.548 However, it is 
assumed that the road system has not changed substantially since 1632 and most crossings 
might have existed during the battle. The bridges were only 3m wide (Plate 16) forcing 
units to break formation before crossing with time lost to reorganize on the other side. 
Probably the major problem caused by the Floßgraben and its narrow bridges for Gustav 
Adolf was how to bring his heavy artillery pieces over, in particular his 24-pounders that 
weighed approximately 3.5tons and needed 20 to 25 horses to pull them.549 As Gustav 
                                                 
543 Andronov 2006, 22. 
544 Brzezinski 2001, 43, Sennewald 2013, 168. See also Richelieu 1823, 258. 
545 Guthrie 2002, 202, Mortimer 2010, 173. 
546 Andronov 2006, 94. 
547 Bücker/Härtig 2004, 35-40. 
548 Andronov 2006, 29. 
549 Engerisser 2007, 579. 
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Adolf had only two bridges, the Meuchen and Sckölpitz, for his army to cross the 
Floßgraben, he put some effort into building additional makeshift bridges from float-wood, 
as the sketch from Stockholm suggests (Fig. 57).550 
 
 
Plate 15: The Floßgraben had very steep embankments and would have been extremely 
difficult to cross during battle. There were almost certainly trees along its length in the 17th 
century, as suggested by copperplates. The water level in the picture is much lower than it 
was in 1632, as brown coal mining in the region has reduced the ground water level. 
 
A more serious obstacle was the Mühlgraben, an artificial canal or mill race, for the 
water mills in Lützen. It had the same steep embankments as the Floßgraben, but no 
bridges crossed it outside the town. In addition, west of Lützen the Mühlgraben’s bank was 
marshland and impossible to cross by artillery or cavalry. Gustav Adolf had little choice 
but to move south of Lützen and cross the Floßgraben twice. 
 
6.1.3 The woods: Großgöttern orchard and Skölzig wood 
 
Trees did not play a role as obstacle in the Battle of Lützen as there were only few. 
Nevertheless, there is a misunderstanding among historians regarding a small wood called 
                                                 
550 Float wood was stored along the entire length of the Floßgraben to ensure a constant supply for the salt 
production in Halle (Andronov 2006, 28-29, Brzezinski 2001, 47 and 52, Sennewald 2013, 168). 
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‘Skölziger Holz’ located 300m east of the Floßgraben.551 This wood was often 
misidentified as the wood on the far left Imperial wing, where Holk wanted to deploy 
1,000 musketeers, if he had a sufficient number of them.552 Although Holk did not name 
this wood, it has been suggested that he meant the Skölziger Holz,553 which is mentioned 
three times, in the Relation from 1633, Theatrum Europaeum and Khevenhiller, as an 
emplacement for the Swedish artillery.554 
 
 
Plate 16: The Sckölpitz bridge over the Floßgraben. One of two still existing 17th century 
structures. 
 
This wood was located 1,200m southeast of the Imperial battle line on the east side 
of the Floßgraben and was, therefore, some distance from the battlefield, which makes the 
wood neither an ideal position for Swedish artillery555 nor for Imperial musketeers, as the 
distance would have left them cut off from their own lines and with no targets to fire at. 
However, Holk mentioned another wood on the Swedish right wing “one musket shot from 
the battaglia”.556 This wood could have been the ‘Skölziger Holz’. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
551 The ‘Skölziger Holz’ is completely gone today and is localised according to a plane table map, scale 
1:25,000 from 1903. 
552 Wittrock 1932, 308. 
553 Guthrie 2002, 202, Seidler 1954, 34, Deuticke 1917, 66, Generalstaben 1939, 419, Mann 1971, 849. 
554 Abelinum 1646, 745 and Khevenhiller 1726, 190 copied this part from the Relation from 1633 (Droysen 
1880, 30). 
555 Incorrectly suggested by Mann 1971, 851. 
556 Wittrock 1932, 308. 
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Figure 56: Pond and wood of Großgöttern on 1710 field boundary map. 
 
William Watts wrote that 
 
“the king advanced, till he came with the end of the Right Wing, within Musket shot of a 
little wood: having all the way a full view of the Imperiall Army,”557 
 
suggesting a wheeling manoeuvre by the Swedish right wing toward its left. This wheeling 
manoeuvre is also confirmed by Vitzthum/Berlepsch.558 From the little wood Gustav Adolf 
would have had a full view of Wallenstein’s army from the Imperial left wing (sections 
7.1.1 and 8.2.2). Although Watts was no eyewitness, this is the only source mentioning the 
location of a wood. If Watts is credible, then this “little wood” could only have been the 
former village of Großgöttern, which was abandoned in the 15th century. This village’s 
pond still exists and the former village is marked on the 1710 field boundary map as a 
small green area, which meant any form of vegetation other than farmland; it is possible 
that there was a small wood or an orchard (Plate 17). This location would have been an 
ideal position for Holk’s musketeers out on the end of his left wing, giving flanking fire 
from a covered position as the right wing musketeers actually did from the gardens of 
Lützen. 
                                                 
557 Watts 1633, 132. 
558 Glafey 1749, 13. 
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Figure 57: Sketch from Stockholm Krigsarkivet. 
 
 
Figure 58: Lützen on 1710 field boundary map. 
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Plate 17: View from the Imperial left wing toward a small wood (trees in the front), the former 
village of Großgöttern, in which Holk failed to deploy 1,000 musketeers, and the Floßgraben 
(trees in the background).  
 
6.1.4 The structures: City walls, enclosures, windmills and 
miller’s house 
 
When the Swedish army approached Lützen, they were fired at from the city walls and the 
castle of Lützen (Fig. 75).559 According to Holk the Imperial army had 400 detached 
musketeers in Lützen, but he estimated that 1,000 would have been needed to defend the 
town.560 To prevent the Swedish army from using the town, the musketeers set it afire and 
necessarily left it.561 The only source which mentioned what happened to the musketeers 
after setting the town afire is William Watts: 
 
“Between the Mills and the towne, were there divers gardens with mudd-walls round about 
them…”562 and “…he [Bernhard von Weimar] must with the end of his Wing, even touch 
(as it were) the very walls with Muskettiers; they must needs have so sorely galled his 
Horsemen, that there had beene no coming neere: nor could horse and Pistols, have done 
any service against walls and Muskettiers.”563 
                                                 
559 Vitzthum/Berlepsch (Glafey 1749, 13). The castle is one of the two still existing 17th century structures. 
560 Wittrock 1932, 308. 
561 Fleetwood 1632, 7. 
562 Watts 1633, 131. 
563 Watts 1633, 147. 
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The 1710 field boundary map does not show any walls around the gardens, nor does it 
show the city walls. It is, therefore, possible, that there was an enclosure defended by 
musketeers as Watts claimed. 
 
 
Figure 59: Miller’s house N on van Hulsen’s copperplate. 
 
 
Figure 60: Miller’s house N on Merian’s copperplate. 
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Wallenstein’s key defence point was his fortified large battery on the windmill 
hills.564 Today there are no hills left and the last picture of the windmills made in the early 
20th century show the hills were slight rises of a meter or less. Even if slightly higher in 
1632, they would not have been much of a rise. There was possibly enough space to give 
three guns a slightly better field of fire. Although Fleetwood and Watts claimed that the 
hills were an advantage for the Imperial army, Holk did not mention them565 and they were 
certainly not a decisive factor in the battle. There was also a miller’s house near the mills 
which is mentioned by Inventarium Sueciae.566 The van Hulsen (Fig. 59) and Merian (Fig. 
60) copperplates show it south or on (sic!) the Via Regia, while the more reliable 1710 
field boundary map shows it north of the Via Regia. 
 
 
Figure 61: Windmills and miller’s house on 1710 field boundary map. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
564 Vitzthum/Berlepsch (Glafey 1749, 13). 
565 Fleetwood 1632, 6, Watts 1633, 131. See also Declaration from 1633 (Droysen 1880, 39) and Poyntz 
(1908, 72). 
566 Gottfried 1633, 25, copied by Wahrhaftige Beschreibung 1633, Glaubwürdiger Bericht 1633, Monro 
1637, part II, 164, Abelinum 1646, 750 and Chemnitz 1648, 465. 
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6.2 Via Regia and Wallenstein’s trenches 
 
According to the 1710 field boundary map, the Via Regia extended a distance of 1,350m in 
a straight line from Lützen to the northeast. It was not curved, as Deuticke believed, and 
this was demonstrated by trial trench 4 (see below).567 Only after 1,350m did it turn, first 
east, and then north, where it crossed the Floßgraben, as shown by trial trenches 1-3. The 
road had drainage ditches on either side of which Wallenstein took advantage. He deployed 
his infantry centre and artillery behind those ditches. If there is one thing most historians568 
agree on, it is Wallenstein’s fortification, a 2.5km long double trench system covering the 
whole Imperial battle line, dug into the road ditches of the Via Regia during the night of 15 
to 16 November. It is believed that this position served detached musketeers as a first 
defensive line and caused a fierce engagement, while the trench posted a severe obstacle 
hindering Swedish troop movements.569 The double trench system was never questioned by 
historians over the last 150 years, although its construction meant digging 5km of trench in 
one night which, although it seems possible, would have exhausted the Imperial army 
before this important battle. As such a fortification would have had a major impact on the 
course of the battle, it is important to discuss it in detail. 
 
6.2.1 Historical sources 
 
In the historical sources there seems little doubt about the existence of an Imperial trench 
system. Most contemporary non-eyewitness accounts agree that there was such a 
fortification and all copperplates show some kind of artificial trenches (see below). This 
picture changes if we look to the eyewitness accounts. 
 
Protestant eyewitnesses 
The Protestant eyewitnesses Vitzthum/Berlepsch and Fabricius did not mention any 
trenches or musketeers at the road.570 Vitzthum/Berlepsch described Gustav Adolf’s 
manoeuvre before the battle as wheeling around with his right wing against the refused 
                                                 
567 Deuticke 1917, 58. 
568 Droysen 1865, 102 and Wedgewood 1938, 326 are exceptions. However, the latter is still suggesting 
heavy combat at the ditches of the Via Regia. 
569 Deuticke 1917, 65, Generalstaben 1939, 420, 431, Seidler 1954, 32, 45, 47, Mann 1971, 850, Brzezinski 
2001, 39, 54, Guthrie 2002, 203, Eriksson 2006, 255, Mortimer 2010, 171 and Sennewald 2013, 169 are only 
a few out of a long list assuming trenches in Lützen. 
570 Glafey 1749, 12-14, Wittrock 1932, 305-307. 
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Imperial left wing and having no difficulties at all in getting over the Via Regia.571 The 
only fortification Vitzthum/Berlepsch mentioned is a “retrengement” of the Imperial right 
battery at the windmills.572 Similar to Vitzthum/Berlepsch, Fabricius wrote that “Gustav 
Adolf advanced over a ditch and attacked the enemy” without suggesting any delay or 
combat at the Via Regia.573 
 
Dalbier stated that the enemy waited for the Swedes in a fortified and advantageous 
position behind a great ditch where they had placed their guns.574 This great ditch could be 
one of the road ditches or even the Via Regia itself, which was a sunken road (see below), 
but Dalbier described neither trenches nor any other problems the Swedish army had in 
getting over the Via Regia so the fortified position is very likely the Imperial batteries. 
 
Fleetwood’s comment on the Imperial fortifications is difficult to understand. When 
he described the Imperial deployment, he wrote that 
 
“the enimie had the advantage of Lypsicke highwaye, on either side of which a grafte.”575  
 
In discussing a skirmish just before the battle, he said: 
 
“upon which the enimies they retyred again behinde the dike, where they had cast upp a 
kind of a brestworke.”576 
 
The “grafts” seem to have been simple road ditches577 and have nothing to do with the 
“breastwork”. At least Gustav Adolf did not seem to have any difficulty when “he leaped 
over the graft and charged the enimie.”578 The “brestworke” was very likely the fortified 
artillery position, as Vitzthum/Berlepsch and Dalbier described it. 
 
The key to understanding the nature of the Imperial fortifications is probably the 
letter from Swedish headquarters, which states that 
 
                                                 
571 Glafey 1749, 13. 
572 Glafey 1749, 13. 
573 Wittrock 1932, 306. 
574 Dalbier 1632, 251. 
575 Fleetwood 1632, 6. 
576 Fleetwood 1632, 7. 
577 According to Thesaurus 2009, 382, ‘graft’ is known to have been used from 1644 to 1737 as a term for 
‘field drain ditch.’ 
578 Fleetwood 1632, 7. 
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“…they [Imperial army] moved on a hill, with three windmills on top, digging a trench and 
a redoubt...”579 
 
It seems rather obvious that this describes the fortified artillery position at the windmills, 
although it should be noted that this eyewitness was with the Swedish baggage train and 
had probably not seen the fortification himself, at least not from a close distance. 
 
Imperial eyewitnesses 
The Imperial eyewitnesses Münchhausen and Diodati did not mention any trenches or road 
ditches nor any musketeers on the Via Regia, which is surprising given the particular 
details in Diodati’s substantial account.580 Ottavio Piccolomini reported that the Swedes 
crossed a ditch and road and closed in on them, without having any difficulties and later he 
charged the enemy to a ditch and road, but he could not pursue them because of the “bad 
condition of the road.”581 The road was probably too muddy in November to charge on it, 
but it was not impossible to cross. His nephew Silvio Piccolomini, who served in his 
uncle’s regiment, described an entirely different event when he wrote, that “we advanced 
to a small ditch and there we waited,” by which he meant the whole army before battle and 
not his regiment only.582 It is important that both Piccolominis did not mention any 
trenches or any fighting at the Via Regia. 
 
Sydnam Poyntz wrote: 
 
“In the front of his [Wallenstein’s] Camp lay a long dry ditche which hee filled full of 
Musketiers.”583 
 
He is the only eyewitness, who mentioned Imperial musketeers in ditches, but he did not 
mention trenches. The meaning of the location “in front of his camp” is uncertain, but it 
seems possible that he meant the Imperial centre. 
 
Holk, who was responsible for the deployment of the Imperial army, and therefore 
must have known the battlefield best, wrote that the Imperial army had a hollow road 
before their front, which served neither side as advantage once they stood together with the 
enemy pike to pike.584 At this point Holk should have mentioned trenches if there were 
                                                 
579 Söltl 1842, 346. 
580 Wittrock 1932, 304-305, Fiedler 1864, 557-568. 
581 Argang 1894, 89. 
582 Archivio 1871, 240. 
583 Poyntz 1908, 72. 
584 Wittrock 1932, 308. 
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any. Even more important is that Holk listed the detached musketeers deployed in the town 
of Lützen and in front of the wings, but did not mention any on the road and it is not likely 
that he forgot them. In this circumstance, a reasonable explanation could be that Holk 
listed only independent units, while the musketeers in the road ditches were not an 
independent unit. The men in the ditches were likely detached musketeers from the front 
line infantry sent forward as skirmishers, but who otherwise fought as part of their 
squadrons. 
 
Secondary sources 
It is certainly not coincidental that no eyewitness to the Battle of Lützen mentioned 
artificial trenches made by the Imperial army,585 nor did the early non-eyewitness accounts. 
A short account from 19 November586 and Relation I from Grimma from 23 November587 
mentioned neither ditches nor trenches, and the 24 November Extrakt Schreiben aus Berlin 
stated that 
 
“the enemy had the advantage of the pass and several ditches, which were occupied by 
musketeers.”588 
 
Hallenus’ account from 30 November is one of the earliest accounts mentioning some kind 
of artificial trenches (löpgrafvar) occupied by Imperial soldiers in context with the small 
Imperial battery, but was otherwise not very specific about them, nor did he suggest that 
they were tactically important.589 It is possible that his eyewitnesses actually reported 
trenches to him, but they had seen them in front of the small Imperial battery very close to 
their unit. 
 
                                                 
585 With the exception of Leubelfing’s account (Murr 1790, 122), which proves again that this account 
derived not from an eyewitness and is almost certainly a forgery (see section 2.2.3). 
586 Droysen 1880, 14. 
587 Studien 1844, 50-52. 
588 Mankell 1860, 658. 
589 Mankell 1860, 662. 
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Figure 62: Most copied copperplate from van Hulsen showing a double trench system. 
 
The turning point in the historic narrative concerning the road ditches was the 22 
November Relation II from Erfurt, which stated that 
 
“the enemy had built a breastwork at the Floßgraben during the night and occupied it to his 
advantage.”590 
 
Shortly later, Adam Heinrich Pentz wrote a letter to Gustav Horn, describing two long 
ditches, which were impassable for cavalry except on a narrow “grass trail”, where Gustav 
Adolf could cross with his right wing in march formation only, suggesting that it took a 
long time to do so,591 a circumstance also repeated by Watts.592 For the first time, the 
impassability of two ditches and a fortification at a ditch is emphasized. The key to 
understanding what was changed and falsified in the historic narrative is the Declaration 
from 1633, which stated that “Gustav Adolf reached the Floßgraben occupied by Imperial 
                                                 
590 Droysen 1880, 18. 
591 Fiedler 1864, 570. 
592 Watts 1633, 131 and 134. 
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musketeers, forced them out and used it to harass Wallenstein’s troops with his own 
musketeers.”593 
 
 
Figure 63: Detail of Merian’s copperplate from Theatrum Europaeum following van Hulsen’s 
plan. It shows the Swedish right wing crossing the trenches after heavy fighting. 
 
The Floßgraben was certainly not occupied by Imperial musketeers, because it was 
filled with water and at 1.4km to 1.8km distance, it was too far away from the Imperial 
main battle line for an infantry skirmish line and was therefore certainly not fortified. 
These non-eyewitness accounts simply confused the Floßgraben, which was indeed an 
obstacle, with the road ditches. 
 
The Swedish army had to cross the Floßgraben twice, the advance guard 
commanded by Gustav Adolf on a narrow bridge, to reach the battlefield and it seems very 
likely that Pentz misunderstood an eyewitness, believing that this event was the beginning 
of the battle and that Gustav Adolf had to cross an impassable ditch on a narrow “grass 
trail”. The impassibility of the road ditches would contradict Fleetwood’s statement that 
Gustav Adolf “leaped over the graft.” 
 
                                                 
593 Droysen 1880, 39-40. 
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Figure 64: Copperplate from William Watts’ Swedish Intelligencer. 
 
Unfortunately, almost all later accounts594 followed this erroneous historic narrative 
and gave a false impression of Wallenstein’s fortifications. Khevenhiller,595 Chemnitz596 
and Inventarium Sueciae597 were very specific about artificial trenches made by the 
Imperial army. Watts, in particular, mentioned them: 
 
“All night and next morning, his Dragooners and Pioners, wrought with thei: Spades about 
the High-way; and to make the Ditches, or Draine by it, serve them for a Breast-worke, to 
lodge their Muskettiers in.”598 
 
According to Watts, these trenches were man high and the Swedes had considerable 
problems getting over them.599 Watts also described a trench erected around the artillery 
batteries.600 This second trench is probably what Watts’ eyewitnesses had seen, and was 
possibly one source for the misunderstanding that there was some kind of trenches along 
the front of the Imperial army. 
                                                 
594 Except for the Spanish Relation from 16 February 1633 (Watts 1633, 160). 
595 Khevenhiller 1726, 188. 
596 Chemnitz 1648, 464. 
597 Gottfried 1633, 25, copied by Wahrhaftige Beschreibung 1633, Glaubwürdiger Bericht 1633, Monro 
1637, part II, 163 and Abelinum 1646, 749. 
598 Watts 1633, 125-126, 131. 
599 Watts 1633, 131. 
600 Watts 1633, 125. 
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Although Priorato and Richelieu did not mention any artificial trenches, their 
accounts suggest that there was some kind of fortification, describing either the difficulty 
of the Swedish army getting over the ditches601 or heavy fighting at the ditches.602 Of the 
non-eyewitness accounts only Burgus is more specific in describing the fortification as one 
trench only in front of the infantry centre and not the cavalry wings.603 
 
6.2.2 Pictorial representations: Copperplates and paintings 
 
Most copperplates, following the most copied plan from Friedrich van Hulsen, continue the 
later tradition of historic narrative by showing a double trench system running from Lützen 
across the whole battlefield to the Floßgraben in front of the Imperial army (Fig. 62). 
Merian’s copperplate combined the trenches with a fierce combat (Fig. 63). 
A slightly different trench system is illustrated by the Swedish Intelligencer, showing a 
single trench in one of the road ditches in the eastern half and a double trench south of the 
Via Regia in the western half (Fig. 64). This configuration is even more unlikely, because 
it would have meant digging a whole new double trench instead of modifying the existing 
road ditches, not to say that there is no historical evidence supporting such a fortification. 
The only pictorial representation illustrating a completely different situation is the painting 
by Snayers, showing no trenches and no musketeers on the Via Regia; however, the road is 
in the painting’s background, which makes it difficult to see details (Fig. 65). It seems that 
this painting shows the situation of the Imperial army more accurately than other 
copperplates and paintings. 
 
                                                 
601 Priorato 1672, 120. 
602 Richelieu 1823, 258-259. 
603 Burgus 1641, 317. 
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Figure 65: Painting from Pieter Snayer with the Imperial army in the foreground. 
(image has been removed due to copyright restrictions) 
6.2.3 Archaeological sources: excavations 
 
Because the historical sources are not entirely conclusive, four trial trenches were 
excavated in the area where the Via Regia is located according to the 1710 field boundary 
map (Fig. 55). Trenches 1-3 were positioned on the Imperial left wing (Fig. 66).604 Only 
trench 1 covered the road entirely. Wheel tracks in two areas over a distance of 19.9m 
between the outer tracks at maximum depth of 1.02m from topsoil’s surface605 confirmed 
that the Via Regia was a shallow hollow dirt road, as Holk and Ottavio Piccolomini 
described it, which is a typical medieval-early modern major road in Germany (Plate 
18).606 
 
                                                 
604 Schürger 2009, 138-141. 
605 Depths from topsoil’s surface means from modern and 1632 surface, which were almost identical. 
606 Schürger 2006, 190. Despite Holk’s statement that the Via Regia was a sunken or hollow road, Deuticke 
(1917, 58) emphasized that the road had the same height as the surrounding fields, an observation that was 
neither challenged nor discussed by historians. 
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Figure 66: Sectional view of the Via Regia. Section 1: Entire Via Regia, Sections 2 and 4: 
Northern road ditch. 
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Plate 18: Sectional view section 1: Wheel tracks of the Via Regia. 
 
A modern existing drain destroyed all archaeological evidence on the southern side, 
where the old road ditch was expected (Plate 19). While the northern road ditch was used 
until the mid-20th century, the bottom of the old ditch was still intact. This indicates a total 
width of 24m from road ditch to modern drain. The northern road ditch is 1.8m wide and 
has a depth of 0.32m to the old road and is 0.99m below the surface (Plate 20). In order to 
date the ditch, 10m of its filling was sieved, which produced 67 pieces of monochrome 
lead glazed pottery, dating to the 16th and 17th centuries. Since no more recent or older 
pottery was found, the bottom of the road ditch very likely represents the original 17th 
century ditch. The road ditch showed no traces of any attempt to reshape it into a trench. 
The shape of the northern drain was confirmed in sections 2 and 3, where it looked like the 
road ditch in section 1. 
 
In the Imperial centre the Via Regia was built over by a modern road for most of its 
length and the southern road ditch was destroyed by a gas pipeline. Trial trench 4 revealed 
15m of the northern road ditch and a very small part of the hollow way. It confirms that the 
Via Regia went in a straight line from Lützen to the Gustav-Adolf-Memorial, where it 
made a turn to the south, as shown on the 1710 field boundary map. In section 4 the road 
ditch is 1.6m wide and has a depth of 0.64m to the old road and 1.42m to the surface (Plate 
21). Therefore, it is 0.43m deeper than in section 1, but it also did not show any sign of 
entrenchment. No battle related artefact was found anywhere in the road ditch. 
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Plate 19: Modern southern drain of the Via Regia, which destroyed all archaeological 
evidence. 
 
 
Figure 67: Reconstruction of the Via Regia in sectional view. The missing front (southern) 
ditch is reconstructed according to the known rear (northern) ditch to illustrate that it is 
deep enough to provide some cover. 
 
The results from the archaeological excavations show that there was no double 
trench as well as demonstrating that a second musketeer line on the northern side would 
have been ineffective, because the Via Regia was a hollow road. Musketeers firing south 
from such a position would either have the protection of a trench but no line of fire or no 
protection, but still an ineffective line of fire against the backs of their comrades (Fig. 67). 
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Plate 20: Sectional view of the northern road ditch in section 1. 
(image has been removed due to copyright restrictions) 
 
Plate 21: Sectional view of the northern road ditch in section 4. 
(image has been removed due to copyright restrictions) 
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Figure 68: Bullet distribution near the Via Regia in front of the Imperial left wing. 
 
If we assume that the southern road ditch looked similar to the northern, it would 
have provided average cover (0.99m) from distant fire on the Imperial left wing and good 
cover (1.42m) in the Imperial centre. Some brush could have provided additional 
concealment. The ditches, however, would have been insufficient for trench warfare, as it 
was often suggested by historians. Also, it would have been counterproductive to dig the 
road ditch on the Imperial centre even deeper, because such a trench would have been too 
deep for musketeers to fire from. The road ditches would have provided neither side with 
an advantage at point-blank range, as Holk mentioned, and it certainly would not have 
prevented the Swedish cavalry from crossing the Via Regia on the Imperial left wing, 
where the road ditches were shallower than in the centre. Still, the hollow road and the 
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ditches were an obstacle to charging cavalry, as Ottavio Piccolomini described, because 
cavalry would loose momentum the instant they reached the road. 
 
6.2.4 Archaeological sources: survey 
 
As the southern road ditch is probably entirely destroyed by a modern ditch and gas 
pipeline, a survey was conducted to investigate the fighting at the Via Regia on the 
Imperial left wing. Imperial musketeers on the Via Regia would have fired southward 
against the advancing Swedish troops. In an area of 3ha, a maximum of eleven musket 
bullets were found 40m to 140m south of the Via Regia (Fig. 68). The widely scattered 
bullet distribution pattern and distance from the road could suggest that there were 
Imperial musketeers deployed on the road. However, if there were musketeers on the Via 
Regia, we could expect the Swedish troops to have returned fire and there would have been 
clearly visible bullet distribution patterns south and north along the road. But there are 
almost no bullets near the road reflecting such a combat; in fact, the bullets seem to avoid 
the road. 
 
Musket bullets south of the road are mixed with nine pistol bullets. Four show 
impact damage and one shows firing evidence, confirming that it was a combat and not a 
unit reloading their pistols. The bullets are too far away to be related to any combat at the 
Via Regia. Their distribution pattern is similar to patterns 500m to the north, which can be 
related to skirmishes fought by light cavalry and musketeers on open ground (section 
8.2.1). It is, therefore, very likely that the bullets south of the road derive from a skirmish 
too.607 
 
Although the bullet distribution pattern is not entirely conclusive, it demonstrates 
that there was no heavy fighting along the Via Regia on the Imperial left wing and it is 
most unlikely that there were any Imperial musketeers deployed. However, the bullet 
distribution pattern south of the Via Regia in field IX, particularly the concentration of 
Imperial m4 and M5 musket bullets, is evidence for an Imperial skirmish line in the road 
ditches in front of the centre only. 
 
 
                                                 
607 Schürger 2011, 103-120. 
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6.2.5 The dike 
 
Deuticke claimed that the Via Regia was built on a 1.5m high dike near the Floßgraben 
without quoting any sources or explaining how he came to this conclusion.608 In fact, only 
Fleetwood mentioned a dike on the battlefield, but in context of a breastwork, which was 
most likely the fortified artillery position.609 At the present time, the area where the Via 
Regia crossed the Floßgraben is completely flat and it is almost impossible that any such 
extensive earthwork vanished without leaving traces in an area which has never been 
ploughed. Deuticke, who first created this story, was probably influenced by the modern 
road, which is built on a 1.5m high causeway dating to the late 18th century, which is now 
federal road B 81. 
 
6.2.6 Tactical value of the Via Regia 
 
The tactical value of the Via Regia and its ditches for Wallenstein was marginal. It 
certainly helped Wallenstein’s infantry deploy and in defending the centre by providing a 
site for harassing the Swedes with skirmishing fire from the road’s ditches. On the Imperial 
left wing, the Via Regia made a turn to the east, in the direction of the Swedish battle line, 
exposing it to Swedish artillery fire and attacks down its length, which made this part of 
the Via Regia useless as a defensive position for Wallenstein. In fact, he chose a defensive 
battle array with refused wings (section 7.1.1), which increased the distance between Via 
Regia and his left wing to 600m to 1,000m. Imperial musketeers on the road would have 
had to retreat this distance over open ground to reach the safety of the Imperial cavalry 
wing. An even more likely scenario would be that the Swedish cavalry charged to the 
trenches after the first Imperial volley and fired their pistols at the musketeers before they 
had a chance to fire a second time, killing all of them in seconds without risking many 
casualties or being seriously delayed. It is most unlikely that Holk, who was in charge of 
the Imperial deployment, would have wasted his musketeers so casually when he 
complained that he did not have enough to deploy some in the small wood to his right; it 
certainly would have been a waste of time to dig trenches without occupying them. 
 
 
                                                 
608 Deuticke 1917, 58 and 65, followed by Mann 1971, 847 and 849, Roberts 1958, 765, Generalstaben 1939, 
431 and Eriksson 2006, 255. 
609 Fleetwood 1632, 7. 
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6.2.7 Conclusion 
 
It is much more difficult to prove that something did not exist than to prove its existence, 
in particular when it has already influenced research for decades. Despite the numerous 
illustrations on copperplates and descriptions in secondary sources, archaeology has 
demonstrated that there was no double trench and no heavy fighting along the Via Regia 
on the Imperial left wing. The archaeological results are confirmed by eyewitness 
accounts, none of which suggest an entrenchment inside the road ditches or any delay the 
Via Regia might have caused the advancing Swedish right wing. In particular, Holk’s 
silence about trenches is strong evidence that there were none. Building a 5km long trench 
system during one night would have exhausted the Imperial army, while it would have 
provided only a very limited advantage on the Imperial left wing. Instead, Wallenstein 
deployed three Croat regiments as a mobile skirmisher screen in front of the left wing 
(section 7.1.2). 
 
According to the historical and archaeological sources, it can not be ruled out 
entirely that there was a single trench only in front of the Imperial centre, as Burgus 
described it. However, there was no necessity; the road ditch in this area was already deep 
enough to provide some cover for musketeers. Those musketeers very likely consisted of 
the first musketeer lines of the five forward infantry squadrons, delivering skirmishing fire 
at the advancing Swedish infantry. They certainly retreated behind their lines when the 
Swedes were closing in, as there was no tactical advantage to defending the ditches to the 
last man. It seems as if historians expected Wallenstein to have entrenched his army 
because he did so at Dessau Bridge (1626) and Nurnberg/Alte Veste (1632), and it became 
a topos or cliché in printed ‘relations’. This new archaeological and historical 
interpretation changes all former interpretations of the battle and it seriously changes the 
assessment of secondary sources, written and pictorial. 
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Chapter Seven 
Deployments 
 
7.1 Imperial battle array 
 
Probably one of the most discussed issues relating to the Battle of Lützen over the last 150 
years has been the Imperial deployment, at least until Brzezinski published his substantial 
research in 2001. He re-evaluated all the known sources and in addition discovered some 
new material. Alas since then, a number of publications about the Battle of Lützen have 
failed to recognize his findings, but repeat the out-of-date work from Deuticke 1917, 
Generalstaben 1939 and Seidler 1954; it is therefore necessary here to re-evaluate all 
known historical sources and reassess the position of Wallenstein’s initial battle lines in 
conjunction with the archaeological sources. 
 
7.1.1 Alignment of wings and position of the centre 
 
Historical sources 
There are three basic eyewitness accounts giving valuable evidence about the alignment of 
the Imperial wings: Vitzthum/Berlepsch, Diodati and Ottavio Piccolomini. Although their 
accounts were published in 18th and 19th century, researchers tended not to take their 
statements seriously. 
 
Deuticke believed the Imperial battle line was completely aligned with the Via 
Regia, which he incorrectly reconstructed as an s-turn, thus suggesting some kind of trench 
warfare. In doing so, Deuticke610 ignored Diodati, the main source in this matter, who 
wrote: 
 
“…the cavalry was deployed equally on the right and left wing in ‘stairs’ [It.: scala] order, 
well covering the one and the other flank of the army, advancing when necessary to attack 
the enemy, joined by the infantry…”611 
 
Diodati meant quite literally that the cavalry wings were echeloned to the rear like stairs, 
so that the flanks of the army were covered and that cavalry had to advance to attack. This 
                                                 
610 Deuticke 1917, 65, Mann 1971, 847-849. 
611 Fiedler 1864, 561-562. 
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is confirmed by Diodati’s second statement that the right wing had Lützen to its front,612 
which is only reasonable if the right wing was echeloned to the rear, and by Ottavio 
Piccolomini’s account that the Cuirassier Regiment Götz was to his right in front of him.613 
 
Although Seidler614 and Generalstaben615 recognized Diodati’s and Piccolomini’s 
accounts, they did not believe that Wallenstein left a gap between his right wing and 
Lützen and therefore concluded only the left wing was echeloned to the rear, and then only 
slightly, while the right formed a straight line with the centre, leaning towards the town of 
Lützen. This is still the acknowledged view today.616 To solve the contradiction between 
their reconstruction of the Imperial deployment and Diodati’s account, Seidler and 
Generalstaben moved the centre and right wing 230m away from the Via Regia to the 
north so that parts of the right wing have Lützen to its front. Even after this adjustment, 
they still insisted on intensive fighting over the trenches, which would have been a serious 
tactical mistake, because the first line would have been too far away to effectively support 
the skirmish line in the road ditches. 
 
Brzezinski was the only scholar to recognize Diodati’s account. He moved the 
Imperial centre closer to the Via Regia and reconstructed the alignment of the Imperial 
wings as angled 45° towards the centre, an interpretation supported by other sources.617 
The Protestant eyewitness Vitzthum/Berlepsch reported: 
 
“…but finally his Majesty [Gustav Adolf] advanced the right wing so far that he had 
almost turned his back towards Ranstädt, with which the encounter on both sides began on 
horse and foot,…”618 
 
                                                 
612 Fiedler 1864, 561. 
613 Argang 1894, 89. 
614 Seidler (1954, 36) initially recognized the Imperial refused wings, but came to the conclusion that the 
Imperial right wing immediately advanced to the Via Regia upon the beginning of the battle. 
615 Generalstaben 1939, 417. 
616 Guthrie 2002, 203. 
617 Brzezinski 2001, 39-55. 
618 Glafey 1749, 13. 
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Figure 69: Bullet distribution. Pistol/carbine bullets according to calibre and weight: 8.4-
14.5mm or 3.00-14.75g, musket/carbine bullets according to calibre: 14.6-19.9mm or 
15.00g+. 
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Ranstädt was a town 3.5km northeast of the battlefield, which formed almost a 
straight line with the Swedish battle array. In order to have Ranstädt in its back, the 
Swedish right wing had to wheel to the left. Since the battle began after this manoeuvre, 
according to Vitzthum/Berlepsch, it must be assumed that the Swedish army had reached 
the left Imperial wing by this manoeuvre. If this is so, Vitzthum/Berlepsch implies that the 
Imperial left wing was refused at an angle of approximately 40° to 50° to the centre, which 
corresponds with Diodati’s and Burgus’ accounts.619 
 
Supporting his arguments, Brzezinski presented two previously unknown pictorial 
representations, an equestrian portrait of Gustav Adolf by Bianchi (Fig. 123) and a painting 
by Snayer (Fig. 65).620 Although copperplates and paintings are usually unreliable, both 
show refused wings and, in addition, almost the identical deployment of the Imperial 
centre as Holk and Diodati described it, suggesting they had access to Imperial eyewitness 
accounts.621 
 
 
Figure 70: Bullet distribution on the Imperial right centre: Imperial muskets m4 and M5 (17.3-
17.8mm), possibly mixed with few M2 and m3 musket bullets and very few c1 carbine 
bullets. 
 
Archaeological sources 
The bullet distribution on the battlefield provides some evidence for the Imperial 
deployment (Fig. 69). The densest bullet concentration of the survey is south of field VII; 
it is oval shaped and runs parallel to the Via Regia (Inf15). This concentration almost 
certainly derives from several different fighting episodes, but it clearly indicates the right 
centre of first Imperial battle line, which must have run somewhere through it. 
                                                 
619 Burgus 1641, 317. 
620 Brzezinski 2001, 47 and 55. 
621 Brzezinski (2001, 46) suggests that Bianchi had information from one of Wallenstein’s Italian officers. 
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The distribution pattern of the m4 and M5 musket bullets in the same area provides 
additional evidence to further pinpoint their position (Fig. 70). Those muskets were used 
mostly by the Imperial army and their bullets are scattered widely across the battlefield 
except south of field VII, where fifteen bullets were scattered in a 170m long and 70m 
wide zone parallel to the Via Regia. A distance of 170m is only slightly larger than the 
estimated length of an Imperial infantry squadron, suggesting that those bullets were fired 
by one unit. Therefore, the northwest end of this concentration very likely marks the first 
Imperial line as being 70m away from the Via Regia, a position that would have allowed a 
closer interaction between infantry squadrons and skirmishers in the road ditches.  
 
The second bullet concentration is in the south corner of field I. This is not as 
distinctive as that in field VII, because it is blurred with other distribution patterns to the 
west (Inf5). To the northeast this concentration is limited because the bullet distribution 
pattern thins out, not only marking the end of the Imperial left centre, but suggesting it is 
very unlikely that cavalry was deployed on a straight line with the centre. It also suggests a 
distance of approximately 70m between the first line and the Via Regia. The total length of 
the Imperial centre, defined by the windmills and the bullet concentration in field I, is 
approximately 1,035m. 
 
The bullet concentration at the Imperial centre’s northeastern (left) end continues 
spreading northward (Inf5). This might indicate the refused left wing’s position. Further 
east in field III, the bullet density diminishes rapidly, which suggests skirmishing rather 
than full scale combat. The low density bullet distribution pattern on field III definitely 
rules out Deuticke’s reconstruction of the Imperial battle array. Seidler’s and 
Generalstaben’s reconstruction of a first Imperial battle line 230m north of the Via Regia is 
also contradicted by the bullet distribution pattern, because their projections would run 
through low density areas, in particular on the right centre, where most of the fighting took 
place. In addition, most of the heavily impacted musket bullets are distributed near the Via 
Regia, suggesting point-blank musket fire near the road and therefore that the Imperial 
centre was closer to the road than Seidler and Generalstaben believed. Therefore, the 
archaeological resources, as well as the eyewitness accounts and pictorial representations, 
support Brzezinski’s thesis of the Imperial battle line with refused wings and a centre in 
close proximity to the Via Regia. 
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7.1.2 Battle array 
 
As we have reliable eyewitness accounts from Holk and Diodati,622 there is little doubt 
about the Imperial infantry deployment in eight squadrons: Five were in the first line, two 
in the second, and one as reserve. According to Holk, each first and second line squadron 
fielded approximately 1,000 men.623 However, the reserve squadron consisted of 500 
musketeers, not 2,500 as Holk stated accidently (section 3.1.2). There are very few hints 
about the precise positioning of units in the Imperial battle array. These known units are 
mentioned by their regimental name rather than by squadron composition. Only Diodati 
gives an approximate position for infantry regiments; Berthold von Waldstein’s on the 
right centre and Grana’s somewhere left of him.624 There is only one eyewitness account 
about the centre’s cavalry reserve. According to Holk, the infantry reserve squadron was 
flanked by two cavalry squadrons whilst the second line had either two or three cavalry 
squadrons, depending on interpreting Holk’s statement that the two infantry squadrons and 
the six cavalry companies were mixed two by two.625 It is not entirely certain, if 
Münchhausen refers to the cavalry reserve when he mentioned the Regiment Bredau, 
which he probably had seen in action near his Regiment Comargo.626 
 
Five eyewitness accounts627 concern deployment of the Imperial wings, but they 
remain relatively vague, which allowed historians to come to very different conclusions. 
Holk’s statement, in particular, that the Duke [Wallenstein] fought for two hours against 
the Swedish infantry with the Cavalry Regiments Holk, Trcka, Piccolomini and Desfour 
has led historians into erroneously believing that those regiments were initially deployed 
together on the right wing. However, Holk actually described another event, which 
occurred at a later time during battle, when the Imperial cavalry had possibly changed 
wings.628 
 
According to Diodati629 and Ottavio Piccolomini,630 the Cavalry Regiments Götz 
and Piccolomini were initially deployed on the left wing adjacent to the infantry centre.631 
                                                 
622 Wittrock 1932, 308, Fiedler 1864, 561. 
623 Wittrock 1932, 308. 
624 Fiedler 1864, 565. 
625 Wittrock 1932, 308. 
626 Wittrock 1932, 305. 
627 Holk, Diodati, Ottavio Piccolomini, court martial document, and Fleetwood. 
628 This part of Holk’s account (Wittrock 1932, 309) was ignored by Generalstaben (1939, 418), who placed 
three of these four regiments on the left wing, which would have meant that most of the left wing moved to 
the right during the battle. It was also misinterpreted by Seidler (1954, 38), who believed that all those 
regiments were deployed initially on the right wing. 
629 Fiedler 1864, 563. 
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The document of the court martial at Prague states that the Regiments Hagen and Trcka 
were initially deployed adjacent to each other somewhere on the right wing but that Hagen 
later moved to the left near the Regiment Goschütz, the left wing reserve.632 Fleetwood 
reported that “the crabates haveing the lefte wynge”,633 but some Croats were also 
deployed on the right wing.634  
 
Trauttmansdorff’s list without Pappenheim’s corps Author’s notes 
A Pertoldt von Waldstein und Alt-Sachsen  
B Coloredo und Chiesa  
C Grana und Fridrich Breiner Infantry first line centre 
D Alt-Preuner  
E Comargo  
F Baden Infantry second line centre 
G Jung-Breiner  
H Comandirte fändl Infantry reserve centre 
J Holckhe  
K Terzka und des Four  
L Haagen Cavalry right wing 
M Droost  
N Breda  
O Westpfalen Cavalry second line reserve 
P Tontinelli  
Q Isolani Cavalry left wing screen 
R Göz  
S Piccolomini  
T Leuderßhaimb Cavalry left wing 
V Loyers und Lohe  
Y Westromb  
X Gouschier Cavalry wing reserve 
Table 21: Trauttmansdorff’s list. 
 
Still the best sources about the Imperial wings are the accounts from Holk and 
Diodati. According to Holk, each wing consisted of 36 companies of cavalry with 150 
detached musketeers,635 a statement supported by Diodati, who mentioned an equal 
deployment of cavalry on both wings.636 Vitzthum/Berlepsch reported that: 
 
“four troops of cavalrymen have shown themselves on the side of the city.” 637 
 
This statement led Deuticke to conclude that this is the number of cavalry squadrons on the 
right wing,638 but it is more likely that Vitzthum/Berlepsch referred to a Croat skirmish 
                                                                                                                                                    
630 Argang 1894, 89. 
631 Only Burgus (1641, 324) placed Götz incorrectly on the right wing. 
632 Seidler 1954, 141. 
633 Fleetwood 1632, 6. This is also mentioned by Gottfried (1633, 26), copied by Wahrhaftige Beschreibung 
1633, Glaubwürdiger Bericht 1633, Monro 1637, part II, 164, Abelinum 1646, 750 and Chemnitz 1648, 466, 
which referred to an event in the early afternoon. 
634 According to the document of the court martial the Regiment Hagen was routed by retreating Croats on 
the right wing (Seidler 1954, 141). 
635 Wittrock 1932, 308. 
636 Fiedler 1864, 561. 
637 Glafey 1749, 13. 
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screen at the Floßgraben and Mühlgraben before the battle, although each wing did consist 
of four squadrons (see below).639 
 
The Trauttmansdorff’s list (section 2.2.4) was probably the most important 
discovery for reconstructing the Imperial deployment. Unlike the accounts, it lists 
complete squadrons with some consisting of two regiments as they were assembled to 
provide the necessary troop strength for a battle formation.640 The squadrons on the list are 
marked with letters in alphabetical order, in case of Pappenheim’s corps with symbols, and 
we can assume that they were marked on a now lost map in a specific order.641 
 
In conjunction with eyewitness accounts, the list can be interpreted as follows (Fig. 
72): Since Waldstein was in the right centre and Grana somewhere left of him, infantry 
squadrons A to E should be in the first line from right to left. Baden was very likely near 
Comargo so infantry squadrons F and G were in the second line from left to right and the 
detached musketeers H formed the reserve. Trcka and Hagen were deployed adjacent to 
each other on the right wing. Therefore, the cavalry squadrons J to M were on the right 
with Holk’s squadron to the front. This deployment almost matches Holk’s statement that 
the Regiments Holk, Trcka and Desfour were on the right, while Piccolomini must have 
moved from the left to the right during the battle. Götz and Piccolomini flanked the centre 
on the left, which puts the cavalry squadrons R to V on the left. Bredau was probably in 
reserve behind Comargo, which makes it likely that the cavalry squadrons N to P were the 
second line reserve from left to right. Isolani’s Croats (Q) are listed between the second 
line reserve and the left wing and could have been deployed anywhere in front of the left 
wing and moved as circumstances dictated. The cavalry squadrons Westrumb (Y) and 
Goschütz (X) flanked the musketeer reserve with Goschütz on the left. 
 
Wallenstein detached four musketeer squadrons from his infantry regiments. One 
squadron of five companies functioned as reserve. Two ‘squadrons’642 of 150 musketeers 
each were positioned “in front of each wing,” probably deployed either as 50 men strong 
                                                                                                                                                    
638 Deuticke 1917, 66. 
639 Brzezinski 2001, 46. 
640 There are eight infantry units marked as A to H on the list, which match the number of infantry squadrons 
mentioned by Diodati (Fiedler 1864, 561) and Holk (Wittrock 1932, 308). 
641 Suggested first by Stadler (1991, 891-892) and utilized by Brzezinski (2001, 48) to reconstruct the 
Imperial deployment. Although it was acknowledged by Sennewald (2013, 158), he reconstructed the 
deployment in a mostly confused alphabetical order, by trying to tally it with Generalstaben’s incorrect 
result. 
642 The term ‘squadron’ is not used in historical sources for the musketeers deployed on the wings or in the 
gardens, but they certainly consisted of more than one company and were therefore commanded by an officer 
with a rank higher than captain, which made them de facto independently operating squadrons. 
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companies between cavalry squadrons to match the Swedish tactics,643 or as one unit, but 
they were too few to form an effective skirmishing screen in front of the entire wing and 
they were certainly not deployed in the road ditches.644 One ‘squadron’ of 400 musketeers 
was initially deployed in the city and castle of Lützen,645 but were redeployed into the 
gardens of Lützen behind a mud wall at the beginning of the battle.646 The musketeers in 
the Via Regia road ditch were not independent units, but very likely consisted of one or 
two ranks from the frontline infantry squadrons, who simply retired to their linear positions 
after they had performed their duty as skirmishers. 
 
The centre was flanked by two batteries of heavy artillery pieces that were almost 
certainly in fortified positions. There is evidence for such a fortification at the windmills 
(section 6.2.1) and some hints about another fortified small Imperial battery. According to 
the only eyewitness, Dalbier, who provided the number of artillery pieces in the smaller, 
left centre, battery, it consisted of six pieces, four 24-pounders and two 12-pounders,647 
although most secondary sources mentioned seven pieces.648 There is no historical 
evidence and no direct archaeological evidence to pinpoint this battery’s position. Since 
the northeast end of the left centre’s position is known, the battery must have been 
deployed in close proximity to this area. Secondary sources give a variety of different 
numbers of artillery pieces for the larger battery at the windmills on the right centre. These 
figures range from nine to seventeen.649 If the document from Stralsund is correct, the 
battery had seventeen pieces: five 24-pounders, two 16-pounders, four 12-pounders, one 
10-pounder and six 6-pounders. 
 
Regimental guns, probably eight to sixteen pieces, were deployed in the first line 
between the infantry squadrons (section 3.1.2). The approximate spacing between the first 
line infantry squadrons at Lützen can be calculated because a 1,000 men strong infantry 
squadron deployed seven ranks deep had a frontage of 153m, assuming 5m spacing for 
officers between the bodies of pikemen and musketeers. That would leave a spacing of 
roughly 67.5m between squadrons, as the total length of the centre was approximately 
                                                 
643 Seidler 1954, 34. 
644 Suggested by Brzezinski (2001, 39) and Sennewald (2013, 169). 
645 Holk (Wittrock 1932, 308). 
646 Watts 1633, 129, 132 and 149. 
647 Dalbier 1632, 252, confirmed by Silvio Piccolomini (Archivio 1871, 240) and Burgus 1641, 321. 
648 Declaration from 1633 (Droysen 1880, 40), Khevenhiller 1726, 191 and Gottfried 1633, 25, copied by 
Wahrhaftige Beschreibung 1633, Glaubwürdiger Bericht 1633, Monro 1637, part II, 164, Abelinum 1646, 
749-750 and Chemnitz 1648, 464. 
649 Nine pieces: Fleetwood 1632, 6, Watts 1633, 129. Thirteen pieces: Declaration from 1633 (Droysen 1880, 
42). Fourteen pieces: Dalbier 1632, 252, Gottfried 1633, 26, Chemnitz 1648, 464. Sixteen pieces: Burgus 
1641, 321 and 327. Seventeen pieces: Priorato 1672, 119. 
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1,035m. This space was large enough to allow a cavalry squadron to advance through, as 
was common practice in 17th century warfare (section 3.3.3.1), but too small for a reserve 
infantry squadron, as it is often claimed for the Imperial army at Lützen.650 
 
Based on Poyntz and the painting by Snayer, Brzezinski believed that Wallenstein 
deployed a ‘fake’ troop at the end of his left wing, consisting of camp followers and 
baggage handlers, to give the impression of a larger wing.651 This episode is mentioned 
nowhere else and there remain some doubt. However, it is possible that Swedish 
eyewitnesses might not have noticed them, because they ran off before they could have 
been engaged and Imperial eyewitnesses probably tried to hide such an unworthy military 
deception in their accounts. 
 
7.1.3 Command structure 
 
It is curious that few sources designate the Imperial wing commanders and that they 
contradict each other, leading historians to believe that command changed during the 
course of the battle, according to Deuticke, several times.652 However, it would have been 
a serious tactical mistake to make changes in command during a battle without reason, and 
this is not one Wallenstein is believed to have made. 
 
Right wing 
Holk, as second-in-command was certainly familiar with the command structure, and 
stated that Wallenstein commanded the right wing.653 This is confirmed by the record of 
the court martial at Prague, according to which Hofkirchen, when he arrived at the right 
wing, was guilty of disobeying a direct order from Wallenstein.654 Therefore, there is no 
reason to doubt that Wallenstein actually commanded the right wing.655 Unfortunately, 
Generalstaben followed Watts’ unreliable account that Colloredo commanded the right 
wing, which made an impact on even recent research.656 
 
                                                 
650 Deuticke 1917, 66, Generalstaben 1939, 416, Seidler 1954, 35. 
651 Poyntz 1908, 126, Brzezinski 2001, 54, Wedgewood 1938, 325. 
652 Deuticke 1917, 68. 
653 Wittrock 1932, 308. 
654 Seidler 1954, 143. 
655 See also Seidler 1954, 40 and Brzezinski 2001, 42. 
656 Watts 1633, 129-130. Guthrie 2002, 202-203, Eriksson 2006, 239, Wolke 2007, 64, Reichel 2009, 129 
and Sennewald 2013, 169 are the most recent publications following Generalstaben’s (1939, 417) incorrect 
assertion. 
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Left wing 
Holk, supported by Watts, stated that he commanded the left wing, which has never been 
doubted after publication of Holk’s letter; indeed this seems to be one of the few generally 
accepted facts about the Battle of Lützen.657 However, it is believed by most historians,658 
following Seidler, that Holk had to hand over command of the left wing to Pappenheim on 
his arrival. For some unknown reason, Seidler659 desperately tried to prove that the 
unreliable Khevenhiller660 account was correct stating that Gustav Adolf died on the left 
instead of the right Swedish wing, a detail contradicting Holk’s account among others.661 
To prove his point, Seidler strongly suggested that Pappenheim received an order from 
Wallenstein on the evening 15 November to reinforce the left wing upon his arrival, thus 
taking command from Holk, who in turn was moved to assist Wallenstein on the right. 
Seidler’s assertion is based on the incorrect assumption that the left wing was weaker than 
the right, and his interpretation was grounded on a flawed translation of Holk’s account, 
and on Watts’ and Khevenhiller’s unreliable accounts, as well as being influenced by the 
Weissenfels battle plan, which he believed was some kind of provisional battle plan for 
Lützen.662 
 
Although it is likely, but not certain, that Pappenheim carried the Weissenfels battle 
plan together with Wallenstein’s order with him, both are marred by bloodstains,663 
Wallenstein’s Lützen battle order was perfectly symmetrical and Pappenheim’s missing 
units on the left wing, as shown on the plan, were substituted by other units at Lützen 
(section 7.1.2). Therefore, there was no need to plan ahead with reinforcements for the left 
wing. The flaw in his argument is that Wallenstein could not possibly have anticipated the 
battle’s development before the arrival of Pappenheim’s corps. In the end, it remains 
unknown if Pappenheim carried the Weissenfels battle plan, and the reason for doing so, if 
he actually did. Wallenstein’s 15 November written order to Pappenheim states: 
 
“The enemy is marching towards us. Your honour shall drop everything, and route himself 
hereto with all troops and guns, to be with us tomorrow morning (Fig. 71).”664 
 
                                                 
657 Wittrock 1932, 308, Watts 1633, 130. 
658 Deuticke 1917, 68, Generalstaben 1939, 417, Mann 1971, 850, 854, Junkelmann 1993, 455, Brzezinski 
2001, 42, Guthrie 2002, 203 and Mortimer 2010, 173 are a few examples. 
659 Seidler 1954, 58-77, followed by Diwald 1969, 500. 
660 Khevenhiller 1726, 191. 
661 Wittrock 1932, 309. 
662 Seidler 1954, 121-122, ref. 31. 
663 Holl 1976, 63. The traces of blood on both papers do not match, which seems to prove that Pappenheim 
did not receive the battle plan together with the order. 
664 Translation by Brzezinski, (2001, 37), slightly modified by the author. 
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If it would have been so important for Wallenstein to order Pappenheim to the left wing as 
early as the 15th, we could expect him to have included that order in the letter. 
 
 
Figure 71: Blood stained letter carried by Pappenheim when he was shot at Lützen. 
(image has been removed due to copyright restrictions) 
Seidler’s main argument was that Holk’s account states: 
 
“Hertzogen commenderede och förde self den Rette Flügel imod Weimar. Holche, som 
commenderede I Feldt Marschalls sted, förde den Venstre.”665 
 
which he translated: “The Duke [Wallenstein] commanded and led himself the right wing 
against Weimar. Holk, who commanded instead of the Field Marshall, led the left.” and he 
interpreted this as meaning Holk commanded the left wing instead of Pappenheim [the 
Field Marshall] until his arrival.666 However, there is one mistake in Seidler’s 
argumentation: He assumed that the second sentence describes one subject. Both sentences 
consist of a main and a subordinate clause using two different verbs to express command, 
‘commenderede’ and ‘förde’, which have a slightly different meaning. ‘Förde’ is used here 
                                                 
665 Wittrock 1932, 308. 
666 Seidler 1954, 58-59. 
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in context of the actual field command and therefore expresses the command of a wing 
during the battle. The meaning of ‘commenderede’ is more difficult to comprehend, 
because the object in the first sentence is missing. But in the second sentence 
‘commenderede’ is used in the context of a rank: “Holk commanded instead of the Field 
Marshall”, which means that Holk was second-in-command of the army in the absence of 
Pappenheim, expressing his rank inside the command structure of the army. We can 
assume the same meaning of ‘commenderede’ in the first sentence “Wallenstein 
commanded”, which implies that he commanded the army. Therefore, both sentences 
describe two different subjects at a time: Wallenstein commanded the army AND the right 
wing; Holk commanded the left wing AND was second-in-command. It was important to 
him to mention the latter to King Christian IV of Denmark that he, just recently been 
promoted from Oberst to Feldmarschall Leutnant, and now held a high command in the 
Imperial main army, even if it was only temporarily, which was indeed a successful career 
step. There is no connection between “Holk commanded instead of the Field Marshall” and 
“Holk commanded the left wing”, as Seidler suggested.667 
 
                                                 
667 The author’s new interpretation of Holk’s account was approved by the Danish Professor Jens Olesen, 
Institute for Nordic History, University of Greifswald. 
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Figure 72: Imperial battle array with all units in actual scale. The positioning of the first line 
infantry squadrons, the artillery batteries and the alignment of wings is almost exact. The 
distance between squadrons of the wings and between reserve squadrons is estimated. The 
position of Croat regiments is not known and is an approximation. Note: All battle maps in 
this thesis are only models to explain the course of the battle. To prevent complicating 
matters, all maps contain all units which were presumably in the shown area, even though 
some unit locations are speculative. 
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Watts’ statement that 
 
“The left wing … was led by Colonel Hendrick Holck; newly made Lieftenant-Felt-
Marshall unto Pappenheim: who but commanded till Felt. Marshall Pappenheim should be 
comne into Field”668 
 
has a similarity to Holk’s statement, in particular the different use of the words ‘led’, to 
express command of a wing, and ‘command’, to express his rank inside the army, which 
suggests, although not clearly, that Watts had access to Holk’s account. However, even if 
there is no connection and we interpret Watts’ statement according to Seidler’s basic idea, 
Watts confused the commanders of the centre and the right wing, leaving his statement 
about command on the left wing somewhat questionable at the least. A hint on the left 
wing action is given by Diodati, who wrote that Pappenheim, when arriving on the 
battlefield, counterattacked the left wing, “because there it seemed that the King [Gustav 
Adolf] attacked most stubborn.”669 This is not a description of an attack planned a day 
ahead. 
 
There is no hint in the historical sources suggesting that there was a plan for 
Pappenheim to take over command of any wing, nor that there was any plan for the corps 
under his command to reinforce any specific wing,670 as no one could possibly have 
anticipated how the battle would have developed by the time he arrived. As an experienced 
field officer, it was Pappenheim’s decision to counterattack immediately upon arriving 
because that was where the crisis developed. The best fit with the evidence is that Holk 
kept command of the left wing during the battle. There is no hint in the Silvio or Ottavio 
Piccolomini accounts, or anywhere else,671 that Ottavio Piccolomini took command on the 
left wing after the death of Pappenheim, as Seidler claimed;672 Ottavio Piccolomini 
certainly would have mentioned such an important leadership role in his letter to the 
emperor. Since Pappenheim outranked Holk, he would have ordinarily assumed his 
position as second-in-command had he not been killed soon after his arrival. 
                                                 
668 Watt 1633, 130. 
669 Fiedler 1864, 562. 
670 Only Khevenhiller (1726, 190-191) claimed, that Wallenstein gave orders for Pappenheim in the morning 
before battle to take position where the baggage train stood (i. e. in reserve), which he had sent to Leipzig. 
Besides the fact that Wallenstein did not sent the baggage train away, Khevenhiller’s unreliable account is 
not enough evidence to suggest such an order, although it would have been reasonable to order Pappenheim’s 
corps, which had marched all night, into reserve first. 
671 With the exception of Khevenhiller (1726, 194), who claimed that Piccolomini rallied the Imperial left 
wing, because he did not realise that Holk was in command, whom Khevenhiller (1726, 187) mentioned only 
once, when he ordered the Imperial battle array in the night before battle. 
672 There is no hint of Piccolomini taking command in the letter of his nephew Silvio Piccolomini (Archivio 
1871, 239-242) as Seidler (1954, 59 and rem. 132) claimed. 
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Centre 
Holk did not mention who was in charge of the centre and there is no clear evidence in 
other historical sources. Diodati did write that “Sargente Maggiore di battaglia” Colloredo 
always assisted the infantry673 and Silvio Piccolomini mentioned that “sergente generale di 
bataglia” Colloredo fought well with the infantry.674 Although it is not entirely certain that 
“bat(t)aglia” could be interpreted as ‘centre’,675 both sources demonstrate that Colloredo 
was in the centre and did not command the right wing as Watts claimed.676 Diodati’s 
account also suggested that there were some kind of Imperial brigade commanders, 
Berthold von Waldstein on the right and Grana on the left centre,677 leading three infantry 
squadrons according to the Swedish example, but ordered in a more defensive battle array 
similar to Basta’s brigade (two front and one reserve squadrons).678 Officially there were 
no Imperial brigades in 1632 and there is no further evidence apart from Diodati’s account, 
but it seems possible that the wing commanders Wallenstein and Holk extended their 
commands toward the centre with Waldstein and Grana as local commanders to assist 
them. If this is so, then Colloredo was only commander in an emergency situation, similar 
to the Swedish command structure at Lützen. Generalfeldzeugmeister Hans Philipp von 
Breuner commanded the artillery and as commanding officer of the Imperial artillery, was 
very likely at the windmill battery.679 
 
7.1.4 Conclusion 
 
The Imperial battle array, with five infantry squadrons in the first line and four cavalry 
squadrons on each wing echeloned back, is also illustrated in the painting by Snayer and 
the copperplate by Bianchi. Bianchi shows the reserve as consisting of one infantry 
squadron and seven cavalry squadrons. Snayer shows the reserve according to Holk’s 
account and the Trauttmansdorff list with the regimental guns between the first line 
infantry squadrons, making his painting probably the most accurate pictorial 
representation. The distribution of cavalry on each wing according to the Trauttmansdorff 
list is also supported by the number of companies: 36 on each wing according to Holk, and 
37 on the left and 36 on the right according to Brzezinski’s calculation (section 3.1.2). On 
                                                 
673 Fiedler 1864, 565. 
674 Archivio 1871, 241. 
675 Khevenhiller (1726, 195), whose account is based partially on Diodati, interpreted it this way. Also, 
Monro (1637, part II, 25) used the term “Battaile” for ‘centre’ of a Swedish brigade formation. 
676 Watts 1633, 129. 
677 Fiedler 1864, 565. 
678 Generalstaben 1939, 416. See also Brzezinski 2001, 42. 
679 Khevenhiller 1726, 195. 
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the other hand, the number of cavalry reserve companies, fifteen in the second line and 
eight as wing reserve, does not match Holk’s account, which lists six in the second line and 
twelve as wing reserve. These discrepancies leave some unanswered questions about the 
cavalry reserve. 
 
To understand what Wallenstein had in mind with the Lützen battle deployment, a 
comparison with the Weissenfels battle plan bears some resemblances concerning the 
regimental positioning. In comparison with Weissenfels, the Lützen first line centre is 
reduced by one squadron; the cavalry reserve was reduced by one squadron as well, but 
they were stronger than in Weissenfels to compensate for the weaker second line and 
reserve consisting of only two and one squadron compared to five and two at Weissenfels. 
If there was any hint of a plan for Pappenheim’s corps, the weak second line and wing 
reserves were to be filled up by his forces should they arrive in time to get some rest from 
the march before being committed to action, as the Regiments Tontinelli and Bredau 
actually did.680 It has to be pointed out that Imperial units were probably still arriving 
during the morning and filling up the reserve; this could explain the discrepancy between 
Holk’s count and the actual number of reserve cavalry companies. The 6:5:2 infantry 
deployment at Weissenfels contradicts Generalstaben’s suggestion that Wallenstein’s 
infantry was deployed as Basta’s brigades, but does not exclude the existence of local 
commanders. The two rear cavalry squadrons were almost certainly not a reserve for the 
centre but for the wings and could have easily supported either wing from their rear 
position. 
 
In both battle arrays, the weak points at the ends of the infantry centre were 
protected by Wallenstein’s crack troops, the cuirassiers and Piccolomini’s equally 
armoured harquebusiers, while the less reliable lightly armoured cavalry units were 
deployed at the wings’ extremities. It has to be noted that Lohe’s cuirassiers were deployed 
at the end of a wing in both battle arrays, probably because the regiment was only recently 
raised and was not fully armoured. It was often argued that the Weissenfels battle plan was 
no battle line, but a square681 and therefore nothing more than a stereotype sketch682 or a 
night deployment;683 but with the evidence from Lützen, it seems most likely that it 
actually shows Wallenstein’s defensive battle tactics. 
                                                 
680 Brzezinski 2001, 48. 
681 Philippi (Holl 1976, 60). 
682 Droysen 1865, 112. He admitted that the Weissenfels plan has a resemblance with Diodati’s description of 
the refused wings. 
683 Guthrie 2002, 202 and 227. 
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Figure 73: Weissenfels battle plan from 12 November 1632. It is not certain if the names G. 
Merode, Reinach, Feldmarschall Leutnant (i.e. Holk) and Colloredo are wing commanders. 
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The Imperial battle array at Lützen was perfectly balanced, as far as it was possible 
for such a small army, with a similar number of heavy cavalry on both wings. The left 
Imperial wing was not weaker than the right and it was not planned to be reinforced by 
Pappenheim’s corps as Seidler, and after him so many others, suggested.684 Although the 
right centre had almost three times the number of artillery pieces than the left and 400 
musketeers behind the mud walls of the Lützen gardens, this was compensated by the 
many more Croats on the left, giving the left wing less firepower, but more mobility, a 
necessity because of the open ground. The deep deployment would allow reinforcing the 
most endangered wing, as it is the best tactical solution for a defensive battle array. 
 
A final observation concerns the distance of 70m between Imperial skirmishers in 
the road ditches and the first line, which is not coincidental. The distance is too far to allow 
the Swedes to effectively fire at the Imperial first line from the cover of the hollow road. 
At the same time it seems to have been the range at which Imperial musketeers usually 
opened a constant caracoling fire (section 3.3.3.3). 
 
7.2 Swedish battle array 
 
In contrast to the Imperial battle array, the Swedish deployment is well documented, 
although it should be noted that almost all information is based on secondary sources. 
Nevertheless, there seems to be little doubt about the Swedish battle positions, with some 
minor exceptions (Fig. 74). 
 
7.2.1 Cavalry and interlined musketeers 
 
Most sources state that the Swedish wings consisted of six first line and six second line 
cavalry squadrons each. The squadrons of the right first line consisted of the six national 
Swedish Regiments Smaland, Östgöta, Uppland, Södermanland, Västgöta and Finland, but 
                                                 
684 Seidler (1954, 38), who placed all heavy cavalry except Götz on the right wing and explained his 
interpretation with reference to the Battle at Nurnberg/Alte Veste, where Gustav Adolf attacked the best 
protected place and he assumed that Wallenstein ‘knew’ Gustav Adolf would do the same at Lützen. This 
notion contradicts all military principles, in particular for a defensive battle array, where a commander has to 
react to an attack and therefore needs sufficient reserves. Roberts 1958, 767, Mann 1971, 850, Holl 1976, 69-
70, Stadler 1991, 730, Doughty/Gruber 1996, 25, Neuhold 2011, 98 and Mortimer 2010, 173 followed 
Seidler’s thesis. Generalstaben (1939, 417) placed all heavy cavalry except Desfour on the left wing. 
Strangely Junkelmann 1993, 454 and Guthrie 2002, 203-204 followed Generalstaben’s thesis, but still 
suggested a weak left wing, which was planned to be reinforced by Pappenheim. 
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Fleetwood reported that the Finish cavalry was divided into two squadrons, which would, 
technically, have given this wing seven squadrons instead of six.685 
 
The question about the number of right wing first line cavalry squadrons is 
connected to the question about the strength of the detached musketeers interlined between 
the first line cavalry squadrons on both wings, which is not mentioned by any eyewitness. 
According to Khevenhiller686 and the Relation from 1633687 each of the ten musketeer 
companies consisted of 50 men, a strength they had also at Breitenfeld (1631) according to 
Monro,688 while Hülshorst689 and Richelieu690 reported a strength of 200 per company. 
Most historians assume that those companies were formed by musketeers from several 
regiments, but Langmann’s list suggests that all regiments were at their combat strength on 
15 November and it is unlikely they released musketeers before the battle (section 3.3.3.1), 
except, possibly, as skirmishers to their immediate front. In addition, the Regiments 
Löwenstein and Brandenstein, consisting of musketeers only, were already designated to 
form the interlined musketeer companies.691 Together with a total of 798 musketeers, they 
had the necessary troop strength and a total number of eleven companies, exactly the 
number needed assuming that the left wing’s front line consisted of six cavalry squadrons 
with five musketeer companies and the right wing of seven squadrons with six companies, 
averaging a reasonable 72 men each. 
 
7.2.2 Battle array and command 
 
The Swedish battle array consisted of two almost equally powerful lines,692 a strong 
alignment that enabled the Swedish army to attack over a period of 6 hours. Four brigades 
                                                 
685 Fleetwood 1632, 7. 
686 Khevenhiller (1726, 189) had copied this part from the Relation from 1633. 
687 Droysen 1880, 29. 
688 Monro 1637, part II, 64. 
689 Wittrock 1932, 303. 
690 Richelieu 1823, 257. 
691 Brzezinski 2001, 22. See also Hülshorst (Wittrock 1932, 303), who stated that the interlined companies 
were formed by the 9th Brigade’s Regiments Löwenstein and Brandenstein (Henderson was likely part of the 
brigade, but formed the 1st line reserve). This would exclude Leslie’s Scots, who, according to Monro (1637, 
part II, 164), formed the musketeer companies on the left wing and charged the Imperial windmill battery 
(See Brzezinski 2001, 23, rem. 15). Monro very likely misunderstood a report, probably from Leslie himself. 
It is almost certain that the Scots charged the battery as part of the Green Brigade, which would have been 
short of one squadron otherwise. The Scots did fight in close proximity to the left wing cavalry. 
692 This thesis follows Brzezinski’s (2001, 19-23 and 43-49) results, which is largely based on Watts (1633, 
128-129) and Gottfried (1633, 27-28) with the copperplate from van Hulsen, copied by Abelinum 1646, 751-
752 with the copperplate from Merian, Wahrhaftige Beschreibung 1633, Glaubwürdiger Bericht 1633 and 
Chemnitz 1648, 463-464. The lack of information from eyewitnesses prevents verification at the present 
time. 
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and one musketeer squadron in reserve with a total of 6,170 infantrymen and sixteen to 
twenty regimental guns formed the first line centre. In theory under command of 
Generalmajor Nils Brahe Greve till Visingborg,693 it seems that the wing commanders, 
Gustav Adolf and Bernhard von Weimar, extended their command over the two centre 
brigades adjacent to their wings, and in effect commanded the first line centre.694 The 
brigades were not deployed randomly. As Brahe had no cavalry reserve at his disposal, the 
two centre brigades, the Yellow and the Old Blue, had substantially more pikemen than 
any other brigade. It was hoped that this would enable them to survive an Imperial cavalry 
charge, while the two outer brigades, the Swedish and Green, could have been supported 
by cavalry from the wings and thus had fewer pikemen. As it turned out pikemen were no 
substitute for a cavalry reserve; of all units of the Swedish army, the Yellow and Old Blue 
Brigades took the most damage inflicted by the combined Imperial infantry-cavalry 
counterattack. 
 
Likewise, the second line centre was formed by four brigades and one cavalry 
squadron in reserve with 6,512 infantry and 300 cavalry under command of Generalmajor 
Dodo von Innhausen und zu Knyphausen.695 It is not entirely certain whether he also had 
control over the second line wings,696 six cavalry squadrons each. These horsemen were 
probably under the local commanders Oberst Ernst von Sachsen-Weimar on the left with 
1,430 men and Oberst Claus Conrad Zorn von Bulach with 1,080 on the right.697 
 
Six cavalry squadrons with five musketeer companies interlined with 
approximately 1,550 cavalrymen, 423 musketeers and ten regimental guns formed the first 
line’s left wing under Generalleutnant Bernhard von Sachsen-Weimar698 with Oberst Hans 
Abraham Graf von Gersdorf in field command of the musketeers.699 The first line right 
wing was under command of King Gustav Adolf700, with Överste Torsten Stalhandske 
probably as second-in-command.701 This force consisted of seven squadrons with six 
                                                 
693 Only confirmed through secondary sources from Chemnitz 1648, 464, Watts 1633, 129, Abelinum 1646, 
746 and Khevenhiller 1726, 189, who copied the Relation from 1633 (Droysen 1880, 29). 
694 The two left brigades, Green and Old Blue, followed the left wing (Fleetwood 1632, 7). See also 
Brzezinski 2001, 47. 
695 Fleetwood 1632, 6, Abelinum 1646, 746, Chemnitz 1648, 464, Khevenhiller 1726, 189, Relation from 
1633 (Droysen 1880, 29). 
696 Suggested by Brzezinski 2001, 48 according to Watts 1633, 132. 
697 Only mentioned by Watts 1633, 129. 
698 Fleetwood 1632, 6, Dalbier 1632, 252 and almost all secondary sources except Hallenus (Mankell 1860, 
662), who incorrectly led Brahe command the left wing and Leubelfing (Murr 1790, 122), who has got the 
Swedish command structure completely wrong. 
699 Watts 1633, 129. 
700 Confirmed by all sources except for the account of Leubelfing (see above). 
701 Only based on an obscure story of Gustav Adolf giving personally command to Stalhandske at the 
beginning of the battle (Watts 1633, 134; see also Brzezinski 2001, 21). Certainly incorrect is Khevenhiller’s 
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musketeer companies interlined between cavalry squadrons, commanded by Oberst Caspar 
Graf von Eberstein,702 with 1,850 cavalrymen, 507 musketeers, twelve regimental guns and 
probably 30 mounted riflemen of the djurskyttar company. With a total of 2,930 horse, 507 
foot and twelve regimental guns, the right wing was just as strong as the left with a total of 
2,980 horse, 423 foot and ten regimental guns. Gustav Adolf did not concentrate his forces 
on one wing and the troop quality was equally good on both wings, with the best units in 
the first line.703 The twenty Swedish heavy artillery pieces were very likely delayed by the 
Floßgraben and the narrow bridges. According to Vitzthum/Berlepsch, Gustav Adolf 
opened the battle with only three 24-pounders (section 8.1.3), which were probably 
deployed between the two central brigades. 
 
The deployment of the Swedish army was restricted to a frontal width of less than 
2,600m by the Mühlgraben and Lützen to the west and the Floßgraben in the east. This 
space was barely enough to deploy the army in two lines, if the Swedish cavalry was 
deployed four ranks deep and the brigades still served with reserve musketeers. If the 
wings touched the Mühlgraben and the Floßgraben, this linear distance would have left a 
gap of not much more than 60m between the brigades. A gap this size would have been 
sufficient space to bring forward reserves or let retreating squadrons through, but not for 
deploying an entire brigade on line as it has often been suggested.704 The limited space on 
the Lützen battlefield is also evidence that the Swedish brigades were deployed with 
reserve musketeers. The baggage train was very likely left south of the Floßgraben near 
Meuchen, where it was threatened with capture by Croats.705 
 
In comparison to Breitenfeld (1631), where the ratio of first to second lines was 2:1 
on the wings and 4:3 in the centre, the Swedish second line was much stronger at Lützen. 
This strength might have been at least partially the result of the limited space available on 
the battlefield. Regardless of whether it was planned or not, such a strong and dense 
                                                                                                                                                    
(1726, 191) statement that Fältmarskalk Horn, who took not part in the battle, was second-in-command of the 
right wing. 
702 Watts 1633, 129. 
703 A quantitative or qualitative concentration of forces on the right wing is sometimes suggested by 
historians (Doughty/Gruber 1996, 25, Brzezinski 2001, 53, Seidler 1954, 48, Deuticke 1917, 70). 
704 Monro (1637, part II, 64) clearly stated that at Breitenfeld the space between brigades were large enough 
to move a cavalry squadron forward, for which a space of 60m would be sufficient. A copperplate showing 
the Battle of Pfaffenhofen 10 August 1633 actually shows a cavalry squadron filling the space between two 
brigades (Brzezinski/Hook 2006, 83). It is unclear why Watts (1633, 130) believed that this space was large 
enough to move another brigade between them. This would have meant a space of 120m to 150m, which 
would have exposed the brigades to flank attacks and, moreover, the space was not available between Lützen 
and the Floßgraben. Note: The spacing between Imperial infantry squadrons seem to have been similar to the 
spacing between Swedish brigades and were very likely common Thirty Years War practice. 
705 According to Swedish HQ (Söltl 1842, 347). See also Brzezinski 2001, 49. 
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reserve needed to be committed as early as possible to prevent both lines from being 
beaten separately, or the second line from being put to flight due to a routed first line 
retreating through the second. Although there is no historical evidence, it is very likely that 
Gustav Adolf’s tactics were based on an early second line commitment. This assumption 
will play a crucial role in interpreting the early stages of the battle. 
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Figure 74: Swedish battle array with all units in actual scale. 
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Chapter Eight 
The battle according to archaeological and historical 
sources 
 
Archaeology provides a substantial and valuable addition to the historical sources, but, on 
the other hand, makes an evaluation of the battle’s events even more complicated. 
Therefore, single events of the battle are discussed in chronological order, first according 
to historical sources, then according to archaeological sources. Both sources are then 
combined to reconcile and reconstruct the events. Some important events, such as the 
movement of the Old Blue Brigade, are discussed in several different sections because of 
this complexity. This chapter is much longer than any other, because there was no practical 
way to divide it into several chapters without interrupting the argumentations. However, 
this chapter is subdivided into four sections representing the four main stages of the battle 
– Swedish approach, Swedish attack, Imperial counterattack and second Swedish attack. 
 
8.1 Swedish approach 
 
8.1.1 The ‘Lützen fog’ 
 
It is believed by most historians, chiefly based on secondary sources, that fog influenced 
the battle decisively, by delaying the battle in the morning and, when returning around 
midday, concealing the Imperial or Swedish rout.706 This fog, into which the Swedish King 
disappeared and was not seen alive again, became legend as the ‘Lützen fog’ and is still a 
local expression for thick fog in autumn. This fog is a local meteorological phenomenon 
caused by high humidity. It appears on the plain of Lützen most commonly in November 
and was observed by the author whilst coming from Leipzig on a clear day and 
encountering fog 5 to 7km before Lützen. Although this is additional evidence, the 
historical sources and even the eyewitness accounts are very inconsistent about the 
duration and nature of this fog during the battle. 
 
                                                 
706 Deuticke 1917, 68 and 73, Seidler 1954, 44 and 52, Wedgewood 1938, 324, Roberts 1958, 767, Diwald 
1969, 498, Doughty/Gruber 1996, 25, Englund 1998, 130, Wolke 2007, 64-65, Neuhold 2011, 98-99. 
Although Brzezinski (2001, 43 and 74) suggested fog in the early morning, he had some doubt about 
returning fog in the afternoon. 
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Only two eyewitnesses, Dalbier and the Swedish HQ (Table 22), reported fog in the 
morning, but only after it first appeared to be a clear day; according to Dalbier it lasted 
until 9am, but returned at 10.30am. This contradicts Fleetwood’s account, who stated that 
there was a clear day until 10am, just when the battle began, while Diodati and Fabricius 
reported fog around midday and thirteen eyewitnesses did not mention any fog at all. 
 
 
Plate 22: A typical morning haze on the Lützen battlefield. View from the Imperial baggage 
train looking towards the advancing Swedish army’s position. 
 
Despite the differences, all eyewitnesses agree that there was no fog at dawn and it is 
highly unlikely that Gustav Adolf would have dared trying to move his army in thick fog 
or before dawn without intelligence about an enemy who knew and controlled the terrain 
with light cavalry.707 Fleetwood, in particular, mentioned no delay of the Swedish army by 
fog in the early morning 16 November. 
 
“The six of November the Kinge at break of the day marched his army…”708 
 
and Vitzthum/Berlepsch 
 
“The other morning, the 6th as soon as it was dawn, one had started to move against the 
enemy…”709 
                                                 
707 Suggested by Seidler 1954, 44. 
708 Fleetwood 1632, 6. 
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Generally, it seems unlikely that a fog appeared after a clear morning – this never 
happened once during the five years of the archaeological project in Lützen, despite a lot of 
foggy days. There was either fog already in the early morning or there was no fog the 
whole day, but fog never appeared once the sun was up and fog never reappeared once it 
was gone. 
 
The most likely scenario is that there was no fog but that there was haze in the 
morning, something not thought to be worth mentioning by the eyewitnesses (Plate 22). 
The first shooting and skirmishing, followed by Imperial artillery fire, began long before 
the battle started. The high humidity of the Lützen plain would have caused gun smoke to 
stay along the battle line, especially if there was no wind.710 Then the Imperial forces set 
Lützen on fire. A small fire was observed by the author on a calm and hazy November day, 
when a farmer burned leaves in his garden. This little fire soon covered a large part of the 
battlefield with a smoky film. Burning Lützen would have created a massive fire; very 
soon after this broke out, the battle started and the increasing smoke of musket and artillery 
fire, as well as the smoke from the burning town, mixed with the haze, giving the 
impression of fog building up during the morning, and reducing the visibility severely. Due 
to the unusual circumstances of a combination of high humidity, haze, gun smoke in a 
static battle and smoke from a burning town, visibility was reduced more than usual in a 
battle; the eyewitnesses referred to it as ‘fog’ or ‘mist’.711 That would also explain the 
different times given by eyewitnesses about the returning and disappearing fog. 
 
The first account mentioning an actual delay of the Swedish advance by fog in the 
morning was the Relation II from Erfurt, which unfortunately was copied by the Relation 
from 1633, Inventarium Sueciae, with its great influence on other sources, Chemnitz and 
Khevenhiller; it still has a great influence on modern research. However, even in the 
secondary sources a clear morning is mentioned by the Declaration from 1633. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
709 Glafey 1749, 12. 
710 Babits 1998, 80. 
711 Brzezinski 2001, 52. 
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Eyewitness 
accounts 
Morning fog before 
battle (page) 
Fog during the battle (page) Start of battle 
(page) 
Swedish HQ 
- Söltl 1842 
Clear dawn?, then fog in 
the morning (346) 
 11am 
(346) 
Dalbier 
- 1632 
Clear dawn, then fog 
until 9am (251) 
Fog returns at 10.30am 
(251) 
9am 
(251) 
Fleetwood 
- 1632 
Clear morning (7) Fog after 10am (8) 8am (first shot) to 
10am (7) 
Fabricius 
- Wittrock 1932 
 Fog midday (306)  
Diodati 
- Fiedler 1864 
 Fog midday (563)  
Wallenstein 
- Lorenz 1987 
  10am 
(256) 
Holk 
- Wittrock 1932 
  11am first ‘salvo’ 
(308) 
Knyphausen 
- Studien 1844 
  10am 
(49) 
S. Piccolomini 
- Archivio 1871 
  2 hours before 
midday (240) 
Münchhausen 
- Wittrock 1932 
  9am 
(304) 
Secondary sources, 
letters 
   
Hallenus 
- Mankell 1860 
Fog the whole day (662)  After 9am 
(662) 
Pentz 
- Fiedler 1864 
 Fog midday (570)  
Relation I Grimma 
- Studien 1844 
 Fog 1pm (51)  
Hülshorst 
- Wittrock 1932 
  11-12am 
(303) 
Gallas 
-Förster 1844 
  11am (95) 
Secondary sources, 
‘relations’ 
   
Relation II Erfurt 
- Droysen 1880 
Fog all morning delayed 
Swedish advance (18) 
 9-10am 
(19) 
Relation 1632 
- Droysen 1880 
Fog the whole day (10)  After 10am 
(7) 
Relation 1633 
- Droysen 1880 
Fog in the morning (30) Fog 1pm (31) 11am 
(30) 
Declaration 1633 
- Droysen 1880 
Clear morning (40) Smoke and fog midday (41) Before 10am (40) 
Spanish Relation 
- Watts 1633 
 Fog midday (161)  
Watts 
- 1633 
Fog until 8am delayed 
Swedish advance (126) 
Fog after 11am (137) 
Fog in afternoon until 3-4pm (147) 
9am 
(132) 
Gottfried 
- 1633 
Fog all morning delayed 
Swedish advance 
 9-10am 
(25) 
Burgus 
- 1641 
 Fog early afternoon (326)  
Chemnitz 
- 1648 
Fog all morning delayed 
Swedish advance (464) 
Smoke and fog midday (466) 11am 
(465) 
Khevenhiller 
- 1726 
Fog all morning delayed 
Swedish advance (188) 
Fog midday (194) 11am 
(190) 
Richelieu 
- 1823 
Clear dawn?, then fog in 
the morning until 10am 
(258) 
  
Table 22: The ‘Lützen fog’ and commencement of battle in historical sources. 
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8.1.2 First skirmishes 
 
Marching 23km along the Via Regia from Naumburg on 15 November, the Swedish army 
was delayed until nightfall at the Rippach by Imperial Croats and Dragoons. They camped 
in full battle order not far from the eastern bank of the stream only 5km from the Imperial 
army, encamped at Lützen.712 Vitzthum/Berlepsch reported that they had seen Imperial 
army watch fires in several villages during the night.713 As Zöllschen, Kaya and Meuchen 
can-not be seen from the Swedish camp, the only reasonable explanation is that there were 
still outposts or scouting parties in Bothfeld and Röcken less than 2km away, creating a 
tense situation for the Protestant soldiers. This also seems to be the reason why the 
Swedish army camped in battle order. Well protected against a Swedish surprise attack 
behind Lützen, Mühlgraben and Floßgraben, Wallenstein sent for Pappenheim and all 
other forces he could get to gather at Lützen after he decided that “he would rather die than 
retreat one foot.”714 
 
Reports about the Swedish approach towards Lützen on the morning 16 November 
are only vague, sparse and mostly from non-eyewitnesses. Explaining the Swedish 
approach is the key to understanding the delay, which proved so fateful for Gustav Adolf, 
and it seems necessary to figure out the events from what little is reported. After a cold 
November night on an open plain with probably not much more than a blanket – most of 
the baggage train was left in Naumburg to allow faster movement for a surprise attack – 
the Swedish army was set to march at first light of dawn at about 7am715 on a hazy and 
calm day. Knowing that Pappenheim was on his way to reinforce the Imperial army, 
Gustav Adolf was in a hurry. With the Imperial army near, the Swedish army certainly 
moved as they had camped in battle order in two columns, the eventual two battle lines, 
2km to 2.3km long right wing head on, which might have caused some wheeling in the 
morning, assuming that they camped in battle order across the road to prevent an Imperial 
surprise attack. 
                                                 
712 The skirmish at the Rippach is not an issue in this thesis. See Brzezinski 2001, 34-38. Fleetwood (1632, 6) 
gave a distance of one English mile between Lützen and the Swedish camp, but that would have meant 
marching another 4km in dark night against an enemy, who was familiar with the terrain. More reliable is 
Holk’s account (Wittrock 1932, 308), giving a distance of “four canon shots”, which translates roughly as 
6km. 
713 Glafey 1749, 12. 
714 Holk (Wittrock 1932, 308). 
715 At “daybreak” according to Vitzthum/Berlepsch (Glafey 1749, 12), Fleetwood 1632, 6 and Dalbier 1632, 
251. All time in this thesis is given according to our modern standard European time. 7am is the first and 
5pm the last light on 16 November at Lützen. Time given in historical sources for single events sometimes 
vary substantially, but it was not possible to establish if both armies used the same or a different time at 
Lützen. 
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The Imperial scouting parties at Röcken and Bothfeld certainly did not try to resist 
and retreated behind the Floßgraben. The Swedish army advanced 5km along the Via 
Regia towards Lützen blinded by the rising sun at 7.30am, when musket fire from the walls 
of Lützen stopped the advance guard at around 8am.716 The approach towards Lützen and 
the musket fire can be seen as a hint that Gustav Adolf was not entirely familiar with the 
situation at that time. It took Gustav Adolf probably another half an hour before he made 
the decision to move south around Lützen, based on reconnaissance reports that the 
Mühlgraben to the north had boggy river banks, “uncomfortably places”, and no bridges.717 
 
Although Tontinelli and Bredau had just arrived that morning718 and were tasked as 
reserve behind the centre to rest from their night march, Wallenstein still had to wait for 
the rest of Pappenheim’s corps and had to play for time. According to Vitzthum/Berlepsch  
 
“Four troops of cavalrymen have shown themselves on the side of the city”719 
 
after the Swedes were fired at from the city walls. The Swedish HQ reported that when the 
Swedish army advanced towards Lützen, 
 
“the Imperials had shown and presented themselves there, but did not fire.”720 
 
Those troops were very likely Isolani’s four Croat regiments deployed as a skirmisher 
screen at the Floßgraben and Mühlgraben to secure the bridges and delay the Swedish 
advance.721 This disposition would concur with Gallas’ report722 of Croats skirmishing 
during the Swedish advance, which is confirmed by the Relation from 1633 reporting 
skirmishes all morning.723 
 
 
 
                                                 
716 Vitzthum/Berlepsch (Glafey 1749, 13). Fleetwood (1632, 7) reported the first shot at 8am. Hallenus 
(Mankell 1860, 662) mentioned the Swedish arrival at Lützen at 9am, which seems too late. 
717 Mentioned first by the Relation from 1633 (Droysen 1880, 30), copied by Abelinum 1646, 748 and 
Khevenhiller 1726, 190. 
718 According to Watts (1633, 124) “some horse that were Quartered very farre off, being not able to reach 
up, till ten a clocke next morning“, which probably could have been seen and reported by his eyewitnesses. 
719 Glafey 1749, 13. 
720 Söltl 1842, 346. 
721 Deuticke 1917, 68, Seidler 1954, 40, Brzezinski 2001, 45. 
722 Förster 1844, 95. 
723 Droysen 1880, 30, copied by Abelinum 1646, 749, Chemnitz 1648, 464 and Khevenhiller 1726, 190, and 
was possibly also used by Priorato 1672, 120. 
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Figure 75: Imperial and Swedish camps on evening 15 November and Swedish approach in 
the next morning. 
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The Croats had already suffered some losses at Rippach 15 November724 and were 
not supposed to hold the bridges for long. There were only two bridges, and possibly a 
third further south near Kaya at the first crossing and two at the second, which might have 
enabled them to delay the Swedish advance for a short while. After clearing the bridges, 
Gustav Adolf had to build makeshift bridges from float wood stored near the Floßgraben, 
to bring his 18,000 soldiers over as quickly as possible without letting the infantry suffer 
from cold water by wading.725 It was this crossing and skirmishing, and not a fog, which 
was responsible for the considerable delay of the main battle’s commencement and Gustav 
Adolf had to sacrifice his battle formation to cross the Floßgraben.726 
 
8.1.3 Swedish deployment and Imperial artillery fire 
 
Historical sources 
Some historians believed that the fog prevented artillery fire before the battle.727 In fact, it 
is almost certain that artillery fire was a key factor creating the ‘fog’ in the first place. In 
addition, early artillery fire is also reported by eyewitnesses. According to Fleetwood728 
and Münchhausen,729 it lasted “a while” before the main battle started. 
 
The artillery fire is described best by Vitzthum/Berlepsch, who reported that 
 
“…one [the Swedes] had started to fire several salvos with three half-cannons, which the 
enemy answered with a battery, which he had cast up [the fortification] at the windmills 
near the town, and which he continued with the other batteries, he had at the side of 
Scheiditz [Skölzig] … and there was heavy firing with pieces but one hour on both 
sides…”730 
 
According to Vitzthum/Berlepsch the Swedes opened fire with only three 24-
pounders, almost certainly because the other pieces were delayed crossing the Floßgraben. 
The commander of the Imperial artillery, Generalfeldzeugmeister Breuner, answered first 
with the windmill battery and later with the smaller left wing battery. The artillery fire 
went on for one hour. In particular the sequence of fire is an important consideration, 
because the line of sight from the small battery was blocked by Hill 126 at a distance of 
                                                 
724 Brzezinski 2001, 37. 
725 Hülshorst (Wittrock 1932, 302) reported that the Swedish army could not advance in battle order because 
of the “narrow passage“ probably meaning the difficulties at the Floßgraben. 
726 Brzezinski 2001, 46-47. 
727 In particular Seidler 1954, 44-45 and Guthrie 2002, 208. 
728 Fleetwood 1632, 7. 
729 Wittrock 1932, 304. 
730 Glafey 1749, 13. 
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1,200m. This suggests that the wind-mill battery started firing at a longer distance and the 
small battery joined the firing when the Swedes came into sight. 
 
In contradiction to Vitzthum/Berlepsch, the Swedish HQ reported that the Imperial 
artillery was first to open fire,731 which is supported by secondary sources, though of lesser 
reliability;732 in particular Hülshorst733 and Hallenus734 mentioned that the Imperial 
artillery fired during the Swedish deployment. Many eyewitnesses including Diodati and 
Holk735 did not report any prebattle artillery fire, probably because it was just common 
practice in the early stage of any battle, one which inflicted few casualties. Still, their lack 
of reporting can not be seen as evidence that there was no such fire. 
 
Only two secondary sources explicitly state that there was no extensive prebattle 
artillery fire. According to the Relation II from Erfurt, the Swedish Blue and Yellow 
Regiments advanced against the trenches, while supported by five shots from large pieces, 
which was answered by 80 shots.736 We find this story changed, but certainly based on the 
Relation II from Erfurt, in the Declaration from 1633, which states that the Swedish army 
fired one round with five 24-pounders and advanced against the trenches, while the 
Imperial artillery held their fire to acquire better targets.737 This whole episode was 
fictitious; there were no trenches, the Blue and Yellow Regiments did not advance first 
(see section 8.2), and prebattle artillery fire is reported by four eyewitnesses and several 
secondary sources. 
 
Nevertheless, some historians have given priority to the two second-hand accounts 
over eyewitness accounts.738 Seidler also based his argument on the Swedish HQ account 
that 
 
“the Imperials had shown and presented themselves there [Lützen], but did not fire,”739 
 
                                                 
731 Söltl 1842, 346. 
732 Relation from 1632 (Droysen 1880, 7-8) and Relation from 1633 (Droysen 1880, 29), copied by 
Khevenhiller 1726, 189. An early artillery fire, without specifying who fired first, is mentioned by Gottfried 
1633, 25 (for two hours), copied by Monro 1637, part II, 163-164, Wahrhaftige Beschreibung 1633, 
Glaubwürdiger Bericht 1633, and used by Burgus 1641, 321 (one and a half hours) and Abelinum 1646, 749 
(some time). 
733 Wittrock 1932, 302. 
734 Mankell 1860, 662. 
735 Fiedler 1864, 562, Wittrock 1932, 308. 
736 Droysen 1880, 18. 
737 Droysen 1880, 40. 
738 Seidler 1954, 45, Brzezinski 2001, 49-50. 
739 Söltl 1842, 346. 
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which he interpreted as meaning there was no artillery fire, although the account made 
clear that this event did not occur during the Swedish deployment but earlier during the 
Swedish advance from Rippach to Lützen.740 Although the reports about an early artillery 
fire are not entirely conclusive, there are some facts to consider: 
 
1. The Imperial heavy artillery was already deployed in well chosen positions, which 
certainly would have enabled them to fire first if they wanted to.741 
2. The main task of heavy artillery in a field engagement was to deliver long range 
harassing fire either to keep the enemy at distance or force him to quick action, 
which makes it likely that the Imperial artillery opened fire as soon as the Swedish 
army entered firing range. In addition, heavy artillery had a low rate of fire and 
there was no point in holding fire until the enemy was in point-blank range. 
3. Gustav Adolf could not afford to lose more time with an artillery duel and very 
likely advanced as soon as his army was deployed.742 
 
Under these circumstances, all early Swedish artillery fire was certainly covering 
fire directed against the Imperial artillery positions while the Swedish army reformed after 
passing through the choke points over the canal.743 This interpretation is supported by 
Vitzthum/Berlepsch’s statement that only three Swedish pieces opened fire although they 
had twenty which were delayed at the Floßgraben. 
 
Archaeological sources 
Additional evidence for this early artillery fire is provided by the distribution pattern of 
shell fragments, although with appropriate caution, because the patterns might be 
influenced by the unmethodical search for ferrous material, which resulted most definitely 
in a much lower recovery rate and density of patterns. Two pieces from one or two 24-
pounder shells were found 190m north of the small Imperial battery, which derive very 
likely from the three Swedish 24-pounders that Vitzthum/Berlepsch mentioned firing 
against the fortified artillery position in a futile attempt to silence them. 
 
 
                                                 
740 Seidler 1954, 45. 
741 Droysen 1865, 119. 
742 Dalbier 1632, 251. See also Seidler 1954, 44. 
743 Firing at the enemies artillery positions was probably common practice in the Thirty Years War. The 
Swedish army used this tactic successfully in the Battle of Rain on the Lech 15 April 1632 (Brzezinski/Hook 
2006, 82). 
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Figure 76: Distribution of spherical cast iron fragments. 
 
The location of the small Imperial battery and the Swedish battery was pinpointed 
according to the length of the battle lines. While there is historical and archaeological 
evidence for the approximate position of the Imperial battery, it is only suggested that the 
three Swedish pieces were initially deployed between the two central brigades, which 
would have enabled them to provide covering fire for the forming and advancing Swedish 
army against both Imperial batteries. This position puts the Swedish pieces in an almost 
straight line with the small Imperial battery at a distance of 980m and the two shell 
fragments found further north suggesting an overshot (section 3.3.4). It can not be ruled 
out entirely that those two fragments derived from Imperial guns, which were captured by 
the Swedes and turned, but by a distance of only 190m the Swedes were more likely to 
have fired grape or case shot instead of shells, as they would be difficult to be detonate in 
such a short distance with a dangerously short fuse. 
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One piece of spherical cast iron 420m southeast of the small battery very likely 
derives from the early stage of the battle. It suggests that the Imperial heavy artillery also 
fired shells against the advancing Swedish cavalry. All other shell fragments are located 
between the first and second Imperial lines and were almost certainly fired by the Swedes 
in a later stage, although possibly by captured Imperial guns (section 8.4.3). 
 
The events 
It took the Swedish advance guard at least until 9am to arrive on the battlefield, now 
having the sun in their back.744 The Imperial windmill battery had a good view on the 
Swedish army crossing the Floßgraben some 1,750m away and a clear line of fire after the 
Croats had retreated to their designated places in front of the wings. To avoid clustering at 
the crossing and to be able to form a line between Mühlgraben and Floßgraben, the 
Swedish army had to advance slowly but steadily as new units arrived on the northern side 
of the Floßgraben. 
 
Approximately between 9am and 9.30am,745 as the Swedish lines were slowly 
forming and advancing, the 24- and 12-pounders at the windmills opened fire with round 
shot at a distance of possibly less than 1,500m.746 At that distance it was ineffective, but it 
unnerved the forming Swedish soldiers, who were still waiting for their own heavy artillery 
to come up and return fire. 
 
When they reached Hill 126 between 9.30am and 10am, 1,200m south of the 
Imperial battle line, they came into sight of the small Imperial battery, which now joined 
the firing. Meanwhile, the Swedes had deployed three 24-pounders at a distance of less 
than 1,000m and returned fire, which was even more ineffective than the Imperial fire.747 
Single units came over the Floßgraben, formed under artillery fire, and joined the slowly 
advancing and growing army, giving the impression of an attack. Diodati reported that the 
Swedes seemed trying to attack the Imperial left and then their right wing, and it must have 
looked that way to an observer from the Imperial battle line.748 Fleetwood had also seen 
that 
                                                 
744 According to Pentz (Fiedler 1864, 570) the whole army arrived at 9am on the battlefield, but that seems 
too early. 
745 There is no reliable information about when the firing started. 
746 A maximum firing range for 24- and 12-pounders is estimated at 1,500m to 2,000m, for 6-pounders at 
1,150m to 1,600m (Engerisser 2007, 586). 
747 According to Watts (1633, 133) the Imperial artillery had the advantage of being deployed already and 
caused more damage than the Swedish artillery. 
748 Fiedler 1864, 562. Copied by Spanish Relation (Watts 1633, 160) and Khevenhiller 1726, 191. A 
manoeuvring Swedish army is also reported by Poyntz (1908, 72). However, it is highly unlikely that Gustav 
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“The enimie at first seemed to advance, which soe soone as the Kinge perceaved, he gave 
presently orders to advance; upon which the enimies they retyred again behinde the 
dike,”749 
 
suggesting that the Imperial army was not entirely deployed upon the arrival of the 
Swedish army and that there was a lot of movement on both sides prior to battle. 
 
Although there is no notion in any account, the Imperial artillery fire, regardless of 
how ineffective it was, might have been at least partially responsible for the delay of the 
Swedish deployment and the beginning of the battle as well as it might have had a negative 
influence on morale,750 at least for the less experienced Protestant soldiers. 
 
8.1.4 Beginning of the battle 
 
The time given by eyewitnesses and secondary sources alike for the onset of battle varies 
between 8am and 12am (Table 22). Except for the general observation that time was 
different in every town, not all participants had a clock or watch at hand and sense of time 
is very personal, this discrepancy can be explained with the personal opinion on what event 
marks the beginning of the battle, as it might have been the first shots from the city walls, 
the skirmishing, the initial Imperial artillery fire, the final Swedish deployment, their 
advance, or the first combat at the Imperial battle line.  
 
Two eyewitnesses referred to this interpretive conundrum when they reported that 
 
“about 8 of the clock, first shott his looseninge … and the battaile ioyned aboute tenn of 
the clock (Fleetwood)”751 and that “the first salvo was fired at 11am (Holk).”752 
 
The “first shot” might indicate musket fire from the city walls or the first Imperial artillery 
fire, while the “first salvo” is more likely to mean the first musket volley after the Swedish 
army had already advanced, than it means the first artillery fire; “the battaile ioyned aboute 
tenn of the clock” probably means that the Swedish army had deployed and was ready to 
                                                                                                                                                    
Adolf, after being delayed substantially, wasted any time with feint attacks, as it is sometimes claimed 
(Weigley 2003, 140, Wedgewood 1938, 326, Deuticke 1917, 69). 
749 Fleetwood 1632, 6. 
750 Sennewald 2013, 168. 
751 Fleetwood 1632, 7. 
752 Wittrock 1932, 308. 
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advance. A beginning at 11am753 better explains the sequence of events of Pappenheim’s 
arrival and the death of Gustav Adolf around midday than an earlier commencement 
would. This suggests that the Swedish army was finishing their deployment around 
10.30am and was ready to advance, approximately 1.5 to 2 hours later than they would 
have if they could have moved in a straight line, rather than making a detour south to cross 
over the bridges. 
 
As soon as the Swedish army had deployed, Wallenstein ordered Lützen set on fire 
to avoid the town to be taken by the enemy and posing a threat to his right wing. The 
musketeer garrison, which had fired on the Swedish advance guard from the city walls in 
the morning, were redeployed into the town’s gardens behind a mud wall. Two 
eyewitnesses, Fleetwood and the Swedish HQ,754 and several secondary sources755 reported 
this incident. All agree that the fire in Lützen started just before battle. 
 
Gustav Adolf’s plan of a surprise attack had utterly failed the day before at 
Rippach. Unable to make a quick move in the morning of 16 November, facing unexpected 
problems, he lost the opportunity to overwhelm the Imperial army before the arrival of 
Pappenheim’s corps. The distance from Rippach to Lützen is only 5km, but being forced to 
make a detour to the south, it became an 8km to 9km march through an area controlled by 
Croats, delayed by the narrow but deep Floßgraben, where makeshift bridges had to be 
built. When the Swedish army finally arrived on the battlefield, they had to deploy under 
Imperial artillery fire. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
753 11am is the accepted view for begin of the battle. See Deuticke 1917, 69, Generalstaben 1939, 430, 
Seidler 1954, 44 and Brzezinski 2001, 52. 
754 Fleetwood 1632, 7, Söltl 1842, 346. 
755 Hallenus (Mankell 1860, 662), Relation II from Erfurt (Droysen 1880, 19). The latter was copied by 
Gottfried 1633, 25, which in turn was copied by Wahrhaftige Beschreibung 1633, Glaubwürdiger Bericht 
1633, Monro 1637, part II, 163, Abelinum 1646, 749 and Chemnitz 1648, 465. 
 263 
8.2 Gustav Adolf: First Swedish attack 
 
8.2.1 Stalhandske’s charge 10.30-11.00am 
 
 
 
 
Note: For better orientation, most sections contain two maps below the headline, showing 
the location on the battlefield with the attack vector (arrow) and combat details of the 
discussed events. 
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Historical sources 
When the Swedish army was deployed around 10.30am, Gustav Adolf opened the battle 
with his right wing.756 The first action of the battle is reported by Fleetwood: 
 
“…the enimie had ordered the crabates to fall rounde about upon our rere, which the Kinge 
perceaving gave command to the ffynes [Finns] under the command of Statehomes 
[Stalhandske] to march upon them, which hee did diligentlie. And haveing eighte 
companies, hee charged them with fower companies, putting them to flighte; but, upon his 
retreateing (according to expectation) they charged him soe that they putt him to the worst, 
till being received by his fower companies (sett for the purpose) hee charged them soe sore 
that he soe rowted them that the whole day wee were noe more troubled with them.”757 
 
Although Fleetwood is imprecise about when this incident occurred, combat between Finns 
and Croats is also reported by the Relation from 1633 to have occurred at 11am during the 
battle’s earliest phases.758 This should be expected as the Croats were primarily 
skirmishers and flankers rather than main force troops. 
 
 
Figure 77: Left: Överste Torsten Stalhandske. Right: General Ludwig Johann Hector Graf 
von Isolani. 
 
 
                                                 
756 It was not Bernhard’s left wing, which opened the battle, as Richelieu (1823, 258) suggested. 
757 Fleetwood 1632, 7. 
758 Droysen 1880, 30. This combat is also reported by Burgus (1641, 322) and Khevenhiller (1726, 191). 
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Figure 78: Detailed musket bullet distribution map, Imperial left wing skirmish area (dark 
blue 99% musket, blue 75% musket, white 25% musket). 
 
Archaeological sources 
Fields IIa and III contain low density distribution patterns with a pistol/carbine and musket 
bullet mix suggesting cavalry-infantry skirmishes, which might have resulted from 
Stalhandske’s charge.759 The lowest density bullet concentrations, Inf2 and Cav2, on the 
battlefield with only one pistol bullet with moderate impact damage derive very likely 
from a cavalry pursuit with minimal or no hand-to-hand combat. Slightly more dense are 
bullet concentrations Inf1 and Cav1. A similar density occurs with Inf3, Cav3 and Cav5, 
which certainly derive from only one combat episode, but these concentrations have an 
oddly elongated form, which could be the result of an east to west moving combat and 
pursuit. All three concentrations very likely represent Stalhandske’s charge against the 
retreating Croat screen. The relatively high number of musket bullets can not entirely be 
explained by the two musketeer companies in Stalhandske’s task force, but in this case 
                                                 
759 See Schürger 2011 for details. 
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most of the uncertain musket bullets might actually be bullets from larger calibre carbines. 
That would also explain why there is only one certain carbine bullet, although the Croats 
are expected to be equipped with them. Even if most of the uncertain bullets derive from 
carbines, their number is too low if we assume that carbines were the standard weapons for 
Croats. It is more likely that the Croats were still in the process of being equipped with 
carbines in 1632, when their main arms were pistols and thrusting weapons. Strangely, 
bullet concentrations Inf4 and Cav4 are located south of the Via Regia in an area where no 
combat is reported. They contain a greater portion of pistol bullets than other field III 
concentrations. The different bullet composition, suggesting different kind of units, and the 
exposed position make it more likely that they derive from a later event. 
 
 
Figure 79: Detailed pistol/carbine bullet distribution map, Imperial left wing skirmish area 
(red: pistol, beige: pistol or carbine, green: carbine, white: 75% carbine). 
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Figure 80: Detailed impacted pistol/carbine bullet distribution map, Imperial left wing 
skirmish area (impact damage: dark brown 70-90%, orange 40-60%). 
 
The events 
Rather than letting his whole battle line lose cohesion due to the Croat skirmisher screen, 
Gustav Adolf sent Överste Torsten Stalhandske with two Finish squadrons and one or two 
musketeer companies to drive them away. Even against 500 horse, 150 foot and four 
regimental guns, the approximately 500 Croats did not give up without a fight and made a 
stand with one regiment positioned 100m north of the road, the other near the Leipzig 
Bridge, where one Croat regiment possibly was cornered and forced to retreat over the 
bridge.760 Commanded by the experienced General Isolani, it seems unlikely that all three 
Croat regiments left the battlefield completely, as Fleetwood claimed, which certainly 
                                                 
760 Croats have not disrupted their own line on the left wing, which Burgus (1641, 322) and Khevenhiller 
(1726, 192) have confused with an event on the right (section 8.2.4). 
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would have been an issue in the court martial at Prague. The more likely scenario is that 
Stalhandske chased them a good distance, but eventually returned to the battle, while the 
Croats were rallied somewhere safe and probably returned to the fight with Pappenheim’s 
corps.761 
 
 
Figure 81: 10.30am to 11am: Stalhandske’s attack on the Imperial light cavalry screen. 
                                                 
761 It is a myth that Gustav Adolf had ordered Stalhandske to charge the cuirassiers, as Watts (1633, 134) 
claimed. The Finns were more a light cavalry than the other Swedish cavalry. As such they were deployed on 
the outer wing because of their higher mobility. If Gustav Adolf wanted them to attack the cuirassiers, for 
which they were not suited, he would have deployed them on the inner wing. 
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After Stalhandske cleared the way, “Gustav Adolf did not loose any time”762 and 
advanced at the head of his remaining five right wing cavalry squadrons Smaland, Ostgöta, 
Uppland, Södermanland and Västgöta and two infantry brigades, the Yellow and Swedish, 
from the centre, probably in echelon as flank protection. 
 
8.2.2 Swedish right wing advance 10.45-11.15am 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
762 Dalbier 1632, 251. 
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Historical sources 
The traditional view, based on secondary sources, is that the Swedish right wing advanced 
basically in a straight line to the front and, while the Swedish Brigade attacked the small 
Imperial battery first and then the Imperial infantry, the Swedish cavalry engaged the 
Imperial cavalry.763 
 
This interpretation is contradicted by Ottavio Piccolomini’s account: 
 
“…comincio una furiosa salua di moschettate da due Regim:i d’Infanteria et maniche de 
moschettieri che ogni squadrone de cavalleria conduceva et uno di quelli uenne à occupare 
un fosso è strada che era auanti li nostri squadroni et cominciando à passare quel fosso è 
strada si auicinauano à Noi. Io uedendo questo et hauendo tenuto il mio Regim:to un 
quarto d’hora alle descritione di tutte le moschettate di due squadroni, doue mi 
ammazzorno infinite soldate et officiali, li andai ad inuestiri et ribbutai uno di essi di la dal 
fosso è strada,…” 764 
 
He described that the battle began with a furious Swedish musket volley from two 
“Regimenti d’Infanteria” and the interlined musketeer companies (“maniche de 
moschettieri”, i.e. rabble of musketeers), after which “one of those” – the demonstrative 
pronoun “quelli” relates to “Regimenti” – “crossed the road (i.e. Via Regia) in front of our 
squadron and approached us [Piccolomini’s Regiment].” Piccolomini’s Regiment then 
came under musket fire from two “squadroni” for a quarter of an hour. The musketry killed 
many of his soldiers and officers, so he decided to charge one of the opposing squadrons. 
 
Ottavio Piccolomini used three different terms to describe types of units; he 
explained adequately that the “maniche de moschettieri” are the musketeer companies 
interlined between the cavalry. The “due Regimenti d’Infanteria” in this context means 
‘two infantry brigades’, which are the Yellow and Swedish Brigades, which he could see 
from his position. One of those units, which could have been only the Swedish Brigade on 
the right centre, occupied a ditch and a road, which is certainly the Via Regia, and by 
crossing it the brigade advanced towards Piccolomini’s Regiment. 
 
The following musket fire from two “squadroni” in this context can only describe 
the squadrons of the Swedish Brigade and not the interlined musketeer companies, as 
                                                 
763 Generalstaben 1939, 439, Seidler 1954, 47, Brzezinski 2001, 55. Relation II from Erfurt (Droysen 1880, 
19), Burgus 1641, 321, Chemnitz 1648, 465, Khevenhiller 1726, 191 and Gottfried 1633, 25, copied by 
Wahrhaftige Beschreibung 1633, Glaubwürdiger Bericht 1633, Monro 1637, part II, 164 and Abelinum 
1646, 749. 
764 Argang 1894, 89. 
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Brzezinski suggested, for several reasons.765 The musketeer companies are referred to as 
“maniche de moschettieri” and there is no reason to believe that Ottavio Piccolomini 
switched terms. When he described the charge against one of the two “squadroni”, he did 
not mention any Swedish cavalry being involved and it seems highly unlikely that two 
Swedish interlined companies of 150 musketeers alone would have been able to pin down 
Piccolomini’s 500 heavily armoured harquebusiers for 15 minutes on open ground and 
inflict heavy casualties. It is also highly unlikely that Piccolomini would advance 400m 
south to the Via Regia at the start of the battle, as that would have opened a huge gap in the 
Imperial battle line, and put his regiment in the line of fire of Swedish musketeers in the 
road ditches, an act which would contradict also his previous statement that the unit in 
question had already crossed the road.766 Following the example of Diodati’s Imperial 
infantry “squadroni”, who looked very similar to Swedish infantry squadrons, the two 
“squadroni” in Piccolomini’s account are very likely two Swedish Brigade squadrons, 
which did not attack the Imperial artillery and infantry but engaged the Imperial cavalry 
instead. 
 
This incident is reported slightly differently by Silvio Piccolomini: 
 
“And it is certain that we can thank God and Holy Madonna for not all being dead, because 
basically we were standing a quarter hour at a distance of twenty paces from an infantry 
squadron, having the colour of this ditch, escaping miraculously and because of the 
cuirasses of proof, saving the lives of all those, who were spared.”767 
 
In contradiction to his uncle, Silvio mentioned only one squadron, which is very likely one 
from the Swedish Brigade, but it is uncertain, what he mends by saying that it had the 
colour of the ditch. No unit with brown colours or uniforms is known to have participated 
in the battle. 
 
Excursus: ‘Winckel’s Old Blue’ and ‘Eric Hand’s New Blue Regiments’ in historical 
sources 
There is one misconception in the historical sources concerning the New Swedish and the 
Old Blue Brigades, which is deeply embedded in modern research and needs to be 
                                                 
765 Brzezinski 2001, 59. 
766 Suggested by Brzezinski 2001, 59. Silvio Piccolomini’s statement (Archivio 1871, 240) that “the General 
[Wallenstein] decided to accept battle and we advanced a little to a small ditch, and there we waited” refer to 
the entire Imperial army, specifically to the infantry, and not to Piccolomini’s Regiment. 
767 Archivio 1871, 242. 
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clarified. Diodati reported that the yellow casacks768 (“casacche gialle”) were attacked by 
infantry and the blue casacks (“casacche turchine”) were attacked by the Regiments 
Piccolomini and Götz.769 He is the only Imperial eyewitness who was not speculating 
about enemy units, but reported what he saw of the uniform colours. The yellow casacks 
are clearly the Yellow Brigade, while the meaning of ‘blue casacks’ is unclear, but was 
imprecisely translated by Fiedler as ‘Blue Regiment’. The Old Blue Regiment, which 
formed the Blue Brigade, as well as Eric Hand’s New Blue Regiment, which was operating 
as part of the Swedish Brigade, had blue uniforms and colours.770 
 
Münchhausen, who fought in Comargo’s Regiment near Götz and Piccolomini 
noted in his 19 November letter that his unit destroyed “three regiments, which remained 
in one”, which is the description of a Swedish three squadron brigade, and they took fifteen 
colours,771 while he specified in his 6 December letter that his unit destroyed the Yellow 
and Old Blue Regiments, taking fourteen colours from them.772 The change between those 
two letters, only seventeen days apart, is evident; in the first letter he stated to have fought 
against one brigade, while in the second he had fought against two brigades, which are 
now described as Yellow and Old Blue Brigades. However, Münchhausen could not have 
seen the Old Blue Regiment, because it advanced together with the Swedish left wing 
against the windmills (section 8.2.4), and it seems very likely that Münchhausen had 
confused the Old Blue with the New Blue, also called Swedish, Brigade, which can also be 
seen in Gallas’ account.773 
 
That the ‘Blue Regiment’ in Imperial eyewitness accounts was, in fact, Eric Hand’s 
New Blue Regiment of the Swedish Brigade becomes clear in Ottavio Piccolomini’s 
account. He described that, after he had chased one infantry squadron to the Via Regia, the 
“Blue Regiment, the king’s most appreciated (Regimento torchino [sic: turchino] il più 
stimato dal Re)” advanced against Götz’s Regiment, which was to his right. This event 
happened at the beginning of the battle when Piccolomini’s and Götz’s Regiments could 
not possibly have met the Old Blue Regiment. Further more “the king’s most appreciated 
regiment” is more likely a description of the only national Swedish infantry which took 
part in the battle, than it is of a German unit. Excepting the Declaration from 1633, most 
                                                 
768 A ‘casack’ is a shawl-like coat for musketeers to protect the gunpowder and musket from rain 
(Brzezinski/Hook 2006, 34). 
769 Fiedler 1864, 563. 
770 Brzezinski/Hook 2006, 46. 
771 Wittrock 1932, 305. 
772 Münchhausen 1632. 
773 Förster 1844, 95. 
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secondary sources, based on the Inventarium Sueciae, seems to have repeated this mistake 
by reporting that the Swedish, Yellow and Old Blue Brigades advanced together with the 
Swedish right wing. 774 This scenario is contradicted by the results from the archaeological 
survey (section 8.3.5). Although the eyewitness accounts are unclear about the Swedish 
right centre, not one explicitly reported that the Swedish Brigade attacked the Imperial 
battery and left centre. 
 
 
Figure 82: Detailed musket bullet distribution map, Imperial left wing and left centre (dark 
blue 99% musket, blue 75% musket, white 25% musket, red: rifle). 
                                                 
774 The Declaration from 1633 (Droysen 1880, 40) reported the ‘Blue Regiment’ on the Swedish right centre, 
aware that it was the Swedish Brigade. It was Gottfried (1633, 26), who seems to have confused the two Blue 
Brigades first, reporting both incorrectly to have advanced against the Imperial left centre, which was copied 
by Wahrhaftige Beschreibung 1633, Glaubwürdiger Bericht 1633, Monro 1637, part II, 164, Abelinum 1646, 
750, Chemnitz 1648, 465, and from there entered modern publications. See also Generalstaben 1939, 436. 
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Archaeological sources 
Ottavio and Silvio Piccolomini’s reports of fighting between their regiment and a Swedish 
infantry brigade are confirmed by the elongated concentration Inf5 of musket bullets, 
running north-south, which contains the second highest concentration of bullets with 
impact damage in its southern area. 
 
 
Figure 83: Detailed impacted musket bullet distribution map, Imperial left wing and left 
centre (impact damage: dark brown 70-90%, orange 40-60%, yellow 10-30%). 
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In comparison with the low density concentrations Inf1 to Inf4 deriving from 
skirmishing, Inf5 represents major combat involving large infantry formations rather than 
single musketeer companies. Therefore, the northern part of concentration Inf5 very likely 
derives from the advancing Swedish Brigade, while the even denser concentration in the 
southern part probably represents two different infantry fighting episodes involving the 
Yellow Brigade in the late morning and a second attack on the Imperial battery in the 
afternoon. The location of the Swedish Brigade on the battlefield is of major importance, 
because the Swedish cavalry was to its right and the length of this wing shows the extent of 
Gustav Adolf’s outflanking manoeuvre. 
 
One shell fragment found on field II suggests that the small Imperial battery 
initially did not fire straight on at the Swedish infantry, but on the cavalry, probably 
because they advanced first, while the Swedish infantry followed them in echelon 
formation. 
 
Six of eight small calibre rifle bullets were found on the Imperial left wing, 
suggesting that Swedish rifles were used in particular on this wing. They derive possibly 
from Gustav Adolf’s djurskyttar. 
 
The events 
While the Finns were very likely still chasing the Croats, five Swedish cavalry 
squadrons775 crossed the Via Regia without any difficulties,776 wheeled around in a wide 
outflanking manoeuvre until they had Ranstädt in their rear.777 They were followed by the 
Swedish Brigade as direct left flank protection. The Yellow Brigade had a more difficult 
approach as they attacked the small Imperial battery frontally, and were probably being 
fired on by a musketeer detachment of Comargo’s Regiment from the road ditches.778 A 
total force of 1,350 horse and 3,150 foot advanced “in the most beautiful order.”779 The 
rightmost Regiment Västgöta had to cover 1,700m. For cavalry only, this manoeuvre could 
                                                 
775 According to Fleetwood (1632, 7) Gustav Adolf attacked with four regiments. Although he reported four 
instead of five regiments, his statement seems to prove that the Finns were somewhere else at that time. 
776 Fabricius (Wittrock 1932, 306), Fleetwood 1632, 7. However, the latter stated incorrectly that the King 
was shot at the road as there was no major combat there. 
777 Vitzthum/Berlepsch (Glafey 1749, 13). 
778 Münchhausen (1632 and Wittrock 1932, 306) of Comargo’s Regiment reported that they had fought 
against the Yellow and Old Blue (sic: New Blue) Regiments. 
779 Silvio Piccolomini (Archivio 1871, 240). 
 276 
have been achieved in a short time, but the musketeer companies towing regimental guns 
made a slower advance of approximately 28 minutes.780 
 
 
Figure 84: 10.45am to 11.15am: Advancing Swedish right wing. 
 
It is possible that this shift to the right was not deliberate, but the result of the 
rightmost Swedish cavalry following the line of least resistance and simply moving too far; 
the rest had to follow to maintain the line. However, it seems more likely that it was 
Gustav Adolf’s plan to pin the dangerous Imperial armoured cavalry with his infantry, 
while the Swedish cavalry engaged the weaker harquebusiers. 
 
Although there is no direct evidence, it is likely that Holk, with only 1,450 horse 
and 1,150 foot, outnumbered and threatened to be out flanked, reacted by extending his 
line with reinforcements, probably consisting of the two wing reserve squadrons Goschütz 
                                                 
780 There is no historical evidence on the speed of formations in 17th century. However, it is assumed that 17th 
century infantry with regimental guns could not move faster than late 18th century infantry in common step, 
which is 60m per minute (Babits 1998, 114). 
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and Westrumb, the latter sent by Wallenstein to assist Holk on the left, “because there all 
the fury began.”781 Holk, now having 1,800 horse, gained cavalry superiority, but was still 
severely outnumbered by infantry. The Swedish outflanking manoeuvre must have looked 
so impressive that the Imperial baggage train was relocated to the right Imperial wing to 
avoid capture.782 The right wing reserve Westrumb moving to the left at the 
commencement of the battle is an important indicator for Holk’s situation, which would 
not have been so desperate if he were facing only the Swedish cavalry and musketeer 
companies, without the Swedish Brigade pinning down his crack units Götz and 
Piccolomini. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
781 Holk (Wittrock 1932, 308) reported that he was reinforced by five cornets from the right wing at the 
battle’s beginning, which is mostly overlooked by historians. This cavalry was certainly not pulled out of the 
frontline, which still awaited a Swedish attack, but Wallenstein’s right wing reserve squadron Westrumb. 
Although there is no historical evidence it seems likely that Holk brought in his own reserve too. The 
commencement of the battle on the left Imperial wing, at the instance when the Swedish right wing had 
wheeled around is reported by Holk (Wittrock 1932, 308) and Vitzthum/Berlepsch (Glafey 1749, 13). 
782 Diodati (Fiedler 1864, 562), copied by the Spanish Relation (Watts 1633, 160). 
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8.2.3 Swedish right wing attack 11.00-12.00am 
 
 
 
 
 
Historical sources 
There is not much historical evidence for the early stage of the Swedish right wing attack. 
According to Ottavio and Silvio Piccolomini, the Swedish Brigade pinned down their 
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regiment, and very likely that of Götz, by musket fire for 15 minutes.783 Münchhausen’s 
account started at a later time, when his regiment (Comargo) made a counterattack, 
together with Baden’s Regiment of the second line, after his Oberst was mortally wounded 
and his Oberstleutnant killed.784 Although he avoided mentioning a retreat, it is pretty clear 
that his regiment was forced to withdraw after taking heavy casualties. Fleetwood stated 
that the small Imperial battery, deployed in front of Comargo’s Regiment, was soon taken 
and its guns spiked.785 However, there is no historical evidence of the achievements of the 
Swedish cavalry or the Imperial harquebusiers. 
 
 
Figure 85: Detailed pistol/carbine bullet distribution map, Imperial left wing and left centre 
rear. 
 
Archaeological sources 
The low density pistol and carbine bullet distribution patterns on field IV and the northern 
part of field VII (Cav10, Cav11), as well as the small concentration of musket bullets Inf6 
with medium impact damage suggest that there was some cavalry action including 
detached musketeers 300m behind the Imperial left wing’s initial deployment. Most of the 
cavalry combat took place further north in an area not yet surveyed. The musket bullet 
concentrations Inf7, Inf8 and Inf9, in combination with some medium and a few heavily 
impacted bullets, clearly show a Swedish brigade breaking through the Imperial left centre 
and advancing 300m towards the second infantry line, slightly shifting to the left. 
                                                 
783 Argang 1894, 89, Archivio 1871, 242. 
784 Wittrock 1932, 305. 
785 Fleetwood 1632, 7. 
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Figure 86: Detailed musket bullet distribution map, Imperial left wing and left centre rear. 
 
Two distribution patterns showing infantry and cavalry combat so far behind the 
Imperial left wing and left centre came as a surprise, as most historians believed that 
Gustav Adolf’s right wing was not able to achieve a substantial break through.786 It is not 
entirely certain if this Swedish success was achieved during the first or second attack. At 
the present time it seems more likely that both the cavalry and infantry combat in the 
Imperial rear occurred during the battle’s first stage. First, the Swedish right wing cavalry 
was not in condition to perform decisive action after Pappenheim’s counterattack. The 
Swedish infantry breakthrough concurs with Münchhausen’s report of an Imperial 
                                                 
786 Brzezinski 2001, 62 and 67, Seidler 1954, 56 and 77, Deuticke 1917, 75. Generalstaben (1939, 433) 
suggested a more successful Swedish infantry attack, but not to this extend. 
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counterattack by two infantry squadrons, for which there would have been enough space, 
only if the Yellow Brigade had not remained at the Via Regia, but advanced towards the 
Imperial second line. 
 
 
Figure 87: Detailed impacted musket bullet distribution map, Imperial left wing and left 
centre rear. 
 
The events 
Harassed by Imperial skirmishing fire from the road ditches, the Yellow Brigade, 
commanded by Generalmajor Nils Brahe, crossed the Via Regia and advanced against the 
Imperial small battery with its four 24-pounders and two 12-pounders. Seeing Gustav 
Adolf’s guard in their yellow (Life Regiment) and grey (Lifeguard) uniforms approaching 
without being much affected by their artillery fire,787 some Imperial gun crews did not 
offer much resistance and left their guns. Ordnance officers Hauptmann Johann Burg and 
Hauptmann Maximilian Kleeblatt were executed a few months later at Prague for 
desertion.788 After Brahe had taken and spiked the guns,789 possibly with help from the left 
squadron of the Swedish Brigade, he turned to the Imperial left centre, where Oberst 
Theodor Comargo commanded one of Wallenstein’s most experienced infantry regiments; 
some of these soldiers had served for thirteen years. After a bitter fight in which Oberst 
                                                 
787 According to the Spanish Relation (Watts 1633, 161) “…our (Imperial) Artillery being never able to 
disorder it (Swedish infantry) though many a shot was made upon it.” 
788 Seidler 1954, 56 and Seidler 1962, 17. 
789 The early capture of the small Imperial battery is mentioned by Fleetwood (1632, 7), Hallenus (Mankell 
1860, 662) and Hülshorst (Wittrock 1932, 303), but not by which unit. 
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Comargo was mortally wounded with four shots and the Oberstleutnant killed,790 
Obristwachtmeister Münchhausen took command791 and ordered a retreat behind the 
second line to reform, probably covered by Bredau’s Cuirassiers. 
 
Meanwhile, Överstelöjtnant Gabriel Kyle’s Swedish Brigade, possibly assisted by 
Överste Stenbock’s Smaland cavalry, arrived in front of Götz’s and Piccolomini’s 
Regiments and began delivering musket fire, which was probably returned by 
Piccolomini’s harquebusiers with their carbines and by one or two Imperial musketeer 
companies. Only their armour prevented them from being annihilated,792 but they held the 
line.793 With the heavily armoured Imperial cavalry held off by the Swedish Brigade, 
Gustav Adolf’s national Swedish cavalry turned with 950 men on the 900 Imperial 
harquebusiers of the outer wing. Watts described that the Swedish wing delivered a 
preparatory fire, first by regimental guns, then by musketeers, and followed it up by a 
cavalry charge, which was a Swedish standard cavalry tactic.794 The Imperial 
harquebusiers were neither equipped nor trained to resist a cavalry charge of this 
magnitude and many fired their carbines and pistols in the air and retreated (see section 
3.3.2.2).795 Although the Imperial left wing was not entirely beaten, the situation, which 
Diodati played down as a stalemate,796 must have become increasingly desperate, in 
particular if Stalhandske’s Finns returned to the battlefield. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
790 Wittrock 1932, 305. 
791 Münchhausen was still in command of Comargo’s Regiment in December 1632 (Hallwich 1912a, 617). 
792 Silvio Piccolomini (Archivio 1871, 242). 
793 Diodati (Fiedler 1864, 563). 
794 Watts 1633, 134. 
795 Poyntz 1908, 74. 
796 Diodati contradicts himself by reporting that “everyone tried to advance to force the enemy from his 
position” on the Imperial left wing, while stating at the same time that the baggage train was in danger of 
being cut of and that Pappenheim on his arrival immediately moved to the left wing, where it seemed that the 
King charged most stubborn (Fiedler 1864, 562). 
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8.2.4 Swedish left wing advance 11.00-12.00am 
 
 
 
 
 
Historical sources 
Reports about events on the Imperial right wing are sparse and short, even in the otherwise 
more informative secondary sources, and no eyewitnesses reported cavalry fighting. 
However, there is one indirect eyewitness account in the form of the death sentence against 
Oberst Johann Nicolaus Hagen von Sauwenbein at the court martial in Prague. It states that 
his harquebusier regiment was disordered by routed Croats and as a result he retreated to a 
safe position, disobeying several orders to return.797 
 
Fleetwood’s report is crucial to understanding the battle in that 
 
                                                 
797 Seidler 1954, 141-142. 
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“Hertzoke Bernerds and Winckles regimentes were comaunded upon the cannons at the 
mills,”798 
 
which he possibly could have seen himself. Fleetwood’s account contradicts the 
Inventarium Sueciae and all secondary sources depending on it,799 reporting incorrectly 
that the Old Blue Brigade advanced along with the Swedish right wing. 
 
There is almost no report of what happened to the Imperial musketeers in the 
Lützen gardens except Watts’ short note that they were finally taken by Swedish troops 
before dusk.800 It seems most unlikely that Bernhard von Weimar left them unchallenged 
and able to deliver flanking fire at his cavalry, which had to advance in close proximity to 
the mud walls. 
 
 
Figure 88: Detailed musket bullet distribution map, Imperial inner right wing and right 
centre. 
 
Archaeological sources 
Unfortunately, most of the archaeological potential on the Swedish left wing is destroyed 
by house development and, in addition, a part of the Imperial centre is at least disturbed by 
gardens. However, there are distribution patterns near the windmills concerning the 
                                                 
798 Fleetwood 1632, 7. 
799 Gottfried 1633, 25, copied by Monro 1637, part II, 164, Abelinum 1646, 750, Chemnitz 1648, 465, 
Wahrhaftige Beschreibung 1633 and Glaubwürdiger Bericht 1633. 
800 Watts 1633, 149. 
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fighting on the Imperial right centre. The densest distribution patterns of musket, pistol and 
carbine bullets with the highest number of impacted bullets on the battlefield are in the 
southern area of field VII. Interpreting those patterns is complicated, because they derive 
from at least two, but probably more, different combat episodes. 
 
In comparison to concentration Inf5, which we know derives from two combat 
episodes, the musket bullet concentration Inf15 is denser and seemingly derives from three 
different engagements, although it is possible that one, or two, lasted a longer time, thus 
producing more bullets. If we consider concentration Inf17 as part of Inf15, it has a length 
of 500m, which is sufficient space for up to three infantry formations, either Imperial 
squadrons or Swedish brigades, to manoeuvre, and it is likely that the Swedes advanced 
with at least two brigades during any attacks on the Imperial right centre. 
 
The archaeological findings not only support Fleetwood’s statement about the Old 
Blue Brigade advancing together with the left wing, but would also suggest that this 
brigade actually engaged the enemy, a key point crucial to understanding the historical 
sources. The concentration demonstrates that the Inventarium Sueciae is incorrect in its 
assumption that the Old Blue Brigade advanced with the right wing, in part because there 
is no extension of concentrations on the Swedish right centre that would support the 
concept that the Old Blue Brigade went forward with the right wing. Under the 
circumstances it would have been also hazardous to redeploy the brigade from the left to 
the right wing to replace the Swedish Brigade once it was engaged in combat, as 
Brzezinski suggested, to explain the contradiction in the historical sources.801 A retreating 
Swedish Brigade would have been replaced by a second line brigade, if necessary. In any 
case, it is additional evidence that Diodati and Münchhausen had seen the New Blue or 
Swedish Brigade on the Swedish right wing and not the Old Blue Brigade. 
 
The events 
Generalleutnant Bernhard von Weimar faced a difficult situation. Seventeen pieces of 
heavy artillery and musketeers in the road ditches to his front and behind a mud wall on his 
flank made any advance difficult. In addition, there was only a small 150m gap guarded by 
Croats between the fortified artillery position and the Lützen gardens, through which he 
could advance with his cavalry. While Gustav Adolf conducted his outflanking manoeuvre, 
                                                 
801 Brzezinski 2001, 67. His suggestion is based entirely on the Declaration from 1633 (Droysen 1880, 40), 
which noted that “they (Swedes) got the enemy’s seven pieces, which rather weakened the Blue Regiment, 
and had to be replaced by others.” The “Blue Regiment” in this text is certainly the Swedish Brigade, while 
“others” is not specified. 
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Bernhard von Weimar waited until the Swedish right wing was engaged in combat, 
probably hoping that Wallenstein would commit some of his reserves to the Imperial left. 
 
In order to avoid clustering cavalry immediately in front of the Imperial artillery at 
point-blank range, it seems likely that Bernhard von Weimar left most of his cavalry 
behind to advance when the Green and Old Blue Brigades reached the Via Regia and 
began attacking the windmill battery. Probably, as did Gustav Adolf on the right, he sent 
some cavalry to clear the way. The Croats were easily defeated, but with the limited space 
and the Swedish cavalry at their heels, the Croats did not retreat around the wing as 
Wallenstein had planned, but crashed into one of their own regiments, Hagen’s 
harquebusiers, which they put to flight. With his largest regiment gone, opening a huge 
hole in the battle line, and his reserve of Westrumb’s harquebusiers committed to the left, 
Wallenstein was in an awkward position. Probably at the same time, Bernhard von Weimar 
ordered Oberst Gersdorf to attack the gardens with his five musketeer companies and ten 
regimental guns. 
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8.2.5 Swedish second line 11.00-12.00am 
 
 
 
 
 
With 9,000 men, almost half the Swedish army, the second line was unusually strong. 
However, the significance of such a large second line is not reflected in the historical 
sources, which ignore its existence almost completely. Without sufficient reports of when 
and where the second line troops were committed, it is almost impossible to understand the 
battle. It is, therefore, crucial to develop at least a hypothesis of how the second line might 
have been used, based on reports from Watts and Dalbier and on the development of the 
battle during the early stage. 
 
Watts claimed that Oberst Bulach was sent with three second line right wing 
cavalry squadrons over the Floßgraben further to the right to “imp out the feathers” 
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immediately after the battle began.802 Watts’ account of the battle has already been shown 
as unreliable in general and, because there is no other report confirming this incident, there 
remains at least some doubt that it occurred. After the Finns routed the Croats, there was 
no immediate threat to the Swedish far right flank and no reason to move units so far away 
from the central battlefield. In addition, it would have been much easier to have deployed 
those three units there in the first place, instead of letting them cross the Floßgraben three 
times. It would appear that Watts simply made up the story, because he assumed, 
incorrectly, that the Imperial battle line was much longer than the Swedish.803 In order to 
secure the outer right wing to avoid being outflanked, Gustav Adolf could have easily 
moved these three cavalry squadrons at the end of the right wing’s wheeling manoeuvre. 
The Swedish HQ reported the Croats as threatening the Swedish baggage train near 
Meuchen in a later stage of the battle804 and it seems reasonable to suggest that Swedish 
second line cavalry intercepted them by moving over the Floßgraben around midday. 
 
Oberst Dalbier reported that Generalmajor Knyphausen, his commanding officer, 
still had two brigades, his own and Duke Wilhelm’s, as well as the cavalry reserve Öhm at 
his disposal, when the Swedish first line collapsed around midday.805 The other two second 
line brigades, Mitzlaff and Thurn, must have been committed some time before midday, 
which means that they had advanced during the first Swedish attack together with, or in 
very close support of, the first line. The newly discovered first hand account from Dalbier 
contradicts Watts, who described the same event as the Brigades Mitzlaff and Thurn being 
released from reserve at a later time, when the Swedish first line was already in full 
retreat,806 a sequence of events most historians agreed on.807 It even seems possible that 
Watts had access to Dalbier’s account, but did not fully understand it. 
 
The reason for the early commitment of two second line infantry brigades becomes 
clear when the situation of the Swedish army around 11.30am is evaluated. In the delayed 
double outflanking manoeuvre, Gustav Adolf’s right wing was already engaged in close 
combat when Bernhard von Weimar’s left wing began its advance, creating a gap of 
approximately 400m in the Swedish centre. At this stage, the battle was certainly going 
                                                 
802 Watts 1633, 132. 
803 Watts 1633, 132. 
804 Söltl 1842, 347. 
805 Dalbier (1632, 252) reported this event after he made a note on the second Swedish attack in the 
afternoon. However, Dalbier made clear that those three units were responsible for rallying fleeing soldiers, 
an event, which took place after the collapse of the first line around midday. 
806 Watts 1633, 145-146. 
807 Brzezinski 2001, 71 and 75, Seidler 1954, 77, Deuticke 1917, 80-81, Generalstaben 1939, 442. 
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according to Gustav Adolf’s plan and he must have envisioned a separation of his centre, 
which would have endangered his entire operation, if this gap were not filled by other 
units. The Brigades Mitzlaff and Thurn did not have to actually attack; their mere presence 
in close proximity would hold the Imperial centre infantry squadrons Breuner/Grana and 
GFZM Breuner in place. 
 
The entire Swedish troop movement suggests that its main purpose was to play on 
their advantage of greater numbers, deploying their troops on a spatially limited battlefield, 
outflanking and outnumbering the Imperial army on its wings, and destroying it with one 
decisive blow before Pappenheim’s corps could arrive and even the odds. This scenario 
would have been an appropriate strategy in this situation, in particular because Gustav 
Adolf could not anticipate when Pappenheim’s infantry would arrive, so there was an 
emphasis on speeding up the Swedish attacks once the battle was joined. 
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Figure 89: 11.00am to 12.00am: Swedish army in preparation for a double outflanking or 
enveloping manoeuvre. 
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8.3 Pappenheim’s and Piccolomini’s counterattacks 
 
8.3.1 Imperial left wing: Pappenheim’s arrival 11.30-12.30am 
 
 
 
 
 
Historical sources 
With eight regiments, a total of 2,400 horse, Pappenheim’s cavalry was an impressive 
force and its arrival marked the turning point of the battle. The exact arrival time is not 
entirely certain and varies not as much between primary and secondary sources as it does 
between Protestant and Imperial sources. 
 
The Protestant sources give a wide time range for Pappenheim’s arrival, from 
before the battle to 3pm and some sources seem to have confused counterattacks by 
Imperial reserves with the arrival of Pappenheim’s infantry.808 Imperial sources provide a 
much narrower period in which Pappenheim’s cavalry might have arrived, shortly after the 
battle commenced according to most eyewitnesses (Table 23). Of the Imperial 
eyewitnesses, only Wallenstein stated that Pappenheim arrived before battle, trying to hide 
the fact that he was not able to assemble his entire army in time. For the same reason, 
Diodati described the circumstances of Pappenheim’s arrival so vaguely, apparently on 
purpose, that some historians were under the false impression he meant the Feldmarschall 
had actually arrived before battle.809 Surprisingly, the early Imperial non-eyewitness 
                                                 
808 Fleetwood 1632, 8. 
809 Diemar 1890, 4. See Seidler (1954, 15 and 49-50) for the interpretation of Diodati’s statement. 
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accounts of Gallas and the Relation from 1632 agree on an early arrival as reported by 
Imperial eyewitnesses. 
 
 
Figure 90: Left: Feldmarschall Gottfried Heinrich Graf von Pappenheim. Right: Oberst 
Ottavio Piccolomini di Aragona. 
 
Most historians follow Holk’s account, as he is the only eyewitness giving an exact 
time of 12am. 810 However, we should not take Holk’s exact time too literally, which 
should be understood more as a rough timeframe, meaning that Pappenheim arrived not 
long after the battle had begun. It is likely that Pappenheim met and rallied at least parts of 
Isolani’s left wing Croats, increasing his force to over 2,800 cavalry. After Isolani’s Croats 
had joined Pappenheim, half his cavalry consisted of light cavalry and it seems to be a 
consensus among historians that Pappenheim divided his force into two columns. All 
cuirassiers, harquebusiers and dragoons, the heavy and medium cavalry, attacked the 
Swedish right wing directly under his own command, while he sent the Croats and Polish 
Cossacks, the light cavalry, east of the Floßgraben toward the Swedish rear.811 Although 
this is a reasonable tactical assessment, and might actually have happened, there is no 
historical source supporting this suggestion directly. 
 
 
                                                 
810 Droysen 1865, 122, Deuticke 1917, 71, Generalstaben 1939, 435, Seidler 1954, 49-50, Brzezinski 2001, 
58. 
811 Deuticke 1917, 72, Seidler 1954, 57, Generalstaben 1939, 435, Roberts 1958, 768, Brzezinski 2001, 59 
and 73. 
 293 
Imperial eyewitness accounts Arrival of Pappenheim’s cavalry (page) 
Wallenstein 
-Lorenz 1987 
Shortly before the battle had begun (256) 
Holk 
-Wittrock 1932 
12am, shortly after the battle had begun (309) 
Münchhausen 
-Wittrock 1932 
Midday (305) 
Diodati 
-Fiedler 1864 
=Spanish Relation 
-Watts 1633 
Shortly after the battle had begun (562) 
 
(160) 
Silvio Piccolomini 
-Archivio 1871 
Shortly before the battle had begun (240) 
Poyntz 
-1908 
Shortly after Piccolomini’s counterattack (72) 
Protestant eyewitness accounts  
Dalbier 
-1632 
Before battle (251) 
Fleetwood 
-1632 
2pm (6 and 8) 
Fabricius 
-Wittrock 1932 
After Gustav Adolf’s death and Swedish rout (307) 
Vitzthum/Berlepsch 
-Glafey 1749 
After windmill battery was captured (13) 
Secondary sources, letters  
Gallas 
-Förster 1844 
11am, shortly after the battle had begun (95) 
Hallenus 
-Mankell 1860 
After small battery was captured (662) 
Hülshorst 
-Wittrock 1932 
After Gustav Adolf’s death (303) 
Pentz 
-Fiedler 1864 
3pm (571) 
Secondary sources, ‘relations’  
Relation II Erfurt 
-Droysen 1880 
After 3pm (20) 
Relation 1632 
-Droysen 1880 
Shortly after the battle had begun (8) 
Relation 1633 
-Droysen 1880 
After 1pm, when small battery was captured (31) 
Declaration 1633 
-Droysen 1880 
=Wahrhaftige Beschreibung 
1633 
Cavalry before battle (39). Infantry after second Swedish attack, 
afternoon (42) 
 
Gottfried 
-1633 
=Monro 1637 
=Glaubwürdiger Bericht 1633 
=Abelinum 1646 
=Chemnitz 1648 
Late afternoon (26) 
 
(164) 
 
(750) 
(467) 
Burgus 
-1641 
=Richelieu 1823 
Before battle (319) 
 
(260) 
Khevenhiller 
-1726 
After Gustav Adolf’s death (193) 
Watts 
-1633 
2pm, after second Swedish attack (133) 
Table 23: Pappenheim’s arrival according to historical sources. 
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Most secondary sources stated that Croats outflanked the Swedish right wing and 
plundered the baggage train before Pappenheim arrived.812 However, this interpretation is 
doubtful for several reasons. An early Croat outflanking manoeuvre is contradicted by 
Fleetwood, whose statement is supported by archaeological information (see above); the 
overwhelming Swedish superiority on the right wing would not have allowed it. In 
addition, the description of this event in all secondary sources is based on Relation II from 
Erfurt, so that we are really dealing with only one source, which is not the most reliable. 
 
Only one eyewitness to this event, from the Swedish HQ, described that he heard 
Swedish soldiers shouting the army was in confusion and Croats were attacking the rear on 
two sides, after which he got out of danger and returned to Naumburg in the evening.813 
Although this account confirms that Croats actually did attack the Swedish rear, he puts the 
event at the end of the battle, which is not entirely reliable, because the eyewitness might 
have tried to hide the fact that he left the battlefield well before the fighting ended. The 
most logical conclusion is that the Croat’s attack on the Swedish rear occurred when 
Pappenheim’s reinforcement arrived, as most historians believe, but without additional 
evidence the time of this event can only be approximated as being in the middle of the 
battle. 
 
The events 
Feldmarschall Gottfried Heinrich Graf von Pappenheim almost certainly used the shortest 
route from Halle to Lützen,814 allowing his cavalry to arrive in the rear of the Imperial 
army’s position around noon. Here he very likely met and rallied parts of Wallenstein’s left 
wing Croats, increasing his force to over 2,800 cavalry. The Croats might have provided 
intelligence, but even without, it must have been obvious to Pappenheim that the battle was 
not going well on the Imperial left wing, “where it seemed that the King [Gustav Adolf] 
charged most stubborn.”815 
 
Probably dividing his forces into one light cavalry flanking force of approximately 
1,400 horse, possibly commanded by Isolani, General of all Croats, and one equally strong 
heavy cavalry striking force under his own command, Pappenheim did not waste any time. 
Although his troops were certainly tired from the last two day’s march, he charged 
                                                 
812 Relation II from Erfurt (Droysen 1880, 19), Watts 1633, 135, Gottfried 1633, 26, Wahrhaftige 
Beschreibung 1633, Glaubwürdiger Bericht 1633, Monro 1637, part II, 164, Abelinum 1646, 750, Chemnitz 
1648, 466. 
813 Söltl 1842, 347. 
814 Brzezinski 2001, 46 and 58. 
815 Diodati (Fiedler 1864, 562). 
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immediately at the head of his ‘Rennfahne’ Lifeguard and Dragoons, followed by 
Merode’s ‘Obwacht’ Lifeguard and Dragoons, Sparr’s cuirassiers, Bönninghausen’s 
harquebusiers and Lamboy’s harquebusiers.816 The Imperial left wing now consisted of 
3,200 regular and 1,400 irregular cavalry versus 1,800 Swedish first line soldiers. The 
sudden pressure on the Swedish right wing must have been immense and certainly restored 
order to the Imperial side,817 presenting an opportunity to Holk to rally his forces, while 
Piccolomini was able to escape the deadly musket fire by counterattacking the Swedish 
Brigade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
816 It is a myth, created by Khevenhiller (1726, 193) and Poyntz (1908, 73), that Pappenheim interrogated 
Swedish prisoners first to figure out where Gustav Adolf was, hoping he could challenge the King to a 
personal duel. 
817 Brzezinski 2001, 59. 
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8.3.2 Imperial left wing: Piccolomini’s counterattack 11.30-
12.30am 
 
 
 
 
 
Historical sources 
In their accounts, both Piccolomini’s referred only to their regiment, which makes it 
difficult to time the sequence of events. Diodati stated that Piccolomini’s counterattack 
took place after the death of Pappenheim,818 which was later repeated by other sources.819 
He certainly could have seen Piccolomini’s and Pappenheim’s troops, but not the death of 
Pappenheim. However, it does show that Piccolomini’s counterattack took place after 
Pappenheim’s arrival. That would also explain why he withstood the musket fire for 15 
minutes, after which he attacked. The arrival of reinforcements supported him and enabled 
                                                 
818 Fiedler 1864, 563. 
819 Watts 1633, 143, Burgus 1641, 324, Khevenhiller 1726, 194. 
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him to attack without leaving a gap in the Imperial battle line or exposing his flanks to any 
extent. 
 
Münchhausen made a strange comment that the Bredau cuirassiers “took apart” two 
horse regiments, although Bredau’s position behind the left centre would suggest that he 
fought against infantry.820 Bredau must have moved to the left wing, possibly supporting 
Piccolomini in his counterattack. 
 
 
Figure 91: Detailed pistol/carbine bullet distribution map, Imperial left wing (red: pistol, 
beige: pistol or carbine, green: carbine, white: 75% carbine). 
 
The only other eyewitness telling the story of Piccolomini’s counterattack is 
Poyntz. According to him, Piccolomini first routed the Finnish cavalry, then attacked a 
larger infantry formation, but was stopped by a musket volley, in which moment the rallied 
Finns attacked them from the rear.821 Only the latter event shows some similarities to 
Ottavio Piccolomini’s report of a Swedish cavalry counterattack, which caught him in the 
                                                 
820 Wittrock 1932, 305. 
821 Poyntz 1908, 72. 
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rear just as he attacked a brigade; after which some of his soldiers told him that the king 
had died.822 The Swedish regiment was almost certainly the Smaland cavalry, the last unit 
seeing the king alive, and not the Finns, who were probably fighting against Pappenheim’s 
cavalry at that time, and were certainly quite some distance from Piccolomini on the outer 
wing. Whether Piccolomini first attacked Swedish cavalry before his attack on the infantry 
squadron is unknown, but it is possible that Poyntz confused Piccolomini’s cavalry with 
another armoured cavalry unit, which could have been Götz or Bredau. 
 
 
Figure 92: Detailed small calibre pistol bullet distribution map (8.4-11.7mm und 3.00-7.75g), 
Imperial left wing. 
 
Archaeological sources 
One of the biggest, although not densest, pistol/carbine bullet concentrations (Cav7) has an 
elongated form of 350m to 220m in east-west alignment suggesting a cavalry charge along 
this axis. The concentration consists of 21 carbine/musket, eleven carbine, 36 
pistol/carbine and 30 pistol bullets. The latter consists of an unusually high number (24) of 
                                                 
822 Argang 1894, 89. 
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small calibre (8.4-11.7mm) pistol bullets of South German-Austrian origin, suggesting that 
they derive from an Imperial unit. The Swedes might have had some smaller calibre 
pistols, as the 11mm bullets found on the Solen and Vasa suggest, but their lowest calibre 
is 11mm, which points to other weapon models. The location of bullet concentration Cav7 
and its breadth of 220m make it likely that the bullets derive chiefly from Piccolomini’s 
Regiment, the largest cavalry unit on the left wing, with a frontage of 125m. According to 
their location, the other two high density bullet concentrations on the left wing (Cav8 and 
Cav9) might derive partially from Götz’s and Bredau’s cuirassiers, but the relatively large 
amount of carbine bullets suggests participation by at least one harquebusier regiment, 
possibly Piccolomini’s, which was the nearest. Swedish cavalry did not have a significant 
number of carbines to create such a bullet distribution. The concentration Cav9 of 
pistol/carbine bullets with severe impact damage suggests some intensive cavalry combat 
in that area, possibly the charge of Götz’s cuirassiers against the Swedish Brigade. 
 
 
Figure 93: Detailed impacted pistol/carbine bullet distribution map, Imperial left wing 
(impact damage: dark brown 70-90%, orange 40-60%, yellow 10-30%). 
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The events 
The arrival of Pappenheim’s cavalry on the outer left wing might have relieved 
Piccolomini’s harquebusiers and Götz’s cuirassiers on the inner wing. Probably at the same 
time, Bredau’s cuirassiers changed their position from the left centre to the left wing, after 
they covered Comargo’s retreat. This new situation enabled Piccolomini to charge the right 
squadron of the Swedish Brigade, which he pursued to the Via Regia,823 while Götz’s 
cuirassiers attacked and occupied the rest of the brigade. Meanwhile Bredau’s cuirassiers 
possibly protected Piccolomini’s left flank, attacking the Smaland and Ostgöta cavalry. By 
then, the Överste of the Smaland cavalry, Fredrik Stenbock, had been shot in the foot and 
the Överstelöjtnant Lennart Nilsson Baat of the Ostgöta cavalry was shot in the head,824 
making it very likely that both Swedish regiments had taken heavy casualties. 
 
8.3.3 Swedish left wing attack 11.30-12.30am 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
823 Ottavio Piccolomini (Argang 1894, 89). 
824 Hülshorst (Wittrock 1932, 303) and Pentz (Fiedler 1864, 571). At least Stenbock must have been 
wounded before Gustav Adolf took command of his regiment around midday (Brzezinski 2001, 62). 
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Historical sources 
Reports about Bernhard von Weimar’s attack on the windmill battery are inconsistent. 
Influenced by the Inventarium Sueciae, most secondary sources report that the Swedish 
attack broke down in the Imperial artillery fire that forced the Green Brigade to find shelter 
behind the miller’s house,825 the accepted view of modern research.826 However, this point 
of view leaves some unanswered questions. 
 
The miller’s house is shown in different places along the Via Regia in the battle’s 
imagery; south of the Via Regia on van Hulsen’s copperplate, on (sic!) the road in 
Merian’s copperplate, and north of the road in the 1710 field boundary map. If the more 
reliable 1710 map is correct, the miller’s house was located very close to and in front of the 
Imperial battery, providing almost no cover for Swedish soldiers. Even if it was located 
south of the road, one single building could not have provided sufficient cover for the 
Green Brigade’s 2,000 soldiers. 
 
Holk wrote at the end of his account that 
 
“The Duke [Wallenstein] … fought two hours against infantry with four horse regiments, 
namely Holk, Trcka, Piccolomini and Desfour, and he was encircled completely until Holk 
sent the cavalry to ‘second’ him.”827 
 
Although the timeline in Holk’s account is unclear and he had not seen the event 
personally, it seems that he described the first half of the battle. Bernhard von Weimar 
eventually achieved a breakthrough by the Swedish left wing that surrounded the Imperial 
right wing, which was then rescued by Holk after he was victorious on the left with support 
from Pappenheim’s reinforcements. 
 
                                                 
825 Gottfried 1633, 25, Wahrhaftige Beschreibung 1633, Glaubwürdiger Bericht 1633, Abelinum 1646, 750 
and  Chemnitz 1648, 465. Watts (1633, 147) reported that Bernhard von Weimar found shelter and Monro 
(1637, part II, 164) translated incorrectly from the Inventarium Sueciae that the Swedes forced the Imperial 
cannons to find shelter behind the miller’s house. Khevenhiller (1726, 191) stated that the Swedish left wing 
was disordered and forced to retreat by Imperial artillery fire. 
826 Wedgewood 1938, 326, Generalstaben 1939, 432, Seidler 1954, 56. Brzezinski (2001, 58) suggests a 
successful cavalry charge, while the infantry was stopped. 
827 Wittrock 1932, 309. 
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Figure 94: Detailed musket bullet distribution map, Imperial inner right wing, right centre 
and rear (dark blue 99% musket, blue 75% musket, white 25% musket, red: rifle). 
 
This interpretation also corresponds with the troop numbers. After Hagen’s rout and 
the temporary loss of his reserve Westrumb, Wallenstein’s right wing was down to 1,000 
horse and 150 musketeers with only Tontinelli’s 250 horsemen as a reserve against 1,550 
Swedish horse, 423 musketeers and ten regimental guns of the first line with a second line 
reserve of 1,400 horsemen. Despite the seventeen Imperial heavy pieces, 400 musketeers 
behind the garden walls, and the quality of the Imperial cuirassiers, it seems highly 
unlikely that Wallenstein was able to completely stop Bernhard von Weimar’s cavalry 
charge with his limited forces. On the other hand, however, there is no reliable report from 
any eyewitness about any infantry fighting on the Imperial right centre. 
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Figure 95: Detailed impacted musket bullet distribution map, Imperial right wing, right 
centre and rear. 
 
Archaeological sources 
The multiple combat episodes on the Imperial right centre throughout the battle complicate 
interpretation of the bullet distributions. There are two main lines visible; concentrations 
Inf15/17 mark the Imperial main line, while Inf12 very likely represents the Imperial 
second line. The concentrations Inf13 and Inf14 mark the attack vector. At least once 
during the battle, Swedish infantry broke through the first line and advanced towards the 
second line shifting slightly to the right. 
 
The bullet distribution patterns of 12 bore bullets fired from 10 bore muskets add 
some additional details to the interpretation of fighting at the Imperial right centre. Those 
bullets mostly derive either from the old Dutch (m3) or the new Dutch/Swedish (M2) 
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musket models. The distribution shows a clear concentration on the Imperial right centre. 
There are only three concentrations of 12 bore bullets, one smaller, non-linear 
concentration (Inf9) on the Imperial left and two larger, linear distributions Inf12 and 
Inf15/17 on the Imperial right. Concentration Inf12 has a width of 200m, which is slightly 
larger than the average frontage of a Swedish brigade, suggesting that one Swedish 
infantry unit was equipped with far more 10 bore muskets than any other infantry unit. At 
the present time, it seems that the insufficient availability of new firearms had forced 
commanders to equip newly raised units with new weapons as they came in rather than 
equip veteran troops with the more advanced weapons. Dehner’s report of a Swedish 
company, very likely recruits, arriving on 6 May 1632 at Rothenberg ob der Tauber 
equipped with the new 10 bore musket might be a hint in this direction.828 On the other 
hand, the numbers of older weapon models decreased very slowly in an active army; the 
Spanish/Dutch late 16th century 8 bore musket was used half a century later in the Battle of 
Edgehill. That would imply that bullets from new firearms are more likely to be 
concentrated in smaller areas, while bullets from older firearms are likely to be scattered 
on the whole battlefield and are less likely to create any meaningful patterns. The 
distribution pattern of the 12 bore bullets with three concentrations and a wide scatter 
seems to confirm this assumption. 
 
According to this interpretation, the Swedish breakthrough to the second Imperial 
line (Inf12) was not achieved by the veteran regiments of the Green or Old Blue Brigades, 
but by a more recently raised Swedish infantry unit, which must have been one of the 
second line brigades attacking during Bernhard’s second or third assault. Another 
observation is that the density of concentration Inf15 and the impacted bullets in that area 
does not decrease towards the Via Regia. This might be a hint that an Imperial infantry 
tactic was that the first rank opened fire at 70m when the Swedish crossed the road. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
828 Engerisser 2007, 546-547. 
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Figure 96: Detailed distribution of musket bullets from the Dutch/Swedish 10 bore (M2, m3) 
muskets with calibres of 17.9-18.8mm or 30.25-32.50g. 
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Figure 97: 11.30am to 12.30am: Pappenheim’s arrival and Piccolomini’s counterattack. 
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The events 
Outnumbered by 1,500 Swedish horse against 1,000 Imperial, it was only a matter of time, 
before Wallenstein’s right wing would collapse. The situation grew worse when Oberst 
Hagen, who retreated from the front line, but was still on Wallenstein’s right, saw the 
Swedish cavalry closing in on him and retreated. His 800 harquebusiers moved from the 
right to the left wing in full view of Wallenstein, disobeying a direct order, hoping that it 
would be quieter there.829 Only the inner two Imperial squadrons, Holk’s and 
Trcka/Desfours’ cuirassiers, stood firm,830 while the Swedish cavalry was now able to 
outflank the much shorter Imperial line and threatened to attack the Imperial army from the 
rear. 
 
Meanwhile, the Scots and Germans of Bernhard’s Green Brigade reached the Via 
Regia and were about to assault the ‘retrangement’ of the windmill battery, commanded by 
Generalfeldzeugmeister Hans Philipp von Breuner. These artillerists did not give up easily 
and it is possible that the artillery fire was so severe that some Green Brigade soldiers 
found cover behind the miller’s house. It seems that the Swedes needed more than one 
assault to capture the Imperial battery,831 which was covered by Wallenstein’s nephew, 
Oberst Berthold von Waldstein, who was mortally wounded832 during the fighting. To its 
right, the Green Brigade was flanked by Oberst Winckel’s Old Blue Brigade, but the attack 
lost momentum and was stopped by the squadron Colloredo/Chiesa, probably led by 
Oberst Andreas Matthias Kehraus. 
 
Although there are no clear reports, it seems that Oberst Gersdorf’s 423 detached 
musketeers and ten regimental guns were not very successful against the 400 Imperial 
musketeers behind the garden walls of Lützen.833 This means the Swedish left flank here 
was in the air. 
 
                                                 
829 Seidler 1954, 141-142. 
830 According to Diodati (Fiedler 1864, 565) and Holk (Wittrock 1932, 309). Holk was referring to the whole 
combat at the Imperial right wing and Piccolomini was not there at that time. 
831 Vitzthum/Berlepsch (Glafey 1749, 13) reported, similar to Holk, a whole series of events, when he wrote 
that “the Imperial wing was pushed back at first, but stood firm then, until the Swedes forced their way into 
the ‘retrangement’ and turned the artillery pieces.” Although the meaning of this sentence is not entirely 
clear, it refers probably, first to the rout of the Croats and Hagen, then to heavy fighting at the windmills and 
finally the battery’s capture. The Spanish Relation (Watts 1633, 161) reported a stalemate on the Imperial 
right. 
832 It is not certain when he was wounded. See Holk (Wittrock 1932, 309), Diodati (Fiedler 1864, 565), 
Fleetwood 1632, 10, Hülshorst (Wittrock 1932, 303) and Relation from 1632 (Droysen 1880, 11). 
833 Only Richelieu (1823, 258) reported that the Swedes cleared the gardens at the battle’s start, while Watts 
(1633, 149) claimed that the gardens were captured in the afternoon. However, both accounts are unreliable 
and an exact time can not be estimated. 
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8.3.4 Imperial left wing: Pappenheim’s death and Imperial 
‘Fahnenflucht’ 12.00am-1.00pm 
 
 
 
 
 
Historical sources 
The historical sources are inconclusive about the impact Pappenheim’s attack might have 
had, except that when the Feldmarschall died at the head of his charging cavalry, his fall 
caused the Imperial ‘Fahnenflucht’. Most historians834 followed Holk’s account835 in 
stating that Pappenheim’s attack was entirely unsuccessful. However, the otherwise 
reliable Holk seems not to have been entirely honest here and possibly tried to discredit the 
success of Pappenheim’s cavalry in order to look better himself. 
                                                 
834 Brzezinski (2001, 59) believed that Pappenheim’s attack stabilized the crumbling Imperial left wing for a 
while, but was not successful otherwise. 
835 Holk exaggerated when he stated that Pappenheim was killed before he could gain a foothold and 3,000 
regular cavalry and Croats were routed, which disordered the right wing (Wittrock 1932, 309). 
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A rout of the Imperial left wing would have been a serious setback, but it 
contradicts development of the battle, in particular the collapse of the Swedish army an 
hour later, and the numerical superiority of that Imperial left wing. The main sources of the 
Imperial ‘Fahnenflucht’ are the court martial verdicts from Prague, where this incident was 
examined. Four regiments on the left wing were accused of ‘Fahnenflucht’. The key to 
understanding the sequence of events is Sparr’s Cuirassier Regiment, commanded by 
Oberst Albrecht von Hofkirchen, which refused to fight upon their arrival with 
Pappenheim’s corps, which caused “others” to retreat. It is important to note the statement 
that Hofkirchen ‘caracoled’ (sic: fired and retired), even when the left wing was victorious, 
and was caught in the rear by Swedish cavalry.836 Pappenheim’s trumpeter Conrad Ehinger 
reported that the Feldmarschall was wounded and taken prisoner. Ehinger had to free him 
on his own, because Hofkirchen refused to help.837 Seeing Pappenheim was mortally 
wounded, Hofkirchen left him and moved from the left to the right wing.838 Hofkirchen’s 
insubordination caused Oberst Lothar von Bönninghausen to retreat with his harquebusier 
regiment.839 According to this sequence of events, Pappenheim’s counterattack was 
successful for a while but started to fall apart after the Feldmarschall was wounded. 
Concerning Pappenheim’s counterattack, Protestant sources,840 as well as the printed 
‘relations’,841 reported completely different and largely invented stories, certainly repeating 
the circulating rumours, and can be disregarded. 
 
Archaeological sources 
Most of Pappenheim’s counterattack is located east of the surveyed area. However, one 4 
bore bullet from a Doppelhaken was found on the Imperial left wing, which is evidence 
that these weapons were deployed on the wings and were probably used by sharpshooters 
against officers, because those weapons were able to penetrate any armour. It is reported 
that Pappenheim was hit by a ‘Falkonett’-bullet, but these cannon were not very accurate. 
In any case, bullets from a ‘Falkonett’ were not much larger than those from a 
Doppelhaken and could easily be confused in the heat of a battle.842 Therefore, it seems 
                                                 
836 Verdict vs. Hofkirchen (Seidler 1954, 142-143). 
837 Ehinger’s testimony (Hallwich 1912b, 135). 
838 Verdict vs. Hofkirchen (Seidler 1954, 143). 
839 Ehinger’s testimony (Hallwich 1912b, 136). 
840 Poyntz 1908, 73: Personal duel between Pappenheim and Gustav Adolf. Fleetwood 1632, 8: Pappenheim 
was killed in the morning and his corps was commanded by Merode. Hallenus (Mankell 1860, 663): 
Pappenheim was killed by Stalhandske. 
841 The story of Pappenheim’s death in printed accounts originates from the Relation II from Erfurt (Droysen 
1880, 20) and the Relation from 1633 (Droysen 1880, 31-32) and was retold by Gottfried 1633, 26, Monro 
1637, part II, 164-165, Abelinum 1646 750 and Chemnitz 1648, 466-467, but not copied as usually done. 
842 Diodati (Fiedler 1864, 562), followed by the Spanish Relation (Watts 1633, 160) and Relation from 1632 
(Droysen 1880, 8). 
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more likely that Pappenheim was hit either by a Doppelhaken or a grape shot ball from a 3-
pounder instead. 
 
 
Figure 98: Doppelhaken bullet. 
 
The events 
Given the length of the front line, the Swedish right wing cavalry must have been fully 
engaged in the fighting, possibly excepting only Stalhandske’s Finns, when Pappenheim’s 
main force hit their flank with 1,400 horse. This attack certainly ripped the Swedish outer 
wing apart,843 even though Hofkirchen stayed away from the fighting. At the same time, 
1,400 Croats outflanked the Swedes even farther to their right. 
 
Although there is no evidence, this was the time when all 1,200 Swedish second 
line right wing cavalry must have been committed to avoid total destruction of the entire 
wing. While Uslar, the Hessians and Beckermann possibly supported Gustav Adolf’s right 
wing, the squadrons Bulach, Goldstein and Duke Wilhelm, commanded by Oberst Claus 
Conrad Zorn von Bulach, probably crossed the Floßgraben to counter the Croats as Watts 
                                                 
843 The Relation II from Erfurt reported that the first Imperial counterattack “ruined several (Swedish) cavalry 
regiments, which had retreated” (Droysen 1880, 19), but did not connect this event with Pappenheim’s 
attack. 
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claimed.844 However, it is doubtful that less than 400 Swedish horsemen could have 
stopped 1,400 Croats845 and they must have got some kind of reinforcements. It is likely 
that the three Swedish cavalry squadrons were disordered846 and suffered heavy casualties, 
among them was Oberstleutnant Marx Conrad von Rehlinger, commanding officer of 
Goldstein’s Regiment, who was shot in the arm.847 
 
It was probably not long before the Swedish right wing would have started to fall 
apart, when Pappenheim was hit by a 4 bore bullet from a rifled Doppelhaken, fell off his 
horse and was taken prisoner. Rescued by his 22 year old trumpeter Conrad Ehinger, the 
mortally wounded Feldmarschall is reported to have cried out: 
 
“Oh brothers, that god has mercy! Is there no one, who fights faithful for the emperor!”848  
 
He said this because he saw Bönninghausen’s harquebusiers retreating after Sparr’s 
cuirassiers were already gone, retreating because they were caught in their rear by a 
Swedish cavalry attack, after they had fired and retired. Hagen’s harquebusiers, realising 
that the left wing was not as quiet as they first thought, returned to the right wing.849 
Lohe’s cuirassiers did not perform well either; but his Oberstleutnant, who was accused of 
cowardice, escaped execution at Prague due to Holk’s intervention.850 
 
The wounding of Pappenheim and the confused withdrawal of some Imperial units 
took some pressure from Gustav Adolf’s right wing. However, he still had to deal with 
Piccolomini’s and Götz’s cuirassiers of the Imperial inner left wing and Isolani’s 1,400 
Croats behind the Swedish right rear, and Holk’s wing was far from disintegration.851 
 
 
 
                                                 
844 Watts 1633, 132. 
845 This story was made up by the Relation II from Erfurt (Droysen 1880, 19), retold similar by Gottfried 
1633, 26 and copied from there by Wahrhaftige Beschreibung 1633, Glaubwürdiger Bericht 1633, Monro 
1637, part II, 164, and Abelinum 1646, 750, again retold by Chemnitz 1648, 466. 
846 Mentioned only by the Relation II from Erfurt (Droysen 1880, 19). 
847 However, it is at least suspicious that this story was first mentioned by Gottfried 1633, 26, copied by 
Wahrhaftige Beschreibung 1633, Glaubwürdiger Bericht 1633, Monro 1637, part II, 164, Abelinum 1646, 
750, Chemnitz 1648, 466. 
848 Ehinger’s testimony (Hallwich 1912b, 135). 
849 Verdict vs. Hagen (Seidler 1954, 142). 
850 Holk’s 8 December 1632 letter to Wallenstein (Hallwich 1912a, 588). 
851 Diodati reported that Pappenheim’s death “almost” disordered the left wing (Fiedler 1864, 563). 
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8.3.5 Imperial left wing: Gustav Adolf’s counterattack and his 
death 12.00am-1.00pm 
 
 
 
 
 
Historical sources 
The death of Gustav Adolf is the most discussed event of the Battle of Lützen. The 
contemporary, as well as the modern literature, is correspondingly extensive, diversified 
and colourful. At the same time, however, Gustav Adolf’s death had surprisingly little 
effect on the battle; it is, therefore, not necessary to discuss it in detail. In addition, no one 
who saw his death survived to tell the story and the facts are superimposed by rumours. In 
particular, it is suspicious that the high-ranking officers Herzog Franz Albrecht von 
Sachsen-Lauenburg and Oberstleutnant Falkenberg were reported to have been directly 
involved in the events that have led to Gustav Adolf’s death. Very few authors seem to 
have tried to take advantage of it, like Ottavio Piccolomini, while most just embellished 
their stories to make them more interesting, not believing that Gustav Adolf was just 
another casualty.852 
 
                                                 
852 Herzog Franz Albrecht von Sachsen-Lauenburg had defected from the Imperial army to Gustav Adolf and 
was suspected of murdering the king (Fleetwood 1632, 12, Hülshorst – Wittrock 1932, 303). Some reported 
him as trying to save the king (Dalbier 1632, 251, Extrakt Schreiben aus Berlin – Mankell 1860, 658, Watts 
1633, 137, Chemnitz 1648, 466). The Imperial Oberstleutnant Falkenberg was reported to have killed Gustav 
Adolf (Khevenhiller 1726, 192). 
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Gustav Adolf was last seen taking command of the Smaland cavalry.853 After that 
his whereabouts are unknown until he was found dead.854 Ottavio Piccolomini reported 
that after he retreated from the Via Regia: 
 
“in this moment the Blue Regiment, the king’s most appreciated, advanced, and that made 
it happen that the Regiment Götz, which was to the right in front of me, got damaged by a 
volley. Hearing this, I immediately charged it, which let down the pikes, but making halve 
a caracole, I took them from the flank, where I cut it to pieces and took their colours. The 
king, hearing that this regiment [New Blue] got the ‘load’, felt the impulse to counter this 
disorder and crossed my squadron; after I had dispersed this infantry, I attacked again a 
cavalry regiment and dispersed it and at that time many of my soldiers [i.e. Innecentius 
Buccela]855 came to me telling me the king is dead…”856 
 
Piccolomini could not have known that the king was attacking him. His intention was to 
get a reward from the emperor for killing Gustav Adolf, yet it is one of the more credible 
stories that soldiers came to him and Holk showing trophies from the dead king, as Diodati 
confirmed. 857 A short while later, Jacobus Fabricius saw the Smaland cavalry returning 
without the king and shortly thereafter the regiment’s preacher reported to him “Rex 
vulneratus est.”858 
 
Gustav Adolf had refused to wear armour at Lützen, because a bullet he received in 
Poland during the Battle of Dirschau 8 August 1627 was still in his shoulder and wearing 
armour apparently irritated the wound a great deal.859 The reason for taking personal 
command of the Smaland Cavalry Regiment and charging the enemy was certainly the 
immediate necessity to do so, not that it was Gustav Adolf’s nature to take such an 
enormous risk.860 It is more likely that he had to, because the commanders of the Smaland 
and Ostgöta cavalry were killed or wounded. Seeing his Swedish infantry dying, he could 
not wait for reinforcements. 
                                                 
853 Fabricius (Wittrock 1932, 306) and Hallenus’ eyewitnesses (Mankell 1860, 662) were close enough to 
have seen this incident. See also Relation I from Grimma (Studien 1844, 51), Watts 1633, 137, Richelieu 
1823, 259. 
854 Even the story of the recovery of the king’s body is unclear. According to Hallenus (Mankell 1860, 662), 
a boy spotted his horse, while the Relation I from Grimma (Studien 1844, 51) reported that he fell of his 
horse and was dragged hanging in one stirrup. Certainly unreliable are the stories of Bernhard von Weimar 
(Fleetwood 1632, 8) or Stalhandske (Watts 1633, 142) heroically charging the enemy, finding and recovering 
the king’s body. 
855 Spanish Relation (Watts 1633, 163). 
856 Argang 1894, 89. 
857 Diodati (Fiedler 1864, 564). 
858 Wittrock 1932, 306. Hülshorst reported that the king was missing for two to three hours (Wittrock 1932, 
303). 
859 Bursell 2007, 95. 
860 It is often claimed that Gustav Adolf attacked the Imperial left wing at the head of his cavalry right from 
the start of the battle, which seems to be only another myth about the king: Dalbier 1632, 251, Fleetwood 
1632, 7, Hülshorst (Wittrock 1932, 303), Hallenus (Mankell 1860, 662). See also Brzezinski 2001, 62. 
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This new interpretation suggests a timeline for the events, because it must have 
occurred after the Swedish cavalry took heavy casualties. The heavy casualties place this 
episode after Pappenheim’s arrival and Piccolomini’s counterattack. This scenario agrees 
with both Piccolomini’s account that the king died after Piccolomini attacked the New 
Blue Regiment, and also with Fabricius’ statement that there was not much time between 
the Smaland cavalry advancing with, and then returning without the king. In turn, the 
sequence means that Gustav Adolf could not have gone very far from his position on the 
inner right wing.861 The death site of Gustav Adolf on the Imperial left wing is confirmed 
by Holk862 and Diodati.863 
 
    
Plate 23: Lion seal handle. 
(image has been removed due to copyright restrictions) 
Archaeological sources 
Unusual physical evidence includes Gustav Adolf’s elk-skin buff coat, which was taken as 
trophy and was returned to Sweden after the First World War. The buff coat was 
penetrated by pistol bullets and rapier thrusts, clear evidence for a cavalry fight.864 Another 
rather unusual piece of physical evidence for locating Gustav Adolf’s death is a large 
stone, which according to legend, was moved to the place where the king’s body was 
found wearing only his underwear. Although it is possible that soldiers who found the king 
                                                 
861 This clearly contradicts Seidler (1954, 58-77), who believed, based mostly on Khevenhiller’s (1726, 191) 
unreliable account, that the king rode off on a rescue mission for the left wing with only one cavalry 
regiment, a decision which would have left the right wing without strong leadership, which would have 
endangered the success on the right, and would have come too late and with too few forces to change the fate 
of the left. 
862 Wittrock 1932, 309. Holk reported that Gustav Adolf was killed and the battle won “on this side“, which 
means the left wing commanded by Holk. 
863 Fiedler 1864, 564. Diodati claimed that Holk’s trumpeter showed him Gustav Adolf’s spurs. 
864 According to Brzezinski (1989, 53-55 and 2001, 66) the holes in the buff coat suggest that Gustav Adolf 
was only hit by pistol or carbine bullets rather than musket bullets. This is consistent with historical sources 
reporting that Gustav Adolf was killed by cuirassiers or at least by armoured cavalry: Vitzthum/Berlepsch 
(Glafey 1749, 14), Ottavio Piccolomini (Argang 1894, 89), Hallenus (Mankell 1860, 662), Hülshorst 
(Wittrock 1932, 303), Pentz (Fiedler 1864, 570), Declaration from 1633 (Droysen 1880, 41), Watts 1633, 
137, Khevenhiller 1726, 192, Richelieu 1823, 259. 
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could have remembered the place and marked it, the entire story seems to have been made 
up. After 6 hours of battle, soldiers were exhausted, many wounded, and they had more 
urgent things in mind, like surviving. In addition, the Swedish army left the battlefield the 
next morning before clearing it. Finally, it was not necessary to mark the exact place but to 
mark any place so that people could visit the battlefield to mourn their king.865 
 
A small bronze statue of a lying lion with a globe in one paw was found 130m 
north of the ‘stone’ in 2006. The lion was a handle for something attached below, possibly 
a seal, which is now lost. This portrayal of a lion is the coat of arms of the ‘Vasa’ and 
could have been in Gustav Adolf’s possession. Unfortunately, it was a very popular coat of 
arms element throughout Europe. So, the lion statue is at best only a clue for siting the 
king’s death. 
 
The events 
Presently, there is little real evidence for the events that led to the king’s death. Refusing to 
wear armour because of the pain caused by a bullet in his shoulder, it was not Gustav 
Adolf’s intention to personally lead the right wing cavalry into combat. Pappenheim’s and 
Piccolomini’s counterattacks caused such serious casualties among the Swedish cavalry 
and its leadership that, when Gustav Adolf saw his fellow countrymen being slaughtered 
on the right centre, he took command of the Smalanders and came to their rescue. It seems 
that he arrived in time to cover the Swedish Brigade’s retreat, as it was fighting next to 
him866 and because the pikemen were covering the retreat of their musketeers at all cost 
(section 9.1.1). When he crashed into Piccolomini’s harquebusiers or Götz’s cuirassiers 
before he could reach his Lifeguard, he was separated from his men in the chaos of the 
melee and the thickening gun smoke; finally he fell somewhere on the Imperial left wing 
or left centre.867 
 
                                                 
865 Another kind of mystification of killed soldiers happened on the 1746 battlefield of Culloden. There, the 
Scottish soldiers were incorrectly reported to have been buried in mass graves by clan affiliation, although all 
evidence points to mixed burials (Pollard 2009, 9-10). 
866 There is little evidence for this interpretation. However, the Swedish Brigade took relatively low 
casualties of 35% in comparison to the 68% of the Yellow Brigade (Brzezinski 2001, 87 and 89), except for 
their pikemen, because they were closer to the Swedish cavalry, according to Watts (1633, 145). 
867 Under the circumstances that no one had seen the death of Gustav Adolf, it is almost certainly a made up 
story that the king was killed by Oberstleutnant Moritz von Falkenberg, commanding officer of Götz‘s 
Regiment, as Khevenhiller (1726, 192) claimed. 
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8.3.6 Imperial left wing: Destruction of the Yellow Brigade 
12.00am-1.00pm 
 
 
 
 
 
Historical sources 
The destruction of Gustav Adolf’s Lifeguard, the Yellow Brigade, was so impressive that 
most historical sources reported the event, changing and embellishing it so as to give the 
king’s guard a more heroic end.868 Although there is a lot of historical evidence, the 
sequence of events does not become entirely clear. 
 
                                                 
868 Originally only noted briefly by Relation from 1632 (Droysen 1880, 9), the Inventarium Sueciae 
(Gottfried 1633, 25) was the first ‘relation’, which made up the story of the Yellow Brigade forcing two huge 
Imperial cuadros (sic) to retreat and finally, exhausted from the fighting, was destroyed by two other 
Imperial cuadros, which would have meant that the Yellow Brigade had fought alone against almost the 
entire Imperial infantry. This story was copied by Wahrhaftige Beschreibung 1633, Glaubwürdiger Bericht 
1633, Monro 1637, part II, 164, Abelinum 1646, 749-750 and Chemnitz 1648, 465 and retold by 
Khevenhiller 1726, 191-193. 
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Figure 99: Yellow Brigade’s attack vector 11.00am to 1.00pm on musket bullet distribution 
map. 
 
The most reliable source is certainly the account from Münchhausen, who was 
involved in the fight. He reported that 
 
“we [Münchhausen and Oberstleutnant Stolper], with the two regiments [Comargo and 
Baden], had beaten and ‘separated’ three regiments, which remained in one,”869 
 
meaning three squadrons fighting as one brigade. In another letter Münchhausen stated that 
the Regiments Comargo and Baden captured fourteen colours from the Yellow and Old 
Blue Brigades, confusing the latter with the Swedish Brigade.870 This is supported by 
Diodati, who fought in Grana’s Regiment and certainly saw what happened, reporting the 
Yellow Brigade to have been destroyed by Imperial infantry.871 Hallenus, whose account is 
based on two eyewitnesses who fought next to the Yellow Brigade, probably referred to 
the same event, when he wrote that Brahe was attacked from the flank by an Imperial 
cuirassier regiment, although Hallenus confused Brahe’s command, which was the first 
                                                 
869 Wittrock 1932, 305. 
870 Münchhausen 1632. Probably based on Münchhausen‘s report, Gallas noted incorrectly that Comargo had 
destroyed the Old Blue Brigade (Förster 1844, 95). 
871 Fiedler 1864, 563. 
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line centre and the Yellow Brigade, and not the left wing (section 2.2.2.1).872 The 
“cuirassier regiment” in Hallenus’ letter could have been Piccolomini’s harquebusiers or, 
what is more likely, Götz’s or Bredau’s cuirassiers.  
 
 
Figure 100: Yellow Brigade’s attack vector 11.00am to 1.00pm on musket bullet impact 
damage distribution map. 
 
Archaeological sources 
The track, over which the Yellow Brigade fought its way through the Imperial lines, can be 
reconstructed according to musket bullet distributions. There is a distinctive concentration, 
originating at the south corner of field I (Inf5), reaching 300m to the northwest (Inf7/8) 
passing through the second Imperial centre’s line (Inf9). This area includes several bullets 
with severe and medium impact damage, indicating several encounters at point-blank 
range. Approximately 200m to 250m to the north, the bullet density thins out, containing 
only a few lightly impacted bullets. They are very likely overshots or deflected bullets 
from this combat episode. There are no bullets north of these overshots, marking probably 
the northern end of the infantry combat. Concentration Inf9 represents the furthest advance 
                                                 
872 Mankell 1860, 662. 
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of a Swedish infantry brigade. Given the positioning this can only have been the Yellow 
Brigade. 
 
 
Figure 101: Yellow Brigade’s attack vector 11.00am to 1.00pm on pistol and carbine bullet 
distribution map. 
 
Slightly more blurred due to several combats, but still visible, are pistol/carbine 
bullet concentrations (Cav14/15) in the same zone, also containing several bullets with 
severe and moderate impact damage. Three pistol slugs and eight parted bullets confirm 
that there was substantial infantry-cavalry interaction here as well. In comparison to the 
action on the Imperial right centre, the boundaries between the musket bullet and 
pistol/carbine bullet concentrations is less clear and it seems that they derive mostly from 
one engagement. It resembles more the continuous combat zone of a unit moving forward, 
fighting at close range, and then withdrawing than two separate events, one at the first and 
one at the second Imperial line. This might be seen as evidence that the Yellow Brigade 
did not just stand, fight and die, but tried to retreat out of the killing zone. 
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Figure 102: Yellow Brigade’s attack vector 11.00am to 1.00pm on pistol and carbine bullet 
impact damage distribution map. 
 
There is one problem interpreting these bullet concentrations as the retreat of the 
Yellow Brigade. Once positioned deep behind the first Imperial line, it would have lacked 
left flank protection. However, it is possible that flank protection was provided by one of 
the second line brigades, probably by Thurn’s, either directly, by following the Yellow 
Brigade, or indirectly, by occupying the Imperial infantry squadron GFZM Breuner 
frontally. A corollary to this interpretation would have the Old Blue Brigade following the 
Swedish left wing into action. This concept is supported by a less dense musket bullet 
distribution in the middle of the Imperial centre. Here, there is almost an absence of 
pistol/carbine bullets, confirming that there was only minor combat during the entire battle. 
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Figure 103: Detailed distribution of parted musket bullets (blue) and slugs (red) along the 
Yellow Brigade’s advance. 
 
The events 
After having suffered casualties at the road ditches, the small battery, and the first Imperial 
line, the Yellow Brigade advanced towards the second line and approached the Regiment 
Baden; behind it the Regiment Comargo was reforming. Although its left flank was 
possibly protected by Thurn’s Brigade, the Yellow Brigade became more and more 
isolated after the Swedish Brigade to its right fell back. It seems that Generalmajor Nils 
Brahe was not fully aware of the situation, because the gun smoke and the burning of 
Lützen created a dense ‘fog’. Less than 1,000 men of Gustav Adolf’s guard now faced 
approximately 1,700 Imperial infantry. The sudden appearance of cuirassiers on their 
unprotected flank was devastating because their pikemen were engaged in hand-to-hand 
combat against Baden’s and Comargo’s infantry. Even the Royal Guard veterans had no 
chance against this Imperial combined arms counterattack. 
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Figure 104: 12.00am to 1.00pm: Gustav Adolf’s and Pappenheim’s death and destruction of 
the Yellow Brigade. 
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It was a bloody fight. Generalmajor Nils Brahe was shot in the knee and died a few 
days later;873 693 of his 1,017 men were wounded or killed and only 324 men from the 
Yellow Brigade survived relatively unharmed after fighting their way back to their own 
lines.874 Diodati reported: 
 
“A great body with yellow casacks came up resolutely in formation with pikes covering 
their musketeers. When they were attacked by our foot they remained completely on the 
spot, and it was a wonder to see in a moment the body reduced to a mound of corpses.”875  
 
Gustav Adolf’s Lifeguard and Life Regiment were wiped out in minutes. But the Imperial 
side paid a heavy price. Baden’s Regiment took the highest casualties of any Imperial unit 
in Lützen; the commanding officer, Oberstleutnant Stolper, the Obristwachtmeister and all 
company commanders, except Hauptmann Schulder, were killed, and Obristwachtmeister 
Münchhausen of Comargo’s Infantry had to take command of both regiments.876 From 
Piccolomini’s Regiment, the Oberst received one musket shot and two sword blows; 
Oberstleutnant Conte Avogadri was hit by a musket bullet in the right thigh; Major Pier 
Martelini, Rittmeister Baco, Rittmeister Marchese Palavicino and Rittmeister Fesente were 
killed; Rittmeister Crepi was hit in his ear with a pike; Rittmeister Silvio Piccolomini, who 
“hoped in god and his capable barber”, was shot in the thigh and the knee; Rittmeister 
Baron Mattei’s horse was killed and a cavalry regiment rode over him; 100 cavalry men 
were killed and another 100 wounded.877 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
873 Hülshorst (Wittrock 1932, 303), Pentz (Fiedler 1864, 571), Hallenus (Mankell 1860, 662). 
874 Brzezinski 2001, 87. 
875 Fiedler 1864, 563. 
876 Münchhausen (Wittrock 1932, 305), Relation from 1632 (Droysen 1880, 11), Wallenstein’s 22 December 
1632 letter to Holk (Hallwich 1912a, 657). 
877 Reported by Silvio Piccolomini (Archivio 1871, 241). 
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8.3.7 Imperial right wing: Wallenstein’s counterattack and 
destruction of the Old Blue Brigade 12.30am-1.30pm 
 
 
 
 
 
Historical sources 
The Old Blue Brigade is mentioned once when it advanced along with the Swedish left 
wing.878 It appears only in the Protestant eyewitness account by Fleetwood. All Catholic 
eyewitnesses and secondary sources have confused the Old Blue Brigade with the Swedish 
Brigade, because both were wearing, at least in part, blue uniforms. Because the Green 
Brigade is also mentioned only sporadically, there are no reliable reports about events on 
the Swedish left centre around midday. By then the Old Blue Brigade had suffered terrible 
losses. From 918 soldiers, excluding officers, only 331 were mustered shortly after the 
battle; 63% were killed, wounded, or unaccounted for and the commanding officer, Oberst 
                                                 
878 Fleetwood 1632, 7. 
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Hans Georg aus dem Winckel, was wounded.879 Even the Green Brigade, which frontally 
assaulted the fortified Imperial windmill battery, had only 39% losses. This suggests that 
the Old Blue Brigade met a fate similar to the Yellow Brigade. 
 
There is one more question concerning the Imperial right wing: Where was 
Piccolomini’s Regiment? Neither Ottavio nor Silvio Piccolomini mentioned what 
happened to their regiment after Gustav Adolf’s death. Holk reported that 
 
“The Duke [Wallenstein] … fought two hours against infantry with four horse regiments, 
namely Holk, Trcka, Piccolomini and Desfour, and he was encircled completely until Holk 
gave back the cavalry to ‘second’ him.”880 
 
This comment might be the key to understanding what happened on the Imperial right. 
Holk put this sentence at the end of his account after he had explained the result of the 
battle, making it difficult to fit into the timeline. The cavalry Holk “gave back” is certainly 
that which came from the right as reinforcements, i.e. the Regiment Westrumb. By then the 
Regiment Piccolomini was already engaged on the right. Both regiments were under 
Holk’s command, at least for a time, and he certainly knew that they left his command. 
Both regiments could not have been sent to the right wing before Holk was at least 
partially successful. 
 
It seems that Piccolomini changed to the right wing immediately after he attacked 
the Swedish Brigade around 12am, while Westrumb must have followed soon after, 
possibly after the Swedish right was beaten around 1pm. Piccolomini certainly did not 
fight two hours on the right before Westrumb arrived, which seems only to have been one 
of Holk’s generalizations. However, it does not seem very likely that the Regiment 
Piccolomini was responsible for the destruction of the Old Blue Brigade, because he was 
needed on the right wing to prevent a disaster.881 
 
                                                 
879 According to Eberstein, all colonels of the infantry except possibly Mitzlaff and himself, were wounded or 
killed (Diemar 1893, 348). See also Relation II from Erfurt (Droysen 1880, 21), Relation from 1633 
(Droysen 1880, 34), Declaration from 1633 (Droysen 1880, 44) and Khevenhiller 1726, 197. 
880 Wittrock 1932, 309. 
881 Watts (1633, 161) made a comment in the Spanish Relation reporting that Piccolomini destroyed a 
Swedish regiment, leaving it stretched out on the ground, which Watts (1633, 161) commented to have been 
Winckel’s Regiment, which might be one of the sources for the confusion of the Old Blue and the Swedish 
Brigades. 
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Figure 105: Detailed musket bullet distribution map, Imperial right centre and Swedish 
approach. 
 
Archaeological sources 
As discussed in section 8.3.3, the Old Blue Brigade was likely held in place at the first 
Imperial line; their combat is probably represented by the musket bullet concentration 
Inf15. Located in the same area is one of the largest, densest pistol/carbine bullet 
concentrations Cav21, with the most severely impacted bullets of the battlefield. This same 
zone also contains the densest concentration of slugs, three from pistols, two from 
pistols/carbines and three from carbines. This confirms that there was heavy cavalry 
fighting against infantry and is, therefore, evidence for the destruction of the Old Blue 
Brigade. Field IX is located along the Old Blue Brigade’s attack vector, 120m to 300m 
south of the Via Regia, where no combat is reported to have occurred. The relatively dense 
musket bullet concentration Inf18 can partially be explained by the Imperial skirmish line 
firing from the road ditches (section 6.2.4); however, the number of bullets is too high for 
skirmishing. In addition, one bullet with severe and three with medium impact damage 
were found here. This location is too far away from the Via Regia to create such 
deformation so it is probable that these bullets derive from an infantry engagement. 
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Figure 106: Detailed distribution of parted musket bullets and slugs, Imperial right centre 
and Swedish approach. 
 
 
Figure 107: Detailed impacted musket bullet distribution map, Imperial right centre and 
Swedish approach. 
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Figure 108: Detailed pistol/carbine bullet distribution map, Imperial right centre and Swedish 
approach. 
 
A combat south of the Via Regia is also confirmed by bullet distribution Cav24 in 
field IX. This cluster is out of range for pistol or carbine bullets to have been fired from the 
road. It is a dense concentration containing four pistol, six pistol/carbine, five carbine and 
seven carbine/musket bullets, of which two have severe and two light impact damage and a 
pistol slug, resulted from cavalry closely engaged with infantry. 
 
 
Figure 109: Detailed impacted pistol/carbine bullet distribution map, Imperial right centre 
and Swedish approach. 
 
The most reasonable conclusion is that an engagement took place here during the 
Swedish rout around midday, when the Swedish army was most vulnerable, and Imperial 
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units were bold enough to cross the Via Regia. It is, therefore, very likely connected to the 
retreat and destruction of the Old Blue Brigade, which was pursued by Imperial cavalry. 
The lack of reports about the Old Blue Brigade makes it likely that such an event was 
simply forgotten, a factor that might have been caused by poor visibility due to the smoke 
from the burning town. At any rate, the Protestants were certainly not eager to actively 
draw attention to the destruction of one of their best regiments. 
 
The events 
It seems that the arrival of Pappenheim’s cavalry on the Imperial left wing, despite the 
death of the Feldmarschall and the Imperial ‘Fahnenflucht’, had an impact on the whole 
course of the battle. Once the Swedish attack was stopped by Pappenheim’s 
reinforcements, an Imperial counterattack punched through the Swedish line between the 
centre and right wing. Exploiting this success, adjacent units were attacked and beaten 
freeing Imperial units for other operations; as Holk reported, he sent back the units he had 
received from the right wing.882 
 
With reinforcements from Holk’s successful left wing, the Imperial right centre and 
right wing was stabilized, making it possible to counterattack the Old Blue Brigade, using 
Wallenstein’s successful combined arms tactics with infantry on their front and cavalry on 
the flank. Nevertheless, the Swedish infantry still managed to retreat over the Via Regia, 
closely followed by Imperial units. At some point Oberst Hans Georg aus dem Winckel 
was wounded, the Old Blue Brigade lost cohesion and finally broke up. Only 331 out of 
918 soldiers made it back to their lines relatively unharmed; Winckel’s veteran regiment 
was in no shape to resume fighting. 
 
Meanwhile, the arrival of Piccolomini’s Regiment prevented a disaster on 
Wallenstein’s right, where Bernhard von Weimar was still pressing on. When the Old Blue 
Brigade was beaten back, the Green Brigade’s right flank was threatened, and Oberst 
Georg Wulf von Wildenstein,883 who was wounded, could not hold his position. With 
further reinforcements from Holk, consisting at the very least of Westrumb’s 
harquebusiers, Wallenstein counterattacked Bernhard von Weimar’s wing and drove him 
back. Soon almost the entire Swedish army was in retreat. 
 
                                                 
882 Wittrock 1932, 309. 
883 Monro 1637, part II, 165, Relation II from Erfurt (Droysen 1880, 21), Relation from 1633 (Droysen 1880, 
34), Declaration from 1633 (Droysen 1880, 44), Khevenhiller 1726, 197. 
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8.3.8 Stalemate: Imperial and Swedish armies at the brink of 
collapse 1.00-2.00pm 
 
It is almost impossible to get a clear picture of the situation in the early afternoon. Most 
accounts from both sides played down the chaos with descriptions like “our cavalry was 
almost disordered.”884 However, some eyewitnesses give a completely different picture, in 
particular Gustav Adolf’s Chaplain Jacobus Fabricius: 
 
“After his Majesty King Gustav Adolf …, riding with the Smaland cavalry over a ditch, 
had engaged the enemy … it was soon after that, that this regiment returned, and no one 
wanted to answer my question, where the king was, until a passing by field preacher 
shouted: ‘The king is wounded.’ I was shocked about that and turned to the place where I 
had seen his Royal Majesty moving. But instead I met Oberst Ernst von Anhalt-Bernburg, 
Oberstleutnant Winckler and Oberstleutnant Rehlinger along with other high-ranking 
officers, who asked if I have seen their folk ... Two members of the Royal Office rode by 
and shouted: ‘It is a rout.’ But I responded: ‘Make a stand, our flight provoke all others to 
flee.’ In search for my king I met a lot of fleeing musketeers and cavalrymen and a 
Livonian nobleman named Oberstleutnant Tiesenhausen, whom I ordered to stand. But the 
more we were shouting the faster they were running, because they thought they were 
pursued by the enemy, not seeing far because of the thick fog.”885 
 
It is a very telling point about the Swedish army’s condition that officers were 
searching for their soldiers. Fleetwood’s comment that 
 
“…for had not our foote stoode like a wall, there had not a man of us come off alyve, ... ; 
and our horse did but poorely”886 
 
is evidence the Swedish cavalry was even in worse condition than the infantry. Herzog 
Albrecht von Sachsen-Lauenburg fled from the battlefield with 300 horse.887 If it seems 
that the entire army was about to fall apart, why did Wallenstein not take advantage of the 
situation? It was certainly not because Fabricius and Oberst George Fleetwood began to 
sing Lutheran songs and so rallied many soldiers.888 Pursuing Imperial cavalry, which was 
already moving over the Via Regia to finish off the Swedish army, would have prevented 
that. 
 
                                                 
884 Diodati (Fiedler 1864, 563), Relation from 1633 (Droysen 1880, 31). 
885 Wittrock 1932, 306. The correct names and ranks are given rather than those given by Fabricius. 
886 Fleetwood 1632, 9. 
887 Hülshorst (Wittrock 1932, 303). 
888 According to Fabricius (Wittrock 1932, 306). 
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Figure 110: 12.30am to 2.00pm: Destruction of the Old Blue Brigade and retreat of the 
Swedish army. 
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The answer has to be that the Imperial army was not in a good shape either. The 
Harquebusier Regiment Hagen had changed wings twice without combat and was then 
waiting behind the right wing, disobeying orders to engage the enemy.889 Hagen was 
accompanied by the Cuirassier Regiment Sparr, which also retreated from the left to the 
right wing and also refused to fight, until it finally left the battlefield just before the end of 
the fighting.890 The worst of all was Oberst Lothar von Bönninghausen, whose 
harquebusiers retreated before they engaged at all, then, looted their own baggage train, 
probably frightening the female camp followers who, in turn, cut the wagon horses loose 
and rode off together with the cavalry.891 On their way back to Halle they tried to 
discourage Pappenheim’s infantry from reinforcing the Imperial army at Lützen.892 It was 
not just the mounted men, the infantry, although holding their ground, had suffered terrible 
losses and many high-ranking officers were either killed or wounded. In essence, there 
were too few intact regiments able to pursue the Swedes. 
 
On the Swedish side Generalmajor Knyphausen kept his own brigade, the Brigade 
Duke Wilhelm and the Cavalry Regiment Öhm in reserve.893 They were holding the line so 
the routed Swedish regiments could be rallied behind them. In addition, the other two 
second line Brigades, Mitzlaff and Thurn, whose task had probably been to occupy the 
Imperial centre, but not to break through, had not taken heavy losses894 and seem to have 
made an orderly retreat. At this point the battle paused. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
889 Verdict vs. Hagen (Seidler 1954, 142). 
890 Verdict vs. Hofkirchen (Seidler 1954, 142-143). 
891 Watts 1633, 142. 
892 Verdict vs. officers from Bönninghausen’s Regiment (Seidler 1954, 144-145). Bönninghausen himself 
was too important to be executed. The Imperial ‘Fahnenflucht’ and plundering the baggage train is also 
reported by Holk (Wittrock 1932, 309) and Münchhausen (Wittrock 1932, 305). 
893 Dalbier 1632, 252. 
894 Brzezinski 2001, 87 calculated a total of 38% and 15% losses during the battle. 
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8.4 Bernhard von Weimar and Knyphausen: Second 
Swedish attack 
 
After the Swedish rout, the battle went on for at least another four hours, but eyewitness 
accounts are mostly silent; secondary sources are inconsistent about what happened in the 
latter stages of the battle. Most seem influenced by the unreliable Inventarium Sueciae. 
Consequently, Deuticke895 and Brzezinski896 made only a short mention of any afternoon 
combat. Seidler reconstructed a completely erroneous scenario based on secondary 
sources, reporting that the Swedish army attacked in a ‘storm of vengeance’ because of the 
dead king,897 while Generalstaben suggested a different erroneous account similar to 
modern warfare with a slowly but steadily advancing front, which completely ignored the 
Swedish rout.898 
 
Of the small number of reliable accounts about the afternoon’s events, only 
Fleetwood and Dalbier gave valuable information, reflecting on the condition of both 
armies, which were near collapsing, and on the limited visibility due to gun smoke and the 
burning Lützen. Although it is almost impossible to get a clear picture of the events of the 
afternoon at the present time from historical sources alone, additional evidence is provided 
by the archaeological survey. 
 
With most soldiers near exhaustion, the nature of engagement in the afternoon is 
described best by Vitzthum/Berlepsch: 
 
“A fatal earnestness was seen and heard on both sides.”899 
 
His comment is supported by Extract Underschiedlicher Schreiben900 and Relation from 
1632901 reporting that no quarter was given and the Imperial musketeers clubbed 
Protestants to death with their musket butts, showing the brutality of the engagement 
during its latter stages. The ‘storm of vengeance’ because of Gustav Adolf’s death, which 
                                                 
895 Deuticke 1917, 79-82. 
896 Brzezinski 2001, 79-80. 
897 Seidler 1954, 79-83. 
898 Generalstaben 1939, 438-451. 
899 Glafey 1749, 14. See also Brzezinski 2001, 79. 
900 Droysen 1880, 4-5. 
901 Droysen 1880, 9. 
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turned the tide for the Swedes, is reported by very few sources and seems to have been one 
of the myths associated with the dead king.902 
 
8.4.1 Collapse of the Swedish command structure 
 
With Gustav Adolf’s death and the fatal wounding of Generalmajor Nils Brahe, the army 
had lost its overall commander and the right wing and right centre then lacked command. 
The consequences of the disrupted Swedish command structure have never been subject to 
research. The most accepted view,903 that Bernhard von Weimar got Knyphausen to agree 
to continue the battle, is based only on the unreliable accounts of Siri and Richelieu.904 
This view is very likely a myth possibly created to justify Bernhard von Weimar taking 
command of the army a few days after the battle. Although Generalleutnant Bernhard von 
Weimar outranked Generalmajor Knyphausen, as the only senior officers left, only 
secondary sources claimed that Bernhard actually took command of the Swedish army 
during the battle,905 which is still the accepted view.906 However, Gustav Adolf was more 
than just the army’s commander, not necessarily succeeded by the next in rank. In fact, two 
eyewitnesses907 and four early letters reported Bernhard von Weimar and Knyphausen 
shared army command,908 and Hallenus stated that Bernhard von Weimar took command 
in Weissenfels after the battle.909 
 
The command of the right wing and right centre, which was unlikely to have been 
in the hands of Torsten Stalhandske, who lacked authority as Överste, has been completely 
overlooked by historians. It is likewise not probable that Bernhard von Weimar 
commanded the entire first line centre and both wings, as Deuticke claimed,910 because 
such a command would have been too large to handle, especially with all the casualties 
among senior officers. Dalbier reported Knyphausen as connected with the afternoon’s 
                                                 
902 Fleetwood 1632, 8, Chemnitz 1646, 466. A ‘storm of vengeance‘ is suggested by Seidler (1954, 79) and 
rejected by Brzezinski (2001, 9). 
903 Deuticke 1917, 80, Generalstaben 1939, 447, Seidler 1954, 79, Brzezinski 2001, 78. 
904 Richelieu 1823, 261. 
905 Bodo von Bodenhausen (Glafey 1749, 11), 58. Ordentliche Wochentliche Zeitung (Söltl 1842, 338-339), 
Relation II from Erfurt (Droysen 1880, 20-21), Relation from 1633 (Droysen 1880, 31-32), Declaration from 
1633 (Droysen 1880, 42), Chemnitz 1648, 467, Abelinum 1646, 749-750, Khevenhiller 1726, 196, Richelieu 
1823, 260 and Gottfried 1633, 26, copied by Monro 1637, part II, 164-165, Wahrhaftige Beschreibung 1633 
and Glaubwürdiger Bericht 1633. 
906 Generalstaben 1939, 447, Brzezinski 2001, 78. Seidler ignored the question of command. 
907 Brandenstein (Glafey 1749, 10), Swedish HQ (Söltl 1842, 348). 
908 Extrakt Schreiben aus Berlin (Mankell 1860, 658), Copia verträulichen Schreibens (Söltl 1842, 341), 
letter from 17 December (Söltl 1842, 341), Pentz (Fiedler 1864, 570-571). 
909 Mankell 1860, 665. The problematic of taking over command of the Swedish main army is also reported 
by the 19 November letter from an unknown author (Mankell 1860, 647). 
910 Deuticke 1917, 79. 
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events on the right wing and it seems possible and reasonable that he took command of that 
wing,911 while Bernhard von Weimar kept command of the left wing, both sharing 
command of the centre.912 
 
8.4.2 Second Swedish right wing attack 3.00-6.00pm 
 
 
 
 
 
Historical sources 
If we would believe Holk’s account, the battle ended when his wing put the Swedish right 
wing to flight around midday.913 The result of the battle, especially with all the Imperial 
                                                 
911 Dalbier 1632, 252. Knyphausen as commander of the right wing is also noted by Chemnitz (1648, 466). 
912 Fleetwood 1632, 8, Relation from 1633 (Droysen 1880, 31-32), Chemnitz 1648, 467, Khevenhiller 1726, 
196 and Gottfried 1633, 26, copied by Monro 1637, part II, 164-165, Wahrhaftige Beschreibung 1633 and 
Glaubwürdiger Bericht 1633. 
913 Wittrock 1932, 309. 
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artillery being captured by the Swedes, and that the battle went on until darkness, are proof 
that Holk omitted the circumstances of how he lost the small Imperial battery. 
 
The second capture of the Imperial battery is reported by Dalbier,914 in the most 
detailed part of his account suggesting that he witnessed it. He noted that the Swedes 
captured the battery and spiked the guns at 2pm, but Dalbier’s timeline is not always 
accurate. When they realised that the enemy was not returning, Knyphausen ordered the 
nails removed and he sent ammunition of the correct calibre.915 After the Swedes fired the 
captured artillery for one hour, there was no Imperial unit left on that wing. The absence of 
Imperial forces here very likely means they were out of firing range. While it sounds as if 
there was not much resistance from the Imperial side, the battle still went on for at least 
another three hours, indicating that most details about the fighting around the Imperial 
battery after it was taken by the Swedes are not preserved. A third and fourth attack on the 
Imperial left wing are only mentioned by secondary sources and it seems likely that those 
printed accounts were just to fill in the gap of knowledge.916 
 
Archaeological sources 
It is very difficult to find out which small find derived from which attack. Generally, there 
are more bullets and denser concentrations on the Imperial right centre than on the left 
centre, suggesting that there were more Swedish attacks and/or more intense combat here. 
The archaeological finds seem to support Dalbier’s account that the Imperial right centre 
fighting ended soon after the Swedes captured the Imperial guns. 
 
The events 
At some point in the afternoon it was probably Generalmajor Knyphausen who ordered the 
Swedish right wing to attack with an unknown force. It is likely that the White and Duke 
Wilhelm’s Brigades were part of this attack because they were probably the only intact 
infantry units left in this area. Any other units were possibly ad hoc formations created 
from rallied soldiers. The attack was at least partially successful as the small Imperial 
battery was captured and its guns turned against Imperial forces.917 This episode, in turn, 
forced Holk’s exhausted left wing to retreat beyond firing range. There was certainly a lot 
                                                 
914 Dalbier 1632, 252-253. 
915 Chemnitz (1648, 466) reported this incident similar that Knyphausen’s infantry took the guns and turned 
them. 
916 Relation from 1633 (Droysen 1880, 32), Watts 1633, 148, Abelinum 1646, 750, Chemnitz 1648, 467 and 
Gottfried 1633, 26, copied by Monro 1637, part II, 164-165. 
917 Chemnitz 1648, 466. 
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of skirmishing until the evening, which was concealed by the smoke, but no serious action, 
which could have changed the battle’s outcome. 
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Figure 111: 2.00pm to 3.00pm: Second Swedish attack. 
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8.4.3 Second Swedish left wing attack 3.00-6.00pm 
 
 
 
 
 
Historical sources 
There is not much known about the afternoon’s events at the windmills. There is, however, 
a strange agreement in those historical sources based on the Relation II from Erfurt about 
the arrival of Pappenheim’s infantry in the late afternoon and their subsequent 
counterattack against the windmill battery.918 While more reliable sources state that the 
infantry arrived after nightfall, too late for the battle,919 the eyewitness Fleetwood920 
believed Bernhard von Weimar was attacked by Pappenheim’s infantry in the late 
afternoon, incorrectly as Watts stated.921 Those Imperial infantry squadrons were more 
                                                 
918 Relation II from Erfurt (Droysen 1880, 20), copied or retold by Relation from 1633 (Droysen 1880, 31), 
Declaration from 1633 (Droysen 1880, 42), Gottfried 1633, 26, Monro 1637, part II, 164, Wahrhaftige 
Beschreibung 1633, Glaubwürdiger Bericht 1633, Abelinum 1646, 750, Chemnitz 1648, 467, Khevenhiller 
1726, 193. 
919 In particular Holk (Wittrock 1932, 309), Diodati (Fiedler 1864, 566) and Ottavio Piccolomini (Archivio 
1871, 240). See also Burgus 1641, 326, Spanish Relation (Watts 1633, 163) and Relation from 1632 
(Droysen 1880, 10). 
920 Fleetwood 1632, 8. 
921 Watts 1633, 149. 
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likely rallied, ad hoc assemblies of fragmented units, possibly reinforced by newly arriving 
companies from nearby garrisons.922 
 
According to Fleetwood, the Imperial counterattack broke down when a high-
ranking officer, who he believed, incorrectly, was Merode, was killed.923 
Generalfeldzeugmeister Hans Philipp Breuner and Oberst Berthold von Waldstein, both 
subcommanders, were also fatally wounded near the windmills, which could have caused a 
panic among Imperial soldiers in that area. 
 
Archaeological sources 
As discussed above, the linear distribution of the new Swedish light musket (M2) shot 
inside the musket bullet concentration Inf12, including some severe or medium impacted 
bullets, derives from a second line brigade, probably Mitzlaff’s, during an afternoon 
Swedish attack. This unit reached the Imperial second line and fought against an Imperial 
infantry unit, the Regiment Jung-Breuner, which is confirmed by a concentration of the 
South German m4 and M5 musket bullets in the same area. There is another small bullet 
concentration (Inf10) even further north, but without severe or medium impacted bullets, a 
clue to a medium range infantry fire fight. These concentrations suggest that at least one 
sizeable Swedish infantry unit achieved a breakthrough which got to the Imperial 
musketeer reserve squadron 500m north of the Via Regia. 
 
                                                 
922 Brzezinski 2001, 79. 
923 Fleetwood 1632, 8. 
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Figure 112: Detailed distribution of musket bullets from the German/Imperial 13 bore (m4) 
and 14 bore (M5) muskets with calibres of 17.3-17.8mm, and the Dutch 10 bore (M2, m3) 
muskets with calibres of 17.9-18.8mm or 30.25-32.50g, Imperial right centre second line. 
 
The battlefield’s densest concentration of artillery ammunition, consisting of nine 
shrapnel fragments from 3- to 24-pounders, was found 400m north of the windmill battery 
near the Imperial second line and along a minor road. It could be argued that these 
fragments came from the explosion of Imperial ammunition wagons shown on the Merian 
copperplate, in particular because they were found in close proximity to a road. However, 
the positioning of an ammunition supply train so close to a battle line seems unlikely. 
Another explanation could be that these shell fragments derive from artillery fired by the 
windmill battery, which was captured by the Swedes and turned against Imperial troops 
further to the rear. 
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Figure 113: Detailed impacted musket bullet distribution map, Imperial right centre second 
line. 
 
 
Figure 114: Explosion on the Merian copperplate. 
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Figure 115: Details of spherical cast iron fragments distribution. 
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Figure 116: Detailed musket bullet distribution map, Imperial right centre second line. 
 
The events 
After rallying his troops about 3pm, Generalleutnant Bernhard von Weimar faced the same 
difficult situation as in the morning. He ordered Oberst Gersdorf with his detached 
musketeers to renew the attack against the Lützen gardens,924 this time probably supported 
by additional forces, possibly including Leslie’s Scots.925 The rest of Bernhard von 
Weimar’s task force is unknown, but very likely consisted of the second line and parts of 
the first line cavalry, the Green Brigade, and the leftmost two second line infantry brigades 
Mitzlaff and Thurn. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
924 Watts (1633, 149) reported that the Swedes finally cleared the gardens in the fourth attack. 
925 Monro (1637, part II, 164) stated incorrectly that Gersdorf’s musketeers included Leslie’s Scots. 
However, it might be possible that Monro misunderstood an eyewitness and they supported Gersdorf in the 
second attack. 
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Figure 117: 3.00pm to 4.00pm: Second Imperial counterattack. 
 
 
 
 346 
Wallenstein seems to have gathered his remaining forces on his right wing at the 
windmills. These consisted of three infantry squadrons, probably the leftmost squadrons 
Waldstein/Alt-Sachsen, Colloredo/Chiesa and Jung-Breuner, and some cavalry,926 among 
them Piccolomini and probably the cuirassier squadrons Holk and Trcka/Desfour.927 
 
At some point the Green Brigade managed to capture the windmill battery, now 
only 50 men strong according to Fleetwood,928 and turned the guns on the Imperial 
troops.929 Oberstleutnant Albrecht von Hofkirchen finally left the battlefield with Sparr’s 
Regiment.930 In the end, Wallenstein managed to gather his forces one last time and the 
rallied infantry units recaptured the windmill battery, during which Generalfeldzeugmeister 
Breuner or Oberst Berthold von Waldstein were mortally wounded which broke Imperial 
morale. It was reported that the Swedish Rittmeister Bodo von Bodenhausen managed to 
get close to the Generalissimus and shot at him, but he missed.931 One Swedish brigade, 
probably Mitzlaff’s, pursued the retreating Imperial infantry and engaged them in a last fire 
fight. 
 
8.4.4 The battle’s end and the arrival of Pappenheim’s infantry 
6.00-8.00pm 
 
The battle ended with nightfall at 5pm when darkness made it impossible to fight on.932 
The fact that the battle ended at nightfall suggests that it was not over suddenly. Diodati 
gave a good, although not entirely honest, description of this process: 
                                                 
926 The Relation II from Erfurt (Droysen 1880, 20) noted that there were only three Imperial infantry 
regiments left at the windmills in the afternoon. According to Dalbier (1632, 252) there were two Imperial 
infantry squadrons and cavalry left at the windmills. 
927 Holk (Wittrock 1932, 309). 
928 Fleetwood 1632, 8. The low strength of the Green Brigade can not be explained with exceptional high 
losses, but is probably an argument for Leslie’s Scots being involved in the afternoon’s fight in the Lützen 
gardens. 
929 Fleetwood 1632, 8, Vitzthum/Berlepsch (Glafey 1749, 14), Relation from 1632 (Droysen 1880, 8), 
Relation from 1633 (Droysen 1880, 31), Declaration from 1633 (Droysen 1880, 42), Gottfried 1633, 26, 
Monro 1637, part II, 164, Wahrhaftige Beschreibung 1633, Glaubwürdiger Bericht 1633, Abelinum 1646, 
750 and Richelieu 1823, 261. 
930 Seidler 1954, 143. 
931 Wahrhaftiger Bericht (Diemar 1893, 340). 
932 Eyewitnesses and secondary sources agree on the battle’s end. Eyewitnesses: Swedish HQ (Söltl 1842, 
347), Vitzthum/Berlepsch (Glafey 1749, 14), Wallenstein (Lorenz 1987, 256), Silvio Piccolomini (Archivio 
1871, 240), Poyntz 1908, 73. Secondary sources: Hallenus (Mankell 1860, 663), Relation from 1632 
(Droysen 1880, 9), Relation II from Erfurt (Droysen 1880, 20), Relation from 1633 (Droysen 1880, 32), 
Gottfried 1633, 26, Monro 1637, part II, 165, Wahrhaftige Beschreibung 1633, Glaubwürdiger Bericht 1633, 
Burgus 1641, 326, Abelinum 1646, 751, Chemnitz 1648, 467 and Richelieu 1823, 261. An exact time is 
given by Fleetwood 1632, 8 and Watts 1633, 150 with 5pm; by Knyphausen (Studien 1844, 49) and Pentz 
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“Meanwhile the night was near, and the enemy’s cavalry left the field in disorder, with the 
result that the foot had to follow, after that they started again with a heavy artillery fire, 
concentrated large masses of infantry, and they appeared to attack again, but these were the 
signs of retreat...”933 
 
This illustrates the situation at the evening, when the battle ended with both sides 
separating under artillery fire after 6 hours of fighting, when “both Armies retreated the 
space of one half English mile.”934 According to reliable Imperial eyewitnesses, it was 
after both armies drew apart after or close to nightfall, when Pappenheim’s infantry 
Regiments Gil de Haes, Goltz, Moriamez-Pallant, Pallant, Reinach and Würzburg, 
approximately 3,000 men commanded by Generalwachtmeister Heinrich Graf von 
Reinach,935 arrived on the battlefield,936 eager to fight.937 
 
It was dark when Reinach sent the junior officer Augustin von Fritsch and a 
corporal to gather intelligence about the general situation. He reported after they had 
crawled near the windmills and feared to be caught by Swedish guards, at first believing to 
have seen the burning match cords of muskets: 
 
“I saw, however, that they were only candles which the soldiers were holding as they 
looted the battlefield or visited the dead. From there I went over to see our big canon, but 
there was not a single soldier of ours or the enemy’s at that place.”938 
 
Could Wallenstein have continued the battle the next day with Reinach’s infantry and the 
opportunity to recapture the Imperial artillery? 
 
Wallenstein’s army had fought for 6 hours with many fewer reserves, which meant 
that his soldiers were engaged more often in combat than the Swedish soldiers, and were 
exhausted. Poyntz noted: 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
(Fiedler 1864, 571) with 6pm; by Dalbier 1632, 252 and Holk (Wittrock 1932, 309) with 7pm; and by 
Hülshorst (Wittrock 1932, 303) with 8pm, which seems to agree with a battle’s end at “nightfall.” 
933 Fiedler 1864, 566. 
934 Poyntz 1908, 73. 
935 Officially Oberst Jean Graf Merode-Varoux was Pappenheim’s second-in-command, but he was probably 
somewhere else (Brzezinski 2001, 26 and 81). However, Diodati (Fiedler 1864, 566) reported Merode in 
command of Pappenheim’s infantry. 
936 Holk (Wittrock 1932, 309), Diodati (Fiedler 1864, 566) and Silvio Piccolomini (Archivio 1871, 240), 
confirmed by the catholic secondary sources Relation from 1632 (Droysen 1880, 10), Spanish Relation 
(Watts 1633, 163) and Burgus (1641, 326), clearly contradicts secondary sources of lesser reliability (section 
8.4.3). 
937 Holk (Wittrock 1932, 309). 
938 Brzezinski 2001, 81. 
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“wee were scarcely laid downe on the ground to rest and in dead sleep but comes a 
comaund from the Generall to all Coronells and Sergeant Maiors to give in a Note how 
strong every Regiment was found to bee, but it seemes finding every Regiment very weake 
by the Officers Relation, wee had scarcely had one sleep for ourselves & our horses and as 
little victuals for both.”939 
 
In addition, Wallenstein could not anticipate whether or not Saxon regiments would arrive 
the next day to reinforce the Swedish army. Wallenstein’s health was not the best and it 
seems possible that his will to fight was broken. 
 
After counting his losses,940 among them many fellow officers including his 
nephew Oberst Berthold von Waldstein and his brother-in-law Graf Harrach, and 
discussing the situation with his officers,941 Wallenstein opted for retreat and started to 
make an orderly withdrawal from the battlefield between 8pm and 9pm.942 He had to leave 
his heavy artillery pieces943 with all their ammunition wagons944 behind, because most of 
his draft animals had run away with his camp followers.945 
 
Except the second line’s reserve, Öhm’s cavalry, all Swedish units had been fairly 
heavily engaged in combat.946 The Swedish must have been exhausted too as they made no 
attempt to pursue the Imperial army or to seize the Imperial artillery that evening. 
According to Fritsch and Diodati,947 they withdrew to their initial position before the 
battle, where they camped that night and next day.948 
 
 
                                                 
939 Poyntz 1908, 73. 
940 Poyntz 1908, 73. 
941 Holk (Wittrock 1932, 309). 
942 Two hours after nightfall according to Diodati (Fiedler 1864, 566), three hours according to the Spanish 
Relation (Watts 1633, 163), 9pm according to the Relation II from Erfurt (Droysen 1880, 20). 
943 There is a conflict in secondary sources about the captured Imperial artillery, made up by the Relation II 
from Erfurt (Droysen 1880, 20), stating that the Imperial army burned their camp and left three pieces 
behind. This is changed in Relation from 1633 (Droysen 1880, 32) into “the Imperial army took three pieces 
with them,” which was embellished by the Declaration from 1633 (Droysen 1880, 42) into “the Imperial 
army took three 24-pounders with them,” which was changed again by Gottfried (1633, 26) into “the 
Imperials burned their camp and took three pieces with them.” The Wahrhaftige Beschreibung 1633 and 
Glaubwürdiger Bericht 1633 copied the Declaration from 1633 and Abelinum (1646, 749) used the Relation 
II from Erfurt but changed the number of pieces to two. Watts (1633, 151) misunderstood the story 
completely and noted that the Swedes burned seven pieces, while Monro (1637, part II, 165) claimed that the 
Imperials burned three pieces and took the rest with them. There is no proof from any eyewitness reporting a 
similar story, which was very likely made up in the first place. 
944 Dalbier 1632, 252, Fleetwood 1632, 9, Vitzthum/Berlepsch (Glafey 1749, 14) – most ammunition, 
Hülshorst (Wittrock 1932, 303), Pentz (Fiedler 1864, 571), Relation from 1633 (Droysen 1880, 32). 
945 Diodati (Fiedler 1864, 566), Poyntz 1908, 73. Holk (Wittrock 1932, 309) noted that they had no horses for 
towing the artillery. 
946 Brzezinski 2001, 83. 
947 Brzezinski 2001, 81, Fiedler 1864, 566. 
948 Dalbier 1632, 252. 
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Figure 118: 4.00pm to 5.00pm: Last operations before dusk. 
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Chapter Nine 
Aftermath 
 
9.1 Skirmishes, casualties and mass grave 
 
Soon after the battle both sides began to claim victory based on the casualties, number of 
captured colours and the claim of holding the battlefield. A second battle for the 
sovereignty of interpretation started. Attempts from the Imperial side to make people 
believe the Swedes left the battlefield at first failed.949 The Swedes had the captured 
Imperial guns to show and that settled the question of who could claim the battlefield. 
However, Corpes’ Croats remained three or four days as rearguard, harassing the Swedish 
clearing of the battlefield and they almost recaptured some Imperial artillery on its way to 
Naumburg.950 
 
According to Diodati, the Imperial army captured 60 colours, of which 36 from the 
Old Blue and Yellow Regiments were left on the field because they were mere poles, 
although both units together had only 32 companies.951 Münchhausen reported that his 
regiment and that of Baden alone took fourteen colours from the New Blue and Yellow 
Regiments.952 These numbers correspond with Wallenstein’s note that they captured 30 
colours, while he lost only five or six cornets (cavalry colours),953 four according to 
Diodati.954 
 
Later, the ‘relations’ Glaubwürdiger Bericht and Declaration from 1633 claimed 
that the Swedes captured 28 cornets and 50 colours.955 There is no confirmation of these 
numbers from any eyewitness and they were certainly not taken by the Swedes during 
battle, but in mopping-up operations after battle, as Brzezinski believed, or they are simply 
an invention.956 
                                                 
949 Diodati (Fiedler 1864, 566). 
950 Diodati (Fiedler 1864, 566), Holk (Wittrock 1932, 309), Relation from 1632 (Droysen 1880, 10). 
951 Diodati (Fiedler 1864, 567), Silvio Piccolomini (Archivio 1871, 240). 
952 Münchhausen 1632. In his earlier letter he claimed to have taken fifteen colours from unknown infantry 
regiments (Wittrock 1932, 305). 
953 Droysen 1880, 2. Similar numbers are given by three anonymous letters and Relation from 1632 (Droysen 
1880, 2-3, 9). 
954 Fiedler 1864, 567. 
955 Droysen 1880, 43. 
956 Brzezinski 2001, 87. 
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Figure 119: Wallenstein’s retreat to Bohemia 17 November to 4 January. 
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Swedish Brigade 3 5 5 4 20 374 
Yellow Brigade       
   Yellow Life Regiment 1 5 3 3 0 258 
   Lifeguard 0 0 1 8 9 15 
Blue Brigade 0 5 5 4 18 381 
Green Brigade       
   Bernhard's Green Life Regiment 1 3 1 3 5 96 
   Wildenstein's Black 1 2 3 1 7 80 
   Leslie's Scotts 0 0 3 2 7 47 
Duke Wilhelm's Brigade       
   Wilhelm's Life Regiment 0 2 4 0 7 23 
   Bose/Pforte 0 0 0 0 3 38 
White Brigade 0 3 1 3 5 96 
Thurn's Brigade       
   Thurn 2 1 0 1 3 3 
   Isenburg 1 0 0 0 4 10 
   Wilhelm von Hessen-Kassel 0 0 1 0 2 20 
Mitzlaff's Brigade       
   Gersdorf 1 1 2 0 12 90 
   Mitzlaff 1 0 1 1 12 122 
   Rossow 1 0 1 4 4 45 
9th Brigade       
   Henderson 0 1 1 1 4 47 
   Löwenstein 0 1 0 0 4 183 
Table 24: Swedish casualty listing of wounded infantrymen. 
 
Few historians have discussed the disproportion of numbers of captured colours or 
even wondered why. Most colours were taken from the Old Blue and Yellow Regiments 
when they were destroyed. But the other 30 colours, which were taken by the Imperial 
army, show that the Swedish army in general did not perform well. Many colours might 
have been taken during the collapse and rout of the Swedish army around midday by 
pursuing Imperial cavalry, but the exact circumstances remain uncertain. 
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Swedish Brigade 832 42 212 1086 22.1% 84.3% 31.0% 
   Erik Hand 330 42 96 468 29.0% 84.3% 43.5% 
   Karl Hard 350 0 96 446 21.7%  17.9% 
   Klas Hastfer 152 0 20 172 2.6%  15.7% 
Yellow Brigade 167 (+40)a 82 (+25)a 96 420 68.4% 70.4% 65.6% 
Blue Brigade 279 52 96 427 42.6% 88.0% 61.5% 
   Winckel's Old Blue 279 52 96 427 42.6% 88.0% 61.5% 
Green Brigade 692 (+79)b 200 (+41)b 192b 1204b 37.0% 28.3% 40.9% 
   Bernhard's Green Life Regiment 344 (+44)b 137 (+22)b 96b 643b    
   Wildenstein's Black 348 (+35)b 63 (+19)b 96b 561b    
   Leslie's Scots b b b b    
Duke Wilhelm's Brigade        
   Wilhelm's Life Regiment 108 60 96 264 60.9% 23.1% 46.8% 
   Bose 504 120 96 720 6.7% 23.1% 9.1% 
   Pforte 314c 86c 48c 448c    
White Brigade 534 235 96 865 24.6% 13.0% 22.8% 
   Knyphausen's White 534 235 96 865 24.6% 13.0% 22.8% 
Thurn's Brigade 498 234 168 900 13.5% 31.6% 28.1% 
   Thurn 210 126 96 432 12.5% 12.5% 10.0% 
   Isenburg 96 36 24 156 20.0% 33.3% 42.2% 
   Wilhelm von Hessen-Kassel 192 72 48 312 11.1% 50.0% 37.8% 
Mitzlaff's Brigade 648 282 240 1170 37.6% 39.0% 36.2% 
   Gersdorf 240 48 48 336 27.3% 50.0% 35.6% 
   Mitzlaff 192 90 96 378 43.9% 54.5% 44.6% 
   Rossow 216 144 96 456 41.0% 14.3% 27.6% 
9th Brigade 600d 0 144d 744d 38.7%  35.8% 
   Henderson d 0 d d    
   Löwenstein 480d 0 96d 576d    
   Brandenstein 120d 0 48d 168d    
a Number of unarmed soldiers in parenthesis; suggested distribution of 2:1 to 
musketeers/pikemen. 
b As a; the numbers suggest that Leslie’s Scots were included into Bernhard’s and 
Wildenstein’s Regiments. 
c The numbers suggest that parts from Pforte’s Regiment were detached somewhere 
else at Lützen, but were reunited when this list was made. 
d The numbers suggest that Henderson’s Regiment was included into Löwenstein’s 
and Brandenstein’s Regiments. 
Table 25: Undated list of Swedish infantrymen with losses in percent (Stockholm 1632). 
 
9.1.1 Casualties 
 
Generally, the casualties in Lützen are difficult to estimate because only wounded were 
counted on both sides, probably because they had to be cared for by the army and cost 
money. In fact, there are no entirely reliable numbers for dead soldiers. Not surprisingly, 
the number of killed was exaggerated, in particular those from the enemy, and constantly 
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increased in accounts and ‘relations’ in a kind of race for the highest number until it 
reached a fantastic 18,000 dead according to the French Relation from 1633. A good 
example of how these casualties were estimated is an anonymous and undated letter, which 
noted that Oberst Illow wrote, that Holk told him there were 12,000 dead; but Holk himself 
estimated only 8,000 dead.957 It seems that the numbers were constantly rounded up a bit in 
most accounts. However, casualties of 25% or more are not only suspicious, but also very 
difficult to achieve as long as the opponent fights back and usually apply to situations 
where one side breaks and the other sets out in pursuit of the other with cavalry.958 
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Desfour 1 0 2 2 4 52 
Holk 0 1 1 1 5 66 
Trcka 0 0 0 2 8 58 
Götz 1 0 1 0 7 58 
Bredau 1 1 0 1 4 7 
Loyers 1 0 0 0 3 34 
Goschütz 0 0 1 0 0 20 
Table 26: Imperial “list of damaged” with wounded cavalrymen. 
 
Another problematic issue might be the definition of battle casualties. Watts noted 
that many wounded were frozen to death during the night on the battlefield,959 and the 
Declaration from 1633 stated that only 4,000, the lowest estimated number in any account, 
were killed directly during battle, but many wounded died over a period of several days 
and many scattered and lost Imperial soldiers were killed by angry Saxon peasants seeking 
revenge.960 All these soldiers died as a result of the battle, but not during the battle itself. 
However, these second-hand stories are not confirmed by any eyewitnesses. 
                                                 
957 Droysen 1880, 4, Wittrock 1932, 309. 
958 Casualties of 9,000 or higher: Hülshorst (Wittrock 1932, 309), anonymous letter (Droysen 1880, 2), 
Wahrhaftige Beschreibung 1633, Abelinum 1646, 751, Khevenhiller 1726, 197. The number of 9,000 killed 
has been suggested by Seidler (1954, 95) and has influenced research, but is only a figurative number and too 
high: Mann 1971, 861, Neuhold 2011, 101. 
959 Watts 1633, 152. 
960 Droysen 1880, 43. The number of 4,000 killed was copied by Glaubwürdiger Bericht 1633. Peasants 
killing Imperial soldiers on their retreat are mentioned by the Declaration from 1633 and a letter from 
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Killed Regiment Sources 
Generalfeldzeugmeister Breuner (w) GFZM Breuner H, D, B 
Oberst Waldstein (w) Waldstein H, D, B1, F, Hü 
Oberst Comargo (w) Comargo H, D1, P, B 
Oberst Lohe Lohe M, H, D1, B 
Oberst Westrumb Westrumb M, B 
Oberstleutnant Mendj (u) M 
Oberstleutnant Stolper Baden M, B 
Oberstleutnant Dauignj/Tauigni (p) Lamboy M, D1, B 
Oberstleutnant Ehinhaussen (w) (u) M 
Oberstleutnant Falkenberg Götz D1, B 
Oberstleutnant (u) Desfour D1, B 
Oberstleutnant (u) Comargo B 
Wounded   
Oberst Lamboy Lamboy D1, B1 
Oberst Colloredo Colloredo P, B 
Oberst Piccolomini Piccolomini B1 
Oberst H.G. Breuner Jung-Breuner B1 
Oberstleutnant (u) Waldstein D1, B1 
Oberstleutnant Hämmerle Alt-Sachsen D1, B1 
Oberstleutnant (u) Jung-Breuner D1, B1 
Oberstleutnant (u) Friedrich Breuner B1 
Oberstleutnant (u) Forgatsch D1, B1 
Oberstleutnant Tontinelli Tontinelli B1 
Oberstleutnant von Rauchhaupt Trcka B1 
Oberstleutnant Osterhold (u) B1 
(w) fatally wounded 
(p) prisoner 
(u) name unknown 
M: Münchhausen (Wittrock 1932, 305) 
F: Fleetwood (1632, 10) 
Hü: Hülshorst (Wittrock 1932, 303) 
H: Holk (Wittrock 1932, 309) 
D: Diodati (Fiedler 1864, 565), D1 (567) 
P: Silvio Piccolomini (Archivio, 241) 
B: Relation from 1632 (Droysen 1880, 11), B1 (12) 
Table 27: Imperial officer casualties. 
 
Shortly after the battle, the Swedish army at Naumburg had an effective strength of 
approximately 8,000 foot, including Vitzthum’s 850 men strong garrison, and 4,000 
horse.961 The undated casualty listing states that 2,575 infantrymen962 were wounded; this 
would leave approximately 3,300 foot killed or unaccounted for and 2,000 horse killed, 
wounded or unaccounted for. Some deserters might have turned up later and many soldiers 
probably recovered from their wounds, but the Swedish army had temporarily lost 7,875 
men or 40%.963 How many actually died is difficult to tell. Only one Protestant eyewitness, 
George Fleetwood, mentioned a number killed, which he estimated 1,500, which seems far 
                                                                                                                                                    
Wallenstein to Arnim (Sennewald 2013, 180), and was common practice during the Thirty Years War. This 
‘other war’ between soldiers and peasants is discussed by Langer (1982, 106-111). 
961 Pentz (Fiedler 1864, 572). The number of foot is confirmed by other sources - 7,046 soldiers (Brzezinski 
2001, 87) with an unknown number of officers and Vitzthum’s 850 strong Brigade. 
962 Mankell 1861, 126-128. 
963 Only Deuticke (1917, 53-55) doubted these numbers, because he assumed these men were all dead or 
badly wounded. See Seidler 1954, 43 and Brzezinski 2001, 21-23. 
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too low considering that the Swedish army was the attacker in a 6 hours battle.964 The 
number of killed is usually not higher than the number of wounded so that the upper limit 
of killed is less than 3,900 with the most likely number at around 3,000 to 3,500.965 Among 
them were Gustav Adolf, Generalmajor Brahe, Oberst Stenbock, Oberst Gersdorf and 
Oberstleutnant Nilsson.966 
 
The undated list of Swedish infantrymen967 shows the distribution of losses 
according to regiments. The casualties of pikemen and musketeers in any single regiment 
are similar, except for two units. The pikemen of the Old Blue Brigade lost 88.0% while 
the musketeers suffered 42.6% casualties. With 84.3% pikemen and 22.1% musketeers, the 
ratio is even more evident in the Swedish Brigade. The Swedish pikemen probably have 
sacrificed themselves to guard the retreat of their comrades. 
 
The Imperial casualties are more difficult to estimate, because Wallenstein left 
many wounded behind, on the battlefield and in Leipzig, and there are almost no reliable 
numbers for the Imperial army after the battle. The “list of damaged” provides an exact 
number of wounded, 343 in total, for seven cavalry regiments, but since we do not have 
exact numbers of their original strength it is difficult to estimate a casualty rate.968 Some 
cuirassier regiments seem to have taken heavy casualties; Holk had 74 wounded out of 
approximately 250, which is 30%; the total casualty rate might be 50 % for that regiment. 
The most reliable sources for the Imperial casualties are Diodati, who suggests that the 
Imperial army might have lost 3,000 dead or wounded, and Holk, who estimated 3,000 
dead.969 
 
Considering that the Swedes were the attacker and that two Swedish brigades were 
destroyed, it seems more likely that the Swedish army suffered the worst damage, but there 
is no proof yet and Imperial casualties might have increased substantially during the retreat 
due to deserters, lost soldiers killed by peasants and because Wallenstein had to leave most 
wounded behind.970 The Imperial army clearly had a much higher rate of higher ranking 
officer casualties; Feldmarschall Pappenheim, Generalfeldzeugmeister Breuner, four 
                                                 
964 Fleetwood 1632, 9. 
965 Brzezinski 2001, 87-88. Watts (1633, 153) estimated 2,000 to 3,000 dead Protestants. 
966 According to Eberstein (Diemar 1893, 348), Hülshorst (Wittrock 1932, 303), Pentz (Fiedler 1864, 571), 
Monro 1637, part II, 165, Watts 1633, 154, Relation from 1633 (Droysen 1880, 34), Declaration from 1633 
(Droysen 1880, 44). 
967 Stockholm 1632. 
968 Hallwich 1912a, 596-599. 
969 Fiedler 1864, 567, Wittrock 1932, 309. 
970 Brzezinski 2001, 87-88. 
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colonels and six lieutenant colonels were killed and the Generalissimus Wallenstein, four 
colonels and eight lieutenant colonels were wounded. This circumstance might be seen as 
evidence for an extensive use of sharpshooters in the Swedish army, or for the excellent 
behaviour of those Imperial officers who did not flee the field, or for both. 
 
It was an odd coincident that Gustav Adolf’s former Chaplain Paul Stockmann was 
vicar in Lützen. He had not seen the battle itself - he was probably imprisoned in the castle 
or church together with the townsfolk during the battle - but he visited the battlefield the 
following days and described what he saw in one of his sermons: 
 
“…so dead, that some missed an arm, the other a leg, the third his head and so forth; some 
lay there sky blue coloured, broken and crushed by bullet [i.e. roundshot] … Others lay, 
ten, twenty, or more on a pile, so shot with pieces into pieces, or broken in two that 
everyone could see the wounded lung, liver, hart and intestines without ‘anatomy’ …”971  
 
9.1.2 The mass grave 
 
An Imperial garrison in the castle of Lützen was still present for a few days after both 
armies left the battlefield,972 food supply was low and the town was partially burned 
down.973 So, the townsfolk were not in the condition to clear the battlefield and it took 
some days before a group of 200 civilians from Weissenfels arrived to bury the dead in 
mass graves.974 One of these mass graves was found in 2011.  
 
                                                 
971 Stockmann 1633, Stöwesand 1927, 90. 
972 Stahl 2012, 258. 
973 Lützen was not entirely destroyed (Stahl 2012, 259), as often claimed (Brzezinski 2001, 51, Seidler 1954, 
47). 
974 Stahl 2012, 258-259. 
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Plate 24: Geological drilling with a Cobra by Gerd Virkus.  
 
In order to find a mass grave, aerial photographs were made. In addition, an area of 
0.6ha was surveyed with Ground Penetrating Radar (SIR 3000 and a 400MHz antenna), 
and 7.9ha was surveyed by geomagnetic (Fluxgate-Gradiometer Förster Ferex 4.032) by 
the company Posselt & Zickgraf Prospektionen GbR. The most promising anomalies from 
the geomagnetic survey were subject to geological drilling to establish if there were any 
archaeological features. The entire search operation was a failure. The search for the mass 
grave was resumed by the methodology of information gathering, deduction and trial and 
error. The available information was: 
 
1. One mass grave had been found in 1891 near the Via Regia (Chapter Four). 
2. A document stated that the dead were carried to ‘the road’ during the battlefield 
clearing process. 
3. The area where the heaviest fighting took place was established through the bullet 
distribution patterns. 
 
The author draw a line on a map through the known mass grave, parallel to the Via 
Regia, and through the area with the densest distribution of heavily impacted bullets. On 
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this line a 340m long and 4m wide trial trench was dug with a 20tons excavator by which a 
mass grave was found. 
 
 
Plate 25: Trial trench in 10cm layers, each surveyed with metal detectors. 
 
An interesting fact is that the mass grave was in the area of the geomagnetic survey and 
even another geomagnetic survey, made directly on the mass grave after the top soil was 
removed, was inconclusive. 
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Figure 120: Geomagnetic survey; Ground Penetrating Radar (red); actual position of mass 
grave (blue). 
(image has been removed due to copyright restrictions) 
 The entire mass grave, weighing 52tons, was lifted in two blocks and moved to the 
Archaeological Museum in Halle, where it is prepared for an exhibition. 
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Plate 26: The mass grave is sheathed in wooden planks… 
(image has been removed due to copyright restrictions) 
 
Plate 27: …and reinforced by steel girders. 
(image has been removed due to copyright restrictions) 
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Plate 28: The mass grave is undercut and then supported with steel tubes… 
(image has been removed due to copyright restrictions) 
 
Plate 29: …cut in half with a diamond-reinforced band saw and the cut is secured by steel 
plates, before it is lifted and moved to the museum. 
(image has been removed due to copyright restrictions) 
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The mass grave is located near the Via Regia in an area where the Old Blue Brigade 
presumably fought.975 It contained 47 individuals. Several bones show multiple fractures 
from blunt force trauma, stab and cutting wounds inflicted in hand-to-hand combat. 
Seventeen bullets were found in the grave of which seven were in a bone or found inside a 
skull and therefore ‘belonged’ to the deceased. Most bullets were too deformed from 
impact or too corroded to establish their exact calibre. Only three bullets probably came 
from muskets; all others seem to originate from carbines or possibly pistols. These 
observations concur with events surrounding the Old Blue Brigade, which was destroyed 
by an Imperial infantry-cavalry counterattack. However, in the Alerheim mass grave from 
1645 almost all bullets derive from pistols or carbines, too.976 That might be coincidental, 
but might be due to a reason unknown to us, such as cavalry using less gunpowder in their 
pistols and carbines so these bullets therefore tended to remain in the body they struck. 
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Figure 121: Bullets from the Lützen and Alerheim mass graves by weight.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
975 Alt/Friederich/Meller/Nicklisch/Schürger 2013, 13. 
976 Misterek 2012, 373. 
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9.1.3 Who won? 
 
Golo Mann once wrote that there is no point in arguing who won the battle because both 
armies consumed each other.977 It was certainly not a Swedish victory even if the Swedes 
held the battlefield while the Imperial army retreated. The Swedes did achieve their 
objective of forcing Wallenstein out of Saxony, thus aiding their ally, which might be seen 
as a tactical victory. They gained the spoils of war, all Imperial heavy artillery, parts of the 
baggage train and many weapons. This victory even had a long term effect because 
Wallenstein could not pay his army by looting enemy territory, Saxony, but was forced to 
ask Ferdinand II for money. In addition, Wallenstein was more concerned about punishing 
the deserters at Prague. All that might have convinced Ferdinand II to get rid of his 
Generalissimus. Wallenstein was murdered 25 February 1634 in Eger. 
 
 
Figure 122: Pamphlet after the battle “Der Schwede lebet noch.” 
 
However, all these advantages could not out weight the death of Gustav Adolf. 
Even if he was not the brilliant strategist as often claimed, he was a charismatic figure and 
a living legend and he held the Protestant alliance together. Even after his death he was 
used as uniting figure. “Der Schwede [i.e. Gustav Adolf] lebet noch und wird auch ewig 
                                                 
977 Mann 1971, 860, Brzezinski 2001, 88. 
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leben (The Swede still lives and he will live forever)” claimed a pamphlet in 1633.978 
Nevertheless, the alliance crumbled and Sweden’s most important ally, Saxony, along with 
many other Protestant cities, defected or declared peace with Ferdinand II in the treaty of 
Prague 30 May 1635. Englund argued that Lützen was a decisive Swedish defeat in the 
long run.979 
 
 
Figure 123: Detail of equestrian portrait of Gustav Adolf by Bianchi. 
 
9.2 A tactical analysis of the battle: Consequences on the 
development of 17th century warfare 
 
Military historians have often wondered why the same Swedish army, which achieved a 
decisive victory over Tilly at Breitenfeld, performed so poorly at Lützen. There are several 
reasons given by historians, such as Wallenstein’s fortifications at Lützen, Tilly’s clumsy 
Spanish infantry formation at Breitenfeld, or that Gustav Adolf had to attack an equally 
strong army at Lützen, which are all incorrect. The Battle of Breitenfeld and Tilly’s 
Spanish-German tactics are not entirely understood, which makes it difficult to figure out 
the differences between Tilly’s and Wallenstein’s armies, and why the latter was much 
more successful against the Swedish. The short time between 17 September 1631 
Breitenfeld and 16 November 1632 Lützen, and the fact that both armies consisted of 
Imperial and Leaguist troops suggest that both armies were not that different. 
 
                                                 
978 Mörke 2007, 90-92. 
979 Englund 1998, 137. 
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Infantry and Artillery 
The Swedish army did not change much between Breitenfeld and Lützen. The Swedish 
musketeers were not equipped with a light musket, providing them with a higher mobility, 
as often claimed.980 In fact, musketeers in both armies used similar musket types at Lützen, 
and if the Swedes used different types at Breitenfeld, these muskets were more than likely 
the older and heavier Dutch types. 
 
The Swedish-style infantry brigade formation was not too complicated to handle 
and was not responsible for any setbacks during the Battle of Lützen.981 Otherwise it would 
have been abandoned at Nördlingen two years later. It was very likely only a matter of the 
acceptance of simplicity that the Swedish brigade formation vanished by 1636 Wittstock. 
Wallenstein reduced the number of ranks of his infantry from Tilly’s ten or twelve deep, 
reformed Spanish ‘esquadron’ to seven ranks and he began equipping his army with 3- or 
4- pounder regimental guns, which increased his firepower moderately. But these reforms 
can hardly be seen as a key reason for his success at Lützen. 
 
What was new was that Wallenstein deployed his infantry in three lines, a skirmish 
line in the road ditches, a five squadron first line supported by heavy artillery and 
regimental guns and a two squadron second line. Such a three line defence can be very 
effective against an experienced and well trained enemy, as it was exercised in the 
American War of Independence Battle of Cowpens by Daniel Morgan against the finest 
British forces.982 These tactics slowly disrupt morale and formation cohesion, first by 
skirmish line sharpshooters firing on officers and then by exhausting the enemies soldiers, 
who had to fight their way through two lines, while the defending units can retreat and 
reform behind the 2nd line and counterattack. 
 
Cavalry 
Gustav Adolf had demonstrated at Werben in July 1631 just what a combined arms task 
force of dragoons, light cavalry and musketeers was capable of when he surprised four of 
Tilly’s best cavalry regiments;983 but when he pursued the dispersing Imperial army on 15 
November 1632, he had no dragoons and lacked light cavalry, which then consisted only of 
Stalhandske’s Finns, to provide intelligence and clear the way at Rippach in time to allow 
the Swedish army a smooth crossing of the stream. Instead, Wallenstein’s Croats and 
                                                 
980 Murray 2013, 13. 
981 Brzezinski 2001, 89. 
982 Babits 1998, 157. 
983 Monro 1637, part II, 51-52. 
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Dragoons, greatly outnumbering the Swedish light cavalry, controlled the entire area of 
operations, as they did at Nurnberg/Alte Veste as well,984 preventing Gustav Adolf from 
surprising the Imperial army or gathering intelligence. Wallenstein’s mounted men were a 
constant annoyance during the Swedish deployment on 16 November, and then threatened 
the Swedish rear during the battle. Although Wallenstein’s skirmishing tactics backfired 
once, when one Croat regiment disrupted his battle line on the right, he proved a point; 
light cavalry of any kind became an important branch in European warfare until the early 
19th century. Connected with Gustav Adolf’s lack of light cavalry and dragoons was his 
underestimation of terrain, which cost his army valuable time and was probably the result 
of poor reconnaissance. 
 
Another decisive factor was the Imperial cuirassiers. Much better armoured than the 
Swedish cavalry, they protected the vulnerable flanks of the infantry centre, and the 
Swedish cavalry was never able to break them. The poor performance of Sparr’s 
cuirassiers, however, proved that good armour was no guaranty for success when 
leadership failed. On the other hand, the insufficiently armoured Imperial harquebusiers 
almost led to the destruction of Wallenstein’s army. Wallenstein tried to upgrade the 
harquebusiers to cuirassiers, but was not successful, mainly because cuirassiers were too 
expensive. The costs were probably the main reason why most cavalry remained 
unamoured in Europe. 
 
Leadership 
Although Bernhard von Weimar, Knyphausen and Brahe were good officers, the Swedish 
army at Lützen lacked some of its best commanders. Fältmarskalk Gustav Karlsson Horn 
Greve til Björneborg, according to Monro one of the best Swedish leaders, commanded a 
Swedish army in Alsace;985 General Johan Banér was wounded at Nurnberg/Alte Veste;986 
in the same battle Överste Lennart Thorstenson, who usually commanded Gustav Adolf’s 
artillery, had been taken prisoner, and was succeeded by the inexperienced Major Joen 
Persson Jernlod;987 and there were many other capable commanders missing at Lützen.  
Their absence resulted in low ranking officers, like Överste Thorsten Stalhandske, who 
was certainly a good officer, but lacked experience as wing commander, finding 
themselves in unfamiliar positions of great responsibility, when Gustav Adolf and Nils 
                                                 
984 Monro (1637, part II, 140, 144, 151) specifically pointed out that Wallenstein’s Croats controlled the 
whole area around Nurnberg, harassing Swedish supply and preventing intelligence gathering. 
985 Monro 1637, part II, 58, Engerisser 2007, 133, Murray 2013, 13-14. 
986 Engerisser 2007, 124. 
987 Brzezinski 2001, 22. 
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Brahe were killed. The absence of Gustav Adolf’s brilliant officers, with whom he had 
achieved the decisive victory at Breitenfeld, certainly led to minor mistakes, like the delay 
of his heavy artillery, which in sum let to the stalemate at Lützen. In essence, the Swedish 
army’s success under Gustav Adolf was chiefly based on superior leadership.988 
 
On the other side, Hofkirchen’s and Bönninghausen’s rout have distorted our image 
of Imperial officers. Wallenstein could rely on Feldmarschall Leutnant Holk, who 
demonstrated great prudence in commanding the left wing and the battle would have been 
lost without him. Many other officers, such as Oberst Waldstein, Oberst Piccolomini or 
Obristwachtmeister Münchhausen, took the initiative when appropriate, or held the line 
when necessary, disregarding their safety, for which the high Imperial officer casualties are 
evidence. 
 
Reserve 
Another innovation was Wallenstein’s cavalry reserve. Here lies the real reason for the 
success of the Imperial army. While Gustav Adolf had a very strong second line, his army 
lacked real reserves, which consisted only of Henderson’s musketeers and Öhm’s cavalry, 
and even they were assigned to the centre. In contrast to the Swedish army, Wallenstein 
deployed one musketeer and five cavalry squadrons as reserve. This deployment allowed a 
much more flexible response to the Swedish attacks. The two wing reserve squadrons 
strengthened the Imperial left wing at the beginning of the battle and prevented an early 
Swedish breakthrough until Pappenheim relieved the pressure. Most decisive was the 
deployment of three cavalry reserve squadrons behind the centre and the cavalry-infantry 
combined arms operations against the Yellow and Old Blue Brigades. If the Battle of 
Lützen proved anything, it was the value of highly mobile cavalry reserves, which became 
an important keystone in European tactics.  
 
Development of the battle 
Unlike at Breitenfeld, Gustav Adolf had to take the initiative and start the battle at Lützen, 
because he could not wait for Pappenheim’s corps to arrive and reinforce the Imperial 
army. Without waiting for his heavy artillery, he rushed into action and attacked on both 
wings in a delayed double outflanking manoeuvre, instead of attacking only one wing and 
seeing how the battle developed. When Pappenheim arrived, the Swedish army’s entire 
first line was committed and unable to react, while the lack of excellent commanders, 
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together with a rivalry between Bernhard von Weimar and Knyphausen, prevented swift 
action and moving second line’s cavalry from the left to the right wing. After the Swedish 
right wing was beaten, the whole army collapsed in a domino effect. The Swedes still had 
sufficient leadership to avoid total destruction, but at that point they could not beat the 
Imperial army anymore. Still, the Swedish army’s cohesion, experience and leadership 
allowed Bernhard von Weimar to resume the attack and keep the soldiers going for several 
hours, where most other armies would have failed. 
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Chapter Ten 
Review and prospects 
 
Military history has chiefly failed to understand even the basic events of the Battle of 
Lützen by projecting an incorrectly understood Thirty Years War military system on the 
battle; at the same time the battle was often used to explain the weapons and tactical 
development of the period. In addition, the problematic of the reliability of eyewitness 
accounts in comparison to second-hand information has not been recognized, partially 
because the Battle of Lützen became a myth and Gustav Adolf a religious figure for 
German Protestants in particular. The objective of this thesis was to demonstrate a 
methodology of how to evaluate archaeological and historical sources by comparison in 
order to better understand the Battle of Lützen within the wider context of the development 
of military equipment, weapons and tactics in the early 17th century. 
 
 
Plate 30: International meeting on the Lützen battlefield. From the left: Tim Sutherland, Bo 
Knarrström, André Schürger, and Tony Pollard. 
 
Battlefield archaeology 
Fieldwork conducted over five years stood at the beginning of this thesis. Based on the 
methodology of previously successful battlefield projects, the Lützen project aimed toward 
a more intense small finds collection by using a systematic, full coverage metal detector 
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sweep for the first time on such a large scale with great success. An approximate small 
finds recovery rate has been established in test grids, some of them by independent 
battlefield archaeologists during several international meetings at Lützen. Establishing a 
recovery rate is an important step toward better understanding small finds distribution 
patterns on battlefields with a similar agricultural environment, which proves the point; 
that under normal circumstances, a systematic full coverage metal detector sweep seems to 
be the best compromise between survey progress and quality of results on musket-era 
battlefields. However, more data from other battlefields is required to get a clearer picture. 
The highlight of the fieldwork was the discovery of a mass grave at the end of the project, 
which was a first time occurrence in an active search, chiefly due to the results from the 
survey. 
 
 The most common artefacts on early modern battlefields are bullets from firearms. 
Because of their potential they represent the main subject of research in early modern 
battlefield archaeology and also in this study. The aim was to allocate bullets to firearms, a 
necessary step toward interpreting distribution patterns, which is, at the moment, the main 
tool to allow a comparison between archaeological and historical information. This, 
however, represents a general problem in the musket-era, because windage prevents more 
modern ballistic analysis, with which bullets can be allocated to individual modern 
firearms. Instead, research of the last decade has developed a different approach, using 
bullet weights as a means for allocating them to types of firearms. It was one of the main 
results of this thesis to demonstrate that this methodology led to wrong conclusions, 
because it was based on incorrect assumptions. It had not been realized that calibres 
mentioned by early modern military theorists, our main source for weapon specifications at 
the moment, refer to the bore of the weapon or the bullet calibre, using different terms for 
either. It was believed, instead, that military handbooks always referred to the bullet 
calibre, because the calibre specification is given in bullets per pound. It has been shown 
that different weight systems were used for calibre specifications, depending on the 
nationality of the arms manufacture or manufacturer, which complicates an assigning 
bullets to firearms on any European battlefield because weapons were imported-exported 
on a large scale during this period. Adding to the problems of interpretation, it has been 
demonstrated that un-deformed bullets can have very different shapes giving them a 
varying range of weight. This range of weight for bullets of a specific calibre is not around 
the intended calibre mentioned in the military handbooks, but below it, due to the inability 
to produce exact bores and bullets. The result of all these implications was that in previous 
research in early modern battlefield archaeology the weapon calibre was substantially 
 372 
downsized, with the problematic outcome that known to existing large calibre weapons are 
not represented in the bullet collections. 
 
By adopting the concept of the calibre graph discussion from battlefield 
archaeology and in response to the new achievements in the field of early modern 
weaponry studies, a new approach has been developed. First, firearm models and their 
theoretical bore and bullet diameter can be identified from military handbooks. Then, the 
actual bullet diameters from the Vasa collection were established and compared to known 
weapon models. All known weapon models with their established bullet diameter were 
then superimposed on the Lützen calibre graph. Finally, the results from Lützen were 
compared to other bullet collections from battlefields, sieges and ship wrecks, resulting in 
a new, workable methodology for all known early 17th century bullet collections. This 
methodology is verifiable by weapon specifications from military handbooks. This new 
archaeological approach has led to a better understanding and clarification of a basic 
development of firearms during the late 16th and early 17th century, and at the same time it 
provided new evidence for military tactics, which were partially dependent on specific 
weapon types or models, such as the change from the Spanish military school to a new 
German infantry formation in the Imperial army, and that Gustav Adolf’s army was not 
superior due to a new light musket, which, in fact, had not reached the Swedish main army 
in 1632 in any significant numbers. 
 
In the next step, the basic bullet features were analyzed and a connection between 
casting sprues, tin bullets, paper cartridges and personal bullet production was established. 
The main goal, however, was to visualize the results from the calibre analysis and the 
bullet feature analysis on bullet distribution maps, in order to establish meaningful 
patterns, which could help explain the battle’s events. In particular, the distribution 
patterns of bullets with various degrees of impact damage brought some details to the 
foreground, where dense bullet concentrations of several different combats in one area 
have blurred the results. 
 
 This thesis has also raised many questions. The most important question, which 
should not be underestimated, concerns the different types and models of firearms actually 
used by the different branches, armies, nationalities etc. Early modern battlefield 
archaeologists use ammunition as their main information source at the moment, and this 
question has to be answered on an international level, because armies were equipped 
internationally. We need more historical data from military handbooks and archaeological 
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data from battlefields, ship wrecks, garrisons etc. A more pressing requirement is analyses 
of existing collections of military firearms, the missing link between historical and 
archaeological sources. Very little research has been done on military pistols and carbines, 
but there is almost nothing known about military matchlock muskets and calivers, and 
there is certainly much to find out, such as how many musket models actually existed or 
what range of bore diameter one musket model can have. In addition, metal detector 
surveys on small scale skirmish sites, which are documented by eyewitness accounts, could 
be vital to establish the actual weapons used by specific units or branches. 
 
Impact damage on bullets is poorly understood, and it would be an asset to research 
so we could know what a bullet might have hit. Although some work has been done,989 it 
would require much more test firing with the results being compared to assemblages of 
bullets from battlefields with different ground conditions and terrain. There is also the 
question of the impact the distribution of non-ammunition finds can have on interpreting a 
battle, an issue that has barely been touched by early modern battlefield archaeology: yet 
the results in this research seemed not very promising. However, areas of a rout or hand-to-
hand combat might become clearer, in which equipment was thrown away or ripped off 
uniforms. Nevertheless, this find category had to be withdrawn at a late stage, because it 
would have overburdened this thesis with a complicated, new and not well understood, yet 
important study, which deserves an independent thesis.  
 
Military history and small finds distribution patterns 
The aim of this thesis was to reconstruct the battle’s events. This was done by generating 
ammunition distribution patterns, providing a new translation and interpretation of 
eyewitness statements as well as second-hand information. This procedure included 
placing units scaled to size and form of their tactical formation within the historical 
landscape which was reconstructed due to new results from archaeological excavations. All 
information was then placed within battle episodes that were further aligned by 
chronological sequencing. This approach led to a new interpretation of the battle; it 
brought a new insight into the reliability of historical sources and provided a better 
understanding of the mechanisms of the historical narrative’s development. Finally, 
compilation of the information allowed a better understanding of ammunition distribution 
patterns and attribution of concentrations to specific units and events. 
 
                                                 
989 Sivilich 2009. 
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 An asset to battlefield archaeology lies within its ability to locate combat on the 
battlefield and as a result answering the question of ‘where.’ This is particularly effective 
in showing the orientation and extent of battle lines, as it has already been demonstrated by 
Foard at Edgehill and now for Lützen,990 where it was demonstrated that the Imperial 
wings were echeloned backwards in a 45° angle. Much more challenging was localizing 
single units and events on the battlefield. Most episodes were mixed with others, which 
effectively blurred distribution patterns. Those units, however, which have been located, 
have changed the interpretation of the battle substantially. This was shown with the 
analysis of the Swedish Brigade’s attack vector against the Imperial cavalry, instead of the 
Imperial infantry which, in turn, shifted the whole Swedish right wing attack further to the 
right. Once this shift occurred, the wide gap in the Swedish centre allowed two second line 
brigades to move forward soon after the battle started. This, in turn, opened new 
possibilities for re-interpreting historical sources, and, once the events were clarified, often 
ignored, not- or misunderstood statements in eyewitness accounts made sense. 
 
 In the end, clarification and verification of historical sources is probably the major 
contribution of early modern battlefield archaeology at the moment. Without it, it proves to 
be nearly impossible to assess the fragmented historical sources for the Battle of Lützen, 
and therefore newly discovered accounts can easily change our idea of the battle, as 
Dalbier’s account demonstrates. An important lesson for an understanding of the 
development of historical narrative and the unreliability of second-hand information is the 
non-existence of Wallenstein’s trenches, which are persistently mentioned in all secondary 
sources and most modern interpretations of the battle until the present day, which became a 
topos for Wallenstein’s battle tactics. After the unreliability of non-eyewitness accounts 
was established, a new interpretation of all historical sources, without the burden of a 
flawed modern research, led to many new results. This was, partially, possible due to a re-
translation of, or an evaluation of terms in, documents, which resolved some 
misunderstandings, such as the predestination of Pappenheim’s forces or that the Old and 
New Blue Regiments were confused in the Imperial accounts. This is not to say that 
archaeology is the handmaiden of history but rather, the documentary sources and the 
archaeological artefacts must be taken together to resolve questions they mutually 
generate. Once the two research methodologies are seen as comparable and mutually 
supporting, then a clearer appreciation of what happened occurs. 
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Final conclusions 
It has been demonstrated throughout this thesis that the key factor for understanding a 
battle is a symbiosis between battlefield archaeology and military history. By evaluating 
firearms ammunition evolution, this integrated approach resulted in a better understanding 
of the development of early 17th century firearms, their distribution over central Europe, 
and the change in battle tactics. What remains is to test this approach on an international 
scale. 
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